Sun Hongmin v Wo Wei Dong and others

Mavis Chionh Sze Chyi J:

[1] HC/SUM 1960/2026 (“SUM 1960”) is an ex parte application by the first defendant, Wo Wei Dong (“Applicant”), for leave to commence committal proceedings against the claimant, Sun Hongmin (“Mdm Sun”). In SUM 1960, the Applicant originally relied on ss 3(1)(da), 3(1)(e) and 4(1)(a) of the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 (2020 Rev Ed) (“AJPA”). As contempt proceedings under s 3(1) AJPA may only be instituted with the Attorney-General’s (“AG”) consent (s 30(1) AJPA), the Applicant duly applied for such consent, but his request was rejected by the AG. The Applicant subsequently filed HC/SUM 2475/2026 (“SUM 2475”) to amend SUM 1960 so as to remove the prayer relying on ss 3(1)(da) and 3(1)(e) AJPA, and to insert instead a prayer stating reliance on s 4(1)(b) (in addition to s 4(1)(a)) AJPA.

[2] At the hearing on 26 August 2026, I allowed SUM 2475 and heard counsel for the Applicant on SUM 1960. Having considered the submissions and materials presented, I now dismiss SUM 1960. These are my reasons.

[3] I start by summarising the factual and procedural background to SUM 1960. The two main protagonists in HC/OA 953/2025 (“OA 953”) are the Applicant and Mdm Sun, who are married with two children. They are both citizens of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”). At the time that OA 953 was filed, they were undergoing divorce proceedings in the PRC (“PRC Divorce Proceedings”).

[4] OA 953 was Mdm Sun’s application for a freezing injunction in respect of a sum of US$1,095,000 (“Monies”) held in the bank account(s) of a company known as The Sub Rosa Capitol Pte Ltd (“Company”). The Company is the third defendant in OA 953.

[5] In gist, it was Mdm Sun’s case that the Monies were matrimonial assets which had been transferred without her consent through a Hong Kong bank account (HSBC Account No. XXX-XXXXXX-833 (“HSBC Account”)) to a bank account in the name of the Company. The HSBC Account was held in the name of the second defendant, Zeng Lixin. Per Mdm Sun’s case, Zeng was the Applicant’s nominee and held the HSBC Account (and all the assets therein) on behalf of the Applicant.

[6] Concurrently with OA 953, Mdm Sun filed HC/SUM 2415/2025 (“SUM 2415”) which was an ex parte application for interim relief in aid of the PRC Divorce Proceedings. In SUM 2415, Mdm Sun sought an interim freezing injunction (pending the determination of OA 953) against the Applicant and Zeng, in respect of their assets in Singapore, up to a value of US$1,095,000. This included the monies in the Company’s bank account.

[7] According to Mdm Sun, she and the Applicant “co-developed” a highly successful group of companies (“Huiyin Group”) which they jointly owned through the holding company, Shanghai Huiyin (Group) Co. Ltd (“SH Huiyin”). The Applicant disputes this version of events, claiming instead that the Huiyin Group was founded by and beneficially owned by him. For the purposes of SUM 1960, there is no need for me to determine this factual dispute. Suffice to say, the Huiyin Group is a group of companies intricately linked to Mdm Sun and the Applicant.

[8] In support of OA 953 and SUM 2415, Mdm Sun deposed in an affidavit filed on 26 August 2025 (“SHM-1”) that she had been “informed by an employee of SH Huiyin … that Zeng opened the HSBC Account on 22 November 2024 for the purpose of holding assets on behalf of [the Applicant]” (the “Alleged Falsehood”).

[9] On 14 October 2025, an interim freezing injunction was granted in SUM 2415, against the Applicant and Zeng.

[10] On 31 October 2025, the PRC Divorce Proceedings were dismissed at first instance. On 2 March 2026, Mdm Sun’s appeal against the dismissal of the PRC Divorce Proceedings was also dismissed. On 3 March 2026, by way of a letter to this court, counsel for Mdm Sun confirmed that “[s]ince OA 953 is premised on the PRC Divorce Proceedings, … [Mdm Sun] no longer intends to proceed with OA 953”.

