Appellate Division of the High Court · Decided 3 February 2022
POA Recovery Pte Ltd v Yau Kwok Seng and others and another appeal
Feedback & support[2022] SGHC(A) 2 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 26 of 2021
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] Some 4,000 investors participated in investments relating to crude oil produced in Alberta, Canada from September 2012 until the ventures ended in October 2015. 1,102 of those investors (“the Investors”) claimed to be victims of an investment fraud that was perpetrated by the respondents and their counterparts in Canada. Their accusation was that the scheme of the investments was nothing more than an illusion, as it turned out to be a Ponzi scheme. The Investors, who claimed to have been defrauded of around CAD130m, collectively sought recourse through the appellant, POA Recovery Pte Ltd (“POA Recovery”), a special purpose corporate entity. The respondents deny making any fraudulent misrepresentation and further deny complicity with any Canadian party in the alleged fraudulent investment.
- [2]
[2] The trial Judge (“the Judge”) dismissed the action on a standalone ground, namely, the use of a special purpose vehicle to bring a collective action as assignee of the Investors’ claims was impermissible procedurally and in law. The Judge went on to consider POA Recovery’s pleaded case based on fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation, which was the main case pursued during the trial. The Judge concluded, amongst other things, that there was no investment fraud and that the Investors’ losses were the result of a failed investment.
- [3]
[3] This court will consider whether POA Recovery’s challenges to the Judge’s factual findings satisfy the standard of review to warrant appellate interference, namely, whether the findings of fact were plainly wrong or against the weight of the evidence. Whilst POA Recovery’s allegations of investment fraud have to be tested against all the available evidence adduced at trial, as the Judge noted, the body of available evidence adduced at trial was perceptively disadvantaged by (a) the non-attendance of material witnesses from both sides, and (b) incomplete documentary evidence. The undisputed evidential shortcomings on the legal and factual merits of the dispute will guide this court’s understanding of the arguments, evidence, and materials in the appeals.
- [4]
[4] In reviewing POA Recovery’s slew of allegations, including the assertions that the Judge did not address in his judgment the various points raised by POA Recovery, the court is guided by the following principles: (a) a judge is only required to deal with what is essential to dispose of the dispute before him; and (b) where fraud is alleged, cogent evidence is required to discharge an appellant’s legal and evidential burden to the requisite standard of proof. With these two points in mind, the focus will be on material aspects of the dispute that are necessary to determine the two appeals. One other feature in the main appeal is the use of a special purpose vehicle to sue. This approach raises issues on the permissibility of collective actions structured in such a manner, and whether the rules on maintenance and champerty were transgressed.
Dramatis personae and background to appeals
- [5]
[5] There are two appeals before us: AD/CA 26/2021 (“AD 26”) and AD/CA 34/2021 (“AD 34”). Numerous individuals and entities are involved in the present appeals. For clarity, we set out a table listing and abbreviating the key individuals and entities, before elaborating below on their roles and relationships in the alleged fraud:
POA Recovery & COGI
- [6]
[6] The appellant in AD 26, POA Recovery, is a Singapore-incorporated private limited company with an issued share capital of S$1, and it is the entity to which the claims of the Investors were assigned. It is undisputed that the sole purpose of POA Recovery’s incorporation was to pursue the Investors’ claims. The individual Investors’ claims were said to be assigned to POA Recovery by way of formal agreements (“the Assignment Agreements”). Under each agreement, the 1,102 Investors irrevocably assigned to POA Recovery all “rights, title, benefit and interest” in “appropriate legal action against relevant persons and or entities … who have caused or contributed to [their] loss or damage, including the loss of the Crude Oil Investments”.
- [7]
[7] According to POA Recovery, the crude oil investment (“the Scheme”) involved the Investors purchasing physical barrels of crude oil that would be resold for profit on their behalf by an entity known as POA. POA was a subsidiary of COGI, which operated the oil and gas properties from which the crude oil would be purchased by the Investors. The Investors were promised returns after POA resold the crude oil at a profit.
- [8]
[8] POA Recovery submitted that the investments under the Scheme were marketed (ie, represented to the Investors) as bearing three key features.
(a) Purchase of oil: Each investment was a purchase of crude oil.
(b) Profits for Investors: The oil would be resold by POA on behalf of investors at a profit, which would be paid to the Investors quarterly at 3% of the purchase price until the end of the investment term. This 3% profit was derived from the onward sale of the crude oil (which the Investors purchased) by POA to oil giants. The aggregate annual return would be 12%, and at the end of the investment period, the full purchase price would be returned to the Investors.
(c) Security: As security for their investment capital, the Investors would receive a first charge over the oil fields in the projects in which they had invested.
According to POA Recovery, the investments did not in fact bear any of these features.
- [9]
[9] The duration of the Scheme lasted from September 2012 to October 2015. We will elaborate on the events that unfolded shortly.
Yau, CAG and CAGOM, Li and Luong
- [10]
[10] Yau is the first respondent in AD 26. He is the sole shareholder and director of the second and third respondents, CAG and CAGOM. Yau, CAG and CAGOM are also the respondents in AD 34. It is not disputed that CAG and CAGOM acted primarily through Yau. Where appropriate, we refer to them collectively as “the respondents”.
- [11]
[11] Yau was nominated by POA as the “key employee” involved in the marketing of the investments. CAG was appointed by POA as the exclusive marketing agent of the investments. The agreement between them is referred to by parties as the “Collaboration Agreement”. CAG earned commission of between 18–20% of the capital raised via the investments. The investments were demarcated by projects, named according to the oil fields from which the oil had allegedly been obtained. There was a total of 17 projects between 2012 and 2015 (which we detail in our analysis at [117] below).
- [12]
[12] CAG conducted the marketing of the investments in Asia with the assistance of agents and sub-agents. CAG appointed two entities, CAG MY and CAG HK, as sales agents in Malaysia and Hong Kong respectively. These entities, in turn, appointed marketing companies within their respective regions, known as Associate Marketing Companies (“AMCs”). CAG also enlisted sub-agents from the AMCs to assist in marketing of the investments. Li and Luong, the appellants in AD 34, were two such sub-agents. These sub-agents were investors who also played a role in marketing so that they too could earn a portion of the commissions that POA paid. Some of these investors, including Li and Luong, were invited to POA and COGI installations in Alberta, Canada to see the rigs and production lines. They returned satisfied with what they had seen.
- [14]
[14] CAGOM was incorporated in 2012. It was set up to hold the leasehold security that was provided by POA in respect of the crude oil investments. CAGOM owned 100% of the shares in CAGOM Canada, a Canadian company that was initially used to hold the security provided by POA in respect of the investments. From 20 November 2015 onwards, CAGOM Canada became POA’s 99% shareholder; we will elaborate below at [23] on the significance of this arrangement.
