Appellate Division of the High Court · Decided 15 May 2024
Mustaq Ahmad (alias Mushtaq Ahmad s/o Mustafa) and another v Ayaz Ahmed and others and other appeals
Feedback & support[2024] SGHC(A) 17 · Case no. Appellate Division / Civil Appeal No 132 of 2021
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] The present appeals arise from three suits filed before the General Division of the High Court, namely HC/S 1158/2017 (“Suit 1158”), HCF/S 9/2017 (“Suit 9”) and HC/S 780/2018 (“Suit 780”) (collectively, the “High Court Suits”).
- [2]
[2] Mr Mustafa s/o Majid Khan (“Mustafa”) had two wives, ie, Ms Momina (“Momina”) and then Mdm Asia (“Asia”). He had one son with his first wife, Momina. That son is Mr Mustaq Ahmad @ Mushtaq Ahmad s/o Mustafa (“Mustaq”). Mustafa had five children with his second wife, Asia: Mr Ayaz Ahmad (“Ayaz”), Ms Khalida Bano (“Khalida”), Mr Ishtiaq Ahmad (“Ishtiaq”), Mr Maaz Ahmad Khan (“Maaz”) and Ms Wasela Tasneem (“Wasela”). Asia and her five children are the beneficiaries of Mustafa’s estate (the “Mustafa Estate”) and the plaintiffs in Suit 1158 (the “Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries”) and Suit 9.
- [3]
[3] Mr Samsuddin s/o Mokhtar Ahmad (“Samsuddin”) had five children with his wife, Ms Sitarun Nisha (“Sitarun”). Two of these five children are Mr Fayyaz Ahmad (“Fayyaz”) and Mr Ansar Ahmad (“Ansar”), with the others being Nausaba Khatoon, Mohamed Zakaria and Mohammad Asrar Ahmad. Mustaq and Fayyaz were the two trustees and executors of Samsuddin’s estate (the “Samsuddin Estate”). The five children and Sitarun are the beneficiaries of the Samsuddin Estate. Fayyaz and Ansar are the plaintiffs in Suit 780 (the “Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries”).
- [4]
[4] The Mustafa Estate and the Samsuddin Estate are registered owners of shares in a company known as Mohamed Mustafa & Samsuddin Co Pte Ltd (“MMSCPL”), which is the sixth defendant in Suit 1158 and Suit 780. Where necessary, we refer to the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries and the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries collectively as the “Claimant Beneficiaries”, and the Mustafa Estate and the Samsuddin Estate collectively as the “Mustafa-Samsuddin Estates”.
- [5]
[5] As mentioned, Mustaq is the son of Mustafa and Mustafa’s first wife, Momina (who was also Samsuddin’s cousin). Mustaq and his wife, Ms Ishret Jahan (“Ishret”), are both shareholders and directors of MMSCPL, and are the first and second defendants in both Suit 1158 and Suit 780. Mustaq and Ishret have four children: Ms Shama Bano (“Shama”), Mr Abu Osama (“Osama”), Ms Shams Bano (“Shams”) and Ms Bushra Bano (“Bushra”). Shama and Osama are directors of MMSCPL, and the third and fourth defendants in both Suit 1158 and Suit 780. Mustaq is the sole defendant in Suit 9. Mr Iqbal Ahmad (“Iqbal”), Ishret’s brother, is a director and the company secretary of MMSCPL and the fifth defendant in both Suit 1158 and Suit 780. As counsel for Iqbal confirmed that Iqbal’s case is aligned with the case of Mustaq and Ishret, we consider it appropriate to regard Mustaq, Ishret and Iqbal collectively, and will refer to them as the “Mustaq Group”.
- [6]
[6] Suit 1158 and Suit 780 concerned claims for minority oppression by the Claimant Beneficiaries against the Mustaq Group, which comprised directors of MMSCPL. In addition, it was claimed in Suit 780 that the Samsuddin Estate was entitled to certain assets held for it by Mustaq on an express trust, and that Mustaq had breached his duties as executor and trustee of the Samsuddin Estate. Suit 9 concerned a claim against Mustaq for breach of his duties as the sole administrator and trustee of the Mustafa Estate.
- [7]
[7] In other words, the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries had commenced two actions. Suit 1158 was for oppression in respect of MMSCPL and Suit 9 was for breaches of duty by Mustaq in respect of the Mustafa Estate. On the other hand, the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries commenced one action, ie, Suit 780, for minority oppression in respect of MMSCPL, to claim assets held on an express trust and for alleged breaches of duty by Mustaq in respect of the Samsuddin Estate. All three actions were heard together in the proceedings below.
- [9]
[9] The Mustaq Group and the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries, being dissatisfied with various aspects of the Judge’s findings as set out in the GD, filed the present cross-appeals before us. There are a total of 12 appeals before us. This is partially because the Judge had delivered her decision in various parts. Her first decision was given on 16 August 2021 and clarified on 6 September 2021 when the parties were directed to prepare formal orders of court which would include comprehensive orders on the terms of a share buy-out and any outstanding issue. On 9 December 2021, the terms of the orders were approved by the court. At the same time, the court rejected an oral application by the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries to set aside the share allotments in MMSCPL between 1991 to 1993. By 9 December 2021, some of the appeals had already been filed in view of the decision on 16 August 2021 and clarification on 6 September 2021. After 9 December 2021, more appeals were filed to cover the decision on 9 December 2021. The appeals may be categorised as follows:
(a) AD/CA 91/2021 and AD/CA 5/2022 are the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries’ appeals against the Judge’s Suit 780 decisions delivered on 16 August 2021 and 9 December 2021 respectively.
(b) AD/CA 92/2021 and AD/CA 93/2021 are Iqbal’s respective appeals against the Judge’s Suit 780 and Suit 1158 decisions delivered on 16 August 2021 and clarified on 6 September 2021. AD/CA 135/2021 and AD/CA 136/2021 are Iqbal’s respective appeals against the Judge’s Suit 780 and Suit 1158 decisions delivered on 9 December 2021. Iqbal is not an active participant in these appeals and essentially adopts the submissions of Mustaq and Ishret.
(c) AD/CA 94/2021 and AD/CA 96/2021 are Mustaq and Ishret’s respective appeals against the Judge’s Suit 1158 and Suit 780 decisions delivered on 16 August 2021 and clarified on 6 September 2021. AD/CA 132/2021 and AD/CA 133/2021 are Mustaq and Ishret’s respective appeals against the Judge’s Suit 1158 and Suit 780 decisions delivered on 9 December 2021.
(d) AD/CA 95/2021 and AD/CA 134/2021 are Mustaq’s appeals against the Judge’s Suit 9 decision delivered on 16 August 2021 and clarified on 6 September 2021 and delivered on 9 December 2021 respectively.
Significantly, the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries have not appealed against any aspect of the Judge’s decisions. For convenience, we will refer to the various appeals by any side collectively (eg, the Mustaq Group’s appeal).
- [10]
[10] Pursuant to our directions at a Case Management Conference on 6 January 2023, the parties consolidated their appellants’ cases, respondents’ cases and replies in the substantive cases for: (a) the Mustaq Group; (b) the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries; and (c) the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries. We set out below our decision on each of the issues raised by the parties in their cases.
Background facts
The origins and incorporation of MMSCPL
- [11]
[11] It is not disputed between the parties that prior to the incorporation of MMSCPL, Mustafa and Samsuddin commenced a wholesale business through a partnership known as Mohamed Mustafa & Samsuddin Co (“MMSC”) on 11 July 1973. What is disputed between the parties, however, is their account of the facts leading up to the formation of MMSC, the reason for its formation, and the series of events leading up to MMSCPL’s incorporation (see the GD at [11]–[15]).