[12] The crux of the Applicant’s case in SUM 1960 is that Mdm Sun lied in her affidavit by deposing to the Alleged Falsehood. According to the Applicant, Mdm Sun had accessed his messages on the messaging platform “Telegram” without his consent and knowledge, thereby coming to know of the fund transfers from the HSBC Account into the Company’s bank account.

[13] It is trite that permission to commence committal proceedings will only be granted if it is shown that (a) the respondent to the committal proceedings has prima facie committed a contempt of court; and (b) the committal applicant’s supporting affidavit is sufficiently particularised: Neo Chin Heng v Good Year Contractor Pte Ltd [2024] 4 SLR 1102 (“Neo Chin Heng”) at [9].

[14] Having read the Applicant’s affidavit, I find that it is sufficiently particularised such that a reasonable person reading the affidavit would understand the substance of the alleged contempt: Neo Chin Heng at [11].

[15] As for whether the Applicant is able to establish a prima facie case of contempt of court, while this is a low threshold in that the court is not required to determine the merits of the substantive committal application (Neo Chin Heng at [10]), the live issue in the present case is whether Mdm Sun’s act of (allegedly) lying in SHM-1 can come within the AJPA provisions that the Applicant relies on, ie, ss 4(1)(a) and 4(1)(b) AJPA. If, as a matter of law, Mdm Sun’s actions cannot constitute a disobedience or breach of a judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or process of the court (s 4(1)(a) AJPA), or a breach of an undertaking given to the court (s 4(1)(b) AJPA), then it must follow that the Applicant is unable to make out a prima facie case of contempt.

[16] The Applicant advances three separate arguments; and so long as one of these three arguments succeeds, then a prima facie case of contempt will be made out. The three arguments are as follows:

(a) The words “process of court” in s 4(1)(a) AJPA should be construed so as to include the formal process by which the courts receive sworn or affirmed evidence. According to the Applicant, included or “embedded” in this process is the requirement that the matters sworn or affirmed by the deponent to be within her knowledge are in fact known by her to be true and that any matters stated on belief are genuinely believed on the grounds given. In this connection, the Applicant relies on the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC”) and the Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021 (“SCPD”). On this reading, according to him, Mdm Sun’s deliberate lie in SHM-1 is a breach of the truthfulness requirement embedded in the court’s process of receiving sworn evidence.

(b) SHM-1 contains an express undertaking that “where the matters deposed [thereto] are within [her] knowledge, they are true”. Accordingly, by deposing to the Alleged Falsehood, Mdm Sun breached an express undertaking given to the court, which constitutes conduct falling under s 4(1)(b) AJPA.

(c) Per s 4(9) AJPA, the words “undertaking given to a court” in s 4(1)(b) AJPA include an implied undertaking. In applying for an ex parte injunction, Mdm Sun “[gave] the Court an implied undertaking to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts”. By deposing to the Alleged Falsehood, which concerned a material fact adverse to her own case, Mdm Sun intentionally breached this “implied undertaking” to the court.

[17] I consider each of these three arguments in turn.

“Process of court” under section 4(1)(a) AJPA

[18] Section 4(1)(a) AJPA provides:

[19] The Applicant’s first argument is that the words “other process of a court” in s 4(1)(a) encompass the filing of affidavits. On this reading, an untruth in an affidavit would amount to a “breach of the process of court”.

[20] With respect, I am unable to accept this proposed interpretation of s 4(1)(a). The Applicant has not been able to point to any case law which supports his proposed interpretation of the words “process of court”. In any event, I am of the view that properly construed, s 4(1)(a) AJPA does not include the general procedural machinery of litigation and/or the procedural rules as stated in the ROC or SCPD.