- [15]
[15] POA Recovery refers to POA, COGI and the CAG entities collectively as the “Conserve Group”. This description can be misleading as CAG is a separate entity that is not part of COGI and POA. We will nevertheless use the same terminology in so far as it forms part of POA Recovery’s arguments.
Other key personnel and entities
- [16]
[16] Other key personnel and entities (as tabulated and abbreviated at [5] above), and their roles, include the following:
(a) Payment subsidiaries: POA SG, POA MY and POA HK, collectively the “POA subsidiaries”. These were the subsidiaries through which POA made profit/capital repayments to investors in Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong respectively.
(b) CAG personnel:
(i) Phyllis, Yau’s business partner and legal advisor to CAG.
(ii) Audrey, CAG’s vice-president of marketing.
(iii) Paul Tan, the Chief Operating Officer of CAG. He trained CAG’s sales agents. He was also a director of POA from early 2016 onwards (see [22] below).
(iv) Gary Tan, who trained CAG’s sales agents.
(c) POA and COGI personnel:
(i) Hainzl, COGI’s principal representative during the conception of the Scheme.
(ii) Crombie, the president of COGI and president of POA from 2011 until his resignation in March 2016.
(iii) Gramatzki, the vice-president of POA and Vice President of CAGOM Canada.
(iv) Karen Dowling, COGI’s vice president of Land, ie, COGI’s officer overseeing the leases held over oil fields.
(v) Rick Orman, a director of POA from early 2016 onwards. He was a former Minister of Energy in Alberta, and chairman of WesCan Energy Corp, a listed oil exploration company.
(vi) Busby, part of POA’s new management from early 2016 onwards with Paul Tan and Rick Orman (see [22] below).
(vii) Chan, who was appointed as POA’s accountant after its financial collapse.
(d) CAG MY personnel: Candice and Jonathan, owners of CAG MY and officers who operated POA MY. They were two Investors who were also sub-marketers.
Events leading up to the commencement of the action in Singapore
- [17]
[17] For some of the 17 projects (see [11] above), the Investors had been paid the agreed 3% returns quarterly and obtained full capital refunds after the expiration of each project term. By October 2015, three projects had successfully exited, ie, the investors had received both their capital refunds and their investment returns. Five projects had partially exited, ie, the majority of investors in those projects had been paid their 3% returns and exit payments.
- [18]
[18] For the remaining projects, POA was unable to pay the 3% returns as well as return the investment capital to the Investors. This was due to POA and COGI getting into financial difficulties in 2015 because of the drastic fall in the price of oil world-wide. As the Judge observed, while there was no direct evidence on the fall in oil prices, the parties did not seem to challenge such a fall. However, POA Recovery challenges the Judge’s finding that the collapse of the Scheme was attributable to the fall in oil prices in 2015.
- [20]
[20] In November 2015, officers from POA including Crombie travelled to Singapore to brief the investors on the situation in Canada. They assured the investors that the contracts would be performed.
- [21]
[21] In early 2016, the receivers of COGI applied to put POA under receivership, but this was successfully resisted by Phyllis and Paul Tan. By this time, there were “alarms and frantic action in Canada as well as in Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong among the Investors and the AMCs in the respective countries”: Judgment at [13].
- [22]
[22] In the light of the financial turmoil, POA appointed a new management team. CAGOM Canada successfully took over 99% of the shares in POA and COGI was left with 1%. In January 2016, Rick Orman and Paul Tan were appointed directors of POA, and they formed the new management team that included Busby.
The June Agreement
- [23]
[23] Sometime in June 2016, the new POA management team met the Investors in Kuala Lumpur to discuss how the Investors could recover their investments. This led to the formation of an agreement (“the June Agreement”). Under the June Agreement, the Investors were given shares in CAGOM Canada in proportion to the outstanding money due to them under the crude oil investments. The investors who signed the agreement agreed to forgo their rights under the original contracts governing their purchase of crude oil from POA. They accepted that their recourse would lie in their rights as shareholders of CAGOM Canada instead. In return, the Investors would receive dividends from POA, which was by then 99% owned by CAGOM Canada. Since CAGOM Canada was the 99% shareholder of POA, profits from POA’s restructuring, if successful, would be distributed as dividends to the signatories on a pro rata basis. 85% of the Investors signed the June Agreement. The remaining 15% had their rights held on trust for them. Any disposal of POA’s assets required the approval of 60% of its shareholders.
- [24]
[24] The full extent of the June Agreement was disputed. The parties disagree over whether the newly implemented shareholding structure in CAGOM Canada had the effect of extinguishing the Investors’ original rights as against POA (under the BPOs) and separately as against the respondents. We will address this below in the course of our analysis.
The Interim Advisory Board
- [25]
[25] In April 2017, the management and control of CAGOM Canada was under a new management committee known as the “Interim Advisory Board”. The new committee included Yau, Luong, Li, and four other Investors. Li was the chairman. In November 2017, the members of the Interim Advisory Board were appointed as full directors of CAGOM Canada and formed CAGOM Canada’s “Executive Board”.
- [26]
[26] After gaining control of CAGOM Canada, Li, Luong and several other members of the Interim Advisory Board sold off a valuable POA asset known as the “Joffre” asset without the requisite 60% shareholders’ approval, and in spite of express objections by certain Investors to the sale. Li and Luong only reported, after the fact, that the sale was completed. They then proceeded to inform the CAGOM Canada shareholders that they were getting a final distribution of 1% of the sale proceeds. Li and Luong have not provided proof of the sale: the buyer was not named, and the sale price was not disclosed. Li and Luong were thereafter also involved in two further transactions that were found by the Judge to be against the interests of the Investors.
Procedural history
- [27]
[27] Chiefly, POA Recovery’s pleaded case is that the respondents were complicit in POA and COGI’s fraud against the Investors under the Scheme, and that the investments were not genuine investments in crude oil. Fraudulent misrepresentations were made to Investors to induce investments. The case pursued below largely mirrors POA Recovery’s primary case on appeal.
- [28]
[28] The respondents challenged the action in law and in fact, and their case on appeal is largely identical. The primary defence in law was that POA Recovery had no legal standing to bring an action because its attempt to sue on behalf of the Investors amounted to the illegal practice of maintenance, ie, an unconnected person lending assistance (eg, financial support) to the real aggrieved parties or encouraging them to sue. Their factual case was that the investments were genuine commercial transactions and not a Ponzi scheme as alleged. If fraud had been perpetrated, it would have occurred much later after the sharp drop in oil prices that led to COGI’s receivership. At some point thereafter, POA and COGI or some of their officers took steps that might be viewed as fraud committed against the Investors. Such fraud (if any) was perpetrated against not only the Investors but also the respondents. The respondents were not parties to any fraud.
