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Grounds publishedDecided 2 Jan 2024

Appellate Division of the High Court

ICOP Construction (SG) Pte Ltd v Tiong Seng Civil Engineering (Pte) Ltd

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[2024] SGHC(A) 1Case no. Appellate Division / Civil Appeal No 100 of 2022

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] This appeal, AD/CA 100/2022 (“AD 100”), arises from a construction dispute between ICOP Construction (SG) Pte Ltd (“ICOP”), a subcontractor for microtunneling works, and the main contractor, Tiong Seng Civil Engineering (Private) Limited (“TSCE”).

  3. Background facts

  4. [3] The appellant, ICOP, is a company incorporated in Singapore. It is in the business of constructing, inter alia, water, gas, and sewage pipelines. The respondent, TSCE, is also incorporated in Singapore, and its business is in the provision of infrastructure engineering design and consultancy services, as well as the construction of civil engineering projects. TSCE belongs to a group of companies which includes Tiong Seng Contractors Pte Ltd (“TSC”).

  5. [4] In or around June 2016, TSC was engaged by the Public Utilities Board (the “PUB”) to construct a potable water pipeline in a project titled “Proposed 1600mm Diameter Pipeline from AYE/Henderson Road to River Valley Road” (the “Project”). The Project was part of a larger project for the construction of potable water pipelines from Jalan Kampong Chantek to Marina South and River Valley Road. TSC subcontracted the Project wholly to TSCE.

  6. [5] Around May 2017, TSCE subcontracted the microtunnelling works to ICOP (the “Subcontract”). This was done through the execution of a letter of award (“LOA”), as amended by a supplemental letter (“Supplemental Letter”), both of which were backdated to 15 April 2017. The reason for the backdating was that ICOP had commenced work before the execution of the LOA and Supplemental Letter. The parties were to subsequently agree upon a set of General Conditions of the Subcontract but they were unable to reach an agreement; consequently, the Subcontract did not have any General Conditions.

  7. [6] Under the Subcontract, ICOP’s scope of work was to install: “124m of DN1200mm Reinforced Concrete Composite Pipe with built in Mild Steel Collar” and “2229m of DN1600mm” of the same type of pipe but of a larger diameter (the “Subcontract Works”). “DN” refers to the internal diameter of the pipe. The installation method was microtunnelling.

  8. [7] The process of microtunnelling has been explained by the Judge in detail at [5] to [7] of his decision in ICOP Construction (SG) Pte Ltd v Tiong Seng Civil Engineering Pte Ltd [2022] SGHC 257 (the “Judgment”). For the purposes of this judgment, ICOP’s microtunnelling works under the Subcontract involved the following. Essentially, vertical shafts, called working shafts, were constructed at intervals along the proposed route of the pipeline (this work was carried out by TSCE). These shafts were sunk from ground level to the proposed depth of the tunnel. Tunnel boring would then be carried out by a microtunnel boring machine (“MTBM”) at the correct depth from the bottom of the shaft. This comprised a circular cutter head, or wheel, affixed to a trailing steel cylindrical section (often called a “trailing steel can”) containing the associated machinery; the cutter head rotated as it bored into the soil creating a tunnel for the proposed pipeline. The MTBM was pneumatically pushed forward and into the soil by a hydraulic jacking machine, also situated within the shaft. As the cutter head cut into the soil, rocks and soil were ground down in a chamber immediately behind the cutter head, mixed with a drilling fluid to form a slurry and transferred to the slurry circuit which removed the slurry of rocks and soil away from the cutter head. This slurry was then transported up to a “separator plant” (or a slurry treatment plant, “STP”) on the surface where the rock and soil were separated from the drilling fluid. The rock and soil were disposed off-site, and the drilling fluid recycled back to the MTBM. As the MTBM bored its way through the soil, it would stop at intervals for a section of the prefabricated pipe to be placed securely and accurately, initially, behind the cutter head’s trailing steel cylinder, and subsequently, into the end of the preceding fabricated pipe. These reinforced concrete composite pipes with built in steel collars were exactingly manufactured, so that one end of the pipe securely fitted into the other end of the preceding pipe, thereby forming a hydraulic joint. When a section of the pipe had been sufficiently jacked in, the construction process entered into a “by-pass” mode. The pneumatic jacking was stopped as the next section of the pipe was placed on guide rails ready for jacking in and the various piping lines, which included the slurry removal pipe and cables, were lengthened to cater for the extended length as the next section of the pipe was jacked into the tunnel. The pipe was thus constructed simultaneously as the cutter head progressed through the ground and it was also the means by which the jacking force is transmitted along the sections of the “laid” pipes to the cutter head. The cutter head would eventually break into the next shaft, called the receiving shaft, thereby completing that section, called a “drive”, of the pipe. To complete the picture, there was a control unit on the surface for operating the jacking machinery set within the jacking frame at the bottom of the shaft as well as various pieces of machinery connected to the cutterhead and the trailing steel cylinder. Other important parts of this microtunnelling process included the STP, the generators providing the electrical supply, high-capacity pumps and a crane to lower and raise equipment, machinery and sections of the pipes into and out of the shafts. There were also areas set aside for delivery and storage of pipes, a muck pit and access for lorries to remove the rock and soil.

  9. [8] The Subcontract envisaged that ICOP would install the pipes in four sequential “drives”. Each drive represented the MTBM moving from a launching or jacking shaft to a receiving shaft. The first drive (“Drive 1”) was from Shaft P5-1 (ie, the launching shaft for Drive 1) to Shaft P5-7 (ie, the receiving shaft for Drive 1). Drive 1 was for the installation of the shorter and smaller DN1200mm pipeline (the “DN1200mm Pipeline”). The other three drives were for the installation of the longer and larger DN1600mm pipeline (the “DN1600mm Pipeline”) as follows:

  10. (a) Drive 2 was from Shaft P5-2 (ie, the launching shaft for Drive 2) to Shaft P5-1 (ie, the receiving shaft for Drive 2).

  11. (b) Drive 3 was from Shaft P5-2 to Shaft P5-3.

  12. (c) Drive 4 was from Shaft P5-4 to Shaft P5-3.

  13. [9] According to Appendix D of the Subcontract (ie, the Schedule of Work), the timelines for the four sequential drives were as follows:

  14. Commencement date

  15. Completion date

  16. Duration (days)

  17. Drive 1

  18. [17] April 2017

  19. [2] June 2017

  20. 46

  21. Drive 2

  22. [15] June 2017

  23. [24] October 2017

  24. 131

  25. Drive 3

  26. [25] October 2017

  27. [8] February 2018

  28. 106

  29. Drive 4

  30. [9] February 2018

  31. [7] August 2018

  32. 179

  33. [10] Notably, cll 2.1 and 2.2 of the LOA (as amended by the Supplemental Letter) provided that the scheduled commencement dates and completion dates in Appendix D are “tentative” and that the actual commencement date and completion date for each drive were subject to the parties’ mutual agreement, with TSCE issuing a Notice to Proceed to ICOP no less than 45 days prior to the actual commencement date.

  34. [11] As it transpired, the actual timeline of the Subcontract Works deviated rather substantially from the timelines provided in Appendix D. It suffices to note at this juncture that ICOP only commenced pipe jacking for Drive 1 on 3 June 2017, with the Notice to Proceed for Drive 2 only being issued on 29 December 2017. During Drive 2, the parties were already facing tensions and disagreements, so much so that after ICOP completed Drive 2 in early 2019, ICOP considered itself justified in terminating the Subcontract and did so on 13 March 2019.

