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Grounds publishedDecided 7 Feb 2022

Singapore International Commercial Court

BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd and another v PT Bayan Resources TBK and another

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[2022] SGHC(I) 2Case no. Suit No 1 of 2015

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] This is the third and final tranche (“Tranche 3”) of these proceedings which arise from a joint venture between Australian and Indonesian companies to exploit a new technology to upgrade coal for commercial sale that ended in a series of disputes. This judgment deals with the issues of loss and damage claimed by the plaintiffs.

  3. Background facts

  4. The parties

  5. [4] The second plaintiff, BCBC, holds the exclusive worldwide licence of a technology for the upgrading of sub-bituminous coal known as the Binderless Coal Briquetting Process or the BCB Process. The first plaintiff, BCBCS, is a company incorporated in Singapore. BCBC and BCBCS are indirect wholly-owned subsidiaries of the second defendant by counterclaim, White Energy Company Ltd, or WEC, a public-listed company incorporated in Australia.

  6. [5] The first defendant, BR, is a public-listed company incorporated in Indonesia that owns subsidiaries which operate sub-bituminous coal mines in Tabang, Indonesia. Of these subsidiaries, only Bara and FSP are material for present purposes. The second defendant, BI, is a company incorporated in Singapore and is an associated company of BR.

  7. The JV Deed

  8. [6] In early May 2005, the Defendants learnt about the BCB Process from the sharing by Mr Clark, the then-general manager of BCBC, at a conference in Lexington, Kentucky. Further discussions followed, and eventually the JV Deed was executed between BCBC and BI on 7 June 2006.

  9. (a) The Funding MOU: This document was dated 16 March 2009 and detailed the parties’ respective obligations to fund KSC.

  10. (b) The Expansion MOU: This document was also dated 16 March 2009 and concerned the future expansion of the joint venture.

  11. (c) The Priority Loan Funding Agreement or PLFA: This agreement was signed by KSC, BR and BCBCS on 17 December 2010 but was backdated to 22 April 2010. Under this agreement, BCBCS would advance a revolving working capital facility of up to US$20m (“the Priority Facility”) to KSC. BR would, in turn, supply coal (through Bara and FSP) to KSC at the market price but would require payment of only US$8 per tonne upon delivery, with the balance being looked after by BR (“the Coal Advance”). By way of an addendum, which was stated to be “an inseparable part of the [PLFA]”, the Priority Facility was increased to US$40m (“the Addendum”). The Priority Facility was eventually exhausted in August 2011 (see First Judgment at [134]).

  12. (d) The 2010 CSAs: These were coal supply agreements entered into between KSC and BR’s coal mining subsidiaries – namely, Bara and FSP – between March and June 2011. They superseded the earlier coal supply agreement which KSC had entered into with Bara in 2008, the 2008 CSA (see First Judgment at [32(a)]). Under the 2010 CSAs, Bara and FSP agreed to supply coal to KSC at the benchmark price provided for under Indonesian law (the “HBA Price”). The HBA Price was the result of a piece of legislation passed by the Indonesian government, Regulation 17 of 2010 on Procedures to Determine the Benchmark Price for the Sale of Minerals and Coals, which put in place benchmark prices for the sale of minerals and coal in Indonesia (the “HBA Regulations”). However, as a result of the PLFA, KSC was only required to pay US$8 per tonne of coal upfront (see [8(c)] above). The 2010 CSAs were backdated to 1 October 2010, the date on which the HBA Regulations came into force (see Second Judgment at [16]).

  13. (e) The April 2011 Side Letter: This side letter was signed by BCBC, BR, Bara and KSC on 5 April 2011. The parties thereby agreed that Bara and KSC had entered into the 2010 CSAs to comply with the Indonesian legislative requirements in connection with the calculation of the price of coal to be supplied by Bara to KSC. Importantly, the April 2011 Side Letter provided for a “Payments Reconciliation” mechanism (“PRM”). The PRM was an arrangement among the parties to realign their financial contributions to KSC and to settle how profits from the joint venture would be shared. The inclusion of the PRM in the April 2011 Side Letter was prompted by changes in coal prices arising from the HBA Regulations.

  14. The previous judgments

  15. [9] The parties’ relationship subsequently deteriorated into a series of disputes, culminating in the commencement of these proceedings by the Plaintiffs against the Defendants. Tranche 1 concerned the scope and content of the parties’ contractual obligations in relation to the joint venture. We held the following:

  16. (a) BR was not obliged to fund the Project between November 2011 and March 2012 because: (i) cl 4 of the Funding MOU did not override cll 7.1 and 8 of the JV Deed (see First Judgment at [104]-[125]); and (ii) the good faith obligation in cl 17.3 of the JV Deed did not constrain BR to approve any and all expenditure that BCBCS had assessed (see First Judgment at [126]-[131]).

  17. (b) BCBCS had not undertaken to fund the joint venture until the Tabang Plant achieved commercial production (see First Judgment at [137]-[146]).

  18. (c) BR was not obliged to consent to KSC obtaining a further advance of US$3.033m from Standard Chartered Bank to repay the temporary loan it had received from BCBCS (see First Judgment at [147]-[153]).

  19. (d) BCBCS was not under an implied obligation to use the reasonable skill and care expected of a competent designer, builder and operator of coal preparation and briquetting plants in providing technical assistance to KSC (see First Judgment at [239]-[271]).

  20. (e) There was no implied term in the JV Deed or the Funding MOU that BCBCS was contractually obliged to procure that KSC produce 1 million metric tonnes per annum (“MTPA”) of upgraded coal briquettes within a reasonable period of time (see First Judgment at [283]-[287]). In the light of our finding that BR was not obliged to fund KSC between November 2011 and March 2012 (see [9(a)] above), the issue of whether the JV Deed or the Funding MOU contained any such implied term was, strictly speaking, moot (see First Judgment at [273]).

  21. [10] However, we were not able to determine whether, based on the JV Deed, the PLFA, or the April 2011 Side Letter, BR was under an obligation to supply or assist in procuring the supply of coal to KSC in around the period between early November 2011 and 2 March 2012. This was because the evidence adduced in Tranche 1 was insufficient to enable us to answer the question of what coal KSC had required during that period of time (see First Judgment at [155]-[171]). This issue was accordingly left for determination in Tranche 2. There was no appeal against our decision in Tranche 1.

  22. [11] In Tranche 2, we determined issues relating to BR’s coal supply obligations and the alleged breaches of the parties’ contractual obligations under the joint venture. In respect of BR’s coal supply obligations, we held the following:

  23. (a) BR had: (i) a prima facie obligation under Art. 7.1 of the PLFA, which expired on 31 December 2011, to ensure that Bara and FSP supplied coal to KSC in accordance with cl 3.9 of the 2010 CSAs; and (ii) a prima facie obligation under cl 3.8(b)(iii), until the termination of the JV Deed, to ensure the same (see Second Judgment at [68]–[77]). We refer to these two obligations collectively as the “Coal Supply Obligations”.