- [29]
[29] The respondents brought a third-party action that joined 68 individuals as third parties. 66 third parties were joined in the suit on the ground that they were sales agents appointed by AMCs who over-promised or misrepresented the investments to the other Investors. These 66 third parties, like Yau, marketed the Scheme and also invested their own money in the projects. The respondents claimed, inter alia, for a return of the “Secret Commissions” received by the third parties.
- [30]
[30] The respondents had a separate case against Li and Luong. Luong is a Hong Kong businessman who was an Investor. Luong introduced the investments to Li, a trained accountant and authorised representative of Luck Hock Watch Company Ltd (“Luck Hock”) and Enoch International Company Ltd (“Enoch”). Li invested in the Scheme and got Luck Hock and Enoch to invest as well.
The decision below
POA Recovery’s standing to bring the suit
- [33]
[33] The Judge agreed with the respondents’ characterisation of POA Recovery, ie, that it was a “shell company” incorporated only for the purposes of commencing the suit. The Judge found the Assignment Agreements void for being contrary to the doctrine of maintenance with the effect that POA Recovery had no standing to bring the present action.
- [34]
[34] The Judge applied the test set out by the High Court in Re Vanguard Energy Pte Ltd [2015] 4 SLR 597 (“Re Vanguard”) at [43]–[44], namely, that it is contrary to the doctrine of maintenance for individual plaintiffs to assign their bare rights to litigate unless one of three exceptions could be proven.
- [36]
[36] The Judge said that the use of a special purpose vehicle to sue was procedurally impermissible. The Investors had to “comply with the law” if they wished to pursue their rights in court. That meant that the Investors had to (a) sue individually, and agree to proceed with one suit with the others stayed (since the issues and witnesses involved are common to all), (b) file a representative action under O 15 r 12 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC”), or (c) join the parties and consolidate their actions under O 15 r 4 and O 4 r 1 respectively.
The merits of POA Recovery’s claims
- [37]
[37] After concluding that POA Recovery did not have locus standi to sue, the Judge went on to examine the purported causes of action. The Judge concluded, on the facts, that POA Recovery’s claims lacked merit. The Judge identified the “only clear causes of action” as fraud in tandem with POA and COGI, and fraudulent misrepresentation. These were therefore the subjects of the Judge’s focus in the Judgment. The rest of POA Recovery’s claims were not adequately pleaded, namely the causes of action in breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties and/or trust, negligence, and unlawful means conspiracy. The elements of these causes of action were not elaborated upon – the Judge’s observations in this regard are found at [18]–[20] of the Judgment.
Fraud
- [38]
[38] The Judge’s discussion on POA Recovery’s claim in fraud comprises four main parts. First, the alleged misuse of Investors’ moneys, ie, the allegation that the respondents had permitted or procured the Investors’ moneys to be applied for purposes other than the purchase of crude oil. Second, the wrongful discharge of security, ie, the allegation that the respondents had permitted or procured the discharge of the security that CAGOM and CAGOM Canada held over the oil fields on behalf of the Investors. Third, the allegation of secret commissions being collected by CAG. Fourth, the evidential gaps which led the Judge to conclude that there was no fraud, but merely a failed investment.
- [39]
[39] The Judge was not convinced that POA could only use the Investors’ money to buy crude oil and not for any other purposes. The BPOs signed by the Investors with POA were, by their express wording, contracts for the sale and purchase of crude oil. Clause 7 of each BPO, however, explicitly provided that POA could allocate the Investors’ monies “for development and purchase of oil and gas leases/assets”: Judgment at [24]. Thus, even if the Investors’ moneys had been used to purchase oil and gas assets instead of crude oil, this was a legitimate means of raising money to fulfil POA’s contractual obligations.
- [40]
[40] Based on the above, the Judge opined that “[t]he scheme was unlike a Ponzi scheme in which the fraudster uses the investment monies to pay other investors”: Judgment at [24]. The Judge added, in this regard, that there could be no dispute that POA and COGI were genuinely in the oil-producing business. The respondents asserted that COGI was the largest oil producing company in Alberta prior to it being placed under receivership. This was not disputed by POA Recovery. It therefore appeared “quite clear” to the Judge that COGI was a legitimate oil producing company in Canada: Judgment at [25].
- [41]
[41] Next, the Judge found that the respondents had nothing to do with the discharge of the security that CAGOM and CAGOM Canada held over the oil fields for the benefit of the Investors. The Judge noted that while there was “some unchallenged evidence that in the chaos that followed COGI’s receivership, the securities were discharged”, there was “nothing to show that the authorisation for the discharge had anything to do with the [respondents]”: Judgment at [26]. There was evidence that there might even have been a forgery of the signature authorising the discharge, but that evidence pointed to Karen Dowling, POA’s and COGI’s officer overseeing the leases that they held over the relevant oil fields (ie, “landman”, as referred to by the Judge and the parties).
- [42]
[42] The Judge rejected the allegation that CAG fraudulently received secret commissions from POA. POA Recovery’s witnesses complained that they had not been apprised of the fact that CAG’s commissions were deducted upfront from the capital raised from the Investors (ie, 18–20%; see [11] above). As a result, only about 80% of the Investors’ capital went upstream to POA. In the Judge’s view, these allegations were without merit. It is both legally and commercially acceptable for sales agents to operate on a commission basis. Some of the Investors, who were also the AMCs and sales agents, also received commissions for their sales of the crude oil investments. In so far as POA Recovery took issue with CAG’s non-disclosure of the quantum of its commissions and the mode of their distribution, these were both matters that were strictly between POA and CAG. CAG did not have a legal obligation to report either of these matters to the Investors. The Judge noted the existence of stark evidential gaps that had to be construed against POA Recovery. No one from POA or COGI testified to explain how “[the] BPOs really worked”: Judgment at [27]. The lawyers involved in structuring and executing the documents were not called. No one asked for the audited accounts of POA and COGI to see how these contracts appeared, nor to see what COGI’s normal business practices were.
- [43]
[43] Also, key personnel were not called as witnesses. Karen Dowling and Crombie were not called even though they could have been material witnesses as regards the respondents’ allegation that documents had been forged leading to the discharge of the Investors’ security in Canada. Rick Orman, who was a former Minister of Energy, was a material witness given that he had come to meet the respondents and some of the Investors, but he, too, was not called to testify. Chan, who was appointed POA’s accountant after its collapse, was also not called to testify even though POA Recovery had initially listed him as one of its witnesses. Chan could have shown that the wrongdoings, if any, lay with POA’s old management and not with the respondents. The Judge observed that the absent witnesses were not called for strategic purposes or for practical reasons (eg, the Canadian witnesses may have been unwilling to testify), and not as a result of neglect by counsel: Judgment at [28]. The Judge decided that the evidence that was in the available record supported the finding that there was no fraud; the collapse of the Scheme was an investment failure. That was what the Judge felt that he could reasonably and fairly conclude in the light of evidential gaps.
