Appellate Division of the High Court · Decided 28 April 2023
Liu Shu Ming and another v Koh Chew Chee and another matter
Feedback & support[2023] SGHC(A) 15 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 23 of 2022
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] He who asserts must prove. This is one of the golden rules of litigation. The present appeal against the decision of a judge of the General Division of the High Court (the “Judge”) in Koh Chew Chee v Liu Shu Ming and another [2022] SGHC 25 (the “Judgment”) is a salutary reminder of the consequences of failing to adduce the necessary evidence to prove one’s case.
The facts and the Judgment below
Background and the deal struck between the parties
- [2]
[2] The first and second appellants are Liu Shu Ming and Tong Xin (“Mr Liu” and “Ms Tong” respectively and collectively, the “Appellants”). They were involved in the “condotel” business where they provided condominium units for short-term accommodation. They ran this business through a company called MaxStays (Philippines) Inc (“MaxStays”) in the Philippines. In 2016, the Appellants wanted to expand their business and began looking for investors. One such investor they sought out was the respondent (“Ms Koh”).
- [3]
[3] This was the investment offered by the Appellants: the investor would purchase condominium units and lease them back to the Appellants at a rate amounting to approximately 6–7% of the annual return on the principal purchase price.
- [4]
[4] Ms Koh found this rate of interest to be attractive and became an investor. On 30 May 2017, she entered into a series of agreements (the “Contracts”) with the Appellants. These were made up of two components.
(a) First, an agreement for Ms Koh to purchase five condominium units (“the Units” and “the Purchase Agreement”). The Units consisted of three units, ie, Unit 806A, 615A and 614A at Fort Victoria (“the Victoria Units”) and two units, Unit 18H and 18B of Alessandro Tower at the Venice Residences (“the Venice Units”).
(b) Second, an agreement for the Appellants to rent the Units from Ms Koh for an initial period of three years, that is renewable every three years (“the Leaseback Agreement”). This component of the agreement was where Ms Koh would earn her return on investment, as the rent paid to her was meant to provide around a 6–7% annual return.
- [5]
[5] Both the Purchase Agreement as well as the Leaseback Agreement were captured in writing, which took the form of a “leaseback guarantee” and a “receipt”. As a preliminary point, while it was recognised by the Judge that the receipts did not constitute an agreement for the sale of land nor did the leaseback guarantee constitute an investment contract per se, nothing turns on this because it was accepted by the parties that there was an agreement for the sale and leaseback of the Units.
- [6]
[6] Apart from the Purchase Agreement and the Leaseback Agreement, one other important component of the deal struck between the parties, according to Ms Koh, was that if the market price of the Units had fallen upon the expiry of the leaseback period, the Appellants would buy the Units back from Ms Koh at the principal purchase price paid. However, if the market price of the Units had gone up, Ms Koh could sell the Units on the open market (the “Alleged Buyback Term”).
- [7]
[7] The Judge, however, found that Ms Koh had not proved the existence of the Alleged Buyback Term: Judgment at [35]. Amongst other reasons, the Judge held that if the Alleged Buyback Term was so important to Ms Koh for her to enter into the Contracts, she would have at least queried whether that term was still on the table given that it was missing from the written documents (ie, the leaseback guarantee and receipt) which the Appellants had produced for her signature shortly after she had orally accepted the Contracts. Ms Koh has not sought to challenge the Judge’s findings on this point in the present appeal.
- [8]
[8] Pursuant to the Contracts, Ms Koh began paying the purchase price for the Units, making her final payment in August 2018. It is undisputed that Ms Koh had paid S$1,468,895.69 to the Appellants. What is disputed, however, is whether this constituted full payment of the entire purchase price, as the Appellants’ case is that there was a shortfall.
Ms Koh discovers issues and allegedly terminates the Contracts
- [9]
[9] The Appellants began falling behind on rental payments in late 2019. To explain this, Mr Liu told Ms Koh in a WeChat message on 15 October 2019 that he was facing financial difficulties and thus could not pay the rent.
- [10]
[10] Investigations by Ms Koh through her solicitors showed that the Units were encumbered. Specifically, she found that there were mortgages over the Victoria Units, that the Appellants had assigned their rights and interests in the Victoria Units to MaxStays, and that MaxStays had in turn assigned these rights and interests to the Philippine National Bank. With regard to the Venice Units, she similarly discovered that the Appellants had assigned their rights and interests in these units to MaxStays.
- [11]
[11] Ms Koh, accompanied by her husband, met with Mr Liu on 16 November 2019. Ms Koh secretly recorded this meeting, and the recording and its transcript were produced in evidence. Essentially, Mr Liu tried to explain the current state of affairs, and the meeting ended with some suggestion that a resolution of their dispute would be forthcoming.
- [12]
[12] Further communications between parties regarding this potential resolution, however, bore no fruit. Ms Koh allegedly terminated the Contracts on 27 December 2019.
The claim in the High Court
- [13]
[13] Ms Koh filed an action against the Appellants on 14 February 2020 in HC/S 143/2020. Her main claim was for breach of the Contracts arising from the Appellants’ failure to transfer title to the Units and the non-payment of rent under the Leaseback Agreement. Ms Koh sought to recover damages representing two heads of loss. First, the sum she would have regained had the Appellants not acted in breach and had thus performed the obligation to repurchase the Units. Second, the rental she would have earned if the Leaseback Agreement had continued.
- [14]
[14] Ms Koh’s alternative claim was for fraudulent misrepresentation. She alleged that the Appellants had made many false representations to induce her to enter into the Contracts. In particular, Ms Koh pointed to the assurance, which the Appellants had made, that they would repurchase the Units. She said that without such an assurance, she would not have entered into the Contracts. In respect of her claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, Ms Koh sought to recover the sum of money she paid, less payments received from the Appellants under the Leaseback Agreement.
- [15]
[15] The Judge allowed Ms Koh’s claim for breach of contract, but not the claim for fraudulent misrepresentation. There is, before us, no appeal against the Judge’s decision to dismiss the claim for fraudulent misrepresentation.
- [16]
[16] In arriving at the conclusion that the Appellants had breached the Contracts, the Judge found it appropriate to characterise the two components of the Contracts as parts of a broader commercial investment. The reasons for doing so were twofold. First, the components of the Contracts were evidenced within single documents. Second, these documents did not contain any of the terms or details ordinarily seen in contracts for the sale of real property or leases. The lack of such detail strongly suggested that parties appear to have understood the Contracts as loose collections of obligations which facilitated Ms Koh’s investment in the business.
- [17]
[17] With this characterisation of the Contracts in mind, the Judge held that the Appellants’ obligation to transfer legal title in the Units to Ms Koh was a condition of the Contracts, the breach of which entitled Ms Koh to terminate the Contracts and sue for damages. An essential part of the Contracts was that Ms Koh would obtain a proprietary interest in the Units. Without obtaining such an interest, Ms Koh’s payment to the Appellants would be akin to an outright, unsecured loan. This was not what the parties had intended (Judgment at [97]–[98]).
- [18]
[18] Having found that there had been a breach of the Contracts and termination thereof, the Judge then turned to consider the issue of damages. This exercise was rendered more complex because of the manner in which Ms Koh’s case had been run.