  24. (b) BR’s Coal Supply Obligations remained in place even if there was no funding for KSC (see Second Judgment at [107]-[117]).

  25. (c) BR’s Coal Supply Obligations did not cease merely because there was a lack of funding for KSC or because the Tabang Plant was at a particular stage of commissioning, was non-operational or had been placed into care and maintenance (see Second Judgment at [118]-[127]).

  26. [12] Each side accused the other of repudiatory breaches. In essence, we found that BCBCS had not acted in breach of the JV Deed (see Second Judgment at [148]–[177]). On the other hand, we held that BR had breached its Coal Supply Obligations by: (a) instructing FSP and Bara to cease their supply of coal to KSC on or around 9 November 2011; (b) conveying to KSC that it would not perform its Coal Supply Obligations when the time for actual performance of these obligations came; and (c) conditioning the performance of its Coal Supply Obligations on BCBCS’s buyout of its stake in KSC for US$45m (see Second Judgment at [136]-[144]). We further held that cl 3.8(b)(iii) of the JV Deed was a condition of that deed and that BR’s breaches of its Coal Supply Obligations were therefore repudiatory breaches of the JV Deed (see Second Judgment at [181]–[182]). Nonetheless, as it was undisputed that BCBCS had not purported to accept BR’s breaches of its Coal Supply Obligations, we found that those breaches did not bring the joint venture to an end (see Second Judgment at [183] and [195]).

  27. [13] We also found that BR repudiated the JV Deed by wrongfully issuing the Termination Notice on 21 February 2012. Although the Termination Notice purported to terminate the JV Deed on account of BCBCS’s repudiation of the JV Deed, BR had no grounds to issue the Termination Notice as BCBCS did not repudiate the JV Deed (see Second Judgment at [193]; see also [12] above). Following its receipt of the Termination Notice, BCBCS validly accepted, by way of a letter dated 2 March 2012, BR’s repudiation of the JV Deed. Accordingly, we concluded that the joint venture came to an end on 2 March 2012 (see Second Judgment at [194]-[195]).

  28. [14] As we observed in our decision in Tranche 2, the parties had agreed to leave the questions of damage that follow from a finding of breach, including issues of quantum, to Tranche 3 (see Second Judgment at [202]). Nonetheless the Defendants sought, and we granted them leave, to put forth arguments in Tranche 2 to the effect that, even if BR had breached the JV Deed, BCBCS would only be entitled to nominal damages for a limited period (see Second Judgment at [203]).

  29. [15] One such argument raised by the Defendants was that BCBCS would only be entitled to nominal damages until the expiry of the PLFA on 31 December 2011 (see Second Judgment at [213]). We rejected that argument for two key reasons. First, BR’s Coal Supply Obligations under cl 3.8(b)(iii) of the JV Deed would have subsisted even after 31 December 2011 (see Second Judgment at [214]). Second, it did not follow that all prospect of earnings under the joint venture came to an end upon the expiry of the PLFA. Had the joint venture continued, the Tabang Plant might have resumed operations and possibly achieved commercial production (see Second Judgment at [215]). As for the Defendants’ submission that the Tabang Plant would have been starved of funding from 31 December 2011 onwards, we considered it likely that BCBCS would have been prepared to fund KSC unilaterally (see Second Judgment at [217]-[223]). But we left to Tranche 3 the questions of: (a) whether BCBCS was in fact in a financial position to fund KSC unilaterally to the completion of testing and commission or until June 2012; and (b) whether BR would have objected to such unilateral funding by BCBCS and, if so, the effect of such an objection (see Second Judgment at [223]).

  30. [17] As referenced at [12] above, we concluded in Tranche 2 that BR had breached its Coal Supply Obligations and had wrongfully issued the Termination Notice, and that these acts constituted repudiatory breaches of the JV Deed. Tranche 3 concerns BCBCS’s entitlement to damages (and, if so, the quantum of such damages) as a result of BR’s repudiatory breaches.

  31. [18] BCBCS claims damages under two heads. First, it seeks to recover wasted expenditure of US$91,591,206.68, which comprises the following sums:

  32. (a) BCBCS claims a sum of US$25m that it extended to KSC pursuant to the first of the shareholder loan agreements (“the First SLA”). BCBCS, BI and KSC entered into the First SLA on 16 April 2007, pursuant to which BCBCS and BI each granted KSC a loan of US$25m to finance KSC’s capital expenditure and working capital requirements (see First Judgment at [24]).

  33. (b) BCBCS claims a sum of US$26,591,206.88 that it extended to KSC pursuant to the second of the shareholder loan agreements (“the Second SLA”). BCBCS, BR and KSC entered into the Second SLA on 25 November 2008, pursuant to which BCBCS and BR each agreed to loan up to US$15m to finance KSC’s working capital and other corporate activities. The loan amounts were subsequently increased to US$25m by way of addenda dated 11 December 2008 (see First Judgment at [42]). We refer to the First SLA and the Second SLA collectively as “the SLAs”.

  34. (c) BCBCS claims a sum of US$40m that it extended to KSC under the Priority Facility pursuant to the PLFA (see First Judgment at [58] and [134]; see also [8(c)] above).

  35. According to BCBCS, it would have recouped its wasted expenditure from KSC’s cash flow as well as from the PRM provided for in the April 2011 Side Letter.

  36. [20] Second, BCBCS claims damages for the loss of a chance to increase the production capacity of the Tabang Plant to at least 3 MTPA and to profit therefrom. BCBCS argues that once the Tabang Plant achieved nameplate capacity of 1 MTPA, the parties would have agreed to expand its capacity to 3 MTPA.

  37. [21] As regards the prospect of the Tabang Plant achieving nameplate capacity, it bears highlighting that the Tabang Plant was shut down at the end of October 2011 and underwent extensive modifications in November 2011. These included modifications to the drying column, the dust extraction systems and the coal injection pipes (see Second Judgment at [81]). In Tranche 2, we found that substantial progress had been made on these modifications, which were on course for completion in November or December 2011 (see Second Judgment at [83]). We also determined that the commissioning of the Tabang Plant would have entailed modification works after construction, and that the Tabang Plant remained in the commissioning phase up until 15 December 2011. Although the modification works remained incomplete as of 15 December 2011, we found that the Tabang Plant was put into care and maintenance on that day, following the parties’ agreement on the same at the 6 December 2011 EGM (see Second Judgment at [80], [83] and [176]).

  38. The parties’ cases

  39. BCBCS’s case

  40. [22] In relation to its claim for damages for wasted expenditure, BCBCS’s case is that, but for BR’s breaches, the Tabang Plant would have achieved nameplate capacity by the end of January 2012 or, at the latest, by the end of June 2012. Consequently, the Tabang Plant would have generated sufficient cash flow from which BCBCS’s wasted expenditure could be recovered, whether by way of the repayment of the loans previously extended by BCBCS to KSC or pursuant to the PRM provided for in the April 2011 Side Letter. BCBCS advances two main arguments in support of its claim for damages for wasted expenditure.