  35. Issues on appeal

  36. [12] There are 13 issues that arise for our consideration in this appeal:

  37. (a) Issue 1: Whether the Judge erred in finding ICOP liable to pay damages of $83,790 to TSCE for causing 49 days of critical delay on the basis that ICOP did not have a valid legal basis to request the reconstruction of a headwall (Judgment at [35]–[36] and [90]–[94]).

  38. (b) Issue 2: Whether the Judge erred in finding that ICOP had failed to establish a duty and/or breach on TSCE’s part in relation to the alleged defects in Shaft P5-1 (Judgment at [37]–[48]).

  39. (c) Issue 3: Whether the Judge erred in finding that TSCE did not cause any critical delay between 24 February 2018 and 6 April 2018 (Judgment at [68]–[76]).

  40. (d) Issue 4: Whether the Judge erred in finding that ICOP is not entitled to claim a daily MTBM rental rate of $9,120 for each day of critical delay caused by TSCE, prior to the expiry of an 18-month minimum rental period for the MTBM undertaken by ICOP to a third party (Judgment at [87]–[88]).

  41. (e) Issue 5: Whether the Judge erred in finding that TSCE is entitled to claim liquidated damages for ICOP’s delays as opposed to general damages (Judgment at [94]).

  42. (f) Issue 6: Whether the Judge erred in finding ICOP liable to pay damages of $54,244.27 to TSCE for causing 31.137 days of critical delay for failing to comply with noise restrictions so that pipe jacking works could be carried out at night (Judgment at [95]–[104]).

  43. (g) Issue 7: Whether the Judge erred in finding that TSCE did not cause any delay by: (i) failing to supply a sufficient number of pipes; (ii) supplying poor-quality pipes; (iii) failing to timeously carry out waste disposal; and (iv) insisting on an unplanned cutterhead inspection (Judgment at [105]–[119]).

  44. (h) Issue 8: Whether the Judge erred in finding ICOP liable to pay damages of $39,090.60 to TSCE for causing 22.86 days of critical delay on the basis that its pipe jacking works were slow (Judgment at [120]–[126]).

  45. (i) Issue 9: Whether the Judge erred in finding ICOP liable to pay damages of $35,910 to TSCE for causing 21 days of critical delay in relation to its slow demobilisation after Drive 2 (Judgment at [127]–[130]).

  46. (j) Issue 10: Whether the Judge erred in not considering what a reasonable time to complete Drive 2 was.

  47. (k) Issue 11: Whether the Judge erred in finding that ICOP did not lawfully terminate the Subcontract on 13 March 2019 (Judgment at [139]–[143]).

  48. (l) Issue 12: Whether TSCE’s call on the performance bond was justified and whether ICOP is entitled to the return of the full amount of $570,000 paid under the performance bond (Judgment at [151]–[154]).

  49. [13] Given that the multitude of claims and issues raised by both parties involve different and discrete factual matrices, we set out the facts pertinent to each individual issue on appeal separately under our decision on the individual issues below.

  50. Issue 1: Headwall defects in Shaft P5-2

  51. [14] The first issue on appeal pertains to TSCE’s construction of the headwall in Shaft P5-2, which was the launching shaft for Drive 2 (the “headwall issue”). At para 2(a) of its Notice of Appeal, ICOP appeals against the Judge’s finding that “[ICOP] is to pay [TSCE] S$83,790 for causing 49 days of critical delay on the basis that ICOP did not have a valid legal basis to request the reconstruction of the headwall, and thus, it is ICOP which is liable for 49 days of delay caused by its request (see [35] – [36] and [90] – [94] of the Judgment)”.

  52. Background facts to Issue 1

  53. Headwall, entrance ring seal, and soft eye

  54. [15] By way of context, the hydraulic jack system’s frame is installed between a headwall on one side of the launching shaft and a thrust wall on the other side of the shaft. The purpose of the thrust wall is to provide a surface against which the hydraulic jack can generate jacking force to push the MTBM and then the pipe sections forward. The purpose of the headwall is to provide a flat surface and guidance that allows the MTBM to break through into the ground outside the shaft in the intended alignment, thereby ensuring that the pipe jacking operation proceeds in a particular drive direction.

  55. [16] The headwall also functions to provide a watertight seal between the structure of the jacking shaft and the MTBM. This is achieved by installing a rubber seal (also known as the entrance ring seal) on the headwall to prevent water from outside the jacking shaft from seeping through and entering the shaft.

  56. [17] To aid the initial coring of the MTBM through the headwall before penetrating the soil outside the shaft, “soft eyes” are cast into the headwall in the shaft. Soft eyes refer to parts of the shaft walls that are reinforced with glass fibre reinforced polymers instead of the usual steel reinforcement bars; this enables the MTBM to more easily cut and break through the concrete to begin tunnelling through the soil. This ensures minimal chances of damage to the MTBM cutter head. On the other side of the headwall and working shaft’s in situ caisson wall there is a grout “block” created in the soil; this is called the breakout zone through which the MTBM passes before reaching the soil. This enables the MTBM to align the cutter head more accurately as it starts the tunnelling process.

  57. Chronology of events

  58. [18] We now turn to the events leading to the dispute. On 27 February 2018, TSCE sent an e-mail to One Smart Engineering Pte Ltd (“One Smart”), the Temporary Works Consultant for the Project, attaching TSCE’s draft design drawing of the headwall and thrust wall and seeking One Smart’s review and endorsement. Mr Ng Chew Chiat David (“Mr Ng”), the assistant to the Qualified Person for Design (“QP(D)”) made some amendments to and notes on the drawing and thereafter endorsed the same. On 12 March 2018, One Smart returned the drawing to TSCE with Mr Ng’s endorsement (the “Approved Drawing”).

  59. [19] Thereafter, TSCE commenced construction of the headwall. On 22 March 2018, the Resident Technical Officer (an employee of One Smart), Dy Don Camcam (“RTO Dy Don”), conducted an inspection of the in-progress construction of the headwall and noted that it passed the inspection. On 24 March 2018, RTO Dy Don conducted another inspection of the headwall and recorded that it also passed the inspection.

  60. [20] On 17 May 2018, Mr Ng visited the worksite and observed that the headwall and the thrust wall for Shaft P5-2 had been installed.

  61. [21] On 26 June 2018, ICOP commenced MTBM launching work. Prior to drilling, ICOP’s MTBM operator performed the sealing test of the headwall and entrance seal. A sealing test is done by moving the MTBM into the headwall (without breaking into the soil) and pumping water at a certain pressure to test if there are any leaks in the headwall or entrance seal. At 1.5 bar water pressure, the entrance headwall started to dislocate from the in situ caisson wall and water started to spray out between the two concrete structures. Thereafter, ICOP raised concerns about the leaks to TSCE and TSCE commenced rectification works by injecting foam from the outer joints between the caisson wall and the entrance headwall.

  62. [22] On 3 July 2018, following remedial works by TSCE, a second sealing test was conducted, but it also failed. The headwall started to fail from 0.8 bar to 1.8 bar water pressure. From 4 July 2018 to 10 July 2018, TSCE commenced further rectification works, including the casting of further concrete on the outer joints, grouting works, and pumping of foam in the entrance headwall.