Fraudulent misrepresentation
- [44]
[44] POA Recovery claimed that the Investors were misled by the respondents into signing the contracts to purchase crude oil from POA. The two primary alleged misrepresentations identified by the Judge were, first, the giving of a guarantee that the Investors would receive their annualised returns for the duration of the contract with eventual repayment of the full amount of their investment capital; and second, the representation that the Investors were buying crude oil.
- [45]
[45] The Judge was satisfied that CAG, which was responsible for training the sales agents in Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong, had clearly and unambiguously informed the sales agents that they could not inform potential buyers that the capital returns for the investments were guaranteed. Other than the assertions by some of the witnesses that Yau had guaranteed the capital refunds, the evidence showed that at most, Yau had only assured some of the early Investors that the investments were reliable. Assurances of this sort are not a guarantee in law that can found a cause of action. In any event, by the time those Investors visited the COGI oil fields, they had convinced themselves that they were in a good deal, and themselves became “evangelists of the same cause”: Judgment at [30]. Thus, if individual Investors had been misled by what they claimed to be the promises of capital protection, the promises were made by the sales agents and not by the respondents. In this regard, the Judge appeared to accept the respondents’ evidence that they had “used whatever information they had been given by POA and COGI without embellishment”, and “represented accurately what they were told”. Much of the information could be found in a bound document called the “Crude Oil Bible”. The Investors who were authorised to sell the crude oil investments could also access, and in fact used, the same Crude Oil Bible.
- [46]
[46] Even if the respondents had falsely represented that the Investors’ moneys would only be allocated towards the purchase of actual crude oil, there was no evidence that the Investors had relied on this representation in entering the BPOs. The BPOs specified that if the Investors wanted delivery of crude oil, that could be done on the terms set out in the contracts. Those terms were not put to the test because none of the Investors had opted to take delivery of the crude oil, and indeed none appeared interested in this option. That showed that “so far as the Investors are concerned, they were only interested in getting their capital refund and 12% profit”: Judgment at [33]. Accordingly, it appeared unobjectionable that the BPOs were in fact “a little more sophisticated”, ie, contracts that were more like investments in the “commercial ventures of POA” in which investors were promised a return of 12% per annum.
- [47]
[47] Finally, the Judge noted that the BPOs were not all executed at once but over the years, and the early BPOs had shown promise because they were being performed, and the promises kept. Evidence was also led showing that numerous Investors had visited the COGI oil fields and returned fully satisfied with what CAG was offering them (see [12] above). They had passed on their experience to other interested buyers who relied on their recommendations and purchased the investments with or through them accordingly.
- [48]
[48] As for the remaining representations set out in the Statement of Claim, the Judge observed briefly that many of the alleged misrepresentations sounded like “promotion puffs”: Judgment at [22]. Some representations may have been serious representations of fact but have not been proven to be false, such as the claim that COGI “manages over 70,000,000 barrels of oil equivalent and has oil reserves and resources in excess of CAD7 billion”.
- [49]
[49] Based on the above, the Judge concluded that “[t]he ideas of fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation only came to mind much later, by which time, the story had become more complicated and messier, by reason of the activities of Li and Luong”: Judgment at [36]. Until that point (when the investments failed), the Investors had been working with Yau in trying to recover their investments. Yau was taking the lead not only because he was the person who had introduced the investment to the early investors, but also because he was himself an investor in the scheme. There was also evidence from the email of Gramatzki that showed that the Canadians were trying to control the damage without alarming the investors, but eventually, the loss was way too large, and nothing could be done “but for everyone to roll over and give up”.
Li, Luong and the third parties
- [51]
[51] The first of three wrongdoings by Li and Luong were their sale of the “Joffre” asset without requisite shareholder approval (the “Joffre Asset Purchase”; see [26] above). The Judge also accepted two further allegations against Li and Luong, which concerned what was known as the “Spurs Investment” and the purchase of an asset known as “Provost” (the “Provost Purchase”). In short, the Judge was persuaded that Li and Luong had belatedly disclosed information to the investors, taken up a further investment on the investors’ behalf in highly questionable circumstances, and facilitated a surreptitious purchase of an asset by another entity, to the investors’ detriment.
- [52]
[52] The Judge surmised that it was “obvious” that any action which Li and Luong had carried out to recover POA’s assets had been undertaken purely for their own benefit, because they, as well as their principals, were major investors in the Scheme. The Judge concluded by observing that he had “accepted the [respondents’] claim that Luong and Li financially mismanaged CAGOM Canada in the aftermath of the 2015 oil crisis and that the Investors could have recovered more than 1% of their investment capital if not for Luong’s and Li’s questionable dealings”: Judgment at [48].
- [53]
[53] In relation to the third-party action against the other sales agents, the Judge found that on balance, Yau had been careful to avoid the promise of a guaranteed return: see [45] above. Therefore, if individual Investors had been misled by what they claimed to be the promises of capital protection, the promises were made by the sales agents and not by the respondents.
The parties’ cases on appeal
- [54]
[54] The Appellant’s case and the Respondent’s case copiously set out general narratives that, for the most part, left this court with no clear indication of the critical issues in the appeals. We accept that presentation of narratives in written submissions is not always objectionable, but here, some 34 out of the 77-paged Appellant’s Case comprised a dense coagulation of facts. Some portions were chronological, while others were thematic. The respondents were no better in that some 22 out of 75 pages in the Respondents’ Case comprised their propounded narrative of events.
- [55]
[55] The skeletal arguments were more helpful, but the issues only crystallised and narrowed in the course of oral arguments before us. Suffice it to say, it remains counsel’s duty to assist the court in arriving at a clear and considered decision on the merits at all stages of proceedings; in this case, the structure of both parties’ written cases served to obfuscate rather than aid. Every appeal court desires a succinct and clear covering of only the critical issues in the appeals, such as what questions of law must be reviewed and what findings of fact are in error and reviewable under the well-established standard of review.
- [56]
[56] At this part of the judgment, we deal only with AD 26. We will address AD 34 separately at the end of this section of the judgment (see [203] below onwards). We do not propose to set out the parties’ cases in detail as the salient arguments will be discussed in the judgment. For now, a brief synopsis of the respective cases suffices.
