Singapore International Commercial Court · Decided 21 February 2022
Larpin, Christian Alfred and another v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala and another
Feedback & support[2022] SGHC(I) 4 · Case no. Suit No 3 of 2020
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Grounds of decision
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Overview
- [1]
[1] The plaintiffs claim rescission of agreements for the purchase of shares giving rights to a villa in Thailand, return of the purchase price, and damages to be assessed, on the ground of misrepresentations material to the decision to purchase the shares.
- [2]
[2] The Andora Resort in Phuket (“the Resort”) was a leisure resort developed by Mr Allan Zeman comprising luxury villas, hotel suites, a leisure complex and other facilities. A villa could be acquired for personal use, or as an investment let out through the Resort by a letting agent.
- [3]
[3] Villa 29 (“the Villa”), built in 2007, was acquired by the defendants, Mr Kaikhushru Nargolwala and Mrs Aparna Nargolwala, in that year. They were and are Singapore residents, and for reasons of Thai property law concerning ownership of land by foreign nationals the acquisition was through the ownership of all the shares of Querencia Ltd (“Querencia”), a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands (“the BVI”). Querencia held a lease of the land on which the Villa stood, ownership of the building on the land, and a construction permit and house registration, those matters together giving occupation rights to the Villa.
- [4]
[4] The Nargolwalas used the Villa for their own purposes until late 2014, when they moved to a second villa they had purchased in an associated Andara development. The Villa was made available for rental, and was also available for sale – in legal terms sale, purchase and ownership all being referable to the shares in Querencia.
- [5]
[5] On occasions the Villa was rented by Mr Solomon Lew, an Australian resident. In September 2017 Mr Lew decided that he wanted to purchase the Villa. As will be considered in more detail below, negotiations towards a purchase took place with the Nargolwalas through Mr Daniel Meury, the General Manager of the Resort.
- [6]
[6] In late October 2017 the first plaintiff, Mr Christian Larpin, became aware that the Villa was available for sale. Mr Larpin, a Hong Kong resident, was interested in acquiring a villa or villas in the Resort as an investment. Again as will be considered in more detail below, negotiations towards a purchase took place with the Nargolwalas, initially through Mr Martin Phillips, a real estate agent in Phuket, and then directly.
- [7]
[7] The Larpin negotiations were successful. Mr Larpin purchased the Villa (by the purchase of the shares in Querencia) through his Hong Kong incorporated company, the second plaintiff Quo Vadis Investments Ltd (“Quo Vadis”), for US$7,900,000. On 9 November 2017 a Reservation Agreement was executed between the Nargolwalas and Quo Vadis and a reservation deposit of US$790,000 was paid. On 14 November 2017 a Share Purchase Agreement was executed between the same parties. On 15 November 2017 the balance purchase price of US$7,110,000 was paid, and the Share Purchase Agreement was completed by transfer of the Querencia shares on 16 November 2017.
- [8]
[8] As will be told in the more detailed consideration, however, the culmination of the sale to Mr Larpin was not without incident. Late on 14 November 2017 the Nargolwalas became aware of a claim by Mr Lew in relation to the Villa – I deliberately speak in general terms at this point, as the detail later considered is important in the parties’ contentions in these proceedings. Again in general terms, on 15 November 2017 they told Mr Larpin of the claim and that they believed it was unsustainable, and offered the opportunity to delay or abort the transaction. Mr Larpin said he would proceed. Much more will be said of these events.
- [9]
[9] But Mr Lew followed up on his claim, now contending that he had a binding agreement with the Nargolwalas to purchase the Querencia shares. In late November 2017 he brought proceedings against Quo Vadis and Querencia in the BVI, obtaining a Stop Notice effectively freezing any dealing by Querencia with its shareholder’s rights. In early 2018 he brought proceedings in the Singapore High Court against the Nargolwalas, Quo Vadis, Mr Larpin and Querencia (“the Lew proceedings”), claiming that a binding oral contract of sale had been reached between him and Mr Meury, as agent for the Nargolwalas, on 11 October 2017. He claimed that in entering into the Share Purchase Agreement and completing the transaction the Nargolwalas acted in breach of that contract, and consequently in breach of fiduciary duties owed to him and in breach of trust in transferring the shares to Quo Vadis; that Mr Larpin and hence Quo Vadis had knowledge of the contract such that they were liable for inducing the breach; and that Querencia was liable for dishonestly assisting the Nargolwalas in their breach of fiduciary duties and breach of trust. In further proceedings brought in the BVI in June 2018, he obtained injunctive relief against Quo Vadis and Querencia similar to the Stop Notice, pending the final determination of the Lew proceedings in Singapore.
- [10]
[10] The Lew proceedings were transferred to the Singapore International Commercial Court. In Solomon Lew v Kaikhushru Shiavax Nargolwala and 4 others [2020] 3 SLR 61, delivered on 5 February 2020, Simon Thorley IJ dismissed the action against all the defendants. So far as presently relevant, his Honour held that no binding oral contract had been entered into on 11 October 2017 because what had been said and done was at best an agreement subject to contract, and also because Mr Meury had not had authority to enter into a contract on behalf of the Nargolwalas.
- [12]
[12] Mr Larpin and Quo Vadis joined with the other defendants to the Lew proceedings in resisting Mr Lew’s claims, including denying that a contract binding on the Nargolwalas had been made. However, as plaintiffs in the present proceedings they seek to undo the purchase of the Villa by Quo Vadis. They say that in the course of the Lew proceedings they became aware of matters that had occurred in the negotiations through Mr Meury towards a purchase by Mr Lew, matters which they say the Nargolwalas “actively concealed” from them thereby making material representations. The representations, they say, were false, and were made fraudulently; at least in their pleading, they say that if they were not made fraudulently, reliance is placed on s 2 of the Misrepresentation Act (Cap 390, 1994 Rev Ed) (“the MA”). Had they known of the matters, the plaintiffs say, Quo Vadis would not have entered into the Reservation Agreement, or entered into the Share Purchase Agreement, or completed the purchase.