- [12]
[12] According to the Claimant Beneficiaries, Mustafa and Samsuddin commenced a wholesale business through MMSC on 11 July 1973. On 23 July 1973, Mustafa and Samsuddin lodged a form with the Registrar of Business (“ROB”) to state MMSC’s change of its registered address from 19 Campbell Lane to 67 Serangoon Road Singapore, and that MMSC’s branch would operate from 19 Campbell Lane. On 12 September 1973, Mustaq was added as a partner in MMSC.
- [13]
[13] On the other hand, the Mustaq Group contended that in or around 1971, Mustaq rented 1 Campbell Lane and conducted his business there under the name “Mustaq Ahmad”. Sometime in 1973 when he was informed that the master lease was about to expire, Mustaq bought 19 Campbell Lane to house his business and rented 67 Serangoon Road to store his goods (collectively, the “New Premises”). Mustaq claimed to have made all these payments with no assistance from Mustafa and Samsuddin. Sometime in May or June 1973, before Mustaq could move his goods to the New Premises, he had to visit his wife in India and Mustafa offered to help supervise the running of Mustaq’s business with Samsuddin while he was away. Mustafa and Samsuddin commenced MMSC on 11 July 1973 to facilitate the move to the New Premises, on the understanding that the business operating out of the New Premises was Mustaq’s business. On 12 September 1973, following Mustaq’s return to Singapore, Mustaq’s name was added to MMSC. It is not disputed between the parties that MMSCPL was incorporated in Singapore on 21 February 1989 to take over the business of MMSC. The MMSC partnership was terminated on 30 September 1989 following MMSCPL’s incorporation. Mustaq and Samsuddin were MMSCPL’s initial directors and shareholders with each subscribing to one share of MMSCPL. Mustafa was appointed a director of MMSCPL on 10 April 1989, and became a shareholder on 27 April 1989.
Appointment of MMSCPL’s officers
- [14]
[14] Between 1989 and 2014, various other individuals were also appointed as directors of MMSCPL. The appointments (and some resignations) are set out in a table at [23] of the GD, which we reproduce here:
Iqbal
- [17]
[17] January 1994
Company secretary
N/A
Subscription of shares in MMSCPL
- [15]
[15] A total of eight tranches of share allotments were carried out byMMSCPL since its incorporation on 21 February 1989. These allotments are set out in a table in the GD at [24], which we reproduce here:
Events surrounding Mustafa’s and Samsuddin’s passing
Mustafa’s passing
- [16]
[16] In July 2001, Mustafa died intestate. Shortly after, on 16 August 2001, the Syariah Court of Singapore issued an Inheritance Certificate stating that the beneficiaries of the Mustafa Estate were Asia, and his four sons (including Mustaq) and two daughters (GD at [26]–[27]). On 22 December 2001, Mustaq visited the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries in Jaunpur, India. On the same day, the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries signed a Power of Attorney drafted on Mustaq’s instructions, which provided that the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries jointly and severally appointed Mustaq to apply for and obtain a grant of probate or a grant of letters of administration for the Mustafa Estate. On 30 October 2003, the Mustafa Estate was registered as a shareholder of MMSCPL. On 18 November 2023, Mustaq filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration, and this was granted on 24 November 2003 (the “Mustafa Estate Grant of LAs”). On 28 January 2004, Mustaq extracted the Mustafa Estate Grant of LAs (GD at [28]–[29]).
Samsuddin’s passing
- [17]
[17] Samsuddin died in April 2011. Pursuant to Samsuddin’s will dated 5 November 2004 (“Samsuddin’s Will”), Fayyaz and Mustaq were appointed joint and several executors and trustees of his estate. On 24 October 2012, Mustaq applied for a grant of probate (the “Samsuddin Estate Grant of Probate”), which was issued to Mustaq and Fayyaz on 25 June 2013. Based on the Syariah Court Inheritance Certificate, as stated above, the beneficiaries under the Samsuddin Estate were Sitarun, and her five children with Samsuddin (GD at [30]–[31]).
Commencement of the High Court Suits
- [18]
[18] The Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries commenced Suit 1158 and Suit 9 on 8 December 2017, whilst the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries commenced Suit 780 on 6 August 2018. As stated above, Suit 1158 and Suit 780 essentially concerned the Claimant Beneficiaries’ allegations of minority oppression.
- [19]
[19] In addition to the claims for oppression, Suit 780 involved claims by the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries that: (a) Mustaq held one-third of various assets on trust for the Samsuddin Estate; and (b) Mustaq, as executor and trustee of the Samsuddin Estate, had breached his fiduciary duties to the estate to act in its best interests when he intentionally and systematically removed MMSCPL’s funds, thereby causing loss to the estate.
- [20]
[20] As for Suit 9, that action involved the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries’ claim that Mustaq had, by virtue of his conduct which were alleged to be oppressive, breached his duties as administrator and trustee of the Mustafa Estate.
- [21]
[21] In response, the Mustaq Group raised several counterclaims and defences, both factual and legal. These included allegations that Mustaq was the true beneficial owner of all the shares in MMSCPL and that the Claimant Beneficiaries’ claims were barred by laches and/or acquiescence. Despite these allegations, the Mustaq Group had submitted no case to answer to the claims and elected to call no evidence.
Decision below
- [22]
[22] For brevity, we set out in this section only the portions of the GD that are relevant to the issues in these appeals.
Preliminary issues
Evidence applying across High Court Suits
- [23]
[23] In the course of the trial, the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries and the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries provided different accounts as to what each party’s rightful shareholding in MMSCPL should be. While the former claimed that the Mustafa Estate should have about 25% of the shares in MMSCPL, the latter claimed that Samsuddin, Mustafa and Mustaq should each have an equal one-third share in the company. In their closing submissions below, the Mustaq Group took the position that the evidence led in Suit 1158 was capable of being considered as evidence in Suit 780 and vice versa, but the Claimant Beneficiaries objected (GD at [80]).
- [24]
[24] The Judge held that in assessing the evidence adduced in the trial of the High Court Suits, the evidence led in one suit could and should be treated as evidence in the other suits (GD at [84]–[85] and [92]). However, the Judge emphasised that this did not mean that the claimants in one suit could obtain reliefs which adversely affected the interests of claimants in another suit, if the latter set of claimants were not joined as parties in the former suit (GD at [93]). We note that the parties have not appealed against these aspects of the Judge’s decision.
Locus standi of the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries
- [25]
[25] The Judge held that the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries, despite not being shareholders of MMSCPL, had the necessary locus standi to bring Suit 1158 (which concerned claims for minority oppression against the directors of MMSCPL), based on what has been referred to as the Wong Moy exception (as explained in Wong Moy (administratrix of the estate of Theng Chee Khim, deceased) v Soo Ah Choy [1996] 3 SLR(R) 27 (“Wong Moy”)) (GD at [95]).
The Mustaq Group’s submission of no case to answer
- [26]
[26] Finally, the Mustaq Group made a submission of no case to answer and elected to call no evidence in the High Court Suits. The Judge made the following decisions:
(a) The Mustaq Group, despite having undertaken not to adduce any evidence when they chose to submit no case to answer, sought to rely in their closing submissions on various documents which had not been admitted in evidence. As the Claimant Beneficiaries had not admitted the authenticity of the documents, and there was no direct evidence of the authenticity of those documents led by the Mustaq Group, those documents were not admissible in evidence (GD at [113]–[115]).