- [57]
[57] Essentially, POA Recovery disputes that the investments bore the three key features mentioned at [8] above. It alleges that the respondents were complicit in the fraud perpetrated by COGI and POA, by marketing the investments as bearing the three key features, when in fact the respondents knew that the investments were fictitious. POA Recovery alleges, to this end, that the respondents crafted a web of lies and had repeatedly suppressed information from the Investors to their detriment.
- [58]
[58] The respondents maintain their case below, that is, the investments were not fictitious, and that if there had been any fraud, such fraud was on the part of POA, COGI and their officers. The respondents, as marketing agents, were not privy to any fraud, and always acted in what they believed to be the best interests of the investors.
- [59]
[59] In this appeal, POA Recovery also complained that the Judge was wrong in ruling that the other causes of action were not adequately pleaded. We see this as a half-hearted complaint because POA Recovery did not seriously deal in detail with where, how and why the other causes of action were sustainable. The appeal was primarily based on fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation which was the main case pursued during the trial. We will discuss the pleadings point below.
Issues on appeal in AD 26
- [60]
[60] As regards AD 26, we will address the following issues in turn:
(a) First, whether POA Recovery has sufficiently pleaded its other causes of action besides fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation. These include the actions in negligence, breach of trust and fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and dishonest assistance.
(b) Second, whether POA Recovery has locus standi as assignee to sue the respondents.
(c) Third, whether POA Recovery’s claim in fraud and/or in fraudulent misrepresentation should be allowed.
- [61]
[61] For the reasons explained below, we reverse the Judge’s decision on the second issue, on locus standi, but dismiss POA Recovery’s contentions on the first and third issues. As a result, AD 26 is dismissed.
POA Recovery’s pleadings
- [62]
[62] POA Recovery brought causes of action in negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and/or trust, dishonest assistance and the tort of unlawful means conspiracy. All references hereinafter to “Statement of Claim” are references to Statement of Claim (Amendment No 2) filed by POA Recovery.
- [63]
[63] Paragraphs 17 (breach of fiduciary duty and trust) and 18 (negligence) of the Statement of Claim averred to these causes of action. The Judge’s concern, with which we agree, was that the factual substratum of the negligence and breach of duty claims appeared to be mixed with the fraud claim (at paras 15–18 of the Statement of Claim).
- [64]
[64] There were other concerns. POA Recovery had amalgamated the factual bases of its various claims. That approach may not be objectionable if done properly. But here, facts that constituted the specific elements to make up the individual causes of action (or if the causes of action overlapped, clear explanations as to the degree of overlap) were not particularised at all.
- [65]
[65] On negligence, we agree with the respondents’ contention that nothing in the Statement of Claim pointed clearly to the existence of a duty of care or established with specificity the standard of care that the respondents ought to have been held to. There was not even a tangential reference to meeting the threshold requirement of negligence: that of factual foreseeability (see Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100 (“Spandeck”) at [75] and [76]). Even after close perusal of the Statement of Claim, the facts pertaining to factual foreseeability were not discernible. This lack of factual averment is fatal to POA Recovery’s claim in negligence; factual foreseeability “is a threshold question which the court must be satisfied is fulfilled, failing which the claim does not even take off” [emphasis added]: Spandeck at [76]. A failure to clearly plead the facts that would demonstrate such factual foreseeability would consequently result in a claim in negligence failing in limine.
- [66]
[66] The same observations may be made as regards POA Recovery’s pleadings on breach of trust and fiduciary duty against the respondents in their role as agent. We agree with the observations of the High Court in Tonny Permana v One Tree Capital Management Pte Ltd and another [2021] 5 SLR 477 (“Tonny Permana”) that specificity in arguments (including the pleaded case) is of paramount importance in claims against agents for breach of trust and/or fiduciary duty. This is due to the inherently fact-sensitive nature of such duties, and how different circumstances will often shape the contours of the precise duties in question. In Tonny Permana at [99]–[101], Chan Seng Onn J noted as follows:
- [67]
[67] Chan J’s observation at [100] of Tonny Permana is particularly apposite: that “…just because an agent may be considered a fiduciary in a limited manner … this does not mean that every duty the agent owes to the principal is a fiduciary duty” [emphasis in original]. The onus is on a plaintiff (here, POA Recovery) to aver with specificity the precise duty owed, the scope of such duty, and the context in which it would apply. POA Recovery has mentioned none of these in the Statement of Claim, which leads to many questions: in what specific sense were the respondents alleged to be fiduciaries vis-à-vis the Investors? Were the fiduciary relationships limited to only a particular aspect of the respondents’ dealings with the Investors, many of whom they had never even met personally? Were the fiduciary relationships with all Investors homogenous? Would the different fiduciary relationships, if they existed, not call for varying degrees of scrutiny, given that there were varying layers of sub-agents and sub-marketers sandwiched between the respondents and each individual Investor? These are questions to which POA Recovery has proffered no clear answers, and the source of the difficulty is its inadequate pleadings.
- [68]
[68] We turn to consider the pleadings on dishonest assistance and conspiracy together because the Appellant’s Case discussed both causes of action in one section. As we have commented, different legal claims should be separated as each cause of action possesses different legal elements, which must be independently satisfied on the facts. Regrettably, this unhelpful approach of “lumping” various causes of action together is symptomatic of the lack of clarity that pervades POA Recovery’s case not only on appeal, but also at trial.
- [69]
[69] We agree with the Judge that dishonest assistance and conspiracy were not adequately pleaded. First, dishonest assistance is mentioned at paras 33.2 and 38 of the Statement of Claim: “the Defendants are liable to account to the Plaintiff … on the ground of dishonest assistance”. While the cause of action was expressly spelled out, nothing in the Statement of Claim alluded clearly to the facts in support of the elements of dishonest assistance. At best, it may be said that POA Recovery was impliedly imploring the High Court to discern, from the narrative presented, dishonesty on the part of the respondents. But that is a very general averment. The specifics of the relationship between each of the three respondents in the context of the investments were not spelled out. One would expect to see, in this respect, facts clearly demonstrating the attribution of knowledge between the respondents inter se, and how liability on the part of one necessarily meant liability on the part of the others. A plaintiff must also include how, in the context of the specific transactions in question, there could have been “assistance” that was “dishonest”. These were never explained or elaborated upon in the Statement of Claim, with the result that the court had no reference point for determining whether the elements of dishonest assistance, as a distinct source of secondary liability, could be made out over and above any primary liability on the part of Yau: see also Tonny Permana at [246]. Consequently, the respondents did not know the case that they had to meet.