- [19]
[19] Ms Koh had sought to recover her principal investment of around S$1.5m based solely on the Alleged Buyback Term. She submitted that on the standard measure of damages, if the Appellants had performed the Contracts, she would have recovered her principal investment. This was entirely orthodox.
- [20]
[20] There was, however, one problem. The Judge had found that there was no Alleged Buyback Term. This meant that damages should be awarded for the Appellants’ failure to deliver title to real property on the expectation basis, ie, what Ms Koh would have expected to receive if the Appellants had performed the Contracts by transferring title to her. Damages would be measured by taking the market value of the property at the time when title should have been transferred and deducting the contract price if that had not already been paid. If the contract price had been paid, as Ms Koh alleged, then the measure of damages would simply be the market value of the Units at the time when title should have been transferred. The difficulty the Judge faced was that Ms Koh did not adduce clear evidence to establish when title should have been transferred. More importantly, she did not adduce evidence to prove the market value of the Units.
- [22]
[22] As for Ms Koh’s claim for an account of profits as a consequence of the misuse of the Purchase Price she had paid to the Appellants, this was dismissed by the Judge who considered that the facts of the case did not justify such an award. There is no appeal by Ms Koh in relation to this point.
The appeal
Appellants’ case
- [23]
[23] The Appellants raise four issues on appeal. First, they argue that the Judge wrongly found that they had breached the Contracts (“the Breach Issue”). Second, that the Judge had wrongly awarded Ms Koh reliance damages (“the Damages Issue”). Third, that the Judge erred in awarding Ms Koh interest on the judgment sum from 1 October 2019 instead of the date of the Judgment (“the Interest Issue”). Finally, the Appellants argue that the Judge should have awarded them S$51,825.23 for their “counterclaim” for the remainder of the purchase price that allegedly was outstanding from Ms Koh (“the Shortfall Issue”).
Respondent’s case
- [24]
[24] Ms Koh argues that the Judge had rightly held that the Appellants had breached the Contracts by failing to transfer title to the Units and that Ms Koh had validly terminated the Contracts. As for the Damages Issue, Ms Koh argues that the award of damages ought to be upheld. In particular, Ms Koh asserts that the Judge was right in principle to award reliance damages, that there was evidence to support the award of such damages and that the damages awarded did not run afoul of the principle laid down in Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Exch 850 (“Robinson”). As for the Interest Issue, Ms Koh argued that the Judge was justified in granting pre-judgment interest from 1 October 2019. Ms Koh also argued that there was no shortfall as she had paid the full purchase price.
Application for leave to adduce further evidence for the appeal: AD/SUM 28/2022
- [25]
[25] Before dealing with the appeal, we address AD/SUM 28/2022 (“SUM 28”). This is an application by the Appellants to adduce the following pieces of further evidence (the “Further Documents”):
(a) A document apparently from New San Jose Builders, Inc. (“New San Jose”) on the transfer of rights with drafts of documents related to the transfer;
(b) Two documents said to be setting out “the list of requirements for the processing of the Deed of Absolute Sale and transfer of ownership” from MegaWorld Corporation (“MegaWorld”); and
(c) Various emails between Mr Liu and a gentleman named Kilroy P. Amar in July 2022. Mr Amar was apparently a representative from the contract management department of MegaWorld.
- [26]
[26] New San Jose is the developer of the Victoria Units while MegaWorld is the developer of the Venice Units.
- [27]
[27] In considering whether the Further Documents are to be admitted, the three cumulative requirements for adducing further evidence as set out in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 (“Ladd v Marshall”) are relevant (see also Loy Wei Ezekiel v Yip Holdings Pte Ltd and another matter [2022] SGHC(A) 43 at [40]; Kashmire Merkaney v NCL Housing Pte Ltd and another matter [2022] SGHC(A) 23 (“Kashmire Merkaney”) at [6], citing BNX v BOE [2018] 2 SLR 215 at [74]):
(a) First, the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the hearing below.
(b) Second, the evidence, if given, would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, though it need not be decisive.
(c) Third, the evidence must be apparently credible, though it need not be incontrovertible.
- [28]
[28] The fact that the litigants are unrepresented per se does not necessarily mean that the first Ladd v Marshall criterion would be satisfied. If the evidence was indeed available or could have been obtained with reasonable diligence and could have been put before the trial judge, then the mere fact that the party in question was unrepresented does not give them a second bite of the cherry to adduce that evidence on appeal: see Chan Ah Beng v Liang and Sons Holdings (S) Pte Ltd and another application [2012] 3 SLR 1088 at [21]–[22].
- [29]
[29] It also bears noting that the Ladd v Marshall requirements would typically be applied with full rigour when the proceedings below were a full trial. There are exceptions to this general rule. The Ladd v Marshall criterion may be relaxed in cases where: (a) the new evidence reveals a fraud that has been perpetrated on the trial court; (b) the applicant was prevented from adducing further evidence during the hearing below in circumstances which amount to a denial of natural justice; or (c) the subject matter of the dispute engenders interests of particular importance to the litigant or to the society at large: Kashmire Merkaney at [6] and [7] and Anan Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Co) [2019] 2 SLR 341 (“Anan Group”) at [57] and [58].
The parties’ arguments
- [30]
[30] The Appellants argue that the Further Documents should be admitted. They had only been able to obtain copies of the Further Documents in July 2022, which was some time after the trial had concluded even though they had for some time attempted to obtain such documents. These Further Documents, according to the Appellants, would have a significant impact on the case as they showed that the Appellants had been willing to transfer title to the Units, but had been unable to do so as Ms Koh had not complied with the requirements for transfer. These Further Documents were also credible, as they had been prepared and obtained from the developer.
- [31]
[31] Ms Koh, however, takes the position that leave should not be granted to adduce the Further Documents as evidence because the Ladd v Marshall requirements were not met. First, Ms Koh argues that the Further Documents could have been obtained for use at trial and that this was clear from the fact that the Appellants had stated at the first Case Management Conference that they had some of the Further Documents in their possession. Second, Ms Koh argues that the Further Documents have not been shown to be relevant or material; they would not have had a perceptible impact or important influence on the Judgment had they been adduced at trial. Finally, Ms Koh argues that the Further Documents do not appear to be credible as it is not known who had prepared each of these documents, and that the circumstances and purpose for which they were prepared and received by the Appellants is unknown.
Our decision on SUM 28
- [32]
[32] We dismiss the Appellants’ application to adduce the Further Documents. While the Appellants claim that they were only able to obtain the Further Documents in July 2022 even though they had been attempting to do so for some time, they did not adduce adequate evidence of their earlier attempts to demonstrate that these Further Documents could not have been obtained in time for the trial. For example, there was one email dated 15 July 2022 from Mr Liu to Mr Amar (referred to as Mr Kilroy) thanking him for providing the “SOP after waiting for more than three months”. At most this suggested that Mr Liu had begun to seek documents around beginning of April 2022 (which is more than three months before 15 July 2022).
- [33]
[33] It is clear to us that these Further Documents could have been obtained in time for the trial. Ms Koh had purportedly terminated the Contracts on 27 December 2019. The action was filed on 14 February 2020. The discovery process was already well underway as of 3 December 2020 when a Senior Assistant Registrar gave directions for specific discovery. The trial started on 19 August 2021. Given this, it is difficult to understand why these Further Documents could not have been obtained in time for trial. The story would have been different had the Appellants produced evidence showing that they had written to the developers requesting the Further Documents much earlier than April 2022 but had only received a reply after the trial had concluded. But there was no such evidence before us.