(b) The Judge declined to exercise the power given under s 75 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (the “Evidence Act”) to compare the signatures on some documents, as this was a case where the Mustaq Group had elected to call no evidence, presumably fully aware that there would be no direct evidence of the authenticity of various disputed documents. Moreover, the Mustaq Group’s argument that the Judge should exercise the power under s 75 was made belatedly following the conclusion of the trial (GD at [116]–[119]).
(c) The Mustaq Group bore the legal and evidential burden of proving that Mustaq and Ishret were the true owners of MMSCPL, in accordance with ss 103 and 105 of the Evidence Act. In particular, it was the Mustaq Group which asserted that: (i) the Mustafa-Samsuddin Estates had no interest in MMSCPL despite being registered as minority shareholders; (ii) the Mustafa-Samsuddin Estates held their shares on trust for Mustaq; and (iii) Mustaq was the beneficial owner of all the shares in MMSCPL and was entitled to run the company at his sole discretion (GD at [120]–[122]).
The beneficial ownership of MMSCPL
- [27]
[27] The beneficial ownership of the shares in MMSCPL was a central issue in all the High Court Suits. The Mustaq Group resisted the Claimant Beneficiaries’ claims for minority oppression on the basis that Mustaq was the true beneficial owner of all the shares held in the names of the Mustafa-Samsuddin Estates.
- [28]
[28] The Mustaq Group essentially claimed that Mustafa and Samsuddin held their shares in MMSCPL on a common intention constructive trust or, alternatively, a resulting trust, for the benefit of Mustaq. In particular, the Mustaq Group argued it could be inferred that Mustaq had paid for all the shares in MMSCPL. The Mustaq Group also asserted that common understandings regarding the beneficial ownership of the shares in MMSCPL were reached between Mustaq, Mustafa and Samsuddin in 1973 (the “1973 Common Understanding”) and between Mustaq and the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries in 2001 (the “2001 Common Understanding) (collectively, the “Common Understandings”). The 1973 Common Understanding allegedly entailed that:
(a) MMSC and subsequently, MMSCPL, was wholly owned by Mustaq;
(b) Mustaq would be the sole decision-maker in the business;
(c) Mustafa and Samsuddin would not need to contribute to or be responsible for the business’ finances or assume risks or liabilities in respect of the business;
(d) Mustafa and Samsuddin would not receive any remuneration from the business and any payments made to them were done purely out of goodwill and solely at Mustaq’s discretion, borne out of familial concern and respect; and
(e) as partners of MMSC on record, Mustafa and Samsuddin would sign any and all documents Mustaq required them to sign (GD at [61]–[63] and [128]–[129]).
- [29]
[29] The Mustaq Group also alleged that on or about 20 July 2001 soon after Mustafa had passed away on 17 July 2001, there was a meeting in Asia’s room at Mustaq’s house in India. At that meeting, Khalida, Ishtiaq and Asia agreed on behalf of all the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries that Mustaq should continue running the business as per the 1973 Common Understanding (ie, the 2001 Common Understanding) (GD at [66]–[67]).
- [30]
[30] Unsurprisingly, the Claimant Beneficiaries disputed the existence of the Common Understandings (GD at [130]–[132]).
- [31]
[31] Having evaluated the evidence, the Judge concluded that the Mustaq Group had not discharged its burden of proving that Mustaq was the true beneficial owner of all the shares in MMSCPL. The Judge further concluded that the Mustafa-Samsuddin Estates were the beneficial owners of the shares held in their names (GD at [125] and [179]). In particular, the Judge found that the evidence adduced at trial did not support, and in fact contradicted the existence of the Common Understandings:
(a) The Mustaq Group’s contention – that MMSC was set up as a formality to facilitate the operation of Mustaq’s sole proprietorship (named “Mustaq Ahmad”) in Mustaq’s absence and the move of Mustaq’s business to the New Premises, on the understanding that the business belonged solely to Mustaq – was unsupported by the documentary evidence. Documents lodged with the ROB showed that even after Mustaq was added as a partner of MMSC in September 1973, the three men viewed MMSC as a separate and distinct entity from “Mustaq Ahmad”, and differentiated between Mustaq’s ownership of “Mustaq Ahmad” and his ownership of MMSC (GD at [136]–[137]).
(b) The fact that Mustaq filled out the documents lodged with the ROB in respect of MMSC’s affairs did not mean that that he was the only person responsible for managing the business. On the contrary, the evidence showed that Mustafa and Samsuddin were involved in the running and management of MMSC and later MMSCPL (GD at [140]–[141] and [150]–[154]).
(c) Mustafa and Samsuddin received payments which were clearly made on the basis of their ownership of MMSC, and later, of MMSCPL. They were remunerated as partners of MMSC, which they declared as trade income in their Notices of Assessment (“NOAs”) (GD at [157]).
(d) Following the incorporation of MMSCPL, Mustafa and Samsuddin were paid dividends by the company in proportion to their respective shareholdings. If these dividends were “goodwill payments” from Mustaq, as the Mustaq Group contended, there would have been no reason for Mustafa and Samsuddin to pay income tax on these dividends (GD at [158] and [160]–[161]).
(e) Mustafa and Samsuddin had assumed significant risks and liabilities on behalf of MMSCPL by providing guarantees in respect of MMSCPL’s financial liabilities and had also contributed funds to MMSCPL by paying for their shares in the company. This contradicted the alleged 1973 Common Understanding which included an understanding that Mustafa and Samsuddin would not need to contribute to or be responsible for MMSCPL’s finances or assume risks or liabilities in respect of the business (GD at [163]–[166]).
(f) In the correspondence between the lawyers of the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries and Mustaq, the former had requested financial statements relating to MMSCPL and insisted that Mustaq refrain from reducing or diluting the estate’s shareholding. However, Mustaq made no mention of his purported sole beneficial ownership of MMSCPL up until as late as August 2016, and even acknowledged the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries’ interest in MMSCPL. The position that Mustaq took with respect to various documents indicating that Mustaq and Samsuddin owned shares in MMSCPL also contradicted the assertion that Mustaq beneficially owned all of the shares in MMSCPL (GD at [169]–[175]).
(g) The Mustaq Group attempted mid-trial to recast their entire narrative of the Common Understandings to posit that while MMSCPL was entirely Mustaq’s, Mustaq had given shares to the Mustafa Estate and to the Samsuddin Estate in 2002 and 2004 respectively but later decided to revoke the gifts when the Claimant Beneficiaries commenced the High Court Suits against him. This was at odds with the Mustaq Group’s pleaded case, ie, that Mustaq had always enjoyed uninterrupted beneficial ownership of all the MMSCPL shares, and it also suggested that the Common Understandings were fabrications (GD at [177]–[178]).
The Claimant Beneficiaries’ minority oppression claims
- [32]
[32] The Judge concluded that the Claimant Beneficiaries had established a prima facie case of oppression by the Mustaq Group in respect of several of the acts complained of.
The 5 January 1995 Allotment and 11 December 2001 Allotment
- [33]
[33] The Judge found that the Claimant Beneficiaries had established a prima facie case that the share allotments carried out on 5 January 1995 (the “5 January 1995 Allotment”) and 11 December 2001 (the “11 December 2001 Allotment”) (collectively, the “1995 and 2001 Allotments”) were oppressive for the following reasons:
(a) The Judge rejected the Mustaq Group’s sole pleaded defence that the 1995 and 2001 Allotments were issued without the need to comply with MMSCPL’s memorandum and articles of association (“MMSCPL’s Constitution”) in light of the Common Understandings (GD at [202] and [273]).