- [70]
[70] Next, at para 33.3 of the Statement of Claim, the averment on conspiracy is that “the Defendants and others yet unknown … wrongfully … by unlawful means, conspired and combined together to defraud the Scheme Participants”. The Statement of Claim does not aver to the acts of conspiracy, the nature of the agreement and who precisely were the co-conspirators. The elements of unlawful means conspiracy are fivefold and distinct, and they were stated by the Court of Appeal in EFT Holdings, Inc and another v Marinteknik Shipbuilders (S) Pte Ltd and another [2014] 1 SLR 860 as follows (at [112]):
- [71]
[71] Immediately, the inadequacy of POA Recovery’s pleadings on conspiracy becomes apparent. It is not adequate where a plaintiff avers that a defendant had conspired with “others yet unknown”. In pleading a combination that forms part of a conspiracy, the co-conspirators must be identified. The alleged combination must also be specified. Having failed to do so, the state of POA Recovery’s pleadings was self-evidently prejudicial to the respondents.
- [72]
[72] For these reasons, we affirm the Judge’s decision that POA Recovery had not adequately pleaded its causes of action (apart from fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation).
POA Recovery’s legal standing to bring the claims
Validity and extent of deeds of assignment
- [73]
[73] POA Recovery commenced proceedings as assignee. 1,102 Investors were alleged to have irrevocably assigned their “rights, title, benefit and interest” to POA Recovery by way of the Assignment Agreements. The court’s basic expectation is to see proof of such assignment starting with the disclosure of documentary evidence in support. It is surprising that little attention was paid to make good POA Recovery’s status as assignee. Counsel for the appellants, Mr Danny Ong (“Mr Ong”), acknowledged the deficiencies in the documentary evidence when he was queried about the Assignment Agreements. The appellants only adduced a single template of the deed of assignments. Crucial details such as the dates of the deeds, the parties involved, and whether the deeds had been duly executed were not available in the record of appeal. Accompanying this was also a template of the notice of assignment, with all details absent again, save for the signature and details of Luong (as assignee) and one Wong Puie Kuan (as witness). The only other evidence available on appeal that was remotely related was found in the index to the agreed bundles for the proceedings before the Judge. The index then referred to a series of letters from Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP to various parties, that in turn purported to enclose the notices of assignment issued by the relevant Investors. Post-hearing of the appeals, POA Recovery filed and served a supplementary affidavit exhibiting all 1,102 deeds of assignment. On 8 September 2021, POA Recovery filed a List of Documents (“LOD”) setting out the 1,102 deeds, given that such LOD had not been filed in the court below.
- [74]
[74] The oral arguments had proceeded upon oral confirmation by Mr Ong that there had been at least 143 Assignment Agreements that were properly executed (see [76(a)] below). Counsel for the respondents, Ms Melanie Ho (“Ms Ho”) objected as she could not verify Mr Ong’s figure of 143 Assignment Agreements. We were not impressed with her belated objection as none was taken below. As we explained during the hearing, counsel ought to have raised an objection (at the earliest possible instance) as to the absence of the Assignment Agreements.
- [75]
[75] We also note that the deeds were executed without the legal requirement for sealing. As a matter of Singapore law, the requirement for a deed executed by individuals is that the deed has to be “SIGNED, SEALED and DELIVERED” (see Lim Zhiping v Seow Suat Thin and another ([2020] SGCA 89). It would appear that the deeds in question were not examined for the specific requirements under Singapore law for a deed executed by individuals. Other than making this observation, we say no more on the matter since it was not an issue in the appeal.
- [76]
[76] We now turn to the question whether POA Recovery could pursue claims against the respondents on the basis of accrued rights arising before the assignments. The Writ of Summons (the “Writ”) for the present action was filed on 1 June 2018. The relevant deeds were then annexed to “Schedule 1” of the Statement of Claim accompanying the Writ at varying points in time, as follows:
(a) The first 143 deeds, found in Annex A to the Statement of Claim. were executed at various dates before 1 June 2018 and were included in Schedule 1 on 1 June 2018. We refer to these as the “Annex A” deeds.
(b) The next 74 deeds, found in Annex B to the Statement of Claim, were executed at various dates before 1 June 2018, but were only included in Schedule 1 on 4 April 2019. We refer to these as the “Annex B” deeds
(c) The remaining 885 deeds, found in Annex C, were executed as various times after 1 June 2018, and were included in Schedule 1 on 4 April 2019. We refer to these as the “Annex C” deeds.
- [77]
[77] It appears that after POA Recovery had filed its Writ on 1 June 2018, 886 Investors then formalised the assignment of the causes of action to POA Recovery, by way of the Annex C deeds and one assignment by Mr Kenneth Lim Cher Kiong (“Mr Lim”). There were also 74 deeds that had been formalised (ie, signed) by the date of Writ, namely the Annex B deeds, but were not included in the Statement of Claim. POA Recovery sought to introduce these 960 (ie, 886+74) assignments by amending its Writ on 4 April 2019. As Mr Lim’s claim was withdrawn from the suit, a second amendment to the Writ was made on 16 June 2020.
- [78]
[78] The respondents take no objection in relation to the Annex A deeds, and any reliance on them by POA Recovery. However, they object to the reliance on the Annex B and Annex C deeds, on the basis that these assignments occurred post the issuance of the Writ and therefore did not vest in POA Recovery when the action was commenced. In riposte, POA Recovery relies on The “Jarguh Sawit” [1997] 3 SLR(R) 829 (“Jarguh Sawit (CA)”) for the proposition that a plaintiff may properly pursue a claim assigned to it post-filing of a writ of summons, where such claim had already accrued as at the date of the filing of the writ.
- [79]
[79] Where an amendment to a writ has been duly made, the amendment dates back to the date of the original issue of the writ. As a result, the action continues as though the amendment had been inserted from the beginning: Singapore Civil Procedure 2021, vol 1 (Cavinder Bull SC gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2021) at para 20/8/3, citing Sneade v Wortherton Barytes and Lead Mining Co Ltd [1904] 1 KB 295 at 297 amongst others. In Jarguh Sawit, the appellants contended that by a deed of assignment dated 5 August 1996, they had acquired all of the relevant rights belonging to Oxford Jay International Pte Ltd (“OJI”), pursuant to a memorandum of agreement dated 7 May 1992 (the “MOA”) that OJI had entered into with Navigation Maritime Bulgare (“NMB”). This deed of assignment was executed after the writ was served, and after the original defence and counterclaim was filed. Following this assignment, the appellants sought to amend their counterclaim to include the damages suffered by OJI because of NMB’s breach of the MOA. The court below refused to grant leave to amend the counterclaim.