- [34]
[34] More importantly, we do not find that the Further Documents would have been significant. We accept that if the evidence in question was of such importance that the court cannot simply shut its eyes, then it may still be admitted despite it being available earlier: Anan Group at [59]. This was not the case.
- [35]
[35] The Appellants have stated that the Further Documents relate to two issues. First, that the Judge had “shifted” the burden to them to initiate the transfer of title. Second, that the Judge had not considered that it was impossible for them to transfer title without key documents.
- [36]
[36] It was, however, clear to us that both issues which the Appellants have raised were non-starters in the suit below. This was because the Appellants had conceded in their Defence (Amendment No 1) (“the Defence”) that they were obliged to transfer title once Ms Koh had confirmed and informed them of the nominee(s) whom she wished for the title to be transferred to. It was therefore erroneous of the Appellants to claim that the Judge had “shift[ed]” the burden to them to initiate the transfer of title. By their own case, they were obliged to transfer the title once Ms Koh had confirmed and informed the Appellants as to her choice of nominee. Once Ms Koh had done this, the burden was on them to fulfil their obligation to complete the transfer.
- [37]
[37] The Judge had proceeded on this basis. He considered that in determining whether the Appellants had breached the Contracts, three questions were relevant. First, who was Ms Koh’s nominee? Second, when did she confirm to the Appellants that such nominee was to be the title recipient? Third, what information did she provide so as to effect the transfer? (Judgment at [59]).
- [38]
[38] The Judge found that on 25 August 2018, Ms Koh had informed Mr Liu that transfer of title was to be made to LK (Philippines). She had also asked him to liaise with one Mr Renz directly in respect of any documents that Mr Liu might need. Mr Renz was a corporate secretary for LK (Philippines) and was introduced by Mr Liu to Ms Koh. Although there was no evidence as to any further information provided by Ms Koh, the Appellants had not mentioned to Ms Koh thereafter that they were awaiting further information or documents from her to transfer title to LK (Philippines).
- [39]
[39] Viewed in this light, it was clear that the Further Documents would not be significant. The question was not so much what the requirements for the transfer of title were but whether the Appellants were indeed waiting for Ms Koh to provide more information. The Further Documents did not address this issue.
- [40]
[40] For the above reasons, we dismiss SUM 28 being the Appellants’ application to adduce the Further Documents.
- [41]
[41] Besides SUM 28, the Appellants also sought to introduce some more new evidence by letter dated 21 September 2022 which was eight days before the first hearing of the appeal on 29 September 2022.
- [42]
[42] The new evidence per the Appellants’ letter dated 21 September 2022 was:
(a) three certificates of full payment from New San Jose dated 13 July 2020, stating that MaxStays had paid the full purchase price for the Victoria Units;
(b) two certificates from MegaWorld which were undated stating that MaxStays had paid the total contract price for the Venice Units; and
(c) a document entitled “Partial Release of Real Estate Mortgage” which was undated and purportedly executed by PNB-Mizuho Leasing and Finance Corporation to partially release five units in Fort Victoria (including the Victoria Units) from a mortgage (the “Partial Release”).
- [43]
[43] Ms Koh objected to this attempt to adduce more fresh evidence. She pointed out that the Judge had allowed the Appellants’ every request, nine in total, to adduce further documents already.
- [44]
[44] She said there was no evidence on the provenance of the documents. Also, the Appellants’ Case did not argue that the Judge was wrong in concluding that the Appellants had not redeemed the mortgages over the Units. The new evidence also did not show that as of 27 December 2019, which was the purported date of termination by Ms Koh, the Units were unencumbered.
- [45]
[45] We do not allow such evidence to be adduced. We agree that the provenance of the documents has not been established. In addition, the Partial Release appeared to be an incomplete document as the space for indicating the date of execution was left blank. The space for a witness to the execution to append his signature was left blank too.
- [46]
[46] The documents also do not show that as at 27 December 2019, the Units were unencumbered.
- [47]
[47] We add that at the end of the first hearing of the appeal on 29 September 2022, we adjourned the hearing to give parties time to address us on a legal point which we will elaborate on later (see [121] below). However, the Appellants sought to tender more documentary evidence via email on 24 October 2022. These documents pertained to:
(a) A title search on 4 October 2022 on various properties.
(b) Statements of Account dated 10 April 2022 and 11 January 2022 on real property taxes from the City of Taguig, Metro Manila, in respect of the Victoria Units and the Venice Units.
(c) A letter dated 9 June 2022 from lawyers for Max Group of Companies Inc to New San Jose and emails thereafter.
- [48]
[48] At the resumed hearing on 1 November 2022, Mr Liu said that the purpose of the title search was to show that the Units were no longer encumbered.
- [49]
[49] The documentary evidence about property tax was to show that the developers had paid such tax for which the Appellants had to reimburse them.
- [50]
[50] The letter dated 9 June 2022 was a demand for Victoria Units, as well as two other units at Fort Victoria (Unit 714A and 715A), to be released from encumbrances and the emails showed a discussion thereafter about payment of property tax first before release of encumbrances.
- [51]
[51] Mr Liu suggested that he was producing the documents because the court had observed at the hearing on 29 September 2022 that the Appellants had not adduced any title search to elaborate whether the Units were still encumbered. However, that observation was made in the context of the evidence before the Judge at the material time. It was not an invitation for the Appellants to attempt to furnish further evidence at this late stage.
- [52]
[52] Unsurprisingly, Ms Koh’s counsel objected to this attempt to adduce such evidence without even a formal application to do so. He did not accept that the title search showed that the Units were unencumbered and he was unable to assist on the other documents.
- [53]
[53] We are of the view that this belated attempt by the Appellants to adduce further evidence was unsatisfactory and reject it.
- [54]
[54] As intimated above, our observation at the hearing on 29 September 2022 was not an invitation for the Appellants to attempt to adduce more evidence. Furthermore, aside from the absence of a formal application to adduce such evidence, the same principles in Ladd v Marshall apply.
- [55]
[55] The credibility of the new evidence and its significance was unclear. The Appellants were effectively trying to give evidence on what the title searches showed without the benefit of elaboration by Philippine lawyers. Without such elaboration, we could not tell whether the Units were still encumbered, for example, by a paramount mortgage.
- [57]
[57] There was a further email dated 28 October 2022 from the Appellants enclosing emails about settlement discussions between the parties. However, while we agree that the disputes should be settled amicably, the discussions did not bear on the merits of the disputes and were therefore of no legal significance.
- [58]
[58] We would mention that there is a process by which parties can, if they so choose, adduce further evidence on appeal. A formal application to do so must be made. It does not suffice to drip-feed materials to the court by way of letters or emails to the Registrar/Registry of the Supreme Court. Even when a formal application is made, it may not be successful. In the present case, all the various attempts by the Appellants to introduce new evidence are rejected even if each of them was made by a formal application, as was done in SUM 28.
