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Grounds publishedDecided 26 Apr 2024

Appellate Division of the High Court

DBA v DBB

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[2024] SGHC(A) 12Case no. Appellate Division / Civil Appeal No 67 of 202326 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] This appeal involves the question of whether the parties’ marriage was a dual-income marriage or a single-income one. It touches on the “classification” of a marriage for the purposes of determining whether the structured approach in ANJ v ANK [2015] 4 SLR 1043 (“ANJ”) applies in the division of matrimonial assets pursuant to s 112 of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“Women’s Charter”). This is significant because the structured approach to the division of matrimonial assets applies to “dual-income” marriages but not to “single-income” marriages (TNL v TNK and another appeal and another matter [2017] 1 SLR 609 (“TNL”) at [46]).

  3. Background

  4. [2] The appellant (the “Wife”) and the respondent (the “Husband”) were married on 26 September 1990. An interim judgment of divorce was granted on 6 October 2021. The parties were married for 31 years. Presently, the Husband is 58 years old and the Wife is 56 years old.

  5. [3] There were three children in this marriage, [B], [C] and [D], who are presently aged 26, 22, and 15 years old. The parties have joint custody of [D], who is presently the only child under the age of majority; the Wife has care and control of him, and the Husband has liberal access.

  6. [4] The Judge of the Family Division of the High Court (the “Judge”) held that the parties were in a dual-income marriage and applied the ANJ structured approach in dividing the matrimonial assets. She made the following findings in respect of the parties’ direct and indirect contributions to the marriage, presented here in this Table:

  7. Issues in the appeal

  8. [7] There were three main issues in this appeal:

  9. (a) whether the Judge erred in classifying the present marriage as a dual-income marriage and applying the ANJ structured approach in dividing the matrimonial assets;

  10. (c) whether the Judge erred in her orders in respect of child maintenance for [D] and in ordering no maintenance for the Wife.

  11. Issue 1: Classification of the parties’ marriage: dual-income or single-income

  12. The Parties’ Submissions

  13. Wife’s submissions

  14. [8] The Wife submitted that she should be awarded 50% of the matrimonial assets. Her primary submission was that the Judge had erred in classifying the parties’ marriage as a dual-income marriage. She submitted that it should instead have been classified as a long single-income marriage in which she was a homemaker for most of the marriage. She argued that the Judge ought to have followed the trend of equal division in long single-income marriages identified in TNL at [48].

  15. Husband’s submissions

  16. [9] The Husband submitted that the Judge had not erred in classifying the marriage as a dual-income marriage, as the Wife had worked full-time except for a single year in 1998.

  17. Our Decision

  18. [10] We found that the parties’ marriage, which lasted 31 years, was a long single-income marriage.

  19. [11] The Court of Appeal had affirmed in BPC v BPB and another appeal [2019] 1 SLR 608 (at [102]) that “according to the existing framework laid out in both ANJ v ANK and TNL v TNK, one must first enquire whether the marriage is a long single-income or dual-income marriage. If it is the former, then the approach in TNL v TNK applies, and the court will generally tend towards equal division …”.

  20. [12] In UBM v UBN [2017] 4 SLR 921 (“UBM”), the Family Division of the High Court held that “a ‘Single-Income Marriage’ would include a marriage where one party is primarily the breadwinner and the other is primarily the homemaker” [emphasis in original] (UBM at [50]), noting that it was not likely that “the Court of Appeal [in TNL] intended to draw a thick black line separating cases where the main homemaker worked intermittently for a few years in the course of a long marriage from cases where the homemaker had not worked a single day” (UBM at [49]). In particular, it noted that the Court of Appeal in TNL itself had cited Yow Mee Lan v Chen Kai Buan [2000] 2 SLR(R) 659 (“Yow Mee Lan”) as an instance of a long single-income marriage (TNL at [51]). In Yow Mee Lan, the court considered the parties’ marriage to be a single-income marriage even though it recognised that “the wife did work continuously during the marriage, first for third parties and subsequently for the husband himself” (TNL at [51]). TNL thus envisaged that in some single-income marriages, the spouse who is primarily the homemaker may also work part-time or intermittently over the course of the marriage.

  21. [13] We found that the parties’ marriage in the present case was a single-income marriage as the Husband was primarily the breadwinner and the Wife was primarily the homemaker for the majority of the marriage. We emphasise in this regard that the focus of the analysis is on the primary roles carried out by the parties in the marriage; a large disparity in income between the spouses does not in itself render the marriage a single-income marriage.

  22. [14] The evidence suggested that in the early years of the marriage when the children were younger, the Wife took on the main child-caring role at the expense of her career. [B], the eldest child, stated on affidavit that “when my siblings and I were younger, my father tended to work longer hours while my mother would be at home with us more as she had more flexible working hours”. [B] also stated that “[i]n relation to performing the various household chores, my mother tended to do more of them when my siblings and I were younger, while it is now my father who does more of them since his retirement”.