  63. [23] On 11 July 2018, a third sealing test was conducted, but it also failed. The headwall started to fail from 0.8 bar to 1.5 bar water pressure. ICOP formally wrote to TSCE recommending TSCE to construct a new headwall to avoid further damage to the wall and to ICOP’s equipment. TSCE attempted further remedial works but to no avail. Further sealing tests were conducted on 12, 16, 17 and 18 July 2018, but they all failed.

  64. [24] On 18 July 2018, TSCE called for a meeting with One Smart. Mr Ng met with TSCE’s Mr Peter Sun (“Mr Sun”) at the site office. Mr Ng advised Mr Sun that pipe jacking works could continue because Mr Ng was confident that a pressure of 1.0 bar was sufficient for breaking in the grout block at the breakout zone, before the MTBM reached the soil layer. If there was any leakage, Mr Ng was of the view that polyurethane grouting could be carried out immediately from outside the pipe to stop the leakage.

  65. [25] On 27 July 2018, a meeting took place between representatives from TSCE, ICOP, BTJV (the Black & Veatch and TriTech Joint Venture, which was the PUB’s consultant and representative) and One Smart. ICOP insisted that TSCE rebuild the headwall to resolve the leakage issues. After discussion, TSCE eventually agreed to build a new headwall to comply with ICOP’s operational requirements.

  66. [26] Subsequently, on 30 July 2018, ICOP removed its jacking equipment and demobilised from Shaft P5-2. Shaft P5-2 was handed back to TSCE on 1 August 2018 for TSCE to rebuild the headwall. TSCE completed the reconstruction of the headwall on 14 August 2018 and returned Shaft P5-2 to ICOP.

  67. [27] According to ICOP, a further sealing test of the rebuilt headwall was conducted on 23 August 2018 successfully. The rebuilt headwall and entrance seal appeared to be watertight.

  68. The decision below

  69. [28] In the proceedings below, ICOP argued that TSCE failed to construct the headwall to sustain 1.75 bar of pressure according to the specification prescribed by the QP(D), and therefore, claimed against TSCE for: (a) $94,821.30 comprising loss and damage it incurred whilst the headwall was being rebuilt by TSCE; and (b) damages suffered because of delays caused by TSCE. TSCE argued that there were no specifications by the QP(D) that the headwall must withstand 1.75 bar of pressure. It argued that even though it did reconstruct the headwall, ICOP had no valid grounds to request the reconstruction of the headwall and ICOP should be liable for the delay caused by its request.

  70. [29] The Judge found that ICOP did not have a valid legal basis to request the reconstruction of the headwall and ICOP was liable for the delay caused by its request (Judgment at [36]). The Judge relied on the testimony of Mr Ng, the QP(D)’s assistant, who testified that there were no specifications that the headwall must withstand 1.75 bar of pressure and that TSCE had constructed the headwall in accordance with the QP(D)’s specifications (Judgment at [35] and [36]). The Judge assessed the period of delay in respect of the headwall issue to be 49 days of actual critical delay and awarded TSCE liquidated damages of $83,790 in respect of the headwall issue (Judgment at [94]).

  71. ICOP’s arguments on appeal

  72. [30] On appeal, ICOP argues that the Judge erred in accepting Mr Ng’s testimony. ICOP argues that the Judge’s finding was against the weight of the evidence because:

  73. (a) the Judge failed to consider the Geological Longitudinal Section Sheets (“GLS Sheets”) produced by One Smart to the authorities, which indicated that the maximum face pressure at chainage 690 to 731 (ie, at the location of Shaft P5-2) is 1.75 bar;

  74. (b) the QP(D) himself submitted a document titled “Design Checks on the Proposed 1600mm Diameter Water Pipe Between Shaft P5-1 & Shaft P5-2” dated 1 November 2017 (the “Calculation Report”) to the Building and Construction Authority (“BCA”), which stated that maintaining the correct face support pressure was critical to the safe operation of the MTBM;

  75. (c) TSCE had agreed to rebuild the headwall “in consideration of the quality and safety of the works”; and

  76. (d) the initial headwall was designed (but not constructed) to withstand 2.5 bar of pressure and there was no design difference between the initial headwall and the reconstructed headwall.

  77. Our decision

  78. [31] It is important to note at the outset that ICOP’s pleaded case below was that the QP(D)’s specifications called for the headwall being able to sustain a maximum face pressure of 1.75 bar (before accounting for the safety factor) between the cutter face of the MTBM and the headwall. For the reasons set out below, we are of the view that the Judge was correct in finding that ICOP has no valid legal basis to request the reconstruction of the headwall, ie, the QP(D)’s specifications did not require the headwall to sustain a maximum face pressure of 1.75 bar. We consequently dismiss ICOP’s appeal in relation to the headwall issue.

  79. [32] TSCE’s obligations in relation to the construction of the headwall under the Subcontract include the following:

  80. (a) Under S/No 1.15 of the Matrix of Responsibilities (Appendix C to the Subcontract, “MOR”), the responsibility falls on TSCE to construct all “shafts with flushed headwall/backwall and reinforced concrete base slab according to the project designs and microtunnelling requirement” [emphasis added].

  81. (b) Section 3 of the Method Statement (Appendix E of the Subcontract, “Method Statement”) provides that TSCE must construct:

  82. (c) In the reference document titled “P5-GS11 — Pipe Jacking” , which was referred to at paragraph 2(b) of the Supplemental Letter, section 11.2 provides that:

  83. [33] As seen from the above, TSCE’s contractual obligation under the Subcontract was to construct a headwall with an entrance seal and ring according to the specifications of the QP(D) from One Smart. This is not disputed by the parties. Therefore, the key question is whether the QP(D) required the headwall to withstand 1.75 bar of pressure. In our judgment, the Judge was correct to find that there was no such requirement imposed by the QP(D).

  84. [34] First, although the QP(D) did not give evidence, Mr Ng, who was the QP(D)’s assistant and who assisted the QP(D) in preparing and reviewing the design specifications for the headwall, testified that there was no requirement that the headwall must maintain 1.75 bar of pressure. Specifically, Mr Ng stated in his affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”) that:

  85. [35] In our view, while Mr Ng may not be the QP(D) himself, his evidence on the requisite specifications for the headwall should be given due weight given his active involvement in assisting the QP(D) and his personal knowledge of QP(D)’s specifications. We note that Mr Ng is himself a Professional Engineer and a Specialist Professional Engineer in Geotechnical Engineering with a Masters degree in that area of specialisation. He was previously a Senior Project Engineer with the Land Transport Authority and a Technical Director of Meinhardt Infrastructure Pte Ltd. His evidence was that all the QP(D)’s specifications for the headwall and thrust wall were contained in the Approved Drawing; that drawing had been sent to the QP(D) for his review and endorsement. Mr Ng made some notes on that drawing and endorsed the same, which then became the Approved Drawing (see [18] above). There was nothing in the Approved Drawing which specified that the headwall must withstand 1.75 bar of pressure. This was conceded by Mr Nicolo Alberini (“Mr Alberini”), the deputy project manager in ICOP, during cross-examination.

  86. [36] Based on the record made available before the court, references to 1.75 bar of pressure are only found in two documents: (a) the Method Statement; and (b) the GLS Sheets in the Calculation Report. However, we are of the view that neither of these are the specifications of the QP(D) in relation to the headwall.