Our decision in respect of the appeal
The issues
- [59]
[59] We turn now to address the substantive appeal. The following issues arose for our consideration:
(a) Whether the Judge was correct in finding that the Appellants had breached the Contracts because they did not transfer title of the Units to Ms Koh and whether Ms Koh had validly terminated the Contracts.
(b) Whether the Judge was correct in awarding reliance damages.
(c) If the Judge was correct in awarding reliance damages, should there be a set-off as claimed by the Appellants?
(d) Should interest have been awarded to Ms Koh from 1 October 2019?
- [60]
[60] In considering these issues, the principles governing appellate interference with a trial judge’s factual findings are relevant. As we had noted in Ma Binxiang v Hainan Hui Bang Construction Investment Group Ltd [2022] SGHC(A) 37 at [19], a trial judge’s findings should be taken as prima facie correct and should not be disturbed in the absence of sound reasons. The threshold for appellate intervention is a high one: Dextra Partners Pte Ltd and another v Lavrentiadis, Lavrentios and another appeal and another matter [2021] SGCA 24 at [9]. An appellate court would be slow to overturn the trial judge’s findings of fact unless it can be shown that those findings are plainly wrong or are manifestly against the weight of evidence: Yong Kheng Leong and another v Panweld Trading Pte Ltd and another [2013] 1 SLR 173 at [18]. Where inferences of fact are concerned, an appellate judge is as competent as any trial judge to draw any necessary inferences of fact from the circumstances of the case: Ng Chee Chuan v Ng Ai Tee (administratrix of the estate of Yap Yoon Moi, deceased) [2009] 2 SLR(R) 918 at [12]–[13].
- [61]
[61] We turn to consider the issues, seriatim.
Whether the Judge was correct in finding that the Appellants had breached the Contracts because they did not transfer title of the Units to Ms Koh and whether Ms Koh had validly terminated the Contracts
Did Ms Koh state who the title of the Units was to be transferred to?
- [62]
[62] At trial, and on appeal, the Appellants’ position was that they were not obliged to transfer title to the Units because Ms Koh did not provide them with certain documents over and above the question as to whether she had informed them of the nominee to whom title was to be transferred.
- [63]
[63] However, the Appellants had said in the Defence (see above at [36]) that they would transfer the title to the Units once Ms Koh had confirmed and informed them of the nominee(s) to whom she wished for the title to be transferred. The pertinent question, therefore, was whether the Appellants’ obligation to transfer title had arisen. This turns on whether Ms Koh had informed the Appellants of the identity of the nominee for the transfer.
- [64]
[64] We agree with the Judge that Ms Koh had provided such information to the Appellants on 25 August 2018. The Judge had arrived at this conclusion based on an exchange of messages between Ms Koh and Mr Liu on 25 August 2018 (Judgment at [67]–[68]). We elaborate below on the exchange:
(a) Mr Liu messaged Ms Koh and her husband (Vincent) telling them that he had deposited the rent from the Units.
(b) Ms Koh asked Mr Liu to “advise” on the status of the transfer of the Units’ titles to LK (Philippines). Ms Koh added that she and her husband were transferring ownership of LK (Philippines) to a Singapore company.
(c) When Ms Koh pressed for an update, Mr Liu told Ms Koh that he was “waiting for [her] final decision” and that it would take “six to twelve months to transfer” title to LK (Philippines) if she chose it as her nominee.
(d) Ms Koh then asked: “[i]f to Singapore registered firm direct??” Presumably, she was asking how long it would take to transfer title to a Singapore company instead of to a Philippines entity.
(e) Before Mr Liu could reply, Ms Koh asked why title had yet to be transferred as she had made full payment 12 months ago (referring to the Venice Units). Mr Liu replied that it was because LK (Philippines) has “not yet complete[d] the required documents”. It is unclear what he meant by this, but Ms Koh then replied that she would check, and asked how long the transfer would take if LK (Philippines) was “full registered”.
(f) In reply, Mr Liu sent a PDF file called “Comparison of Alternatives”. This showed a table comparing the pros and cons of transferring title to either LK (Philippines), Strategic Eduhub Pte Ltd (also referred to as “SEPL”) or MaxStays.
(g) After this, Ms Koh stated “Mr Liu, we have decided. Property to be under LK and LK will be under a Singapore registered firm”. She then added that this decision was “final” and that they could not wait for six months. She hoped that the transfer would be completed in three months. Mr Liu replied to say that they would expedite provided that the LK (Philippines) documents were ready. Ms Koh responded to ask what documents were needed and whether Mr Liu could liaise directly with Mr Renz, the corporate secretary whom Mr Liu had introduced.
(h) Mr Liu replied to say that they would try but “no guarantee”. He would check with Mr Renz on the process.
(i) Ms Koh stressed that they needed the Units to be “fully registered in 3 months’ time”.
(j) Mr Liu repeated that they would try to expedite the process, though some things were out of their control.
- [65]
[65] In the circumstances, we saw no reason to disturb the Judge’s finding that Ms Koh had informed Mr Liu of the nominee to whom the title of the Units was to be transferred.
- [66]
[66] Against this, the Appellants argue that they were confused as to who the nominee for the transfer was to be (ie, between SEPL and LK (Philippines)). We reject this argument. The exchange between Ms Koh and Mr Liu on 25 August 2018 unequivocally showed that there was no confusion as to the nominee. As mentioned above, after Ms Koh had confirmed her choice of nominee, Mr Liu replied to say that they would expedite provided that the LK (Philippines) documents were ready.
Whether Ms Koh had failed to provide required documents to effect the transfer
- [67]
[67] We now address the Appellants’ argument that the title could not have been transferred as Ms Koh had failed to provide two key documents which the developer required to effect the transfer to a corporate nominee: (a) a board resolution from her nominee and (b) a Business Information Sheet.
- [68]
[68] The fatal flaw with this argument is that the Defence had not pleaded that Ms Koh had failed to provide these two documents as reasons for the non-transfer of title. Parties are bound by their pleaded case. The Appellants’ failure to plead this meant that the court below was precluded from deciding on the matter which the Appellants decided not to put into issue: V Nithia (co-administratrix of the estate of Ponnusamy Sivapakiam, deceased) v Buthmanaban s/o Vaithilingam and another [2015] 5 SLR 1422 at [38] (see also, Foo Khoon Chin & Ors v Gas Pantai Works Sdn Bhd & Anor [2011] 5 MLJ 438 at [15]).
- [69]
[69] Leaving aside the issue of pleadings, it is clear to us that the Appellants could not establish their argument on the evidence.
- [70]
[70] The Appellants had raised these two points in the trial below, and the Judge had rejected them both. They sought to raise the same points on appeal, but in our view, the result remains the same. We saw no reason to disturb the Judge’s findings on these points. While Mr Liu did inform Ms Koh that a board resolution was required, this request had been made before Ms Koh finally decided to choose LK (Philippines) as her nominee.
- [72]
[72] As for the Appellants’ assertion that Ms Koh had refused to sign the “Buyer Information Sheet”, the Judge noted that this request for her signature was made only in July 2021 (Judgment at [73]). By this time, Ms Koh had already purportedly terminated the Contracts and both parties were in the midst of preparing for trial. Any request made by the Appellants to Ms Koh to assist in transferring title would have, at that point, been water under the bridge. In addition, there was no evidence that the Appellants had made any request for the Buyer Information Sheet prior to the purported termination of the Contracts.