  41. [23] First, BCBCS contends that KSC had sufficient funding for the Tabang Plant to keep operating and to achieve nameplate capacity, because it (BCBCS) was willing and able to fund KSC up to the end of June 2012. Second, BCBCS submits that it was technically feasible for the Tabang Plant to achieve nameplate capacity. It argues that: (a) the technology underlying the BCB Process would work on a commercial scale and the only issue was that of scaling up the Tabang Plant; and (b) any issues that the Tabang Plant faced in scaling up had either been resolved prior to October 2011 or would have been resolved by the modification works carried out in November 2011. BCBCS thus submits that the Tabang Plant would have ramped up to nameplate capacity upon restarting its operations.

  42. [24] BCBCS additionally claims that there was a real and substantial chance, which it lost as a result of BR’s repudiatory breaches, that the parties would have expanded the production capacity of the Tabang Plant to 3 MTPA once the plant reached nameplate capacity of 1 MTPA. In claiming damages for the loss of a chance to realise the net profits of the Tabang Plant’s operation at an expanded capacity, BCBCS makes three primary arguments. First, relying on cl 3.2 of the JV Deed and the parties’ conduct, BCBCS contends that the parties had always intended to expand the production capacity of the Tabang Plant to 3 MTPA in the event that the first plant reached nameplate capacity. Second, KSC would have secured funding for the construction of the second and third plants (for the expansion of the Tabang Plant’s capacity to 3 MTPA), whether by way of third party financing or unilateral gift funding from BCBCS. Third, the infrastructure at Tabang would have been adequate to support a production capacity of 3 MTPA.

  43. [25] BCBCS submits two further arguments. First, it submits that its claims for damages are not barred by the rule against reflective loss as KSC does not have any cause of action in respect of either head of damages claimed. Second, BCBCS contends that it can properly claim damages for both wasted expenditure and the loss of a chance to make future profits from the Tabang Plant. These two heads of damages are said to represent separate losses so that no issue of double recovery arises. The claim for wasted expenditure is in respect of the first plant, whereas the claim for loss of a chance concerns the second and third plants.

  44. BR’s case

  45. [26] BR contends that BCBCS would not have recovered its wasted expenditure, notwithstanding the former’s repudiatory breaches of the JV Deed. First, BR submits that it was not reasonably contemplated by the parties, at the time the various loans were extended to KSC, that those loans could be recouped through the cash flow from the PRM, and for this and other reasons, the court cannot consider any cashflow to BCBCS other than that from KSC. Second, BR argues that KSC would have defaulted on its repayment obligations under the SLAs and the PLFA. Accordingly, BR would have applied to wind up KSC, as it was entitled to do, and there would have been no cash flow from which BCBCS could recover its wasted expenditure. Third, according to BR, the cash flow model put forth by its quantum expert, Mr Greig Taylor (“Mr Taylor”), shows that KSC would have remained insolvent for several years and would have had a negative net present value (“NPV”), and so BCBCS plainly could not have recouped any expenditure. This, too, disposes of BCBCS’s claim for recovery of its wasted expenditure.

  46. [27] Additionally, BR disputes that BCBCS’s wasted expenditure is recoverable as a matter of law. BR submits that BCBCS incurred its wasted expenditure by extending loans to KSC, and that loans are distinguishable from “expenses” and “losses” that generally fall within the realm of claims for wasted expenditure.

  47. [28] In relation to BCBCS’s claim for damages for loss of a chance, BR makes two primary challenges. First, BR highlights the absence of any agreement among the parties to proceed with the second and third plants to expand the capacity of the Tabang Plant to 3 MTPA. This, BR submits, is clear from documents such as the Expansion MOU. BR also stresses that cl 3.2 of the JV Deed expresses no more than the parties’ intention to expand the capacity of the Tabang Plant if the Project succeeded. Second, the evidence shows that the Project was far from succeeding. BR therefore denies any possibility that it would have agreed to the expansion of the Project.

  48. [29] Finally, BR canvasses several broad reasons why BCBCS’s claims must fail. First, BR argues that BCBCS has not shown that its alleged losses were caused by BR’s breaches. Second, BR argues that BCBCS’s alleged losses are too remote. In respect of BCBCS’s wasted expenditure, BR emphasises that when the parties entered into the JV Deed on 7 June 2006, it was never contemplated that BCBCS would provide KSC with loans of nearly US$91.6m. BR contends that BCBCS’s alleged loss of a chance is likewise too remote. This is because the parties were not obliged under the JV Deed to expand the capacity of the Tabang Plant and had agreed to defer the issue of possible expansion to a later date, when they would be better placed to assess the progress of the Project. Third, BR submits that BCBCS’s claims are barred by the rule against reflective loss as articulated in Townsing Henry George v Jenton Overseas Investment Pte Ltd (in liquidation) [2007] 2 SLR(R) 597 (“Townsing Henry”). Fourth, BR challenges the permissibility of BCBCS claiming damages for wasted expenditure and loss of a chance, when those alleged losses stem from the same breaches.

  49. The issues before the court

  50. [30] The following issues arise for our determination:

  51. (a) Are BCBCS’s claims barred as a matter of law? This, in turn, raises the following sub-issues, all of which would bar or limit recovery on BCBCS’s part:

  52. (i) whether the losses claimed by BCBCS are too remote;

  53. (ii) whether loans can be recouped as a form of wasted expenditure;

  54. (iii) whether the losses claimed by BCBCS are barred by the rule against reflective loss;

  55. (iv) whether BCBCS is entitled to claim damages for both wasted expenditure and loss of a chance;

  56. (v) whether BCBCS is entitled to recover its wasted expenditure through the cash flow from the PRM; and

  57. (vi) whether BCBCS is entitled to recover sums that it unilaterally loaned to KSC under the PLFA.

  58. (b) Would BCBCS have recovered its wasted expenditure? This, in turn, raises the following factual sub-issues:

  59. (i) whether the Tabang Plant would have achieved nameplate capacity by June 2012;

  60. (ii) whether BR would have been entitled to wind up KSC; and

  61. (iii) whether BCBCS’s likely cash flow from the Project would have covered its wasted expenditure.

  62. (c) Has BCBCS established its claim for the loss of a chance to profit from the future expansion of the Tabang Plant’s capacity to 3 MTPA? This, in turn, raises the following sub-issues:

  63. (i) whether BR was obliged to proceed with the second and third plants for the expansion of the Tabang Plant’s capacity to 3 MTPA;

  64. (ii) if so, whether the loss of chance doctrine is applicable in this case; and

  65. (iii) if so, whether BCBCS can prove, on a balance of probabilities, that there was a real and substantial chance of expanding the Tabang Plant’s capacity to 3 MTPA, which had been lost as a result of BR’s breaches.