  87. [37] In the Method Statement, the reference to 1.75 bar pressure is found in section 12.10.4, titled “Estimation of Face Stabilization for DN 1600”:

  88. [38] As seen from the above, the reference to “1.3 – 1.75 bar” pressure is in relation to the “face pressure” that must be maintained at the face of the MBTM, ie, the cross-sectional area of the cutter head, during the pipe jacking process to counteract the expected ground water pressure of “1.3 – 1.75 bar” acting on the MTBM cutterhead as it bores through the soil and rock. As Mr Ng explained in his AEIC, for the MTBM to progress through the soil and rock, the face pressure at the MTBM cutter head would have to counteract the surrounding lateral earth pressure and ground water pressure being exerted on it. The MTBM operator controls the MTBM face pressure by setting the slurry charge pressure to control the “face pressure” to counterbalance these forces. Nowhere in the Method Statement is it stated that the headwall itself must be able to withstand a minimum of 1.75 bar pressure.

  89. [39] Turning to the GLS Sheets, which can be found in Annex 1 of the Calculation Report, these were prepared by One Smart’s Dr Ong Chee Wee and submitted to the BCA. The GLS Sheets provide a longitudinal section view of the area of intended pipe jacking. Sheets 02 and 03 of the GLS Sheets contain drawings of the soil investigations for the pipe jacking, and tables summarise the range of “face pressure” along each chainage of the intended tunnel based on the soil investigations. Between chainages 690 and 716 (near the location of Shaft P5-2), the minimum “face pressure” was 1.35 bar and the maximum face pressure was 1.75 bar. Once again, however, these figures pertain to the range of “face pressure” to be expected along the tunnel and say nothing at all about the specifications of the headwall, as rightly conceded by ICOP’s Mr Alberini under cross-examination.

  90. [40] ICOP’s position in the proceedings below and in this appeal is essentially that if the anticipated ground pressure is 1.75 bar, then the MTBM and the pipe string (ie, the pipes being jacked) will experience the same pressure because of Newton’s third law of motion — every action will have an equal and opposite reaction. Since the headwall functions as an anchor block, ICOP argues that it will also experience the same pressure that the MTBM and pipe string are facing. With respect, ICOP’s calculations of the amount of pressure that the headwall was expected to experience during the jacking operation is a separate matter from what the QP(D)’s actual specifications for the headwall were.

  91. [41] Mr Ng had testified unequivocally that the expected “face pressure” is “definitely not a specification that the Headwall had to be able to sustain a maximum face pressure of 1.75 bar”. This is because “the pressure exerted on the headwall during the actual operation of the MTBM was extremely unlikely to exceed 1.0 bar”. We reproduce Mr Ng’s explanation below:

  92. [42] We add that Mr Ng’s testimony in his AEIC is consistent with his position during his meeting with TSCE on 18 July 2018. During that meeting, Mr Ng was of the unequivocal view that pipe jacking operations could commence notwithstanding the sealing test failures. He expressed that “there is no need for high face pressure to be maintained” when the pipe jacking machine was in the grouting block and that he was confident that 1.0 bar of pressure would be sufficient for the break in through the grout block. He further expressed that if there was leakage at below 1.0 bar pressure, polyurethane grouting could be carried out immediately from outside the pipe to stop the leakage. This was recorded in his e-mail correspondence to TSCE on 19 July 2018.

  93. [43] Dato Cheng Chin Keong (“Dato Cheng”), the Managing Director of ICOP, disagreed with Mr Ng’s explanation on this point. In his supplementary AEIC, he went into great detail explaining that once the MTBM breaks out from the grout block into the soil layer, the same pressure that is experienced at the cutting face will be exerted on the headwall. He also highlighted a report produced by the MTBM’s manufacturer, Herrenknecht (the “Herrenknecht Report”), which stated that regardless of how much pressure there was in the ground, the starting situation should always be that there should be no leaks between the sealing structure and the concrete shaft wall.

  94. [44] However, this also misses the real issue. As we have explained above, the only relevant questions before the court are: (a) what the QP(D)’s specifications of the headwall were; and (b) whether TSCE has complied with those specifications. Dato Cheng could very well be correct in his analysis of the amount of pressure that the headwall may experience during the pipe jacking operation, but if the amount of pressure was not stipulated as a specification for the headwall by the QP(D), then ICOP’s pleaded case would still fail.

  95. [45] Therefore, considering: (a) Mr Ng’s unequivocal testimony that there were no specifications that required the headwall to withstand 1.75 bar of pressure; (b) the fact that the Approved Drawings for the headwall made no mention of any specified pressure the headwall must withstand; (c) the fact that the original headwall had passed three inspections by One Smart; and (d) Mr Ng’s direct communications to TSCE on 18 July 2018 that pipe jacking operations could continue without rebuilding the headwall, we are of the view that the Judge did not err in finding that there was no specification for the headwall to withstand 1.75 bar of pressure and that the headwall was constructed according to the QP(D)’s specifications. Consequently, we agree with the Judge that there was no contractual basis for ICOP to require TSCE to reconstruct the headwall. We entirely agree with the Judge’s caution at [46] of the Judgment, that:

  96. [46] For completeness, we deal with ICOP’s two remaining arguments on this point. First, ICOP argues that in any event TSCE had agreed to rebuild the headwall because it accepted Dato Cheng’s technical explanations at the meeting on 27 July 2018. In our view, this does not assist ICOP. Even if TSCE had subsequently agreed to rebuild the headwall to meet ICOP’s additional requests, that does not constitute an admission that the original headwall was not in compliance with the QP(D)’s specifications. This is especially so when TSCE’s position was that it had no choice but to rebuild the headwall given ICOP’s refusal to commence the Subcontract Works otherwise.

  97. [47] Secondly, ICOP argues that according to Mr Ng, the initial headwall was designed to withstand 2.5 bars of pressure but was constructed defectively by TSCE. ICOP relies on the design calculation report prepared by One Smart on 2 August 2018 for the reconstruction of the headwall, which stated that the “design pull out force” for the reconstructed headwall was “100 ton or 2.5 bar pressure acting on Pipe Jacking Machine”. ICOP then argues that Mr Ng had admitted during cross-examination that the initial headwall was also designed to withstand 2.5 bar of pressure. However, this portion of Mr Ng’s testimony appears to be taken out of context. We reproduce the relevant portions of Mr Ng’s testimony below:

  98. [48] As seen from the above excerpt, Mr Ng had explained that the specification for 2.5 bar of pressure was in relation to the “pull out force” that the headwall was built to withstand, which had “nothing to do with the pipe jacking operation”. The headwall was designed to withstand 2.5 bar of pressure from the soil and water pressure acting through the caisson wall onto the headwall, to ensure that the headwall would stay attached to the caisson wall. This is a separate matter from whether the headwall was designed to be watertight when faced with 1.75 bar of cavity pressure within the headwall, which was what ICOP’s multiple sealing tests were testing.

  99. [49] We are of the view that there is no specification by the QP(D) for the headwall to withstand 1.75 bar of face pressure between the cutter face of the MTBM and the headwall. Consequently, the Judge did not err in finding that ICOP had no contractual grounds to require TSCE to reconstruct the headwall based on the results of their sealing tests (which were not required by the QP(D)). We also agree with the Judge that ICOP should be liable for the delay caused by the reconstruction of the headwall.