Whether the Appellants were entitled to any further payment before transferring title
- [73]
[73] The Appellants argue that there was a shortfall in payment by Ms Koh of the purchase price for the Victoria Units. In their Defence, this was pleaded as a set-off and not a counterclaim although both sides refer to the alleged shortfall as a counterclaim in their respective cases for the appeal.
- [74]
[74] Furthermore, the Appellant’s Defence did not assert that the shortfall was a valid reason for not transferring title to Ms Koh.
- [75]
[75] Nevertheless, for the appeal, the Appellants suggest that they must be paid the shortfall before they are obliged to transfer title. Hence, we address the Shortfall Issue here.
- [76]
[76] As mentioned above (at [8]), Ms Koh had paid S$1,468,895.69 to the Appellants for the Units. According to the Judge (Judgment at [42]), the parties had pleaded that the total purchase price was S$1,520,719.97 although the figure derived from the written evidence about the Contracts shows that the price should have been S$1,520,717. For present purposes, the very small difference is not material. Using the latter figure, the difference between S$1,520,717 less S$1,468,895.69 was S$51,821.31. According to the Appellants at the trial, and on appeal, the difference was S$51,824.28. It is not necessary to try and understand how the very small difference came about because the crux of the Appellants’ position is that there was a shortfall of about S$51,000.
- [77]
[77] The issue as to the shortfall arose in respect of the Victoria Units. As mentioned by the Judge, a final tranche of ₱16,093,035.80 was payable by Ms Koh for the Victoria Units. She claimed that she had received Mr Liu’s instructions on 9 July 2018 to transfer either ₱16,093,035.80 or an equivalent amount of S$407,479,546 The latter would be the equivalent of ₱16,093,035.80 using the prevailing exchange rate of S$1 to about ₱39.45 on 9 July 2018. Eventually Ms Koh transferred S$407,979.55 on 7 August 2018. The Appellants did not dispute that aspect of Ms Koh’s evidence but alleged that the rate was used “erroneously” by Mr Liu and that the parties had orally agreed to use an exchange rate of S$1 to ₱35 which would account for the difference of about S$51,000.
- [78]
[78] The Judge considered the evidence and arguments and concluded that the Appellants had failed to prove the oral agreement to use an exchange rate of S$1 to ₱35 (see Judgment at [47]–[53]). It is not necessary for us to reiterate his analysis. It is important to note that during the exchange of messages on 25 August 2018 when Ms Koh was asking for transfer of title (see above at [64]), Mr Liu did not say that there was any shortfall in payment. There was also no subsequent request or demand from him for such payment up to the date of the alleged termination of the Contracts.
- [79]
[79] In the circumstances, the Appellants have not established that the Judge had erred on this issue. We agree that there was no shortfall in the payment of the purchase price of the Victoria Units. The Appellants cannot use it as a reason for not transferring the Units or as a counterclaim or set-off against Ms Koh’s claim for damages.
When title should have been transferred
- [80]
[80] We turn to consider when the Appellants should have effected the transfer of title. The Appellants appeared to suggest, on appeal, that there was some “flexibility” as to when the title should have been transferred.
- [81]
[81] As to the date by which the Appellants had to effect the transfer, the only written document pertaining to the Purchase Agreements and the Receipts do not set out a timeline for transfer. The Appellants argue that it is common practice in the Philippines for agreements relating to property to be flexible, and that this explains why there was no stipulated timeline in the Contracts. They further say that the Judge had failed to appreciate the “dynamics regarding [the] transfer of properties in [the] Philippines”.
- [82]
[82] The Appellants, however, did not put forth any evidence to support their argument about a practice relating to the transfer of properties in the Philippines. We also do not accept, as they suggest, that such flexibility means that they have an indefinite time to do so. That does not make commercial sense. At most, they could argue that they had to do within a reasonable time from 25 August 2018.
- [83]
[83] In cases “where a party to a contract undertakes to do an act, the performance of which depends entirely on itself, and the contract is silent as to the time of performance … the law implies an obligation to perform the act within a reasonable time, having regard to all circumstances of the case”: Chitty on Contracts vol 1 (Hugh G Beale gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 34th Ed, 2021) (“Chitty”) at [24-013]; Naughty G Pte Ltd v Fortune Marketing Pte Ltd [2018] 5 SLR 1208 at [148], citing Max Master Holdings Ltd v Taufik Surya Dharma [2016] SGHC 147 at [98] (see also, Sutcliff v Thirkell [2001] ADR.L.R. 06/08; Behzadi v Shaftesbury Hotels Ltd [1992] Ch 1 at p 24C per Purchas LJ).
- [84]
[84] On the facts, we find that a reasonable time for the Appellants to have effected the transfer was six to 12 months from the exchange of messages on 25 August 2018. After all, Mr Liu himself had told Ms Koh, during their exchange on 25 August 2018, that it would take six to 12 months to transfer the title to LK (Philippines) (see [64(c)] above). The latest date was therefore 25 August 2019.
- [85]
[85] On this basis, the Appellants were in breach of the Contracts. By the time Ms Koh purportedly terminated the Contracts on 27 December 2019, this was more than a year since 25 August 2018 and the Appellants had yet to transfer title.
Whether the breach entitled Ms Koh to terminate and did she validly terminate the Contracts?
- [86]
[86] We examine whether there was a breach of the Contracts which gave Ms Koh the right to terminate them, and whether she had validly terminated the Contracts.
- [87]
[87] We start with what Ms Koh had pleaded in her Statement of Claim (Amendment No 1) (“SOC”).
- [88]
[88] Ms Koh had, at paragraph 20 of the SOC, alleged that the Appellants had made late payments of the monthly Lease Back Payments that fell due from June 2019 to September 2019. Further, the Appellants did not make payment of those which fell due starting from October 2019.
- [89]
[89] Paragraph 21(c) of the SOC alleged that as of 15 October 2019, the Appellants had not made full payment for the Victoria Units to the developer.
- [90]
[90] Paragraph 22 of the SOC alleged that the Appellants had also not made full payment for the Venice Units.
- [91]
[91] Paragraph 23 of the SOC alleged that the Appellants had admitted to Ms Koh on or around 16 November 2019 to having taken up “in-house financing” in respect of the Units without Ms Koh’s knowledge or consent.
- [92]
[92] We now come to paragraph 24 of the SOC. In view of its importance, we set it out in full.
- [93]
[93] We note that paragraph 24 did not specify which act of the Appellants amounted to a repudiation of the Contracts. The Appellants’ taking of a mortgage was not in itself an act of repudiation. Failure to transfer title would be a breach of contract but not necessarily an act of repudiation.
- [94]
[94] At paragraph 33, Ms Koh pleads in the alternative that the Appellants’ failure to make payment of the Lease Back Payments is a breach of the Contracts for which she was entitled to, inter alia, terminate the leases created under the Contracts. But Ms Koh had only pleaded that she was entitled to terminate the leases for breach, and not the Contracts.
- [95]
[95] Ms Koh’s pleadings have, as we explain below (at [105]–[113]), consequences.
- [96]
[96] We now address the letter dated 27 December 2019 which was sent by Ms Koh’s lawyers at the time, Asia Law Corporation, to the Appellants (“the Letter”).