- [81]
[81] That same issue arose again recently before the Court of Appeal in BXH v BXI [2020] 1 SLR 1043 (“BXH”). Having referred to the relevant portions of Jarguh Sawit (CA) as above, the court made several pertinent observations (at [117]–[124]) on the two decisions relied upon by the court in Jarguh Sawit (CA) – namely, Central Insurance Co Ltd v Seacalf Shipping Corporation (The Aiolos) [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 25, CA (“Central Insurance”) and Read v Brown (1888) 22 QBD 128 (“Read v Brown”). In short, the court in BXH noted that those cases do not in fact establish that an assignment can retrospectively vest rights in an assignee. The Court of Appeal reasoned, amongst other things, that Central Insurance and Read v Brown did not concern retrospective vesting. Instead, Central Insurance concerned subrogation (see BXH at [117]), while Read v Brown concerned the significance of an assignment in determining a plaintiff’s cause of action (see BXH at [122]).
- [82]
[82] The court’s observations in BXH are indeed apposite. Neither Central Insurance nor Read v Brown appear to support the existence of a standalone rule on retrospective assignment of causes of action. Instead, and as correctly discerned in BXH, these cases seem to have been decided on their respective unique factual matrices (the former concerning subrogation of rights in the context of an insurer, and the latter concerning whether an assignment could cure what appeared to be a jurisdictional defect in a plaintiff’s cause of action). It would consequently appear that in so far as the court in Jarguh Sawit (CA) relied on Central Insurance and Read v Brown for the proposition that there may be retrospective vesting of causes of action, this would appear doubtful as a matter of reasoning.
- [83]
[83] That said, while we find the reasoning in BXH compelling, these observations were made in obiter; the court eventually held that these principles did not, in any case, concern arbitration proceedings (BXH at [125]), which was the relevant issue there. Also, while BXH cast doubt on the reasoning in Jarguh Sawit (CA), it did not conclude in clear terms whether and why standalone retrospective assignments of causes of action after the date of commencement of a suit are untenable in principle. As a result, we find ourselves bound by the ratio decidendi in Jarguh Sawit (CA), such that all three categories of deeds should be allowed into evidence in this case, notwithstanding that the Annex C deeds were executed after the date of commencement of the suit. The issue that arises for consideration is whether these assignments are affected by maintenance or champerty and are therefore void as contrary to public policy or otherwise illegal (see s 5A(2) of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed)).
Champerty and maintenance
- [84]
[84] The parties have accepted that the relevant exceptions to the rule against maintenance and champerty are set out in Re Vanguard, as follows:
- [85]
[85] The exceptions in Re Vanguard arise for deliberation where there is a prima facie violation of the rules on maintenance and champerty. There would be no need to consider whether the exceptions are engaged in the present case if the doctrines of champerty or maintenance were not transgressed in the first place. The Judge agreed with Ms Ho that the assignments to a shell company like POA Recovery contravened the doctrine of maintenance. Two points were patent in the Judge’s decision: first, the assignee was a shell company “incorporated only for the purposes of commencing this suit”: Judgment at [42]. Second, assignments to such a shell company were unlike a situation where a bare cause of action is assigned to shareholders of a company, because such shareholders possess a “legitimate interest … since they would have benefitted from the spoils of a successful litigation in any event”: Judgment at [44]. The assignments consequently were affected by maintenance or champerty, and were void being contrary to public policy. And since the assignments were void, POA Recovery had no standing to sue as assignee.
- [86]
[86] Maintenance proceedings are defined as the giving of assistance or encouragement to one of the parties to a litigation by a person who has neither an interest in the litigation nor any other motive recognised by the law as justifying his interference: Re Vanguard at [33]; Lim Lie Hoa v Ong Jane Rebecca [1997] 1 SLR(R) 775 (“Lim Lie Hoa”) at [23]; Hill v Archbold [1968] 1 QB 686 at 693; Law Society of Singapore v Kurubalan s/o Manickam Rengaraju [2013] 4 SLR 91 at [40].
- [87]
[87] Maintenance is generally distinguished from its subset, champerty, that consists of maintaining a civil action in consideration of a promise of a share in the proceeds if successful: Choo Cheng Tong Wilfred v Phua Swee Khiang and another [2021] SGHC 154 at [267]–[269]; Otech Pakistan Pvt Ltd v Clough Engineering Ltd [2007] 1 SLR(R) 989 at [32]; Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Civil Law (Amendment) Bill (10 January 2017) vol 94 (Indranee Rajah, Senior Minister of State for Law); UK, Law Commission, Proposals for Reform of the Law Relating to Maintenance and Champerty (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1966) at para 9; Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract (Butterworths Asia, 2nd Singapore and Malaysian Ed, 1998) at p 639.
- [88]
[88] As stated in Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142, the law on maintenance and champerty can best be kept in forward motion by looking to its origins as a principle of public policy designed to protect the purity of justice and the interest of vulnerable litigants. These fundamental considerations are not per se violated by the Investors’ use of a SPV structure, without more. There must be an accompanying element of impropriety (eg, with a surreptitious third-party funder controlling proceedings, or such third-party wagering on the litigation).
- [89]
[89] Upon close scrutiny of the facts, the litigation brought by POA Recovery did not fall into either prohibited category. For all intents and purposes, the Investors made use of POA Recovery for access to the courts. All the claims of transnational Investors were assigned to POA Recovery so that the assigned claims were “consolidated” and brought to court as a single high-value claim. As it transpired, POA Recovery was always controlled by the Investors. Mr Ong confirmed that the litigation was funded by the Investors: the Investors had contributed their pro-rata share of the proceeds of sale of some assets into the litigation pool, and additional funding was from some Investors like Enoch, Li’s employer, and a related company, Luck Hock (see [30] above). Above all, POA Recovery, as the assignee and a separate legal entity, would have no share in the proceeds of the litigation. Fruits of the litigation would be paid out to the Investors according to the terms of the Assignment Agreements. There is also no evidence that points to the existence of third-party financing and a third-party funder controlling the litigation.
- [90]
[90] The arrangement to use a special purpose vehicle with these attendant features, absent of any element of impropriety, would not necessarily offend the doctrine of maintenance nor impermissibly sidestep O 15 r 12 of ROC. With respect, we disagree with the Judge that if the Investors wished to sue collectively, the only procedurally permissible way would be to, inter alia, file a representative action under O 15 r 12 or join the parties and consolidate their actions under O 15 r 4 and O 4 r 1. In our view, the use of an entity to “consolidate” all claims to efficiently bring a single high-value claim to court may be viewed as a modern-day alternative to a representative action because it is much more than a representative action. What matters is that the assignments must not be, and are not, affected by any element of impropriety; POA Recovery as assignee does not sue in a representative capacity at all. Lastly, we add that such an assignment structure may (where appropriately used) also promote efficiency in the administration of justice; it obviates the need for the cumbersome task of filing hundreds, if not thousands of separate writs pending consolidation, thereby easing the strain on both litigants and the courts.