  66. Whether the losses claimed by BCBCS are too remote

  67. [31] We begin by considering the preliminary legal issues, the first of which concerns the remoteness of the losses claimed by BCBCS. The two-pronged rule regarding remoteness of losses was set out in Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341 (“Hadley v Baxendale”). The first limb of the rule limits damages to those which arise naturally in the usual course of things or flow from what may reasonably be supposed to be in the contemplation of both parties when they entered into the contract. The second limb of the rule, on the other hand, concerns actual knowledge of special or extraordinary facts and circumstances.

  68. [32] In Out of the Box Pte Ltd v Wanin Industries Pte Ltd [2013] 2 SLR 363 (“OOTB”), the Court of Appeal set out the rule in Hadley v Baxendale in the following terms (at [15]):

  69. [33] The Court of Appeal then laid out the following framework for assessing remoteness of damage (at [47]):

  70. (a) What are the specific damages that have been claimed?

  71. (b) What are the facts that would have had a bearing on whether these damages would have been within the reasonable contemplation of the parties had they considered this at the time of the contract?

  72. (c) What are the facts that have been pleaded and proved either to have in fact been known or to be taken to have been known by the defendant at the time of the contract?

  73. (d) What are the circumstances in which those facts were brought home to the defendant?

  74. (e) In the light of the defendant’s knowledge and the circumstances in which that knowledge arose, would the damages in question have been considered by a reasonable person in the situation of the defendant at the time of the contract to be foreseeable as a not unlikely consequence that he should be liable for?

  75. [34] We note that BCBCS has, at points, framed the nature of its losses in relation to its claim for recovery of its wasted expenditure unduly broadly. In its reply submissions, for example, BCBCS asserts that “[i]t is plainly foreseeable that if one party reneges on its JV obligations, the expenditure incurred by the other will be wasted”. This assertion ignores the following observations made by the Court of Appeal in OOTB (at [44]):

  76. (a) Clauses 8.2 and 8.3 of the JV Deed provided for financing by way of shareholder loans if third party borrowing proved inadequate or untenable. In other words, it was contemplated by the parties that shareholders might have to provide funding via shareholder loans.

  77. (b) On 25 August 2006, Sinclair Knight Merz produced a report titled “Technical Feasibility Study on the Tabang Mine Coal Upgrade Project” (“the SKM Technical Feasibility Study”). This study, which BR had sight of, estimated capital costs to be US$36.97m as at 30 June 2006, it urged that “sensitivity of the project feasibility be conducted regarding capital costs, noting the current accuracy of the estimate (±25%)”.

  78. (c) On 6 September 2006, Hyde Park Consultants (“HPC”) produced a report titled “Report on the Financial Viability of the Tabang Binderless Coal Briquette Project” (“the HPC Economic Feasibility Report”), which was sent to BR. Having conducted a preliminary risk assessment of the Project, HPC stated in the HPC Economic Feasibility Report that the BCB Process had “not yet been demonstrated in a commercially sized plant”. It also expressly noted the risk that “the costs of such projects could be higher than expected” and the risks “associated with the construction of a project in remote locations and the use of different contractors and suppliers”.

  79. (d) In October 2005, after receiving a letter from WEC about the proposed terms of the joint venture, Mr Neil (who is BR’s chief development officer) prepared a financial model and calculated that the Project would incur around US$37.8m per year in costs, but he acknowledged that “capital expenditure and operating expenditure for any venture would always be higher than what was originally estimated, and … in this case that was especially likely given that Tabang was a very remote location”.

  80. (e) Mr Neil and Mr Lim (the chief operating officer of BR) sent BCBC a letter on 7 November 2005 in which they acknowledged the risk that the parties might not be able to successfully construct and commission a plant that could use the BCB Process on a commercial scale, as well as the other risks inherent in the fact that this was the first time that anyone was attempting to implement the BCB Process on a commercial scale. In his affidavit of evidence-in-chief in Tranche 1, Mr Neil explained that these risks “in effect ma[de] [the Project] an experiment”.

  81. [38] As for BCBCS’s claim for loss of a chance, cl 3.2 of the JV Deed initially stipulated the parties’ intention to increase the production capacity of the Tabang Plant from 1 MTPA to 3 MTPA if the Project succeeded. The figure of 3 MTPA was subsequently amended to 5 MTPA on 14 September 2006. Clearly, the parties had contemplated the prospect of profiting from the expanded capacity of the Tabang Plant. That there was no agreement or obligation to expand the Tabang Plant’s capacity, as BR contends, is irrelevant in so far as remoteness of loss is concerned. We therefore hold, in principle, that BCBCS’s loss of a chance to profit from the Tabang Plant’s expanded capacity, much like its wasted expenditure, is not too remote a loss. Whether they succeed on the facts is another matter that we shall examine below.

  82. Whether loans can be recouped as a form of wasted expenditure

  83. [39] We now examine the second preliminary legal issue, namely, whether loans can be recouped as a form of wasted expenditure. BR submits that this question should be answered in the negative for the following reasons:

  84. (a) A lender’s recourse is against its debtor. BCBCS knew that in extending loans to KSC, any recourse would be against KSC qua debtor.

  85. (b) A loan is an asset rather than an “expense” or “loss”. In exchange for parting with its moneys and assuming a credit risk as well as a risk of the borrower defaulting on repayment, a lender obtains the benefit of the borrower’s payment of interest on the loan.

  86. (c) A loan is also distinct from an “expense” or “loss” because a lender may elect to take security its borrower.

  87. [40] According to BR, loans should be distinguished from expenses and BCBCS should not be allowed to recover its loans to KSC as wasted “expenditure”. BR adds that there does not appear to be any case of a shareholder successfully recovering a loan to a joint venture company as a form of wasted expenditure. In response, BCBCS contends that loans are recoverable as wasted expenditure, and cites Freeman v Londish [2018] NSWSC 1425 (“Freeman”) and Assetco Plc v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2019] EWHC 150 (Comm) (“Assetco”) as examples that illustrate this legal proposition.

  88. [41] We accept BCBCS’s submissions. BR does not cite any authority for the legal proposition that loans to a joint venture company do not constitute recoverable expenditure. This wide and potentially far-ranging proposition is contradicted by Freeman and Assetco, where loans were in fact recovered as wasted expenditure. In any event, BR has not pleaded that loans cannot be recouped as wasted expenditure. Although its Defence and Counterclaim (Amendment No 8) (“D&CC”) states that BCBCS’s wasted expenditure is “not recoverable at law as expenditure”, the substance of its pleading is instead that BCBCS is not entitled, on the facts rather than as a matter of law, to recover the wasted expenditure incurred.