[21] First, in examining the text of s 4(1)(a), I find assistance in the principle of ejusdem generis as an interpretive tool. In Public Prosecutor v Lam Leng Hung [2018] 1 SLR 659, the Court of Appeal summarised the ejusdem generis principle as follows:

[22] In s 4(1)(a) AJPA, a genus is easily identifiable – “judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court” have the common and dominant feature of a binding legal obligation imposed by the court. These are coercive legal instruments by which the court’s orders are delivered. This also coheres with the title of s 4 AJPA: “[c]ontempt by disobedience of court order”. Accordingly, I find that “process of court” – as a residuary category in s 4(1)(a) AJPA – cannot be read so widely as to incorporate the process of filing affidavits (or as the Applicant puts it, “formal process by which the court receives sworn or affirmed evidence”). In my view, the correct interpretation is that only those processes of the court which impose a court-ordered obligation will fall within s 4(1)(a) AJPA.

[23] Second, the above conclusion also coheres with a purposive interpretation (per s 9A(1) Interpretation Act 1965 (2020 Rev Ed)). An examination of the relevant legislative materials indicates that in enacting this provision, Parliament could not have intended that the term “breach of process of court” should include the making of false statements in an affidavit, as this would have resulted in an overlap between s 3(1)(da) AJPA and s 4(1)(a) AJPA.

[24] At the second reading of the Administration of Justice (Protection) (Amendment) Bill on 13 November 2024, then-Minister of State for Law Murali Pillai (“MoS Pillai”) explained, inter alia, that s 3(1)(e) AJPA was broad enough to include abuse of process, including deceiving the court:

[25] Deceiving the court, which necessarily includes giving false evidence, now falls under s 3(1)(da) AJPA. MoS Pillai’s explanation makes it clear that prior to the amendments in 2024, s 3(1)(e) AJPA would have covered such cases. To institute contempt proceedings under s 3 AJPA based on the giving of false evidence in an affidavit, an applicant is required to obtain the consent of the AG: s 30(1) AJPA. Indeed, the Applicant acknowledges that cases involving the filing of knowingly false affidavit evidence are typically “analysed” under s 3 AJPA, but nonetheless submits that this does not preclude such conduct from also falling within s 4(1) AJPA.

[26] If the Applicant is correct in suggesting that the giving of false evidence may equally fall under s 4(1)(a) AJPA, then ss 3 and 30 AJPA would be obsolete in cases involving such conduct, since a party seeking to institute contempt proceedings premised on such conduct would surely just proceed under s 4(1)(a) AJPA, thereby avoiding the added requirement of applying for the AG’s consent. With respect, this cannot be right. Parliament could not have intended to impose a stricter requirement for cases involving deception of the court, while at the same time allowing such cases to bypass this requirement by simply resorting to a different provision within the same legislation. In my view, therefore, there is good reason why cases involving knowingly false affidavits have typically been dealt with under s 3 AJPA.

[27] In respect of the second argument, the Applicant’s case is that the following standard assertion in an affidavit amounts to an express undertaking given to the court as to the truth of the affidavit’s contents:

The Applicant contends that even though the Standard Assertion is not expressly labelled as an undertaking, “it is no less of an assurance … on which the Court is entitled to rely”.

[28] I am unable to accept the Applicant’s arguments. To begin with, the Applicant has not found any authorities defining the term “undertaking” in the context of s 4(1)(b) AJPA. There is also no authority for the proposition that the Standard Assertion amounts to an express undertaking to depose only to the truth.

[29] The ordinary meaning of an “undertaking” is a “formal promise” (Cambridge Dictionary, “Undertaking” <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/undertaking?q=Undertaking> (accessed 26 October 2026)). The ordinary meaning of a “promise” is “the act of saying that you will certainly do something” (Cambridge Dictionary, “Promise” <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/promise> (accessed 26 October 2026)). An assertion in an affidavit that the matters deposed to therein are true, on the other hand, is merely an assertion rather than a formal promise to do something. With respect, therefore, the Applicant’s argument – that the Standard Assertion amounts to an express undertaking to depose only to the truth – flies in the face of the ordinary meaning of the term “undertaking”.