(b) The Judge found that there was also no evidence that these allotments were conducted in accordance with the requirements prescribed by MMSCPL’s Constitution (GD at [203]–[212] and [274]–[285]).
(c) Having regard to the expert evidence adduced by the Claimant Beneficiaries, the Judge was satisfied that these allotments were carried out at an undervalue (GD at [218]–[231] and [292]).
(d) The 1995 and 2001 Allotments were not in MMSCPL’s commercial interest. In particular, MMSCPL was not in any real need of cash during this period so as to warrant an increase in MMSCPL’s share capital. There was also no reason why shares were issued to Mustaq only (GD at [232]–[247], [296], [303] and [305]).
(e) Finally, these allotments served no genuine purpose other than to benefit Mustaq by diluting Mustafa’s and Samsuddin’s shareholdings while increasing Mustaq’s, both in terms of percentage and value (GD at [248]–[252] and [311]–[312]).
- [34]
[34] The Judge further found that the Mustaq Group’s procurement of the 1995 and 2001 Allotments amounted to breaches of Mustaq’s, Ishret’s and Iqbal’s duties to MMSCPL, as directors in the case of Mustaq and Ishret and as company secretary in Iqbal’s case. The Judge was satisfied that these allotments caused Mustafa and Samsuddin (and subsequently, their estates) to suffer real injury which was distinct from the injury suffered by the company, namely the dilution of their respective shareholding in the company and the erosion of their voting power. The Judge thus held that the breaches of duties by Mustaq, Ishret and Iqbal constituted oppressive behaviour (GD at [320]–[328]).
The 1991 and 1993 Allotments
- [35]
[35] The Judge found that a prima facie case of oppression was also established in respect of the share allotments on 27 June 1991, 16 January 1993 and 19 May 1993 (the “1991 and 1993 Allotments”) for reasons similar to the 1995 and 2001 Allotments. The 1991 and 1993 Allotments were carried out without notice being given to Samsuddin as required by MMSCPL’s Constitution (GD at [352]–[354] and [371]). The shares were also issued at a significant undervalue relative to their fair value at the time and were not offered to MMSCPL’s shareholders in proportion to their respective shareholdings (GD at [355] and [373]).
- [36]
[36] Further, with respect to the allotments in 1993, it was not shown that MMSCPL required funding by way of equity financing at that time. On the contrary, the declaration of dividends in 1993 suggested that MMSCPL had excess funds available for distribution to its shareholders (GD at [372]).
- [37]
[37] The Judge also found that Mustaq and Ishret breached their fiduciary and other duties they owed as directors to MMSCPL in procuring the 1991 and 1993 Allotments (GD at [376]).
The 1996 and 1997 Allotments
- [38]
[38] The Judge found that the allotment of shares on 9 April 1996 and 24 February 1997 (the “1996 and 1997 Allotments”) were not oppressive. Although these allotments were carried out in breach of MMSCPL’s Constitution, they were allotted in proportion to each shareholder’s respective shareholding at the relevant dates. Further, these allotments did not dilute the Samsuddin Estate’s shareholding in the company (GD at [394]).
Misappropriation of MMSCPL’s funds
- [39]
[39] The Judge found that a prima facie case of oppression was established on account of various instances of misappropriation of MMSCPL’s funds by the Mustaq Group, which the Claimant Beneficiaries relied on as evidence of the oppressive manner in which the Mustaq Group, Shama and Osama had conducted MMSCPL’s affairs for their own benefit and in disregard of the minority shareholders (GD at [399]–[400]).
- [40]
[40] First, the Judge found that the Mustaq Group had breached their fiduciary duties as directors of MMSCPL by taking unsecured and interest-free loans from MMSCPL (the “Directors’ Loans”). The Judge was also satisfied that these breaches constituted evidence of the Mustaq Group conducting MMSCPL’s affairs oppressively. It was not disputed that the Directors’ Loans were taken out for the Mustaq Group’s personal use. There was neither evidence of a general practice of directors of MMSCPL taking such loans, nor of any discussion or agreement amongst the directors on the conditions for such loans. There was also no evidence that the Claimant Beneficiaries knew of and/or agreed to the Mustaq Group taking the Directors’ Loans. Neither was there any evidence that these loans benefitted MMSCPL in any way. On the contrary, these loans were detrimental to MMSCPL, which had other financial obligations at the time (GD at [402], [416], [419], [425] and [427]–[429]).
- [41]
[41] Second, the Judge accepted that there was a prima facie case that Mustaq had caused MMSCPL to falsely overstate the salaries of its employees in work pass applications to the Ministry of Manpower (“MOM”), and the difference between the declared salaries and the actual salaries paid to the workers was then collected and passed to Mustaq for his personal benefit (the “Cashback Scheme”). The evidence, including the testimonies of six former employees of MMSCPL and recordings of meetings where the salaries of the employees were collected, supported the existence of the Cashback Scheme. The evidence also allowed an inference that the Cashback Scheme was carried out with Mustaq’s knowledge or acquiescence, and that the money collected was taken by Mustaq for his own benefit (GD at [484], [496] and [503]–[506]).
- [42]
[42] Third, the Judge found that a prima facie case was established that Mustaq and Ishret had acted oppressively by causing MMSCPL to pay no dividends to its shareholders for over a dozen years, whilst paying themselves substantial directors’ fees. In this connection, the Judge noted that dividend payments only resumed after Ayaz and Fayyaz began asking questions about the way in which MMSCPL was being run and the entitlements of the Mustafa-Samsuddin Estates in 2014. The Judge rejected the Mustaq Group’s defences that: (a) none of the Claimant Beneficiaries had raised any issue as to Mustaq’s or Ishret’s directors fees or the non-declaration of dividends due to the Common Understandings; and (b) the non-declaration of dividends was commercially justified (GD at [521]–[524] and [528]–[532]).
- [43]
[43] However, the Judge found that the Claimant Beneficiaries failed to establish a prima facie case in respect of their allegation that Mustaq had created sham invoices to cause the appearance that MMSCPL was indebted to B.I. Distributors Pte Ltd (“BID”), a company wholly owned and controlled by Mustaq and Ishret (GD at [548]).
Payment of consultancy fees to Zero and One
- [44]
[44] The Judge found that the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries could not establish a prima facie case that Mustaq had wrongfully caused MMSCPL to pay substantial consultancy fees to Zero and One (“Z&O”), a sole proprietorship set up by Mustaq on 1 February 2006, and that Z&O did not in fact have employees performing consultancy services. The Judge considered that Fayyaz’s evidence in this regard amounted to bare assertions. There was also no objective evidence indicating that the consultancy fees paid to Z&O actually went to Mustaq or that the employees of Z&O were in fact employees of MMSCPL (GD at [606]–[610]).
Unpaid credit sales from MMSCPL to related parties
- [45]
[45] The Judge found that the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries were unable to make out a prima facie case that the Mustaq Group had caused MMSCPL to enter into transactions with related companies, whereby MMSCPL would provide goods to these companies on credit terms but not receive payment. The evidence relied upon by the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries was unreliable and insufficient to substantiate their allegations (GD at [571]–[572]).
Unjustified issuance of bonds
The Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries’ claim of an express trust
- [47]
[47] The Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries claimed that Mustaq held one-third of the following assets on an express trust for the Samsuddin Estate: (i) MMSCPL; (ii) all of Mustaq’s assets; and (iii) companies related to MMSCPL (collectively, the “Family Assets”). Mustaq had made repeated statements and promises to Samsuddin, Fayyaz and other beneficiaries of the Samsuddin Estate that they were entitled to a one-third share in the Family Assets (see GD at [670]–[672]). The Mustaq Group, on the other hand, contended that the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries had not established any of the three certainties of intention, object or subject matter required for an express trust to exist.