  89. Whether the losses claimed by BCBCS are barred by the rule against reflective loss

  90. [42] The third preliminary legal issue concerns whether BCBCS’s claims are barred by the rule against reflective loss. A key sub-issue which arises is, assuming that the loss suffered by a shareholder is indeed reflective of the company’s loss: does the rule against reflective loss only bar claims for loss suffered by a shareholder qua shareholder, or does it extend to situations where a shareholder has suffered detriment in another capacity, eg, as a creditor?

  91. [43] BR cites Townsing Henry ([29] above), in which the Court of Appeal remarked that the reflective loss principle “extends beyond a shareholder’s claim that his shares have been devalued, and includes ‘all other payments which the shareholder might have obtained from the company if it had not been deprived of its funds’ … In particular, the detriment suffered by a shareholder qua creditor of the company is also caught by this bar against recovery” [emphasis in original] (at [70]). Accordingly, detriment suffered by a shareholder qua creditor of the company is caught by the reflective loss principle if the company’s assets can be replenished through an action against the wrongdoer. BR also argues that the UK Supreme Court decision in Sevilleja v Marex Financial Ltd [2021] AC 39 (“Marex”), which limits the scope of the rule to loss suffered by shareholders qua shareholders, does not represent the law in Singapore. Here, KSC has not been dissolved and is still able to commence proceedings against Bara/FSP since its curator is not bound by the JV Deed (which was in any event terminated on 2 March 2012). Even if KSC has been dissolved, the rule against reflective loss still applies if KSC could have sued BR at some point.

  92. [44] BCBCS takes the position that the Court of Appeal’s pronouncements in Townsing Henry on the scope of the rule against reflective loss were dicta and that this court is free to adopt the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Marex, particularly as the Court of Appeal’s dicta in Townsing Henry were based on the House of Lords decision in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1, which has since been overturned. BCBCS says that Marex has limited the ambit of the rule against reflective loss to “claims by shareholders that, as a result of actionable loss suffered by their company, the value of their shares, or of the distributions they receive as shareholders, has been diminished”. This means that where a company’s loss results in a creditor who is also a shareholder suffering a loss, he can pursue a claim without being caught by the rule against reflective loss.

  93. [46] These arguments have since been overtaken by the recent decision of Miao Weiguo v Tendcare Medical Group Holdings Pte Ltd (formerly known as Tian Jian Hua Xia Medical Group Holdings Pte Ltd) (in judicial management) and another [2021] SGCA 116 (“Miao Weiguo”), where the Court of Appeal affirmed the existence of the reflective loss principle and held that it extends only to shareholders claiming qua shareholders, and so it only precludes claims by shareholders for the diminution in the value of their shareholdings or in distributions they receive as shareholders as a result of actionable loss suffered by the company (at [206]). That is because the reflective loss principle is a rule of company law that limits the scope of a shareholder’s remedies against a wrongdoer in respect of losses caused to the company on account of the unique status of shareholders (at [114]-[120]) and the fundamental nature of a share, which lies, not in its market value, but in the right of the shareholder to participate in the company (at [198]-[202]). In arriving at this position, the Court of Appeal followed the majority of the UK Supreme Court in Marex and departed from the position which it had earlier stated in Townsing Henry ([29] above) (at [175] and [193]).

  94. [47] Given the Court of Appeal’s decision in Miao Weiguo, which is binding on us, BCBCS’s claims are not precluded by the reflective loss principle. This is because BCBCS’s wasted expenditure claim is made in respect of reliance loss suffered by BCBCS in extending finance to KSC pursuant to the SLAs and the PLFA, ie, the claim is made by BCBCS qua creditor of KSC, and so it falls squarely outside of the reflective loss principle. BCBCS’s claim for loss of a chance is made in respect of expectation loss suffered by BCBCS as a result of BR’s breaches of its contractual obligations under the joint venture and not for any diminution in value of its shareholding in KSC or distributions which it is entitled to receive as a shareholder of KSC, ie, the claim is not made by BCBCS qua shareholder of KSC. We need say no more about the submissions which parties have made about the scope of the reflective loss principle, given that such issues have since been laid to rest by the Court of Appeal in Miao Weiguo.

  95. [48] In Miao Weiguo, the Court of Appeal also added that the policy against double recovery does not constitute a specific justification for the reflective loss principle (at [185]-[190]), but is one of general application throughout the law in so far as remedies and damages are concerned (at [181]-[185]). As such, even if a claim is not precluded by the reflective loss principle, the court must still consider if there is a risk of double recovery, which may nevertheless bar the claim (see Miao Weiguo at [208]-[210]).

  96. [49] In this case, we are satisfied that there is no risk of double recovery by BCBCS if its claims are allowed. While KSC remains a legal entity following the termination of its bankruptcy in 2016, there is no realistic prospect of KSC commencing legal proceedings against Bara, FSP and BR. We accept evidence of Indonesian law put forth by BCBCS that KSC, which has entered a state of dissolution following the termination of its bankruptcy, can only carry out a limited set of corporate actions which do not include the commencement of complicated litigation. BR has not addressed this point in its submissions on Indonesian law. Indeed, more than eight years have elapsed, but no proceedings have yet been commenced by KSC against FSP, Bara or BR.

  97. Whether BCBCS is entitled to claim damages for both wasted expenditure and loss of a chance

  98. [50] The fourth preliminary legal issue pertains to whether BCBCS is entitled to claim damages for both wasted expenditure and loss of a chance. BR argues that it is not open to BCBCS to do so given that both heads of damages arise from the same contractual breaches. BR adds that BCBCS cannot seek recovery on two mutually exclusive juridical bases: the claim for wasted expenditure is a claim for reliance loss whereas the claim for loss of a chance is a claim for expectation loss.

  99. [51] On the other hand, BCBCS submits that the general rule against recovery for both expectation loss and reliance loss in respect of the same contractual breach only operates when expectation loss is claimed on a gross, rather than net, basis. Its claim for loss of a chance is a claim for loss of net profits in respect of the second and third plants and is not duplicative of its claim for wasted expenditure in respect of the first plant.

  100. [52] The starting point is that the principle against double recovery will preclude a claimant from recovering both expectation loss and reliance loss (see Edwin Peel, Treitel’s Law of Contract (Sweet & Maxwell, 14th Ed, 2015) at para 20-035). This rule is premised on the rationale that, a claim for expectation loss, if allowed, will necessarily also compensate the claimant for his reliance loss (see, eg, J K MacLeod, “Damages: Reliance or Expectancy Interest” [1970] JBL 19 at 20-21). That follows since any reliance loss must necessarily have been incurred in the first place before the contract can be made, performed and profits derived thereunder.