- [94]
[94] Having concluded as we have, there is strictly no need to consider the exceptions in Re Vanguard. However, as the facts relevant to the anterior inquiry overlap with the factual consideration of whether the exceptions to the rule prohibiting maintenance and champerty are satisfied, we find it appropriate to make brief remarks on certain observations made by the Judge.
- [95]
[95] With respect, we express our doubts as to the Judge’s conclusion that POA Recovery did not satisfy the second exception in Re Vanguard – that of a genuine commercial interest. In this inquiry, the court must look broadly at the totality of the transaction to determine whether there was genuine commercial interest: Re Vanguard at [35]; Trendtex Trading Corporation v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 (“Trendtex”) at 603; Brownton Ltd v Edward Moore Inbucon Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 499 (CA) at p 510. A close examination of the relevant jurisprudence reveals that the Judge might have erred in concluding as he did.
- [97]
[97] Similarly, in Lim Lie Hoa, the Court of Appeal held that there was a genuine interest on the part of parties, stating at [34] as follows:
- [98]
[98] The cases in the past required a pre-existing genuine commercial interest only because the entity/person taking the assignment existed independent of the underlying claim. The situation at hand is sui generis in nature, simply because POA Recovery has no distinct purpose from the Investors. It was indeed incorporated solely for the purpose of access to the court in respect of a single claim. A similar situation arose in JEB Recoveries LLP v Binstock [2015] EWHC 1063 (Ch). In that case, three individuals, Mr Wilson, Mr Hardy and Mr Stannard, set up JEB Recoveries LLP (“JEB Recoveries”) and assigned to it their debts and causes of action vis-à-vis the defendant Mr Binstock. The debt included a liquidated debt that Mr Binstock owed to Mr Wilson under a service contract, and this was the liquidated debt for which JEB Recoveries commenced the action against the defendant. In rejecting the arguments on champerty, the court specifically observed as follows:
- [99]
[99] We agree with Mr Ong that on the evidence, POA Recovery’s entire purpose (and indeed existence) was as a convenient tool to prosecute the Investors’ claims – this manifested the genuine commercial interest. We therefore respectfully disagree with the Judge’s view on this issue, as found at [44] of the Judgment. Thus, even if the present assignment structure were to be deemed champertous, POA Recovery would be able to avail itself of the second Re Vanguard exception.
- [100]
[100] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that contrary to the Judge’s view, POA Recovery does have locus standi to bring the present claim.
POA Recovery’s claim
- [101]
[101] As noted at [59] above, in the present appeal POA Recovery has advanced, as its primary case, claims in fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation. These were the same two claims that were advanced at trial: Judgment at [18]. As we explain below with reference to the applicable principles, it is appropriate in the appeal to consider first and foremost whether the respondents were dishonest in the ways alleged, bearing in mind that dishonesty must be established in both causes of action that undergird POA Recovery’s case.
Applicable principles
- [102]
[102] The elements for fraudulent misrepresentation are well-settled. The most recent restatement of the law is in Liberty Sky Investments Ltd v Goh Seng Heng and another [2020] 3 SLR 335 (“Liberty Sky”), which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Liberty Sky Investments Ltd v Aesthetic Medical Partners Pte Ltd and other appeals and another matter [2020] 1 SLR 606. Audrey Lim JC (as she then was) observed in Liberty Sky at [31] the existence of the following four elements:
(a) There must be a representation of fact.
(b) Such representation must have been made with the intention that it should be acted upon by the plaintiff.
(c) The plaintiff must have acted upon the false statement and suffered damage by so doing.
(d) The representation must be made “with knowledge that it is false, it must be wilfully false, or at least made in the absence of any genuine belief that it is true”.
- [103]
[103] The first element is what is commonly referred to as the “actionable representation” requirement: see Tonny Permana at [182], citing Tan Chin Seng and others v Raffles Town Club Pte Ltd [2003] 3 SLR(R) 307 (“RTC”). Not all statements can form the subject matter of a claim in misrepresentation. Actionable misrepresentations must imply “a factum, not a faciendum”, that is, a statement of present fact and not one with any element of futurity: RTC at [21]. Also, statements of opinion do not constitute actionable misrepresentations: Zuraimi bin Mohamed Dahlan and another v Zulkarnine B Hafiz and another [2020] SGHC 219 (“Zuraimi”) at [30], citing Goldrich Venture Pte Ltd and another v Halcyon Offshore Pte Ltd [2015] 3 SLR 990.
- [104]
[104] The second element expressed by Lim JC is a factual one that coalesces two overlapping ideas arising from case law. The first idea is that a representation must be addressed to or targeted at the representee. This is the rule in the seminal decision of Peek v Gurney (1873) LR 6 HL 377. Relatedly, the second idea is that the representation must have been intended to be “acted upon” – that is, the trite notion that mere puff cannot form the subject matter of a claim in misrepresentation: see Zuraimi at [29]. Mere puff “is reserved for a particular type of self-evidently hyperbolic representation … [i]t refers to the classic ‘hard sell’ made off-the-cuff by a salesman”: Zuraimi at [29]. The nexus between the two aforementioned ideas is self-evident – the intention of the representor, and who his intended addressee is, are relevant in the inquiry.
- [105]
[105] The third element is the well-established requirement of inducement, sometimes referred to as the requirement of reliance: see Wee Chiaw Sek Anna v Ng Li-Ann Genevieve (sole executrix of the estate of Ng Hock Seng, deceased) and another [2013] 3 SLR 801 at [44]; Ong Keh Choo v Paul Huntington Bernardo [2020] SGCA 69 at [80]–[91]. A plaintiff would not ordinarily be held to be induced by a misrepresentation if the express contractual terms, read and signed, contradict or correct the representor’s misrepresentation: see Tonny Permana at [70] and [194], citing the Court of Appeal’s decision in Broadley Construction Pte Ltd v Alacran Design Pte Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 110 (“Broadley”). In other words, a plaintiff must prove that he did rely on the misrepresentation, and that he had no opportunity, with due diligence, to rectify any misimpression that had purportedly been conveyed. Separately, where the representation is fraudulent, a rebuttable presumption arises that the representee was in fact induced to enter into the agreement by virtue of the representations made. The burden of proof shifts to the representor who must establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the fraudulent misrepresentation did not play a real and substantial part in causing the representee to enter into the agreement, albeit he does not have to go so far as to show that the misrepresentation played no part at all. In other words, proof that the misrepresentation was not a material cause of the decision to enter the contract would suffice.
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