- [97]
[97] The Letter mentioned:
(a) That Ms Koh had paid $1,520,719.97 (which was actually inaccurate as we have elaborated above at [76]);
(b) The monies were used to purchase the Units;
(c) Lease Back Guarantees from the Appellants by virtue of which the Appellants were to pay Ms Koh a Monthly Lease Back Payment;
(d) Since around August 2019, such payments have not been made.
- [98]
[98] We set out below paragraph 7 of the Letter which states:
- [99]
[99] The reference to the repayment of the purchase price of the Units was out of place because the previous paragraphs did not state why Ms Koh should be entitled to such repayment. The focus was on the Lease Back Payment instead.
- [100]
[100] In addition, there was only a demand for certain payments followed by a threat of legal proceedings. The Letter did not purport to terminate the Contracts.
- [101]
[101] When we pointed this out to Ms Koh’s counsel, he sought to rely on paragraph 12 of the Opening Statement for the Appellants at the start of the trial. Paragraph 12 states:
- [102]
[102] In so far as this paragraph referred to an email dated 23 July 2021 from Ms Koh’s new lawyers, Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP, the email did not help her. The email stated:
- [103]
[103] As can be seen, the email had assumed that the Letter had validly terminated the Contracts on 27 December 2019 when this was not the case.
- [104]
[104] Coming back to paragraph 12 of the Opening Statement, we note that it referred to the termination of “the Lease” (ie, the Lease Back arrangement), not the Contracts. The Appellants had accepted that only the former had been terminated. Ms Koh’s counsel had misconstrued paragraph 12.
- [105]
[105] The Judge said (at [94]) that he had to consider whether the Appellants had committed repudiatory breaches of the Contracts. He concluded (at [98]) that their obligation to transfer legal title of the Units to Ms Koh were conditions of the Contracts, the breach of which entitled her to terminate the Contracts and claim damages.
- [106]
[106] A repudiatory breach, in the narrow sense, refers to the renunciation of a contract: The Law of Contract in Singapore (Andrew Phang Boon Leong gen ed) (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2022) (“The Law of Contract in Singapore”) at [17.007], citing San International Pte Ltd (formerly known as San Ho Huat Construction Pte Ltd) v Keppel Engineering Pte Ltd [1998] 3 SLR(R) 447 (“San International”). The broader definition of a repudiatory breach extends its scope to include reference to a breach of a condition: The Law of Contract in Singapore at [17.006], citing Heyman v Darwins Limited [1942] AC 356 at p 397.
- [107]
[107] Our courts have referred to a repudiatory breach in its wider sense. That is evident from Phosagro Asia Pte Ltd v Piattchanine, Iouri [2016] 5 SLR 1052 where, at [52], the Court of Appeal (“CA”) referred to RDC Concrete Pte Ltd v Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 413 as stating four situations in which a breach of contract would amount to a repudiatory breach.
- [108]
[108] Ms Koh, however, had not pleaded that there was a repudiatory breach. She pleaded that there had been a “repudiation of the Agreement” (ie, the Contracts).
- [109]
[109] Ms Koh’s case, therefore, was that the Appellants had, by their conduct, evinced an intention not to perform their obligations at all under the Contracts. In other words, Ms Koh’s case was that the Appellants had renounced the Contracts: see iVenture Card Ltd and others v Big Bus Singapore City Sightseeing Pte Ltd and others [2022] 1 SLR 302 at [63] and [64].
- [110]
[110] In short, Ms Koh had not pleaded in the SOC the breach of a condition by the Appellants which entitled her to terminate the Contracts. Even if her pleading could be read to include the breach of a condition, there was another difficulty, ie, whether she had validly terminated the Contracts. Her pleaded position was that the termination was effected by the Letter.
- [111]
[111] The Judge appears to have wrongly assumed that the Contracts were validly terminated on 27 December 2019 by the Letter when this was not the case (Judgment at [73]). As earlier mentioned, the Letter did not purport to effect any termination of the Contracts.
- [112]
[112] While the Appellants did not accept that Ms Koh was entitled to terminate the Contracts, they did not challenge the Letter as the act of termination. Be that as it may, we asked Ms Koh’s counsel about the sufficiency of the Letter as the act of termination and, as mentioned, he relied on paragraph 12 of the Opening Statement for the Appellants.
- [114]
[114] In the circumstances, the question whether the Judge was correct in granting Ms Koh reliance damages is academic but because of the significance of that issue, both generally and in the Judgment, we address it below.
Whether the Judge was correct in awarding reliance damages
- [115]
[115] We come now to the issue of whether damages should have been assessed on the reliance basis. It was clear from the Judgment that Ms Koh had failed to adduce evidence as to the market value of the Units as at 25 August 2019 (ie, the latest date for the transfer) or any other date for that matter. We will refer to the “market value” simply as “the value”.
- [116]
[116] The Judge said that Ms Koh’s omission had put the court in a difficult position. Notwithstanding this, the Judge considered that damages in this case could and should be awarded on the reliance basis, although Ms Koh had only sought damages on the expectation basis.
- [117]
[117] In arriving at this conclusion, the Judge noted that there were cases which had “allowed innocent parties to recover the purchase price they paid as a form of ‘wasted expenditure’ within the ambit of reliance damages” [emphasis in original] (Judgment at [109]).
- [118]
[118] It however, appeared to us that in cases where plaintiffs have been awarded reliance damages, this was because it was impossible or, at least, extremely difficult, to prove that they would have turned a profit had the contract not been breached. In the case before us, Ms Koh did not suggest that it was impossible or difficult to adduce evidence of the value of the Units. Indeed, logic suggests that it should have been a simple matter for her to adduce such evidence had she applied her mind to do so.
- [119]
[119] Therefore, the main question was when a court may award reliance damages. Connected to this, a sub-issue was whether a plaintiff could make such a claim only if it was impossible to prove expectation damages in the usual way (ie, by proving the value of the Units).
- [120]
[120] The main question and sub-issue were matters of law which were not raised by the Appellants as such. Their arguments were focussed on the holdings of the Judge which led to his conclusion that they were in breach of contract. Nevertheless, we considered the question and sub-issue because they were important generally and central to the present case.
- [121]
[121] We asked Ms Koh’s counsel to assist us on the main question and, more specifically, the sub-issue and he sought time to do so. As mentioned, the Appellants were not legally represented and were unlikely to assist then. We therefore granted an adjournment of two weeks for parties to file further submissions. The Appellants, being litigants-in-person, were given the opportunity to engage counsel to file submissions on their behalf.
- [122]
[122] Ms Koh’s subsequent submissions took the position that the impossibility of proving expectation damages was not a requirement for claiming reliance damages. At best, the impossibility of proving expectation damages would be one basis to claim reliance damages by raising the presumption that the plaintiff’s wasted expenditure would have been recouped had the contract been performed. This would then shift the burden of proof to a defendant to show that the plaintiff would not have recouped wasted expenditure. The Appellants’ subsequent submissions on this issue simply regurgitated the general rule that a plaintiff was ordinarily entitled to expectation damages.