- [48]
[48] The Judge found that the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries were unable to make out a prima facie case in respect of the three certainties required for the creation of an express trust, and thus rejected the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries’ claim of an express trust of one-third of the Family Assets (GD at [682], [713] and [717]). The requisite certainty of intention was not established as the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries had put forth multiple, inconsistent versions of the oral representations made by Mustaq, the occasions when these representations were made, and the persons to whom they were made (GD at [683] and [698]).
- [49]
[49] The requisite certainty of subject matter was also not established as there were numerous inconsistencies with respect to what the “Family Assets” encompassed within the pleadings of the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries and the evidence advanced in their affidavits and at the trial (GD at [708]). In any event, it was not possible in law for a settlor to create a trust over property that the settlor did not own at the point of creating the trust (GD at [714]).
- [50]
[50] Finally, the requisite certainty of object was not established as the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries’ evidence in relation to the alleged beneficiaries of the trust was wholly inadequate (GD at [711]).
Mustaq’s breaches of his duties as executor and trustee of the Samsuddin Estate and as administrator and trustee of the Mustafa Estate
- [51]
[51] The Judge considered that insofar as Mustaq had oppressed the Samsuddin-Mustafa Estates prior to becoming the executor and trustee of the Samsuddin Estate and the administrator and trustee of the Mustafa Estate, Mustaq did not inform the Claimant Beneficiaries of the wrongdoing, nor did he take any steps to rectify such wrongdoing. The Judge was also satisfied that, insofar as such conduct occurred after Mustaq’s appointments, Mustaq was clearly party to such wrongdoing and likewise did not alert the Claimant Beneficiaries to, or take any steps to rectify, the wrongdoing (GD at [722]–[723] and [778]–[779]).
- [52]
[52] The evidence also showed that when the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries sought information from Mustaq regarding the Mustafa Estate and its shares in MMSCPL, Mustaq withheld the truth from them by stonewalling and lying. The Judge thus found that the claim against Mustaq for breach of his duties as administrator and trustee of the Mustafa Estate was made out (GD at [780] and [782]).
- [53]
[53] In this connection, the Judge also rejected the Mustaq Group’s defence that the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries’ claim was time-barred by s 23(a) of the Limitation Act (Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed), (the “Limitation Act”). The Judge noted that s 23 of the Limitation Act was expressed to be subject to s 22(1), which provided that no period of limitation shall apply to an action by a beneficiary under a trust (a) in respect of any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party or privy or (b) to recover from the trustee trust property or the proceeds thereof in the possession of the trustee or previously received by the trustee and converted to his use. Moreover, the Trustees Act (Cap 337, 2005 Rev Ed) defined “trustees” as encompassing personal representatives which included administrators such as Mustaq. The Judge thus concluded that s 23(a) of the Limitation Act did not apply to the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries’ claims in Suit 9 against Mustaq for wrongdoing relating to the Mustafa Estate’s shares in MMSCPL (GD at [781]–[782]). The Mustaq Group has not appealed against the Judge’s decision on this point.
- [54]
[54] Accordingly, the Judge found that Mustaq was in breach of his duties as: (a) executor and trustee of the Samsuddin Estate; and (b) administrator and trustee of the Mustafa Estate.
The Mustaq Group’s defences
- [55]
[55] The Judge found that the elements of the defences of laches raised by the Mustaq Group were not established as they could not show that there was inordinate delay on the part of the Claimant Beneficiaries in bringing proceedings (GD at [735]), for the following reasons:
(a) The documents relied upon by the Mustaq Group to prove Mustaq’s and Samsuddin’s awareness of the 5 January 1995 Allotment and the 11 December 2001 Allotment were neither shown to be authentic, nor that they were signed by Mustafa and/or Samsuddin (GD at [748]).
(b) The Judge rejected the argument that Samsuddin would have known that directors’ fees were paid to Mustaq and Ishret from 2002 to 2011 because Samsuddin himself had received yearly directors’ fees between 1990 and 2002 and had signed AGM minutes approving the payment of those fees. The authenticity of the minutes relied upon by the Mustaq Group was not admitted by the Claimant Beneficiaries, and Mustafa and Samsuddin’s signatures did not appear on subsequent AGM minutes (GD at [526] and [749]).
(c) The Judge accepted that the Claimant Beneficiaries did not rush to take action after hearing about the Cashback Scheme in 2013 because they needed time to make further enquiries and to find out more about the respective estates’ shares in MMSCPL and their rights. They also met with no substantive answers from Mustaq, who instead diverted or deflected their enquiries by advancing various proposals. Mustaq had also subjected the Claimant Beneficiaries to financial pressure through monthly dividend payments which started after their enquiries commenced, which were halved when Mustaq could not get a draft settlement deed signed, and which ceased shortly after the commencement of Suit 1158 and Suit 9. Further, Ayaz’s and Fayyaz’s lack of familiarity with corporate matters meant that they only found out in 2016 and 2018 respectively about the Mustaq Groups’ wrongdoing after one Rajesh Bafna (“Rajesh”) was engaged to investigate the affairs of the Mustafa Estate and MMSCPL (GD at [37], [434] and [754]–[755]).
(d) Although Samsuddin signed Samsuddin’s Will reflecting his MMSCPL shareholding to be 15.12%, the Judge accepted that Samsuddin felt helpless to challenge Mustaq openly about the value of his shareholding reflected in Samsuddin’s Will in light of Samsuddin’s illiteracy in English and very basic education (GD at [757]).
- [56]
[56] In addition, the Judge found that the Mustaq Group failed to establish their assertion that they were prejudiced by the loss of power, custody and/or possession of contemporaneous records due to the passage of time, as they did not explain exactly what records were lost and how the loss of those alleged records adversely impacted their case (GD at [758]).
- [57]
[57] As for the defence of acquiescence, there was no evidence of any representation being made by the Claimant Beneficiaries to the Mustaq Group in circumstances that could found an estoppel, waiver or abandonment of their rights, nor was there evidence of prejudice to the Mustaq Group (GD at [759]).
- [58]
[58] Finally, the Judge rejected the Mustaq Group’s allegations that the Claimant Beneficiaries had commenced the High Court Suits for an “improper collateral purpose” and “in bad faith”. The Mustaq Group was unable to substantiate their allegations that the High Court Suits were commenced to retaliate against Mustaq for refusing their “unreasonable and excessive demands for more gratuitous property, assets and financial benefits” (GD at [762]–[763]).
Reliefs granted and costs
Suit 1158 and Suit 780
- [60]
[60] Although the Judge found that there was a prima facie case that the 1991 and 1993 Allotments were oppressive vis-à-vis Samsuddin (see [35]–[37] above), the Judge declined to set aside the allotment on 27 June 1991 as doing so would adversely affect the rights of the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries who were not joined as parties in Suit 780. As for the allotments in 1993, the Judge declined to set those aside as doing so would produce an anomalous and untenable result whereby in Suit 780, the rightful shareholding positions of Mustafa and Samsuddin before the 5 January 1995 Allotment differed from what they were in Suit 1158 (GD at [381] and [386]–[388]).