  101. [53] The decision of the English Court of Appeal in Cullinane v British Rema Manufacturing Co Ltd [1954] 1 QB 292 (“Cullinane”) illustrates this. The defendants sold to the plaintiff a machine, warranting that it had certain functional capabilities. The plaintiff sought to claim damages for breach of this warranty under two heads: (a) the capital expenditure incurred in the installation of this machine (corresponding to heads (A) to (C) in his statement of claim) and (b) loss of profits. The majority held that the plaintiff could not recover both, as that would be tantamount to giving the plaintiff damages twice over (at 306 and 312). This is because a claim for loss of profits - arising from the performance of the contract according to its terms - can only be founded on the footing that the full contract price has been paid and all other capital expenditure has been incurred (at 302 and 308). In such a case, the claim for expectation loss will necessarily also compensate the claimant for his reliance loss.

  102. [54] In our view, BCBCS is not precluded from pursuing both claims. The general principle that a claimant has to elect between expectation loss and reliance loss only applies where expectation loss (in the form of loss of profits) is claimed on a gross, rather than net, basis (see Smile Inc Dental Surgeons Pte Ltd v OP3 International Pte Ltd [2020] 3 SLR 1234 at [52]–[57] and The Law of Contract in Singapore (Andrew Phang Boon Leong gen ed) (Academy Publishing, 2012) (“The Law of Contract in Singapore”) at para 21.038). The touchstone of this general principle is to prevent double recovery and to ensure that the claimant is not placed in a better position than he would have been in if not for the breach. Accordingly, if the claimant can prove that he would have derived such profits from the contract which would exceed his capital expenditure, he would be entitled to recover both the capital expenditure and the net profits which he would have made under the contract. In such a case, there will be no overlap between his claims for expectation and reliance loss (see Chitty on Contracts (HG Beale gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 33rd Ed, 2018) at para 26-032; Samuel Stoljar, “Normal, Elective and Preparatory Damages in Contract” (1975) 71 LQR 68 at 85).

  103. [55] In this case, BCBCS is claiming damages for: (a) wasted expenditure in respect of the first plant; and (b) the loss of net profits (on the basis of the loss of a chance) which would have been derived from the second and third plants if the Tabang Plant’s capacity were expanded to 3 MTPA (see [18] and [20] above). BCBCS’s loss of a chance claim is therefore pegged to the profits which it would have made over and above those that were required to compensate it for its reliance loss. As such, there is no risk of double recovery.

  104. [56] BR does not suggest that there will be double recovery on the facts; it simply insists that it is conceptually impermissible for a claimant to claim both expectation loss and reliance loss in respect of the same contractual breach. We need only point out that expectation and reliance losses are not in fact founded on different juridical bases, since both measures of damages are compensatory and based on the claimant’s loss (see Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd and others v Yeo Boong Hua and others and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 655 at [127]–[128]). Accordingly, we consider that BCBCS is not precluded, in principle, from claiming damages for both wasted expenditure and loss of a chance.

  105. Whether BCBCS is entitled to recover its wasted expenditure through the cash flow from the PRM

  106. [57] The fifth preliminary legal issue is whether the cash flow from the PRM should be considered in determining whether BCBCS would have recouped its wasted expenditure. If this question is answered in the negative, then there would have been little likelihood of BCBCS recovering its wasted expenditure.

  107. [58] BR’s arguments on this score can be summarised as follows:

  108. (a) The parties did not contemplate at the time the JV Deed was signed that shareholder loans would be recouped through the cash flow from the PRM. Such loans would instead have been recouped from the debtor, namely, KSC.

  109. (b) BCBCS’s own witnesses testified that the court should look at only KSC’s cash flow and not the cash flow that might flow from BR to BCBCS (such as the cash flow under the PRM).

  110. (c) Taking cash flow from the PRM into account would result in BCBCS being doubly enriched. Not only would the cash flow from the PRM flow from BR to BCBCS, KSC would also remain liable to BCBCS under the SLAs and the PLFA.

  111. (d) The boards of WEC and BCBCS did not discuss treating the cash flow from the PRM as repayment of the loans extended to KSC or consider that doing so would be in WEC’s or BCBCS’s best interests. Moreover, they could not have properly given such an instruction as this was a matter for a future board to consider.

  112. (e) The use of the PRM would violate cl 7.1(s) of the JV Deed, which provides that the unanimous consent of KSC’s shareholders or directors is needed for KSC to approve any other matter that financially or contractually binds any or all of the shareholders.

  113. [59] BCBCS argues that BR has fundamentally mischaracterised the cash flow from the PRM as deemed repayment of the loans extended by BCBCS to KSC. Rather, had the Project proceeded, BCBCS would have enjoyed the cash flow from the PRM in addition to having its loans repaid by KSC. In other words, cash flow from the PRM constituted an additional source from which BCBCS could have recouped its wasted expenditure. BCBCS responds to BR’s specific arguments as follows:

  114. (a) There is no legal basis for the claim that the parties must have contemplated, at the time of contracting, the precise mechanism by which they would recoup wasted expenditure. It suffices that the parties reasonably contemplated that expenditure would be incurred and that a contractual breach would result in that expenditure being wasted.

  115. (b) BCBCS’s case has never been that only KSC’s cash flow should be considered, to the exclusion of any other cash flow that would flow from BR to BCBCS. In this regard, BCBCS argues that BR has mischaracterised its case.

  116. (c) BCBCS would not be doubly enriched. The cash flow from the PRM is separate and distinct from the repayment of the loans extended to KSC; BCBCS was always entitled to both.

  117. (d) There is no authority to support BR’s proposition that a present board cannot bind a company’s future conduct.

  118. (e) BR’s reliance on cl 7.1(s) of the JV Deed is misguided. The repayment of the various loans extended to KSC is governed by the respective loan agreements (namely, the SLAs and the PLFA), not the JV Deed.

  119. [61] Mason CJ and Dawson J held that it was within the contemplation of the parties that the performance of the contract by the plaintiff would place it in an advantageous position to secure renewal of the contract with its attendant benefits, and that the value of this occurring should be evaluated as part of the plaintiff’s wasted expenditure claim (see Amann at 18-19). BR refers to these passages in its submissions but omits certain aspects of its reasoning. Mason CJ and Dawson J made the aforementioned holding in relation to remoteness of damage under the rule in Hadley v Baxendale ([31] above) (see Amann at 18–19):

  120. Read in its proper context, Amann clearly does not stand for the proposition that the parties must have foreseen the precise mechanism by which wasted expenditure would be recouped. In any event, we are not satisfied that there is any sound rationale for such a proposition.