  100. [50] However, we are of the view that the Judge had erred in awarding TSCE liquidated damages, as opposed to general damages, for the delays caused by the reconstruction of the headwall. We elaborate on this under Issue 5 at [127] below.

  101. Issue 2: Alleged defects in Shaft P5-1

  102. [51] At para 2(b) of its Notice of Appeal, ICOP appeals against the Judge’s finding that “ICOP failed to establish a duty on TSCE’s part in relation to the defects in Shaft P5-1 and/or that TSCE breached its duty (see [37] – [48] of the Judgment)”.

  103. Background facts to Issue 2

  104. [52] As noted above, Drive 1 of the Project was from Shaft P5-1 to Shaft P5-7. Drive 2 was from Shaft P5-2 to Shaft P5-1. Shaft P5-1 was therefore the launching shaft for Drive 1 (ie, the 1200mm pipe) and the receiving shaft for Drive 2 (ie, the 1600mm pipe). After Drive 2, the MTBM was to be retrieved from Shaft P5-1 for the next drive.

  105. [53] Under S/No 1.15 of the MOR, TSCE was under an obligation to construct shafts “with flushed headwall/backwall and reinforced concrete base slab according to the project designs and microtunnelling requirement” [emphasis added]. Appendix B and Appendix F to the Subcontract state that the interior diameter of Shaft P5-1 must be 7.5m:

  106. [54] On 6 February 2017, TSCE provided ICOP with the drawings for the shafts, including Shaft P5-1. On 21 February 2017, ICOP provided TSCE with a draft layout for Shaft P5-1. The drawing of the layout for Shaft P5-1 is reproduced below:

  107. [55] As can be seen from the drawing, it was specified that the minimum clearance required to recover the MTBM is 5.6m. The layout also envisioned that the MTBM would break through the centre of Shaft P5-2, ie, the path with the longest wall to wall distance in the circular shape.

  108. [56] It is undisputed that Shaft P5-1 was constructed with an interior diameter of at least 7.5m. The crux of the dispute is the presence of a protruding pipe cap and end valve in Shaft P5-1 which ICOP argues reduced the working space within Shaft P5-1. A picture of Shaft P5-1 can be seen below:

  109. [57] The protruding object annotated “Live PUB water pipeline end valve” in the image above is the pipe cap and end valve installed to cover the end of the 1200mm pipe. After the completion of Drive 1, the PUB carried out hydrotesting on the 1200mm pipe from P5-7 to P5-1, after which the tunnel line was connected to the existing pipeline. On or around 14 December 2017, TSCE installed the pipe cap and end valve to prevent water leakage. Neither party took issue with the pipe cap and end valve at the time of installation. The problem only surfaced about five months later when the parties had to adjust the tunnel alignment in Shaft P5-1.

  110. [58] On 23 May 2018, TSCE informed ICOP that SP Power requested TSCE to keep a 5m clearance between the existing underground 400kV joint bay and the proposed pipeline. In view of said request, TSCE revised the alignment drawing and sought ICOP’s confirmation on the feasibility of the proposed new alignment along Shaft P5-2 to P5-1. ICOP informed TSCE that there would be a misalignment between the tunnel axis and the centre of Shaft P5-1 (ie, the breakthrough of the MTBM would not be along the path with the longest wall to wall distance). The parties then discussed the possibility of adjusting the alignment.

  111. [59] On 7 June 2018, TSCE agreed with ICOP’s suggested amendments to resolve the alignment issue and made the necessary adjustments to the tunnel alignment drawing. On 14 June 2018, ICOP accepted the new alignment on condition that “ICOP shall not be liable for any kind of damages or delays incurred either direct[ly] or indirect[ly] due to the revised alignment”.

  112. [60] Subsequently, ICOP commenced pipe jacking works from Shaft P5-2 to Shaft P5-1 on 25 August 2018. On 8 December 2018, TSCE’s project manager, Mr Jesse Jung Jae Hun (“Mr Jung”), informed ICOP’s Mr Alberini that there might be some problems regarding the exit wall and the recovery of the MTBM in Shaft P5-1. Mr Alberini informed Mr Jung that ICOP’s surveyor would investigate the MTBM tunnel alignment together with TSCE’s surveyor so that TSCE could proceed with the design and the construction of the exit wall accordingly.

  113. [61] On 9 January 2019, TSCE’s Site Engineer, Mr Peter Castillo (“Mr Castillo”) informed ICOP’s Mr Alberini that after superimposing the receiving cradle and pipe jacking machine in the as-built layout plan for the Shaft P5-1, Mr Castillo found that the cutter head of the MTBM would collide with the end valve after the MTBM fully breaks through Shaft P5-1. This is shown in the diagram below:

  114. [62] As seen in Mr Castillo’s drawing above, the entry point of the MTBM is off-centre (the MTBM enters Shaft P5-1 slightly below the horizontal diameter of the circle). The drawing also shows that after the MTBM fully breaks through Shaft P5-1, the cutter head of the MTBM will collide with the end valve. Mr Castillo therefore recommended ICOP to dismantle the cutter head after the pipe jacking machine broke through into Shaft P5-1 to avoid hitting the end valve, so that the MTBM could be retrieved from Shaft P5-1.

  115. [63] In response, ICOP stated in a letter dated 11 January 2019 that as per Appendix F of the Subcontract, the minimum wall to wall distance required for Shaft P5-1 should be 7.5m. ICOP alleged that the clearance was only 3.8m and thus insufficient for the purpose of retrieving the complete MTBM in one piece. ICOP further stated that the removal of the cutting wheel would be insufficient for the recovery of the MTBM. This is demonstrated in the following drawing:

  116. [64] As shown in ICOP’s diagram, if the MTBM broke through fully, not only would the cutter head of the MTBM hit the end valve, the front part of the MTBM machine (which ICOP referred to as the articulation joint of CAN 1) would also be impacted by the end valve. For these reasons, ICOP disagreed with TSCE’s recommendation that it was sufficient to remove the cutting head to retrieve the MTBM. ICOP then attached several other diagrams demonstrating that the MTBM could only be retrieved by removing the cutter head and dismantling the body of the MTBM into three parts before each part could be removed sequentially from Shaft P5-1.

  117. [65] According to TSCE, sometime in January 2019, Mr Castillo showed ICOP’s Mr Alberini and Mr Pierre Mulle (ICOP’s project manager) a simulation on his laptop of how a “wider angular approach” would allow the MTBM to be recovered. Mr Jung explained during cross-examination that a “wider angular approach” meant that the MTBM could be angled differently during its exit, away from the pipe cap, so that it could be lifted out. This was because there was a range of tolerance for the exit point of the MTBM both vertically and horizontally. As per the PUB specifications, the horizontal alignment had an allowance of 250mm per side, which amounted to a total allowance of 500mm, and the vertical allowance had a tolerance of 75mm.

  118. [66] However, ICOP disagreed that the “wider angular approach” would allow the recovery of the MTBM and dismantled the MTBM in the manner described above at [64]. The recovery of the MTBM was completed sometime on or around 25 January 2019. On the same day, ICOP demobilised the MTBM and dispatched the MTBM to Malaysia for “reassem[bly], testing and commissioning of the system”.

  119. The parties’ arguments below

  120. [67] ICOP’s pleaded case in its Statement of Claim (Amendment No 2) (“SOC2”) is, in summary, as follows:

  121. (a) TSCE was obligated, either expressly or impliedly by the Subcontract, to construct Shaft P5-1 with an interior wall to wall working space of 7.5m and free from any protruding objects.