- [63]
[63] Further, the Judge declined to:
Suit 9
- [64]
[64] In respect of Suit 9, the Judge granted (GD at [796]–[798]):
Costs
The parties’ cases on appeal
- [66]
[66] As we have noted above, multiple appeals were filed by members of the Mustaq Group and the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries against different aspects of the Judge’s findings in each of the High Court Suits. In the interest of coherence and conciseness, we think it appropriate to address the appeals raised under the broad categories of appeals filed by the Mustaq Group and those filed by the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries.
- [67]
[67] We set out a broad overview of each of the parties’ cases on appeal and will elaborate on their submissions in greater detail at the appropriate junctures below.
The appeals filed by the Mustaq Group
- [68]
[68] The Mustaq Group’s arguments in these appeals can be divided into the following categories.
- [69]
[69] First, the Judge erred in finding that the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries had locus standi to bring the minority oppression claim as the Wong Moy exception only applied to proprietary claims and not minority oppression claims.
- [70]
[70] Second, the Judge erred in her findings regarding the Claimant Beneficiaries’ allegations of the various instances of minority oppression:
(a) At the outset, the Mustaq Group contended that the alleged acts of misappropriation by Mustaq and/or the Mustaq Group were corporate wrongs committed against MMSCPL, and not wrongs suffered by the Mustafa-Samsuddin Estates in their capacities as MMSCPL’s shareholders. Therefore, the Claimant Beneficiaries were not the proper plaintiffs and their minority oppression claims, which attempted to circumvent the reflective loss principle, were an abuse of process and should be dismissed.
(b) The Mustaq Group further submitted that the Judge erred in failing to consider that the legitimate expectations of Mustafa and Samsuddin had not been departed from in a commercially unfair manner.
(c) The Mustaq Group argued that in any case, the Judge erred in finding that the following acts complained of were oppressive:
(i) the 1995 and 2001 Allotments and the 1991 and 1993 Allotments;
(ii) the taking of the Directors’ Loans;
(iii) the Cashback Scheme; and
(iv) the non-payment of dividends to the Claimant Beneficiaries and the simultaneous payment of directors’ fees to Mustaq and Ishret.
- [71]
[71] We note that the Mustaq Group also raised contentions regarding the Judge’s treatment of evidence relevant to various aspects of the Claimant Beneficiaries’ allegations of oppression. These include:
(a) the weight ascribed by the Judge to allegedly hearsay evidence given by the Claimant Beneficiaries, including what Mustafa and/or Samsuddin had mentioned in relation to their participation in MMSCPL’s management; and
(b) the authenticity and admissibility of the minutes of the extraordinary general meetings (“EOGMs”) convened on 5 January 1995 and 11 December 2001 (respectively, the “5 January 1995 EOGM Minutes” and the “11 December 2001 EOGM Minutes” and collectively, the “EOGM Minutes”) and MMSCPL’s general ledgers, despite these documents being authentic.
- [72]
[72] We will consider these evidentiary contentions when dealing with the relevant and related aspects of the Mustaq Group’s appeals.
- [73]
[73] Third, the Judge erred in dismissing their defences premised on the doctrines of laches and acquiescence.
- [74]
[74] Fourth, the Judge erred in finding that Mustaq breached his duties as administrator and trustee of the Mustafa Estate and as executor and trustee of the Samsuddin Estate. Further, the Judge erred in granting the remedy of an account on a wilful default basis as it was not pleaded or sought by the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries.
- [75]
[75] Finally, if their case on the Common Understandings was accepted, the following counterclaims raised by the Mustaq Group should be allowed, namely: (a) a declaration that Mustaq was the legal and beneficial owner of all MMSCPL shares held in the names of the Mustafa-Samsuddin Estates; and (b) that Fayyaz was in breach of his duties owed to the Samsuddin Estate as its executor and trustee.
The appeals filed by the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries
- [76]
[76] Despite having raised numerous allegations of oppressive conduct before the Judge, we note that the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries have only appealed against the Judge’s findings that the following did not constitute oppressive conduct:
(a) Mustaq’s procurement of MMSCPL to pay consultancy fees to Z&O;
(b) the Mustaq Group’s procurement of unpaid credit sales from MMSCPL to related parties; and
(c) Mustaq’s conduct of procuring MMSCPL to issue the Bonds.
- [77]
[77] Moreover, the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries argued that the Judge also erred in the following respects:
(c) Third, the Judge erred in failing to award the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries costs on an indemnity basis.
Issues in the appeals
- [78]
[78] We propose to deal with the arguments raised in these appeals as canvassed above in the following manner.
- [79]
[79] We deal first with the preliminary matters raised by the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries:
(a) As a preliminary issue, do the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries have locus standi to bring the claims brought in Suit 1158 (which should otherwise be made by the Mustafa Estate itself) (the “Locus Standi Issue”)?
(b) Was Mustaq the beneficial owner of all the shares in MMSCPL as the Mustaq Group claims, and if not, what were the legitimate expectations that Mustafa and Samsuddin were entitled to as shareholders (the “Ownership and Legitimate Expectations Issue”)?
- [80]
[80] Second, we consider whether the following acts of the Mustaq Group complained of by the Claimant Beneficiaries have been established and/or are oppressive:
- [81]
[81] Third, we consider whether the Mustaq Group’s defences of laches, acquiescence and time-bar have been made out (the “Defences Issue”).
- [82]
[82] Fourth, we consider whether Mustaq has breached his duties as: (a) executor and trustee of the Samsuddin Estate; and (b) administrator and trustee of the Mustafa Estate (the “Estate Duties Issue”).
- [83]
[83] Fifth, we consider Mustaq’s counterclaims for beneficial ownership of all the shares in MMSCPL and for damages against Fayyaz in wrongfully suing him (the “Counterclaims Issue”).
- [84]
[84] Finally, we will determine the reliefs that ought to be granted to each party in view of our findings on the issues listed above (the “Reliefs Issues”).
Applicable principles for minority oppression claims
- [85]
[85] The following salient principles governing a claim for relief under s 216 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“Companies Act”) for minority oppression merit noting. Commercial fairness is the touchstone by which the court determines whether to grant relief under s 216: see Over & Over Ltd v Bonvest Holdings Ltd and another [2010] 2 SLR 776 (“Over & Over”) at [81].
- [86]
[86] In assessing commercial fairness, it must be borne in mind that the essence of a claim for relief under s 216 of the Companies Act lies in upholding the commercial agreement between the shareholders of the company: see Ascend Field Pte Ltd and others v Tee Wee Sien and another appeal [2020] 1 SLR 771 at [29]. The court must take into account both the legal rights and the legitimate expectations of members in determining the commercial agreement between them. While these are usually enshrined in the company’s constitution, in exceptional cases involving quasi-partnerships, the court may take into account informal and undocumented understandings and assumptions: see Over & Over at [78] and [84]; Lim Kok Wah and others v Lim Boh Yong and others and other matters [2015] 5 SLR 307 (“Lim Kok Wah”) at [108].
- [87]
[87] In the present case, however, as the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries highlight, it was not the Mustaq Group’s pleaded case that MMSCPL was a quasi-partnership. Accordingly, the Mustaq Group cannot now rely on any informal or undocumented understandings and assumptions to assert the existence of any agreement between Mustaq, Samsuddin and Mustafa regarding the management and/or the beneficial ownership of MMSCPL.
The Mustaq Group’s submission of no case to answer
- [88]
[88] Before we turn to our analysis of the appeals proper, we think it crucial to emphasise the significance of the Mustaq Group’s submission of no case to answer, not least because this has a bearing on the requisite threshold of fact-finding that the Judge was required to apply as well as the threshold of appellate intervention that we are required to apply. To better understand this point, it is essential for us to first consider the effect of a defendant’s submission of no case to answer.