[30] Indeed, as the Applicant points out, the Standard Assertion is routinely included in affidavits because Form 31 of the SCPD requires the deponent to:

[31] Form 31 explicitly explains that this is a statement, ie, not an undertaking. It says nothing about an undertaking to depose only to the truth, although of course, if the maker has knowingly made false statements within the affidavit, then the separate question of whether the maker has deceived the court may arise. To my mind, the Standard Assertion is merely a statement as to the maker’s state of mind – whether he knows the facts affirmed are true or whether he believes that they are true.

[32] Notwithstanding that a solicitor’s undertaking has been recognised as having a “unique status”, the definition of “undertaking” may also be gleaned from the definition of a solicitor’s undertaking: “a solemn promise that is not merely an agreement or a contract” (Law Society of Singapore v Naidu Priyalatha [2023] 3 SLR 1401 at [31]–[32]). A promise is a statement of intention or future conduct; it is prospective. An affidavit, in contrast, is retrospective and assertive. This reinforces my view that the Standard Assertion merely constitutes a representation of fact.

[33] Another source of guidance is the definition in the ROC. Order 15 r 18 ROC states: “An affidavit is a statement of evidence in the English language, signed and affirmed before a commissioner for oaths.” The affidavit being a statement of evidence, it appears to me incongruous to characterise an assertion in the affidavit as an undertaking to the court to tell only the truth.

[35] It should also be pointed out that if the Applicant’s argument were accepted, it would follow that every intentional untruth in an affidavit amounts to contempt of court under both ss 3(1)(da) and 4(1)(b) AJPA. In this regard, I repeat my earlier observations at [23]–[26] that Parliament could not have intended to impose a requirement for the AG’s consent in cases of deceiving the court through the giving of false evidence, while at the same time permitting that requirement to be sidestepped by recourse to a different provision.

[36] For the reasons explained, I do not accept that for the purposes of s 4(1)(b) AJPA, Mdm Sun had, by way of the Standard Assertion, given an express undertaking to the court to state only the truth.

[37] In respect of the third argument, counsel for the Applicant acknowledged that they were unable to find any reported Singapore cases dealing with the question of whether an intentional breach of the “undertaking” to give full and frank disclosure in ex parte applications amounts to conduct covered by s 4(1)(b) AJPA. Nevertheless, counsel advanced the argument that a party who brings an ex parte application “undertakes” the burden or duty of full and frank disclosure – which (according to them) is, in effect, the same as an implied undertaking to the court to tell the truth, the intentional breach of which would subject the party to contempt proceedings.

[38] Counsel started by citing Kok Seng Chong v Bukit Turf Club [1992] 3 SLR(R) 772 (“Kok Seng Chong”) at [95] for the characterisation of the duty of full and frank disclosure as an undertaking:

[39] However, as counsel correctly noted, the court in Kok Seng Chong appears to have used the word “undertake” as a verb – meaning, to assume or to take on a duty – as opposed to using the word in the technical sense of giving an undertaking to the court. Subsequent cases have repeatedly referred to the ex parte applicant’s duty to make full and frank disclosure rather than his giving an undertaking to make full and frank disclosure: see, for example, Castel, Romy Ingrid v Investment Beverage Business Management Pte Ltd [2026] SGHC 158 at [33] and The “Vasiliy Golovnin” [2008] 4 SLR(R) 994 (“Vasiliy Golovnin”) at [83]. In the circumstances, I do not think it is correct to rely on Kok Seng Chong to make the point that the duty of full and frank disclosure has been recognised as an implied undertaking given to the court.