  121. [62] Second, BCBCS has never contended that the court should only take KSC’s cash flow into account when determining whether BCBCS would have recouped its wasted expenditure, contrary to what BR asserts. As BCBCS points out, the statements made by its witnesses and relied on by BR were to the effect that loans incurred by KSC would have to be repaid from KSC’s cash flow. However, BCBCS has never once asserted that only KSC’s cash flow, and not the cash flow from the PRM, are relevant to its recovery of its wasted expenditure. It regarded the cash flow from KSC as well as that from the PRM as sources from which it could have recouped its wasted expenditure. This much is clear from answer 5 of BCBCS’s Particulars of Statement of Claim (Amendment No 6), which reads:

  122. [63] Third, BR appears to have conflated the issue of whether the loans extended by BCBCS to KSC would have been repaid with the issue of whether BCBCS would have recouped its wasted expenditure. As BCBCS notes, it could have recovered its wasted expenditure from either KSC’s cash flow or the cash flow from the PRM – BR’s claim that BCBCS would be “doubly enriched” is therefore a red herring. The relevant question is simply whether BCBCS would have made an overall profit or loss from the Project, and whether it would have therefore recovered its wasted expenditure. Accordingly, it is immaterial whether the boards of WEC or BCBCS considered whether the cash flow from the PRM ought to be treated as repayment of the loans extended to KSC.

  123. [64] Fourth, BR’s submission on cl 7.1(s) of the JV Deed is puzzling. Clause 7.1 of the JV Deed requires the unanimous consent of KSC’s shareholders or directors before KSC may carry out certain actions. However, BCBCS’s reliance on the cash flow from the PRM to recover its wasted expenditure requires no action on KSC’s part; cl 7.1(s) of the JV Deed is hence wholly inapplicable.

  124. [65] In any event, BR has not pleaded that BCBCS is not entitled to recover its wasted expenditure through the cash flow from the PRM. For these reasons, we hold that BCBCS is permitted to rely on the cash flow from the PRM in its claim for recovery of its wasted expenditure.

  125. Whether BCBCS is entitled to recover sums that it unilaterally loaned to KSC under the PLFA

  126. [66] The final preliminary legal issue concerns the sum of US$40m that BCBCS loaned to KSC under the PLFA (see [18(c)] above). Of this sum, BR says that BCBCS cannot recover any amount beyond US$6m because that was the amount that the parties had originally agreed that BCBCS would lend KSC under the PLFA. According to BR, BCBCS unilaterally increased the Priority Facility to US$40m after the amount drawn down had exceeded US$20m. The fact that BR later ratified these sums is said by BR to be irrelevant since the issue is whether, at the time BCBCS unilaterally lent the further sums to KSC, it did so in reliance on any promise by BR. On the other hand, BCBCS submits that there is no reason to cap its recoverable wasted expenditure under the PLFA at US$6m, particularly as the parties had agreed to increase the Priority Facility to US$40m by way of the Addendum (see [8(c)] above).

  127. [67] We agree with BCBCS on this preliminary issue. The Priority Facility was increased to US$40m pursuant to the Addendum, to which BCBCS, BR and KSC were party. Hence, the very premise of BR’s argument – namely, that BCBCS unilaterally increased the Priority Facility to US$40m – is simply incorrect. In fact, BR implicitly conceded in Tranche 2 that the Priority Facility had been increased to US$40m by the parties’ mutual consent; it argued then that BCBCS had wrongfully caused KSC to incur a debt in excess of the Priority Facility of US$40m (see Second Judgment at [55(a)(ii)]). We therefore see no reason to disregard the Addendum in favour of the parties’ initial agreement for BCBCS to lend only US$6m to KSC, when that agreement was subsequently revised.

  128. [68] In any event, BR has plainly failed to plead that BCBCS is only entitled to recover US$6m under the PLFA. For these reasons, the recoverable wasted expenses that BCBCS incurred under the PLFA should not be capped at US$6m.

  129. Conclusion on issue 1

  130. [69] To conclude issue 1, we find that the preliminary legal issues that we have discussed at [31]–[68] above do not, in principle, bar BCBCS’s claims. We now examine the facts under each head of damages claimed by BCBCS in turn.

  131. Issue 2: Whether BCBCS would have recovered its wasted expenditure

  132. Whether the Tabang Plant would have achieved nameplate capacity by June 2012

  133. [70] BCBCS submits that the Tabang Plant would have achieved nameplate, or near nameplate, capacity (ie, 1 MTPA) by June 2012 at the latest. On the other hand, BR submits that there was no prospect of the Tabang Plant achieving 1MTPA by January 2012 or June 2012, or at all.

  134. [71] There are essentially three aspects which we have to consider:

  135. (a) whether the technology underlying the BCB Process (which underlies the Tabang Plant) could have worked;

  136. (b) if so, whether the Tabang Plant could have been designed and constructed to allow the BCB Process to be scaled up; and

  137. (c) if so, whether the briquettes produced by the BCB Process would have been sufficiently durable and stable to be saleable.

  138. The technology underlying the BCB Process

  139. [72] BR says that there is no evidence of any plant built anywhere in the world which has successfully implemented and commercialised the BCB Process, much less a plant with a nameplate capacity of 1 MTPA. If there had been, BR submits, there would be many people interested in obtaining the licensing rights or using licensees to construct plants. Whilst Mr Flannery (the managing director and CEO of WEC) and Mr Maras (the CFO of WEC) say that the Tabang Plant would have become a proven “blueprint”, BCBCS has not built any 1 MTPA plant anywhere in the world with this “blueprint”. That, BR submits, raises serious question marks over the technology underlying the BCB Process.

  140. [73] BCBCS, on the other hand, points to the fact that successful tests of the BCB Process were conducted at the CSIRO and Collie plants using Tabang coal, prior to the execution of the JV Deed (see First Judgment at [3] and [9]-[14]), and that these tests established that Tabang coal briquetted well through the BCB Process and showed that the technology underlying the BCB Process worked. BCBCS says that, on the basis of various feasibility assessment reports and studies, BR concluded that the results looked good and proceeded with the joint venture.

  141. [74] We conclude on the basis of the evidence of the pilot studies and, as set out below, the status of the Tabang Plant in November 2011, that the technology underlying the BCB Process would have worked and that, as BCBCS’s technical expert Professor Batterham (“Prof Batterham”) said, the question for the Tabang Plant was simply one of scaling up.

  142. Issues with the Tabang Plant

  143. [75] On whether the Tabang Plant could be designed and constructed to allow the BCB Process to be scaled up, there was much evidence of past experiences of new processes and the timescale and feasibility of achieving nameplate capacity for those processes. However, we did not find such general evidence of assistance in assessing whether the Tabang Plant could have achieved nameplate capacity. Nor did we think that views expressed at various times by the people involved were of much assistance. Those views were expressed in particular contexts, such as licensing discussions and assumptions for board meetings. They would obviously have taken into account what that particular person knew or assumed at the time, which is likely to be different from the comprehensive factual and expert technical evidence now before us. We therefore think that a detailed technical consideration of the state of the various components of the BCB Process is a much better approach to answering this central question.

  144. [76] As at November 2011, the Tabang Plant was shut and it was about to have modifications carried out to deal with several matters that had arisen (see [21] above). The question is whether the Tabang Plant, with those modifications implemented in November and December 2011, would have enabled a ramp up to nameplate capacity by the end January of 2012, or at the latest, by June 2012.