- [90]
[90] As the Court of Appeal noted in Lim Swee Khiang and another v Borden Co (Pte) Ltd and others [2006] 4 SLR(R) 745 at [84], the burden to establish a prima facie case “is not difficult to discharge”. In determining whether the claimant has established a prima facie case, the court will assume that any evidence led was true, unless it was inherently incredible or offends common sense. Further, any reliance on circumstantial evidence need not give rise to an irresistible inference as long as the desired inference is one of the possible inferences: see Lena Leowardi v Yeap Cheen Soo [2015] 1 SLR 581 at [24]. Another significant consequence of a submission of no case to answer is that the affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”) adduced by the defendant would be expunged from the record of evidence before the trial judge (TWG Tea Co Pte Ltd v Murjani Manoj Mohan [2019] 5 SLR 366 (“TWG Tea”) at [3]), and the defendant must give an undertaking not to call evidence: see Ho Yew Kong v Sakae Holdings Ltd and other appeals and other matters [2018] 2 SLR 333 (“Sakae (CA)”) at [70].
- [91]
[91] Therefore, when considering the contentions raised by the Mustaq Group in the appeals before us, the issue is whether the Judge correctly found the Claimant Beneficiaries to have established a prima facie case: (a) of oppression in respect of the various instances of oppression relied on; and (b) that Mustaq had breached his duties as executor/administrator and trustee of the Mustafa-Samsuddin Estates. The Judge’s focus would have been on evaluating the documentary evidence and witness testimonies advanced at trial to determine whether there was some prima facie evidence (ie, evidence which is not unsatisfactory and not unreliable) that supported the essential elements of the claims. If the Judge correctly identified the relevant evidence and did not take into account unsatisfactory and unreliable evidence, those findings ought not to be disturbed on appeal.
- [92]
[92] This brings us to the next important point on the evidential implications of a defendant’s submission of no case to answer, ie, the expunging of the defendant’s AEIC from the record of evidence before the trial judge: see TWG Tea at [3]. This is also the consequence flowing from the defendant’s failure to attend trial for cross-examination as prescribed under O 38 r 2(1) of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) (“2014 ROC”), which was applicable at the time of the trial. This provision states:
- [93]
[93] More importantly, a defendant who makes a submission of no case to answer has an obligation to give an undertaking not to call evidence. As the Court of Appeal explained in Sakae (CA) (at [70]):
Where a submission of no case to answer is advanced, therefore, the court is essentially left with the plaintiff’s version of the story: see Smile Inc Dental Surgeons Pte Ltd v Lui Andrew Stewart [2012] 1 SLR 847 at [34].
- [94]
[94] The principles discussed above may be summarised as such:
(a) The claimant bears the legal burden of adducing evidence to satisfy the court that a prima facie case on each of the essential elements of its claim has been established.
(b) Crucially, the defendant’s obligation not to call evidence means that the defendant would be unable to adduce evidence to either disprove the claimant’s position or weaken it. It follows that the defendant may only rebut the claimant’s evidence by demonstrating that the evidence is inherently unreliable or unsatisfactory, such that the court ought not to rely on it.
(c) The court is thus left with evaluating the claimant’s evidence and if, on a prima facie basis, the evidence satisfies all the ingredients or essential elements of the cause of action, judgment will be entered against the defendant: see Ma Hongjin at [32].
- [95]
[95] Therefore, in the present case, the Mustaq Group’s submission of no case to answer meant that the Judge would be entitled to consider only the documents adduced and the testimonies of the witnesses called by the Claimant Beneficiaries at trial. The Mustaq Group is only entitled to challenge the evidence adduced by the Claimant Beneficiaries but is not entitled to adduce its own evidence to rebut the Claimant Beneficiaries’ evidence. This follows from their obligation to provide an undertaking not to adduce evidence (and it is not disputed that such an undertaking was indeed provided), as well as the expunging of the relevant affidavits of evidence-in-chief of the various witnesses for the Mustaq Group.
- [96]
[96] With these principles in mind, we turn to consider the issues raised in the appeals, beginning first with the Locus Standi Issue.
The Locus Standi Issue
- [97]
[97] We deal first with the Mustaq Group’s contention that the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries have no locus standi to bring their minority oppression claims. Interestingly, the Mustaq Group did not make a similar contention that the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries had no locus standi to bring their minority oppression claims.
- [98]
[98] The general principles relating to a beneficiary’s standing to bring an action on behalf of and for an estate are largely undisputed: generally, the proper party to obtain a remedy on behalf of and for an estate is the executor or administrator of the estate: see Fong Wai Lyn Carolyn v Kao Chai-Chau Linda and others [2017] 4 SLR 1018 (“Fong Wai Lyn”) at [7]. In the present case, the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries are neither the executor nor the administrator of the Mustafa Estate.
- [99]
[99] To overcome this, the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries relied on the Wong Moy exception. In Wong Moy, the Court of Appeal held that a beneficiary would have the standing to commence an action on behalf of the estate to protect the estate’s assets; crucially, there is no restriction as to the kinds of action that a beneficiary may institute to protect the estate’s assets, save that the beneficiary cannot be in a better position than a trustee carrying out his duties in a proper manner: see Wong Moy at [12], [14], [24] and [28].
- [100]
[100] In response, the Mustaq Group contended that the Wong Moy exception is limited to proprietary claims that beneficiaries of an estate intend to bring. In support, the Mustaq Group referred to the High Court’s decision in Sia Chin Sun v Yong Wai Poh (Sia Tze Ming, non-party) [2019] 3 SLR 1168 (“Sia Chin Sun”), and in particular the following statement (at [27]):
- [101]
[101] They further argued that since the Claimant Beneficiaries’ claim for minority oppression was essentially a “personal claim with pecuniary reliefs”, the Claimant Beneficiaries were not entitled to rely on the Wong Moy exception to bring their minority oppression claim. We note that the Mustaq Group maintained this same argument in these appeals.
- [102]
[102] In holding that the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries had locus standi, the Judge considered that the court in Sia Chin Sun intended, by its use of the term “proprietary claim”, to refer to any claim which had as its object the protection and preservation of the assets of the estate, and found that the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries’ action for minority oppression under s 216 of the Companies Act had as its object the protection and preservation of the estate’s shares in MMSCPL and the rights attached to those shares. The Judge further found that the claims of the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries fell within the Wong Moy exception (see GD at [94]–[104]).
- [103]
[103] We agree with the Judge’s holding that the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries do have locus standi to advance their oppression claims against the Mustaq Group, although we differ slightly in our reasons for concluding as such.
- [104]
[104] At the outset, we do not think the passage in Sia Chin Sun cited above and relied on by the Mustaq Group stands for any legal proposition regarding the limits as to the type of claims that a beneficiary may bring on behalf of the estate. Rather, the court there was considering whether a beneficiary has locus standi to bring a personal claim on behalf of and for an estate: see Fong Wai Lyn at [7]. It was in this context that the court referred to the general proposition that a beneficiary has no locus standi to bring such a claim.
- [105]
[105] That, however, does not mean a beneficiary cannot bring claims against a defendant where the claim has as its object the protection or preservation of the estate’s assets. This proposition is not disputed, and we note that it is consistent with the principles established in Wong Moy, including the Wong Moy exception. Accordingly, we think it was unnecessary for the Judge to determine whether the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries’ claims were “proprietary claim[s]”. Indeed, as mentioned at [29] of Sia Chin Sun, the applicability of the Wong Moy exception was not restricted to the protection of certain classes of assets, excluding money.