[40] Leaving aside Kok Seng Chong, counsel submitted that nonetheless, the duty of full and frank disclosure should be treated as an implied undertaking because, like the Riddick undertaking (ie, the rule commonly attributed to Riddick v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1977] QB 881 (“Riddick”)), the duty of full and frank disclosure is “an obligation imposed by operation of law”. Counsel relied on Pertamina Energy Trading Ltd v Karaha Bodas Co LLC [2007] 2 SLR(R) 518 at [38], which in turn cited the decision of the English High Court in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Fountain Page Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 756 (“Prudential Assurance”) at 764–765:

[41] It is, of course, trite that the Riddick undertaking is an implied undertaking and that its breach may amount to contempt of court. However, there are at least two points of distinction between the Riddick undertaking and the duty of full and frank disclosure in ex parte applications. In my view, these distinctions make it inappropriate for me to treat the duty of full and frank disclosure as being analogous to the Riddick undertaking.

[42] First, as emphasised (in bold italics) in the above passage from Prudential Assurance at [40] above, the characterisation of the Riddick obligation as an implied undertaking to the court derives from the historical origins of the principle. In Riddick itself, Lord Denning MR explained at 896 that the Riddick undertaking was intended to encourage openness and fairness in the discovery process, by protecting the right to privacy and confidence of the party compelled to provide discovery:

[43] It can thus be seen that the Riddick undertaking was implied as a condition for the grant of a discovery order. Put simply, the Riddick undertaking is characterised as an implied undertaking given to the court because it is implied within the court’s discovery order that the documents shall not be used for a collateral purpose. This historical origin is materially different from that of the duty of full and frank disclosure.

[44] The duty of full and frank disclosure can be traced back to English authorities from the 19th century. In Tunas (Pte) Ltd v Mayer Investments Pte Ltd [1989] 1 SLR(R) 161, P Coomaraswamy J summarised it as follows:

[45] In Vasiliy Golovnin at [85], the Court of Appeal explained that the underlying rationale for the duty of full and frank disclosure in ex parte applications for civil remedies was the need to ensure that the judge hearing such an application would have a “balanced view of the matter” in coming to a decision:

[46] The duty of full and frank disclosure thus arises in the course of an ex parte application because the counter-party is not present, and is grounded in the need to ensure that all facts relevant to the court’s exercise of its discretion are duly placed before the court. This is quite different from the Riddick undertaking which is imposed in a different context, for the protection of a different set of interests, ie, as a condition for the grant of a discovery order, to safeguard the public interest in privacy and confidence.

[48] The second point of distinction between the Riddick undertaking and the duty of full and frank disclosure is that the former is characterised as an implied undertaking given to the court because “it is an obligation which the court has the right to control and can modify or release a party from” (Prudential Assurance at 764; see also [39] above). In contrast (as counsel for the Applicant also accepted), the duty of full and frank disclosure is not one which the court can modify or release a party from. Indeed, bearing in mind the rationale underlying the duty of full and frank disclosure, the court should not be able to modify this duty or to release the ex parte applicant from this duty.

[49] Ultimately, counsel very fairly accepted that the Riddick undertaking was not on all fours with the duty of full and frank disclosure. This is, of course, not a bar per se to my finding that the ex parte applicant’s duty of full and frank disclosure can be characterised as an implied undertaking given to the court. I should make it clear that I find no basis for characterising the duty as such. As I alluded to earlier, apart from Kok Seng Chong (which I have not found relevant), counsel has not found any authorities in the long line of cases discussing the duty of full and frank disclosure to support the proposition that this duty is “in effect” the same as an implied undertaking given to the court.

[50] More fundamentally, if the Applicant is correct in characterising the ex parte applicant’s duty of full and frank disclosure as an implied undertaking which is caught by s 4(1)(b) AJPA, this will mean that lies in such an applicant’s affidavit are capable of forming the basis for contempt proceedings under s 4(1)(b). As I explained earlier (at [23]–[26]), this is plainly contrary to Parliament’s clear intention that conduct involving a deception on the court should fall under s 3(1)(da) AJPA and should require the AG’s consent for the commencement of any contempt proceedings.

[51] For the reasons explained, I dismiss SUM 1960.

Ting Yue Xin Victoria, Mah Hao Ran Ian and Sarfaroj Ahmed Malik (Setia Law LLC) for the first defendant.