- [123]
[123] Having considered parties’ submissions, we agree that the impossibility of proving expectation damages is not a prerequisite which a plaintiff must always meet before being entitled to claim reliance damages. In this case, Ms Koh did not advance a claim for reliance damages. Her pleaded relief is for expectation damages only. On the facts of this case, Ms Koh did not succeed in her claim for expectation damages because she omitted to lead any evidence to support her claim for expectation damages; the situation that she finds herself in, from her omission to adduce evidence to support her claim for expectation damages, is detrimental to her.
- [124]
[124] We are also of the view that it is not open to a plaintiff to claim reliance damages simply because he chooses not to adduce evidence of expectation damages. Such a plaintiff does not have an unfettered option to switch to a claim for reliance damages and the court does not have a wide discretion to grant such damages in every case even when such damages are not pleaded.
- [125]
[125] As mentioned, it was not difficult, let alone impossible to prove the value of the Units as at a certain date.
- [126]
[126] In the circumstances, it was not open to the Judge to award reliance damages to Ms Koh after she failed to prove expectation damages. We elaborate below.
The law on contract damages
- [127]
[127] We begin with the basic principle governing contractual damages as expressed in Robinson at 855:
- [128]
[128] In considering the position that the party would have been in had the contract been performed, the following points are relevant. Parties would have to, in pursuing performance of the contract, typically incur some form of capital expenditure. If the plaintiff is confident of showing that the gross profits he would have made, but for the breach, exceeds his initial outlay, the claim would be framed on the basis of his expectation loss in the form of the lost gross profits (Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd and others v Yeo Boong Hua and others and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 655 (“Turf Club”) at [125]). An award of damages on this basis would include and exceed his expenditure.
- [130]
[130] In the vast majority of cases, the plaintiff, being able to put forth evidence as to the quantum of his lost gross profits, would usually claim for expectation damages. In certain situations, however, the plaintiff may realise that he will not be able to adduce evidence to prove the quantum of lost gross profits. Here, the plaintiff may instead choose to frame his claim as one for reliance damages as we elaborate later.
- [131]
[131] If this path is taken, the plaintiff has to show that he had incurred expenses in reliance on the contract. The burden of proof is then shifted to the defendant who has to show that the contract would have been unprofitable, and that the plaintiff would not even have been able to recoup such expenses (Turf Club at [126] and [128]).
- [132]
[132] It is clear that even in cases where reliance damages are awarded, the underlying principle is still that as laid down in Robinson: that the innocent party should be placed in the position he would have been had the contract been performed. As the CA noted in Alvin Nicholas Nathan v Raffles Assets (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2016] 2 SLR 1056 (“Alvin Nicholas”) at [23] and [24]:
- [133]
[133] As can be seen, the expressions used in that case were “expectation loss” and “reliance loss”. These are interchangeable with “expectation damages” and “reliance damages” respectively and we continue to use the latter expressions.
- [134]
[134] Reliance damages are not awarded on a different basis from expectation damages (see Adam Kramer, The Law of Contract Damages (Hart Publishing, 3rd Ed, 2022) (“Law of Contract Damages”) at [18-67]–[18-68]; Andrew Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Contract (Oxford University Press, 2016) at p 123). We note that in Turf Club, Justice Andrew Phang Boon Leong said at [126], obiter, that in contrast to expectation damages, reliance damages puts the plaintiff in the position as if the contract had never been entered into in the first place. This statement is not inconsistent with the proposition set out at the start of this paragraph. Reliance damages would put a plaintiff in a situation akin to one where the contract had not been entered into. That is, practically speaking, the end result. But it does not detract from the fundamental rule that damages for breach of contract should put a plaintiff in the position he would be in if the contract had been performed. However, it is impermissible to award a claimant both expectation damages (ie, a claim for gross profits lost) as well as reliance damages (ie, a claim for wasted expenditure) as that would violate the principle laid down in Robinson.
- [135]
[135] The Judge was aware that the normal measure of damages in respect of the failure by the Appellants to transfer title was the value of the Units at the time the transfer should have been effected if the contract price had been paid (see Judgment at [101]). This would be expectation damages. However, he noted that this would require Ms Koh to prove the value of the Units and no valuation had been tendered as evidence.
- [136]
[136] As mentioned, the Judge was of the view that the court was put in a difficult position. Without evidence of the value of the Units, the court could not state with any certainty the position Ms Koh would be in had the contracts been performed. Therefore, expectation damages could not be properly quantified. On the other hand, there was no claim brought by Ms Koh in unjust enrichment.
- [137]
[137] The Judge considered whether he could nevertheless assume that the value of the Units was that which Ms Koh had originally paid for, but he thought that this would be to coat a conceptual question with evidential veneer (Judgment at [104]). He thought that there were at least two issues with this.
- [138]
[138] First, the assumption would not only unjustifiably relieve Ms Koh of the burden of proving expectation damages. It might also be at the risk that she might be over-compensated (Judgment at [105]).
- [139]
[139] Secondly, Ms Koh did not mount a claim for unjust enrichment. If the court were to assume the value of the Units as the price that Ms Koh paid for, it would effectively be granting her a restitutive remedy without requiring her to demonstrate a total failure of basis of her expenditure (as well as the other elements for an unjust enrichment claim) (Judgment at [106]).
- [140]
[140] That said, the Judge nevertheless considered whether he could and should award Ms Koh reliance damages, ie, the price she had paid for the Units (plus any unpaid rent which she was entitled to receive).
- [141]
[141] He noted that there will invariably be cases where a plaintiff will not be able to prove the profitability of a contract, for example, where the subject of the contract may be too speculative. In such a situation, if the plaintiff was unable to prove that he would have earned a profit, it would be likely that he would also struggle to prove that he would at least have recovered his expenditure. The Judge was of the view that in such a situation, a plaintiff should not be left without any recovery, even if he did not rely on unjust enrichment. The Judge was of the view that even within the field of contract, the law would allow the plaintiff his expenditure by shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. This would mean that it would be for the defendant to prove that the plaintiff would not even have been able to recover his expenditure. The Judge was of the view that the shifting of the burden of proof where reliance damages is claimed is well-established by case authorities (Judgment at [119]). The basis for shifting or reversing the burden of proof is a presumption that a plaintiff would not enter a loss-making contract (Judgment at [120], citing Commonwealth of Australia v Amann Aviation Pty (1991) 104 ALR 1 (“Amann”), L Albert & Son v Armstrong Rubber Co 178 F (2d) 182 (1949) (“L Albert & Son”)).
- [142]
[142] The Judge concluded that reliance damages is awarded on the same basis as ordinary expectation damages (ie, to put a plaintiff in the position he would have been had the contract been performed) (Judgment at [122]). We agree with the Judge’s observation (see above at [134]).
- [144]
[144] With respect, the Judge’s reliance on One Step was in error. He referred to [36], [37] and [96] of the majority judgment delivered by Lord Reed:
- [145]
[145] Presumably, the Judge was referring to the sentence, “The court will have to select the method of measuring the loss which is the most apt in the circumstances to secure that the claimant is compensated for the loss which it has sustained” (“the Sentence”).
- [146]
[146] However, it is important to bear in mind the first two sentences of [37] in One Step before the Sentence which states: “The quantification of economic loss is often relatively straightforward. There are, however, cases in which its precise measurement is inherently impossible.” [emphasis added].