  23. [15] At the hearing, the Wife’s counsel highlighted that the Judge erred in relying on an Excel spreadsheet prepared by the Husband in finding that the Wife was not a homemaker but had worked throughout the marriage. This Excel spreadsheet was a document setting out the Husband’s account of the parties’ work history and income throughout the years of the marriage. While the Wife confirmed that the companies or businesses with which she was involved were accurately reflected in the Excel spreadsheet, she argued that she only worked full-time for four years over the course of the entire marriage; the Excel spreadsheet thus did not support the finding that she was in full-time employment for most of the marriage. The Husband’s counsel, on the other hand, argued that both parties had shared in the homemaking efforts such that it could not be said that the Wife was the primary homemaker in this marriage. We pause here to point out that just because the main breadwinner was involved as a parent to some extent, or contributed substantially to the financial welfare of the family, does not in itself render that party a primary or “joint homemaker” (if there was such a description).

  24. [16] We also noted that the Husband’s own evidence of the parties’ work history over the years corroborated the Wife’s account that she was the primary homemaker. When the three children were young, they would have required a caregiver on a daily basis; the Husband’s counsel at the hearing could not point to evidence that there had been someone else other than the Wife (such as the children’s grandparents) who had carried out that role.

  25. [17] According to the Husband’s own records, from 2001, the Wife took on contract work with a “Temp Agency” and thereafter worked for her own business from 2003 to 2013 before transiting back to contract work until 2021, with the exception of a two-year stint of full-time work in 2005–2006. The Wife’s remuneration across her years of working was very low relative to the Husband’s. According to the Husband’s own computation, while his income from 1990 to 2021 was $5,766,283, the Wife’s income was only $173,706 (with some information on some years of her income being unavailable). We observed that while the large disparity in income on its own did not transform a marriage into a single-income marriage, it was consistent with the Wife’s narrative that she was the primary homemaker. The Wife gave evidence that her business was a small home-based handicraft business, which allowed her to take care of the children and the household while earning a side income. She also stated that she took a year of maternity leave following the birth of each of her children to care for them and breastfed each of them for about six months after they were born, and gave up opportunities in her career (such as an opportunity to attend company-funded further studies) so that she could be present to care for the children. Further, between 1991 to 1997, the Wife was an insurance agent; the Husband claimed that she was working full-time then but the Wife said that she was working part-time. We were of the view that it would not be accurate to say that she was working full-time as an insurance agent.

  26. [19] It was not disputed that the Husband left full-time employment in 2016. However, the Husband himself had adduced evidence that he was engaged in contract work, and drew income even after 2016, from 2018 to 2020. When the Husband left full-time employment in April 2016, the three children of the marriage were 18, 14, and 7 years of age. In the Husband’s affidavit of assets and means, his account of his care for the children focused on aspects such as preparing the children’s breakfasts, ensuring that they were driven to school, coaching them in their studies, doing household chores, organising and participating in family dinners and outings, and engaging the children in their hobbies. The Husband’s non-financial contributions, particularly significant from 2016, would be recognised when considering the proportions of division in the TNL context, but they did not displace the finding that the Wife was the primary homemaker in this marriage.

  27. [20] While TNL had held at [48] that in “long Single-Income Marriages, the precedent cases show that our courts tend towards an equal division of the matrimonial assets”, there is no immutable rule requiring that each party in a long single-income marriage should receive a 50% share. The trends in precedent cases as well as the specific facts of each case must be considered. In UBM, the court noted at [72] that the husband was responsible for the generation of income in the marriage while the wife played a minimal role in that regard. It noted that the husband was close to the children; he actively looked after the children despite being the main breadwinner, and had been retired since 1999, years before the interim judgment of divorce was granted in December 2015. The husband was awarded 60% of the assets in UBM.

  28. [21] We were satisfied that the Husband had played an active role at home alongside his role as the primary breadwinner. [B] had given evidence of the Husband’s extensive involvement in the family, such as by contributing actively to household chores, fetching the children to and from their activities, tutoring the children and supporting their endeavours. The Wife did not dispute the Husband’s affidavit evidence recounting his active involvement in the children’s lives. She expressed appreciation that the Husband had been supportive of her in relation to the jobs that she took up on a part-time and intermittent basis. While the Wife asserted that she bore most of the household chores for large parts of the marriage, she conceded that at the very least, the Husband had helped out with the housework since 2016 after he stopped full-time employment.

  29. [22] We were of the view that it was just and equitable to divide the assets in the ratio of 60:40 in favour of the Husband. This would not undervalue the Wife’s homemaking contributions, while giving due recognition to the Husband’s generation of income in the marriage and his not insignificant non-financial contributions at home.