- [106]
[106] The sole question that arises on the Locus Standi Issue, therefore, is whether the circumstances surrounding the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries’ claims in Suit 1158 fall within the Wong Moy exception. In Wong Moy, the Court of Appeal held at [12] that a beneficiary may in certain circumstances institute action to recover assets of the estate. Such special circumstances are not confined solely to cases where the personal representative has defaulted in acting to recover the property, and all the circumstances of the case should be considered, including the nature of the assets, the position of the personal representative and the reason for the default of the personal representative. It would also be pertinent to consider whether the circumstances made it impossible or seriously inconvenient for the representative to take proceedings: see Wong Moy at [24] and [28].
- [107]
[107] In our view, it is quite obvious that the special circumstance in the present case is that the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries are suing Mustaq, who is also the sole administrator and trustee of the Mustafa Estate. It is quite clear that Mustaq would not commence proceedings on behalf of the Mustafa Estate against himself. The claims of the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries fall within the classic example where the personal representative is the person against whom the claims are being made.
- [108]
[108] We are therefore of the view that the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries have the requisite locus standi to make the claims which they did in the present case against Mustaq (and the Mustaq Group) in Suit 1158.
The Ownership and Legitimate Expectations Issue
- [109]
[109] The next issue we consider is whether the Mustaq Group has established its contention that Mustaq is the beneficial owner of all the shares in MMSCPL, and that the Claimant Beneficiaries are thus not entitled to complain of their interests being oppressed.
- [110]
[110] In the proceedings below, the Mustaq Group argued that Mustafa and Samsuddin held their shares in MMSCPL on a resulting trust for Mustaq as Mustaq had paid for those shares (GD at [128]). This argument has not been seriously pursued in these appeals. Alternatively, the Mustaq Group argued that Mustafa and Samsuddin held their shares on a common intention constructive trust for Mustaq pursuant to the 1973 Common Understanding, which was subsequently confirmed pursuant to the 2001 Common Understanding (see [28] above).
- [111]
[111] In these appeals, the Mustaq Group argued that the minority oppression claims by the Claimant Beneficiaries had no merit because the legitimate expectations of Mustafa and Samsuddin had not been departed from in a manner unfair to them. In gist, they argued that: (a) the evidence showed that Mustaq was the only person responsible for managing the business and that Mustafa and Samsuddin never saw themselves as the true owners of, or persons responsible for managing, the business; (b) there was no evidence that Mustafa and Samsuddin ever objected to the decisions made in respect of the business; and (c) the evidence did not support the Judge’s findings in relation to the Common Understandings and Mustafa’s and Samsuddin’s ownership of MMSC and subsequently, MMSCPL. These arguments were contested by both the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries and the Samsuddin Estate Beneficiaries.
- [112]
[112] We agree with the Judge’s conclusion that the evidence available in the present case does not support the Mustaq Group’s contention that Mustaq was the beneficial owner of all the shares in MMSCPL. In particular, the following factors, which we elaborate on in turn, militate against any suggestion that Mustaq was the beneficial owner of all the shares in the company:
(a) Mustafa and Samsuddin were allotted shares over the years, and the Mustaq Group’s contention that Mustafa had paid for those shares is not borne out by the evidence.
(b) Mustafa and Samsuddin received partnership income from MMSC and dividends from MMSCPL.
(c) The alleged Common Understandings are undermined by the evidence.
(d) The Mustaq Group’s attempt to introduce the narrative that the shares in MMSCPL held by the Mustafa-Samsuddin Estates were given by Mustaq (the “Gift Allegation”) also undermines the Common Understandings which were that these shares were held on trust for Mustaq.
- [113]
[113] Our conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to examine whether Mustaq was the only person responsible for managing the business and/or whether the oral evidence of the Claimant Beneficiaries as to the involvement of Mustafa and Samsuddin in the management of MMSCPL was credible. There is also no need to consider the evidence as to whether Mustafa and Samsuddin saw themselves as owners or controllers of MMSCPL.
Allotment of shares to Mustafa and Samsuddin and payment for those shares
- [114]
[114] In the first place, the fact that Mustafa and Samsuddin remained as shareholders in MMSCPL and were allotted shares over the years is indicative that Mustaq was not the beneficial owner of all the shares in MMSCPL, and Mustafa and Samsuddin were also shareholders of the company. If, as the Mustaq Group claims, MMSC was formed purely as a formality to facilitate the move of Mustaq’s business to the New Premises, there would have been no reason for Mustafa and Samsuddin to be shareholders when MMSCPL was incorporated. Similarly, if MMSC and subsequently, MMSCPL, belonged solely to Mustaq, there would have been no reason for Mustaq to allot shares to Mustafa and Samsuddin between 1989 and 2001 (see [15] above).
- [115]
[115] In this regard, the Mustaq Group contended that Mustafa and Samsuddin held their shares in MMSCPL on a resulting trust for Mustaq as he had paid for them. In our view, this contention is not borne out by the documentary evidence, namely the correspondence between the Commissioner of Estate Duties (the “CED”) and Mallal & Namazie (“M&N”) who represented the Mustafa Estate and were taking instructions from Mustaq.
- [116]
[116] By a letter dated 29 November 2002, the CED wrote to the Mustafa Estate seeking particulars regarding the names of those in the Mustafa Estate who held shares in MMSCPL, whether Mustafa had provided the funds for the purchase of those shares and “if not, [to] state their source of funds”. By a letter dated 11 December 2002, M&N responded stating that Mustaq, Mustafa, Samsuddin and Ishret each held various amounts of shares in the company, and more significantly, that M&N was “ascertaining whether [Mustafa] advanced any funds for the purchase of shares by the other shareholders”. If Mustaq had in fact paid for Mustafa’s shares as the Mustaq Group claims, he would have instructed M&N to inform the CED of that fact. In fact, by a further letter dated 16 June 2003, M&N informed the CED that “[Mustafa] did not provide the funds for the shares allocated to the 3 persons therein mentioned”.
- [117]
[117] The Mustaq Group’s only explanation in this regard was that the CED’s question was whether Mustafa had paid for other people’s shares in MMSCPL, and not whether Mustaq had paid for Mustafa’s shares. This submission is untenable. As mentioned, the query initially posed by the CED in his letter of 29 November 2022 was whether Mustafa had provided the funds for the purchase of the shares held by Mustafa’s Estate, and “if not, [to] state their source of funds”. It was for Mustaq to instruct M&N to inform the CED that he paid for the shares of Mustafa and Samsuddin, if that were true. In our view, the Judge was entitled to take into account this correspondence to determine whether Mustaq had paid for such shares and to conclude that he had not proved this.
Payment of partnership income and dividends to Mustafa and Samsuddin
- [118]
[118] In concluding that Mustaq was not the beneficial owner of all the shares in MMSCPL, the Judge also had regard to the fact that Mustafa and Samsuddin received income as partners of MMSC, which was declared as trade income in their NOAs for income tax. The Judge further noted that following MMSCPL’s incorporation, when MMSCPL declared dividends between 1992 and 1996, Mustafa and Samsuddin received dividends from the company which were declared in their NOAs for the years 1994 to 1998. Furthermore, between 2014 and 2017, the dividend payments to the Mustafa Estate were distributed to the Mustafa Estate Beneficiaries in the proportion of their respective shareholdings as stated in the Syariah Court Inheritance Certificate. The Judge also rejected the Mustaq Group’s assertion that these were merely “goodwill payments” from Mustaq as, if that were the case, there would have been no reason for Mustafa and Samsuddin to pay income tax on those payments (GD at [157]–[162]).
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