  122. (b) Further or in the alternative, TSCE owed ICOP a duty of care to construct Shaft P5-1 with a minimum interior diameter of 7.5m and free from any protruding objects.

  123. (c) TSCE breached its obligations under the Subcontract and/or its duty of care because Shaft P5-1 was constructed with a pipe cap protruding into it, which substantially reduced the interior working space to 3.8m.

  124. (d) TSCE knew or ought reasonably to have known that this would have caused ICOP difficulties, such as having to dismantle the MTBM, which would lead to increased time and costs.

  125. (e) As a result of the above, ICOP suffered loss and damage amounting to $104,154.54 which consists of $19,703.75 in manpower costs and $84,450.79 in costs incurred from dismantling the MTBM.

  126. [68] TSCE, in its Defence and Counterclaim (Amendment No 4) (“DCC4”), admitted that it was obligated to construct Shaft P5-1 with an internal diameter of 7.5m but denied that it was obligated to construct Shaft P5-1 with a minimum internal working space of 7.5m and free from protruding objects. TSCE averred that it had constructed Shaft P5-1 in accordance with the specification of 7.5m diameter. TSCE also averred that the figure of 7.5m was based on the Method Statement prepared by ICOP and that ICOP failed to specify a wider diameter for Shaft P5-1 or specify a wider angular approach for the MTBM such that it would avoid the protruding pipe cap.

  127. [69] ICOP’s arguments in its closing submissions after the trial are summarised as follows:

  128. (a) TSCE failed to account for a subterranean 400kV cable joint bay when it provided the initial tunnel alignment to ICOP. This necessitated the changes to the alignment of Drive 2 with the result that the exit point for Drive 2 was off-centre. The off-centre alignment caused a shorter wall to wall distance for ICOP to recover the MTBM.

  129. (b) ICOP’s working space was further compromised because TSCE installed the pipe cap and end-valve within Shaft P5-2.

  130. (c) The misalignment issue caused by the revision of the initial alignment and the presence of the pipe cap/end valve resulted in ICOP having insufficient space to retrieve the MTBM in one piece.

  131. The decision below

  132. [70] The Judge dismissed ICOP’s claim on this issue. In relation to ICOP’s claim in contract, the Judge held that the terms “working space” and “freedom from protruding objects” cannot be interpolated into the clear terms of the Subcontract, which only provided that TSCE was to build Shaft P5-1 with a minimum internal diameter of 7.5m “wall to wall”. This is a plain, clear, and strict obligation which TSCE fulfilled. There is also no room for an implied term to the same effect because there is no gap which needs to be filled by the implication of such a duty.

  133. [71] In relation to ICOP’s tortious claim, the Judge found that there is also no duty on the part of TSCE to ensure that Shaft P5-1 had 7.5m of “working space” and should be “free from protruding objects”. The scope of a tortious duty depends on the proximity between the parties and that stems mainly from the terms of the Subcontract. Given that the plain and clear terms of the Subcontract did not admit the implied terms contended for by ICOP, ICOP failed to establish the relevant and necessary duty of care on the part of TSCE.

  134. [72] Furthermore, the Judge noted that ICOP’s case in its closing submissions was that both the presence of the pipe cap and the misalignment of the tunnel were necessary causes of ICOP’s inability to extract the MTBM in one piece. However, the fact of and problems caused by the misalignment were not pleaded by ICOP. As noted above (at [45]), the Judge found that in technical disputes such as the present case, parties ought to be bound more strictly to their pleaded cases. Given ICOP’s failure to plead the material facts concerning the tunnel misalignment, the Judge disallowed ICOP from relying on it and found that ICOP failed to establish the relevant and necessary duty of care on TSCE’s part (Judgment at [45]–[47]).

  135. ICOP’s arguments on appeal

  136. [73] ICOP makes two main arguments on appeal. First, given that the MOR provides that TSCE was obliged to construct the shaft with a minimum diameter of 7.5m “wall to wall”, it must logically be interpreted, or necessarily implied, that TSCE was to provide ICOP with that amount of working space free from protruding objects. This is because TSCE knew or ought to have known that this was the working and clearance space required for ICOP to extract its MTBM in one piece as per the Method Statement.

  137. [74] Secondly, ICOP argues that the Judge erred in not considering the unpleaded misalignment issue. ICOP argues that there could have been no surprise or prejudice to TSCE because TSCE was aware of the misalignment issue. ICOP further argues that TSCE had pleaded in its DCC4 that ICOP had failed to specify a “wider angular approach” for the MTBM. ICOP argues that this meant that the misalignment issue was a live issue between the parties.

  138. Our decision

  139. [75] We dismiss ICOP’s appeal on this issue.

  140. [76] We first address ICOP’s arguments on contractual interpretation. The Subcontract provides that TSCE was to build Shaft P5-1 with a minimum internal diameter of 7.5m. In our view, the term “internal diameter” pertains only to the physical dimensions of Shaft P5-1. It cannot be interpreted to impose on TSCE the additional obligation to ensure that ICOP has 7.5m of “working space” within Shaft P5-1. The concept of “working space” goes beyond the physical dimensions of Shaft P5-1 and will depend on various factors, including the nature of the operation, the size of the machinery and even the number of workers within the shaft at any material time. Requiring TSCE to guarantee a “working space” of 7.5m will mean that TSCE is expected to foresee all these factors and construct Shaft P5-1 with an internal diameter that is wider than 7.5m, which goes against the plain reading of the contractual requirement. Similarly, the term “internal diameter of 7.5m” also cannot be interpreted to mean “free from protruding objects”. The presence of protruding objects within the shaft does not change the internal diameter of the shaft, or the “wall to wall” distance within the shaft.

  141. [77] In so far as ICOP relies on the implication of terms, we agree with the Judge that ICOP has not shown that the requirements under Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd and another and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 193 have been satisfied. For instance, ICOP has not shown that there is a true gap in the contract that needs to be filled by the implication of such terms, nor that any such term is necessary for the business efficacy of the contract or that the parties would have definitely agreed to the inclusion of such terms if asked by an officious bystander at the time they concluded the contract. ICOP has also not adduced any evidence on whether there are any industry standards which interpret the term “wall to wall internal diameter” to mean “free from protruding objects”. Even in this appeal, ICOP’s argument on this point is no more than a bare assertion.

  142. [78] Consequently, we dismiss ICOP’s argument based on contractual interpretation and implication of terms. We find that TSCE has fulfilled its obligations under the Subcontract to construct Shaft P5-1 with an internal diameter of 7.5m. There is no express or implied term in the Subcontract that requires TSCE to ensure that ICOP has 7.5m of “working space” in Shaft P5-1 or that Shaft P5-1 must be “free from protruding objects”.

  143. [80] We are of the view that the exception does not apply in the present case because allowing ICOP to rely on the unpleaded misalignment issue will cause irreparable prejudice to TSCE. ICOP’s unpleaded case was that the “need to change the pipejacking alignment was solely attributable to TSCE’s failure to account for a subterranean 400kV cable joint bay when it provided the initial tunnel alignment to ICOP” [emphasis in original]. However, this material fact was not raised by ICOP in its SOC2 or Reply and Defence to Counterclaim. A perusal of ICOP’s pleadings suggests that ICOP’s sole ground for its claims in relation to the defects in Shaft P5-1 pertains to the installation of the pipe cap and end valve, which ICOP argues reduced the working space within Shaft P5-1.