  145. [77] We accordingly turn to consider the components of the Tabang Plant which are still in dispute. We note that, as BCBCS observes, BR has not raised any issues with the Tabang Plant’s cooling column, cage mill crusher, dried coal bin system and Redler distribution conveyors. We therefore deal with those aspects only briefly.

  146. [78] To put the component parts of the Tabang Plant into context, the main components in the BCB Process at the Tabang Plant are as follows:

  147. (a) Crushing: The raw coal from the mine is initially crushed in a primary feeder breaker crusher followed by a secondary cage mill crusher, reducing the input coal of 50mm size to coal particles with a maximum size of 3mm, which is then transferred to the crushed coal bin.

  148. (b) Pneumatic coal injection system: The crushed coal is transferred from the crushed coal bin to the drying column by a pneumatic transport system using recycled gas from the drying column.

  149. (c) Drying column: The drying column is 30m high and the crushed raw coal is pneumatically conveyed into the drying column. It is then fluidised by hot gas from the furnace through the drying column into the cyclones. The drying column is equipped with an artificial evaporative load (“AEL”) system, which uses compressed air and fine spray nozzles to vaporise the water droplets to regulate the hot gas temperature during start up, shutdown and upset operating conditions.

  150. (d) Cyclones and main bag filter: There are four cyclones in parallel to remove the dried coal from the hot gas in the drying column. The dried coal is discharged from the cyclones into the dried coal bin. The hot gas is then separated, with the majority of the hot gas going to the main bag filter and the remainder returning as recycled gas to the recycle fan, to the furnace and to transport the raw crushed coal in the pneumatic coal injection system. The dust laden effluent hot gas from the cyclones goes to the main bag filter for dust removal.

  151. (e) Dried coal bin and distribution conveyors: The dried coal is discharged from the dried coal bin to the four Redler distribution conveyors; one Redler distribution conveyor feeds four briquetting machines.

  152. (f) Briquetting machines: The four Redler distribution conveyors feed 16 Komarek B400 briquetting machines equipped with Rossi gear boxes; each briquetting machine is designed to produce 10 tonnes per hour (“TPH”) operated at 100% speed.

  153. (g) Dust extraction system: Each briquetting machine has a dust pick up point. There are two bag filters for the briquetting machines, each collecting dust from eight briquetting machines. The dust discharge from the briquetting machine bag filters is discharged to two screw conveyors, one for each bag filter. The screw conveyors discharge the dust to the pulveriser bin or to a dump bin.

  154. (h) Main bag filter: This removes the dust from the hot gas after the cyclones. The dust from the main bag filter discharges into screw conveyors, which discharge the dust into the dried coal bin, to be briquetted along with the dried coal from the cyclones.

  155. (i) Cooling system: The briquettes are collected on two conveyors transferring them to a collecting conveyor, which then transports the briquettes to a bucket elevator that feeds them to a 20m high cooling column. The briquettes slowly move down the cooling column while high velocity ambient air circulates through it, cooling the briquettes. The cooled briquettes are discharged from the cooling column via vibrating feeders to a conveyor, which transports the cool briquettes to an out loading bin. The cooled briquettes are then loaded into trucks and taken to the briquette stockpiles.

  156. (1) Coal injection system

  157. [79] Blockages had occurred at the coal injection pipes which prevented the coal injection system from functioning at full capacity. This had been overcome by shortening the drop lengths of the pipes and installing deflector plates, more powerful fans, flow measurement devices and control dampers. This enabled the coal injection system to operate at 100% injection rates. There remained a problem, because erosion occurred at the elbows of the steel injection pipes at a faster rate than anticipated. The steel pipes were therefore replaced with ceramic tile-lined pipes in mid-October 2011 to reduce the rate of erosion but this had the inadvertent effect of introducing turbulence and pressure drops in the pipes and meant that, as of late October 2011, coal injection rates could not be raised to 100%. The planned solution was to reinstate the original steel pipes but with reinforced steel welded to the pipe elbows.

  158. [81] BR says that Mr Brian Kenihan (“Mr Kenihan”), who was WEC’s senior mechanical engineer and had been involved in the Tabang Plant’s commissioning, accepted that the solution was a “short-term” one and that the steel pipes would wear out and need to be replaced every three months. BR submits that this solution would not have worked as the erosion would cause blockages and lowered flow rate, so that the problem of blockage would not have been satisfactorily addressed by merely reinstalling the same pipes and welding plates on the outside. It says that neither Mr Rahm nor Prof Batterham gave evidence which supported this as a long-term solution. BR also raises concerns about the other proposals which Mr Kenihan said could resolve the issues with the coal injection system, including the use of a non-pneumatic screw feed coal injection system and the use of chromium carbide pipes. BR says that it is unlikely that the former, which had been in use at another plant (the Cessnock demonstration plant) could be scaled-up for the Tabang Plant as the Cessnock plant was 14 times smaller in scale than the Tabang Plant in terms of production rate. BR also says that the use of chromium carbide pipes had never been tested at the Tabang Plant.

  159. [82] We note that the issue of erosion at the elbow of the pipes was the only remaining issue in November 2011 and that the solution was to revert to the original system and replace the pipes every few months. Whilst the pipes would still be prone to erosion, the issue of blockages occurring when the steel wore through to the concrete backing would be resolved by this solution, as Mr Rahm explained. We consider that this was a perfectly feasible solution and whether it is described as a short or longer-term solution merely reflects the fact that it is a perfectly adequate solution, although one needing periodic replacement of the pipes. There were clearly other potential solutions to overcome the need for pipe replacement. However, that does not make the reinforced pipes any less of a solution. We consider that the periodic replacement of the pipes would be likely to prevent the problem of blockages affecting the 100% coal injection rate.

  160. (2) Dust extraction system

  161. [83] During the ramp-up process, the dust extraction system, as originally designed by SKM, did not have sufficient capacity to handle the amount of dust actually generated during the briquetting process. This resulted in KSC deliberately limiting the Tabang Plant’s production rate so as to limit the amount of dust being produced. To overcome this, the dust extraction system was overhauled and in November 2011 a new dust extraction system was being put in place, with more capacity that could handle the dust generated when the Tabang Plant was operating at 100% production capacity.

  162. [84] That new dust extraction system had a number of components. First, to address the issue of coarse dust/unbriquetted dried coal feed escaping from the briquetting machines, SKM designed and would have installed a dust separation chute system at the briquetters. This was designed to capture up to 16 TPH of unbriquetted feed present in the briquetter hoods in a separate chute and return it to the dried coal bin via tube chain conveyors. Second, to address the issue of airborne nuisance dust in the briquetter hoods, Advitech redesigned the baghouse dust extraction system (comprising two dust collector systems, newly designed briquette hoods, ducts and duct support structures, bag-house filters and exhaust fans), so that it would now capture up to 5.7 TPH of nuisance dust. BCBCS says that these works would have been completed by December 2011.

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