- [147]
[147] The case of Parabola Investments Ltd v Browallia Cal Ltd (formerly Union Cal Ltd) [2011] QB 477 is then cited which mentions consequential damages which are capable of being established with precision and others which are not. An example of the latter is then given (pertaining to a breach of contract affecting the operation of a business), followed by the Sentence.
- [148]
[148] Therefore, the Sentence was referring to the second scenario where the precise measurement of economic loss is inherently impossible and not the first where quantification of economic loss (ie, expectation damages) is relatively straightforward.
- [149]
[149] In the first scenario, expectation damages can be proven quite easily. Therefore, One Step is not a basis upon which the award of reliance damages to Ms Koh can be justified.
- [150]
[150] The Judge’s later reliance on Chitty at [29-019] and [38] of One Step was also in error for a similar reason (Judgment at [131]). We set out the first part of [38] of One Step which states:
- [151]
[151] The passage from Chitty refers to genuine difficulty in establishing expectation damages with precision. That should not be read to apply to a situation where a plaintiff simply fails to adduce evidence to prove expectation damages.
- [152]
[152] On the question of pleadings, the Judge was mindful of Filobake Ltd v Rondo Ltd and another [2005] EWCA Civ 563 (“Filobake”) where a plaintiff had applied to amend the particulars of its claim at the appeal stage to insert a claim for “wasted expenditure” (ie, reliance damages). The UK Court of Appeal refused the application to amend. Chadwick LJ said at [62] and [63]:
- [153]
[153] The Judge also noted (Judgment at [134]) Chadwick LJ’s observations in Filobake at [64] that:
- [154]
[154] The Judge continued (Judgment at [135]):
- [155]
[155] The Judge then said that he would offer no general solution and that the matter would have to be resolved in another case.
- [156]
[156] However, and more importantly for our present purposes, the Judge was of the view that the court could determine the most suitable measure of damages even without much assistance from counsel and, we add, even if the alternative method of assessment had not been pleaded or advocated by the plaintiff. Hence, he was of the view that it was permissible to award Ms Koh reliance damages even where she did not claim such a loss “so long as the defendant is not prejudiced by the shift in the burden of proof …” (Judgment at [138]).
- [157]
[157] On the facts before him, the Judge was of the view that the Appellants would not be prejudiced. Even if the Appellants had been put on notice that the burden of proof had shifted to them, it was highly unlikely that they would have discharged the burden for two reasons (Judgment at [139]).
- [158]
[158] First, the Judge took into account the rental revenue which Ms Koh was supposed to receive from the Leaseback Agreement. This represented about 18.5% of the total expenditure. He then opined that as the Units were situated in Manila, the capital of the Philippines, it was not likely that their value would have dropped by a rather substantial 18.5% (Judgment at [141]).
- [159]
[159] Secondly, even if the Appellants could have shown a drop in value, Ms Koh could have waited for an upswing in the market and continued leasing out the Units in the meantime to generate revenue (Judgment at [142]).
- [160]
[160] Accordingly, the Judge found it appropriate to award Ms Koh reliance damages notwithstanding (a) that she had only claimed expectation damages and (b) the difficulties identified in Filobake if a plaintiff were allowed such a claim after trial.
- [161]
[161] With due respect, we do not agree with the Judge at various levels.
- [162]
[162] First, we do not agree with the two reasons given by the Judge to say that the Appellants would not be prejudiced. It was not for the Judge to determine that it was unlikely that the value of the Units would not drop by more than 18.5%. This was a matter for expert evidence. He was effectively attributing some arbitrary value to the Units without the benefit of a valuation. It was not open to a court to do so in the circumstances.
- [163]
[163] It was also not open to him to consider that Ms Koh could rely on an upswing in the market. The value of a property is to be determined as at a certain date (or a certain period). It is not for a court to take into account possible upswings in the future.
- [164]
[164] Furthermore, Ms Koh had not given notice of a claim for reliance damages such that the Appellants might have realised that the burden of proof might shift to them to show the value of the Units and so that they could have taken steps to show that the value was less than what she had expended. It is no answer to say that, being lay defendants, they were not likely to have acted on that opportunity. They were represented initially and if the appropriate plea had been made at the outset, they might have received advice to adduce such evidence as they needed. In any event, the point is that they should have been given the opportunity to respond to a claim for reliance damages whether or not they would have acted on it.
- [165]
[165] It is not necessary for us to decide whether claims for expectation and reliance damages may be made, if both are being pursued as alternatives. Assuming it is permissible (and we do not decide on this), at the minimum, Ms Koh should have given notice of a claim for reliance damages as soon as possible so that the Appellants were given the opportunity to take such steps as they deemed fit.
- [166]
[166] Most importantly, the Judge had wrongly concluded that it is open to a court to award reliance damages because it is for the court to determine the most suitable measure of damages in any event. This suggested a wide discretion to award reliance damages in any case so long as there is no prejudice to a defendant (“the Judge’s proposition”). As we mentioned above (at [143]–[151]), the Judge’s reliance on One Step was in error.
- [167]
[167] Furthermore, in our view, there is always prejudice to a defendant if reliance damages are considered because the burden of proof is shifted to him to show that the plaintiff would have not been entitled to wasted expenditure. The correct approach is not to see if there is prejudice to a defendant. It is for a plaintiff to first cross the threshold that it is appropriate to consider reliance damages in the first place.
- [168]
[168] We turn next to address the sub-issue which we had earlier identified (above at [119]).
- [169]
[169] Expectation damages are ordinarily the damages that a plaintiff is entitled to claim. He may also claim reliance damages but the question is whether that is at his unfettered option or whether such a claim may only be made if it was impossible to prove expectation damages.
- [170]
[170] In Cullinane v British “Rema” Manufacturing Co Ltd [1954] 1 QB 292 (“Cullinane”), Sir Evershed MR said, at p 303:
- [171]
[171] At p 308, Jenkins LJ said:
- [172]
[172] The ratio of Cullinane, as some commentators have observed, is debatable (McGregor on Damages (James Edelman, Jason Varuhas & Simon Colton gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 21st Ed, 2020) at [4-044]–[4-049]). What is clear, however, is that Cullinane did lay down the proposition that a plaintiff could choose between expectation and reliance damages, but he could not have both. Cullinane, however, is silent as to when a plaintiff is entitled to claim reliance damages.
- [173]
[173] In Anglia Television Ltd v Reed [1972] 1 QB 60 (“Anglia Television”), the plaintiff, which was a television company, took action against an actor, the defendant, for his wrongful repudiation of a contract to play the leading man’s part in a television play that the plaintiff was producing.
- [174]
[174] Lord Denning MR noted that the plaintiff could not say what its profit would have been if the defendant had performed the contract. So, the plaintiff claimed wasted expenditure (ie, reliance damages). The issue there was not whether the plaintiff could claim reliance damages, as such, but whether such damages would extend to expenditure incurred before the contract with the defendant was made. Lord Denning MR said (at 63 and 64):
- [175]
[175] In CCC Films (London) Ltd v Impact Quadrant Films Ltd [1985] QB 16 (“CCC Films”), Hutchison J cited the passages of the judgments of Sir Evershed MR in Cullinane and Lord Denning MR in Anglia Television which we have mentioned above and said (at 32):
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