  144. [81] ICOP’s main argument on appeal is that the misalignment issue had been pleaded by TSCE in its DCC4. We are of the view that this argument is misconceived. TSCE merely stated in its DCC4 that:

  145. [82] The reference to the “wider angular approach” here is a separate matter from the change in alignment caused by the subterranean 400kV cable joint bay. As Mr Jung explained during cross-examination, the “wider angular approach” refers to the angling of the MTBM to arrive at an exit point within the range of tolerance (ie, horizontal allowance of 250mm to either side and vertical allowance of 75mm) as approved by the PUB. This is a separate matter from whether TSCE was entitled to revise its initial alignment to account for the subterranean 400kV cable joint bay. Therefore, we hold that, contrary to ICOP’s contention, the issue of whether TSCE owed a duty to ICOP to account for the subterranean 400kV cable joint bay in its initial alignment planning was not put in issue by either party’s pleadings.

  146. [83] The allegation concerning the misalignment issue arising from 400kV cable joint bay surfaced for the first time in Mr Alberini’s AEIC. The relevant portions of Mr Alberini’s AEIC are reproduced below:

  147. [84] Although Mr Alberini alluded to the misalignment issue in his AEIC, we are of the view that this is insufficient to give notice to TSCE of the change in ICOP’s case. We reiterate that ICOP’s pleaded case was that the protruding pipe cap and end valve was the sole cause of the narrower interior working space of 3.8m. There is no clear indication in Mr Alberini’s AEIC that ICOP is deviating from its pleaded case and pursuing claims against TSCE for its alleged failure to account for the 400kV cable joint bay in its initial design. ICOP could have and should have sought leave from the court to amend its pleadings to inform TSCE of its change in case, but it did not do so. Without such notice, TSCE will not have had the opportunity to adduce evidence at trial challenging the existence of any alleged duty of care to ensure that the initial design for Shaft P5-1 accounted for the 400kV cable joint bay.

  148. [85] Consequently, we are of the view that the Judge was correct in rejecting ICOP’s unpleaded point and we dismiss ICOP’s appeal in relation to the alleged defects in Shaft P5-1.

  149. Issue 3: Alleged critical delays to the Project before 6 April 2018

  150. [86] At para 2(c) of its Notice of Appeal, ICOP appeals against the Judge’s finding that “TSCE did not cause and/or was not responsible for any critical delay to the progress of ICOP’s works between 24 February 2018 [and] 6 April 2018 (see [68] – [76] of the Judgment)”.

  151. Background facts to Issue 3

  152. [87] In the proceedings below, ICOP argued that TSCE was supposed to handover Shaft P5-2 to ICOP on 24 February 2018 (see [92] below), but only did so on 2 April 2018, which caused critical delays to the Project. ICOP went further to claim that it was only given “unfettered access” to Shaft P5-2 on 6 April 2018 (Judgment at [70]). ICOP argued that TSCE should be liable for the delays caused by the slow handover of Shaft P5-2 (the “worksite readiness and slow handover issue”).

  153. [88] In response, TSCE argued that even after the worksite had been handed over to ICOP, ICOP was still unable to mobilise its equipment in accordance with the stipulated timelines, and the primary generator and MTBM only arrived on site on 27 April 2018 (Judgment at [74]). TSCE therefore counterclaims against ICOP for the delays caused by the slow mobilisation of its equipment (the “slow mobilisation issue”).

  154. [89] Having considered these allegations, the Judge found that both parties missed the real point because the critical delays were neither caused by TSCE’s late handover of the worksite, nor by ICOP’s allegedly delayed mobilisation of the equipment (Judgment at [76]). The Judge found that regardless of how promptly TSCE handed over the worksite or how quickly ICOP mobilised its equipment, ICOP simply could not have commenced pipe jacking works because TSCE had not obtained the necessary approvals from SP Powergrid Ltd (“SPPG”) and the PUB (the “Authorities’ Approvals”) (Judgment at [76]). By the time such approvals were obtained on 25 June 2018, TSCE had already handed over the worksite to ICOP, and ICOP was ready to commence pipe jacking works (Judgment at [76]). Therefore, the Judge found that any critical delay was caused solely by TSCE’s failure to obtain the necessary approvals from SPPG and the PUB on time (the “Authorities’ Approvals issue”).

  155. [90] The Judge found that the work programme sent by ICOP to TSCE on 8 January 2018 was the applicable baseline programme which sets out the start and end dates of works, the planned duration of works and the sequence in which the works were to be carried out (the “8 January 2018 Programme”) (Judgment at [64]). According to the 8 January 2018 Programme, TSCE was required to obtain the Authorities’ Approvals by 6 April 2018, which was the date the parties planned for the MTBM to be launched. However, TSCE only obtained approval from SPPG and the PUB on 20 June 2018 and 25 June 2018 respectively. Consequently, the Judge found that TSCE was liable for 69-working days of critical delay between 6 April 2018 and 25 June 2018 (Judgment at [85]).

  156. [91] The Judge went on to hold at [84] that:

  157. The parties’ cases

  158. [92] On appeal, ICOP argues that the Judge erred in not considering the alleged critical delays prior to the scheduled launch of the MTBM on 6 April 2018. ICOP’s main argument is that TSCE was required to obtain the Authorities’ Approvals well before the worksite and shaft were to be handed over to ICOP and thus, the Authorities’ Approvals issue predates the worksite handover issue. ICOP then relies on the case of Saga Cruises BDF Ltd and another v Fincantieri SPA (formerly Fincantieri Cantieri Navali Italiani SPA) [2016] EWHC 1875 (Comm) (“Saga Cruises”) for the proposition that where there are concurrent causes of delay, any critical delay is caused by the event which is first in time, or which caused the delay first (the “first-in-time approach”). On those grounds, ICOP argues that TSCE should also be liable for the delay from 24 February 2018 (ie, the date on which TSCE was required to handover the worksite) to 5 April 2018, in addition to the period of 6 April 2018 to 25 June 2018 which TSCE has already been found to be liable for (see [90] above).

  159. [93] In response, TSCE argues that the applicable baseline programme, ie, the 8 January 2018 Programme, only required TSCE to obtain the Authorities’ Approvals by 4 April 2018. TSCE also challenges ICOP’s reliance on Saga Cruises. TSCE relies on the cases of Henry Boot Construction (UK) Ltd v Malmaison Hotel (Manchester) Ltd (1999) 70 ConLR 32 (“Malmaison”) and Walter Lilly & Company Ltd v Mackay [2012] EWHC 1773. In those cases, the court held that where there are concurrent causes for a delay, and when the employer’s delay events would have delayed completion in the absence of the contractor’s delay, the contractor is entitled to an extension of time, but cannot recover damages for the delay (the “Malmaison approach”). In so far as Saga Cruises adopts a “first-in-time approach”, TSCE argues that it represents a departure from the established line of cases adopting the Malmaison approach.

  160. Our decision

  161. [94] We dismiss ICOP’s appeal on this issue. We are of the view that the Judge was correct in finding that any delays caused by either TSCE or ICOP in respect of the period before ICOP was scheduled to launch the MTBM and commence pipe jacking works (ie, 6 April 2018) were not critical delays. We deal with ICOP’s arguments in turn.