  30. Issue 2: Consequential orders

  31. Parties’ Submissions

  32. Wife’s submissions

  33. [23] The Wife sought to have the matrimonial home and the properties in Japan and in Australia currently in the parties’ joint names transferred to her. She also submitted that the Judge had erred by ordering, in relation to the sale of the matrimonial home in the open market, that the parties’ CPF contributions to the matrimonial home be refunded to their CPF accounts before dividing the sale proceeds in accordance with the ratio for division.

  34. Husband’s submissions

  35. Our Decision

  36. [25] We first make a preliminary observation on the Judge’s finding on the total matrimonial pool. At [81] of the Grounds of Decision issued by the Judge, the Judge had stated that the couple’s “total assets” were $5,661,560.77. This statement was confusing as this sum did not include the value of the matrimonial home and properties in Japan, Australia and Birmingham that formed part of the matrimonial pool (“the Five Properties”). In our view, a court’s judgment or grounds of decision on the division of matrimonial assets should set out clearly the total value of the matrimonial pool, the proportions in which this pool is divided between the parties, and the consequential orders that implement the main division orders. In CVC v CVB (“CVC”) [2023] SGHC(A) 28, this court observed (at [44]):

  37. In USB v USA and another appeal [2020] 2 SLR 588 (“USB”) at [27], the Court of Appeal observed that “[t]he starting point of the division exercise… is the identification of the material gains of the marital partnership”. Thus, the total pool of matrimonial assets ought to have been identified and valued before the first step of the ANJ approach is taken …

  38. [28] In the present appeal, the parties did not raise before us the issue of the valuation of the Five Properties, nor were they prepared at the hearing to submit on the matter. As we have found that this was a single-income marriage to which the ANJ approach was not applicable, we were able to proceed with determining our orders without further submissions on these valuations. We considered the respective submissions which both parties had made in their “joint summary of relevant information” on the valuations of the Five Properties. Based on the values submitted by both parties, we estimated that the parties’ total pool of assets had a value of over $7 million.

  39. [29] While the TNL approach does not specifically require the determination of the parties’ direct contributions ratio, an estimate of the total pool is nevertheless relevant. Indeed, the “starting point of the division exercise… is the identification of the material gains of the marital partnership” (USB v USA and another appeal [2020] 2 SLR 588 at [27]). The size of the total matrimonial pool is a relevant factor to consider when a court exercises its discretion pursuant to s 112 of the Women’s Charter to reach a “just and equitable” division. It can assist in providing the court a sense of what the parties’ joint marital partnership was like and what material gains it produced. Further, a matrimonial pool of a very large size is a significant factor. Despite the trend in long single-income marriages that inclined towards the equal division of matrimonial assets, in Yeo Chong Lin v Tay Ang Choo Nancy and another appeal [2011] 2 SLR 1157, the homemaker wife in a 49-year marriage received 35% of the matrimonial assets. The Court of Appeal in TNL explained this outcome in Yeo Chong Lin (TNL at [52]) as follows:

  40. … This court upheld (at [82]) the … 65:35 distribution in favour of the husband [in Yeo Chong Lin]. However, … it is clear that a major factor that featured in the analysis was the exceptionally large size of the asset pool, which amounted to around $69m ...

  41. Issue 3: Maintenance for child [D] and the Wife

  42. Parties’ cases

  43. Wife’s submissions

  44. [33] In relation to [D’s] maintenance, the Wife submitted that the Judge had erred in finding that a reasonable assessment of [D’s] monthly expenses for the purposes of child maintenance was $1,500 per month. The Wife submitted that $2,230 would be the appropriate monthly maintenance sum for [D].

  45. Husband’s submissions

  46. Our Decision

  47. [38] The Judge found that [D], as a secondary school student in Singapore, needed $1,500 to live reasonably well given his family’s standard of living. We observed that this figure was below the figure submitted by the Husband himself (and even further below the sum submitted by the Wife). The Husband had submitted in the court below that [D’s] reasonable monthly expenses were $1,760 while the Wife submitted the figure of $2,230. In the court below, the Husband took the position that his offer to pay $1,500 per month for [D’s] maintenance, seen against [D’s] reasonable monthly expenses of $1,760, resulted in him paying a higher share (ie, about 85%) of the maintenance than the proportion of the matrimonial assets that were awarded to him (ie, 77.5%); further, he highlighted that he was retired.

  48. [40] We add a reminder here which we think the parties should bear in mind. In both the quantification of child maintenance and the apportionment of the maintenance obligation as between the parties, a broad-brush approach is appropriate: WBU v WBT [2023] SGHCF 3 (“WBU”) at [31] and [39]. As a child’s needs and expenses may fluctuate from month to month, approaching child maintenance from a “budget” perspective is sensible and practical, instead of focusing on counting which dollar is meant for which specific expense: WBU at [10]–[11].