  162. [95] First, ICOP’s entire argument is premised on the assumption that TSCE was required to obtain the Authorities’ Approvals before it handed the worksite and the shaft to ICOP. ICOP relies on: (a) the work programme dated 22 February 2016 (“22 February 2016 Programme”) which stated that the launching of the MTBM was to be on 17 June 2017, and thus the Authorities’ Approvals were to be obtained on or before 17 June 2017; and (b) TSCE’s internal baseline programme dated 30 November 2016 which provided that the requisite Authorities’ Approvals were to be obtained on 17 April 2017.

  163. [96] However, we are of the view that ICOP’s reliance on these documents is misplaced. The Judge has found that the applicable baseline programme is the 8 January 2018 Programme. Significantly, ICOP did not raise any issue on appeal about the Judge’s finding on the applicable baseline programme. In fact, ICOP’s own expert, Mr George Wall (“Mr Wall”), testified that the 8 January 2018 Programme is the most appropriate programme to be used and that the 22 February 2016 Programme should not be considered at all because it was issued before the LOA was issued on 15 April 2017.

  164. [97] We agree with the Judge that the applicable baseline programme for Drive 2 should be the 8 January 2018 Programme. The 22 February 2016 Programme was drafted as a tentative timeline more than a year before TSCE issued the Notice to Proceed for Drive 2. Clause 2.2 of the LOA expressly states that the schedule of the Subcontract Works depends on TSCE issuing the Notice to Proceed “no less than 45 days prior to the actual Commencement Date” [emphasis added]. The timing of TSCE’s Notice to Proceed for Drive 2 is therefore crucial in determining the applicable baseline programme that should be used for Drive 2. The Notice to Proceed for Drive 2 was issued on 28 December 2017, which was immediately followed by the issuance of the 8 January 2018 Programme. The commencement date for Drive 2 was stated in the 8 January 2018 Programme to be 24 February 2018, which is 47 days (excluding Sundays and public holidays) after the Notice to Proceed and consistent with the parties’ agreement under cl 2.2 of the LOA. Consequently, we are of the view that the 8 January 2018 Programme is the most accurate reflection of the parties’ baseline programme for Drive 2.

  165. [98] By the same token, ICOP’s reliance on TSCE’s internal work programme is also misplaced, given that there is no evidence that TSCE’s internal work programme was accepted by the parties as the applicable baseline programme for Drive 2. Moreover, TSCE’s internal work programme was also drafted in November 2016, which was a year before the Notice to Proceed for Drive 2 was issued in December 2017. This means that the timeline in TSCE’s internal programme does not take reference to the “actual commencement date” of Drive 2, as per cl 2.2 of the LOA, and thus, is inappropriate for use as a baseline programme for Drive 2.

  166. [99] In any event, even if TSCE had planned to obtain the Authorities’ Approvals before the worksite handover, TSCE would not have caused any critical delays until 6 April 2018 (ie, the date of launching of the MTBM under the 8 January 2018 Programme). This is because the Authorities’ Approvals are only relevant in so far as commencement of the pipe jacking operations is concerned. The lack of Authorities’ Approvals does not prevent TSCE from handing over the worksite to ICOP or ICOP from mobilising its equipment.

  167. [100] Secondly, although the parties spent a great portion of their submissions arguing between the “first-in-time approach” in Saga Cruises and the Malmaison approach, we are of the view that this debate is irrelevant in the present case – it is meaningless to speak of concurrent causes to a delay when the delay in question is not on the critical path. As the learned author in Keating on Construction Contracts (Stephen Furst & Sir Vivian Ramsey gen eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 11th Ed, 2021) (“Keating”) puts it: “there is only true concurrency in this sense where both events cause delay to the progress of the works and the delaying effect of the two events is felt at the same time and each is critical to completion” (at para 8-026) [emphasis added]. Therefore, the debate on the proper approach to concurrent delays is only relevant where both events causing delay are “of approximately equal causative potency” and both events must, in fact, cause critical delays (ie, they must both affect the critical path of the project).

  168. [101] Given that the applicable work programme was the 8 January 2018 Programme (see [97] above), we agree with the Judge that any delays caused by either party between 24 February 2018 to 5 April 2018 were not critical delays. The task on the critical path is TSCE’s obligation to obtain the Authorities’ Approvals because this was an outstanding precondition to ICOP commencing pipe jacking works. It is not disputed that by the time the Authorities’ Approvals were obtained by TSCE on 25 June 2018, any prior issues concerning TSCE’s slow handover of the worksite or ICOP’s slow mobilisation of its equipment were no longer effective or causative of any relevant delay — the worksite had been handed over and ICOP had already mobilised its equipment and was ready to commence pipe jacking as of 22 May 2018. Therefore, any delays caused by the worksite handover issue, or the slow mobilisation issue are not critical or effective delays. Consequently, there is no need to consider the different approaches to concurrent causes in relation to the period between 24 February 2018 to 5 April 2018.

  169. [102] For the aforementioned reasons, we dismiss ICOP’s appeal on Issue 3.

  170. [103] This leaves us to address one remaining point on the damages payable by TSCE for the 69 days of critical delay between 6 April 2018 and 25 June 2018 due to the Authorities’ Approval issue. At the hearing before us, counsel for ICOP, Mr Shaun Lee (“Mr Lee”), informed us that the Judge, in determining the quantum of damages payable for these 69 working days, had erroneously used (at [86] of the Judgment) the daily rates provided by the quantum experts which were computed on a calendar day basis. In other words, the quantum experts arrived at the daily rates by dividing the loss that would be incurred each month over the number of calendar days in that month, as opposed to the number of working days. The working day daily rate should therefore be higher.

  171. [104] We agree with ICOP that the Judge erred in applying the calendar day daily rate when he had found TSCE liable for 69 working days of delay. We directed the parties to provide their positions on the quantification of general damages payable in respect of the delays that the Judge had found each of them liable for. The parties were able to come to an agreement on the calculation of general damages. In relation to the Authorities’ Approvals issue, the parties agreed to convert the daily rates agreed between the quantum experts to working day daily rates. The parties agreed that the revised general damages payable by TSCE to ICOP for the 69 working days of delay should be $489,064.89, instead of the $401,338.47 assessed by the Judge. Consequently, we allow ICOP’s appeal in relation to the quantum of damages payable by TSCE to ICOP for the Authorities’ Approvals issue.

  172. Issue 4: ICOP’s entitlement to MTBM rental costs

  173. [105] At para 2(d) of its Notice of Appeal, ICOP appeals against the Judge’s finding that “ICOP is not entitled to claim a daily rental rate of S$9,120 for each day of critical delay caused by TSCE, prior to the expiry of the 18-month rental period (see [87] – [88] of the Judgment)”.

  174. The parties’ cases

  175. [110] On appeal, ICOP appears to advance its case on two alternative grounds.

  176. [114] Furthermore, TSCE argues that ICOP has not shown that TSCE’s delays would have led to the 18-month period being overrun. TSCE had only caused 69 days of critical delay, which falls short of the 179-day buffer calculated by Mr Snadden. Even if the 8 January 2018 Programme applied, ICOP’s delays would not have exceeded the available buffer.

  177. Our decision

  178. [115] With respect, we cannot agree with the Judge. The parties have spent a lot of effort putting forward arguments on whether this is a head of reliance or expectation loss and drawing distinctions which, with respect, cloud, rather than clarify the position.

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