- [15]
[15] After a hiatus waiting for the decision of the appeal in the Lew proceedings, evidence in the proceedings was taken on 27, 28, 29 and 30 September 2021. Evidence in the plaintiffs’ case was given by Mr Larpin and Mrs Dao Te Lagger, a co-director of Quo Vadis, who were both cross-examined, and affidavits of Mr Meury and Mr Martin Phillips were admitted although they were not available to give evidence. Evidence in the defendants’ case was given by Mr Nargolwala and Mrs Nargolwala, who were both cross-examined. There was an agreed bundle of documents of over 9,000 pages, which included almost all if not the entire records of the proceedings in the BVI and of the Lew proceedings, at both levels, in Singapore. Closing submissions were heard on 5 November 2021, with supplementary written submissions received on 19 November 2021.
- [16]
[16] For the reasons which follow, the proceedings should be dismissed.
The legal framework
- [17]
[17] It was common ground that Singapore law is the governing law in the proceedings.
- [18]
[18] In Panatron Pte Ltd and another v Lee Cheow Lee and another [2001] 2 SLR(R) 435 (“Panatron”), speaking of the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation, the Court of Appeal said at [14]:
- [19]
[19] Implicit in this is that the representation must indeed be false, and it is sufficient that it is substantially false: Ernest Ferdinand Perez De La Sala v Compañia De Navegación Palomar, SA and others and other appeals [2018] 1 SLR 894 at [173].
- [20]
[20] At common law, rescission was available to a party who was induced to enter into a contract by a fraudulent misrepresentation. It was necessary that the representation be made fraudulently, see Lord Gilbert Kennedy v The Panama, New Zealand, and Australian Royal Mail Co (Limited) (1867) LR 2 QB 580 at 580:
- [21]
[21] Equity did not insist on the representation being made fraudulently, and rescission was available to a party induced to enter into a contract by an innocent misrepresentation. In Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1 at 12–13, Jessel MR said:
- [22]
[22] In the well-known case of Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337, Lord Herschell said succinctly at 359:
- [23]
[23] However, equity did not grant damages; to recover damages, it was necessary to establish the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation. Section 2 of the MA modifies this, giving additional or alternative remedies in damages in the case of innocent misrepresentation. It provides:
- [24]
[24] Apart from a false representation founding rescission of a contract, damages can also be awarded to compensate for loss suffered by reason of a fraudulent misrepresentation, under the tort described in Panatron.
The plaintiffs’ pleading of representations
- [25]
[25] The pleading of the representations on which the plaintiffs relied was not straightforward.
- [26]
[26] The plaintiffs began with pleadings that:
(a) by executing the Reservation Agreement on 8 November 2017, the defendants made to them what was called the Reservation Agreement Representation;
(b) by executing the Share Purchase Agreement on 14 November 2017, the defendants made to them what were called the Share Purchase Agreement Representations; and
(c) in a telephone conversation between Mr Nargolwala and Mr Larpin on 15 November 2017, Mr Nargolwala made to Mr Larpin what were called the Oral Representations.
- [27]
[27] But the plaintiffs did not go straight to pleading that these representations were false, and did not rely on them as the actionable misrepresentations. Instead, they pleaded a number of matters in the dealings between the Nargolwalas and Mr Lew in the period to 12 October 2017, called the Material Facts, and more matters in those dealings on 14 November 2017, called the Further Material Facts, which they said were material to the decision to purchase the Villa and were not disclosed to them. The representations on which they relied were then pleaded as representations made by “actively concealing” the Material Facts and the Further Material Facts, as the case may be, called the 8 November Representations, the 14 November Representations and the 15 November Representations, which representations were more extensive but included representations that the Reservation Agreement Representation, the Share Purchase Agreement Representations and the Oral Representations were true.
- [28]
[28] To illustrate, the pleading of the 8 November Representations was:
- [29]
[29] The pleading of the 14 November Representations and the 15 November Representations was in similar form, but in both cases referring to active concealment also of the Further Material Facts and including respectively as true as at 14 November 2017 that the Share Purchase Agreement Representations were true, and as true at 15 November 2017 that the Share Purchase Agreement Representations and the Oral Representations were true.
- [30]
[30] There are one Reservation Agreement Representation, three Share Purchase Agreement Representations and two Oral Representations. The pleading contains fourteen separate representations on which the plaintiffs relied, albeit in part by repetition as true as at the later dates of the representations as at the earlier dates. Within these representations, sometimes two or more separate representations are expressed, such as the “no issues” and separately the “no possible adverse claims” in the first of the 8 November Representations above at [28].
- [31]
[31] All of the representations relied on as actionable representations begin, “By actively concealing [the Material Facts/the Further Material Facts]…”. Active concealment was put as an essential part of the plaintiffs’ case. In the written closing submissions, speaking of all of the Reservation Agreement Representation, the Share Purchase Agreement Representations and the Oral Representations (and after asserting that each was a statement of fact), it was said that the plaintiffs’ position was “not that these statements of fact are, taken alone, actionable misrepresentations”, but that:
- [32]
[32] The plaintiffs’ case was squarely one of representation by failure to disclose, more particularly by active concealment. By active concealment was meant more than simple failure to disclose, from the above passage in the submissions being intentional withholding and as later discussed (see at [41]– [53] below) being concealment with the dishonest intention to mislead the plaintiffs. As the plaintiffs pleaded their case, the representations themselves were because of failure to disclose, by active concealment, the Material Facts/ Further Material Facts.
When can failure to disclose produce a representation?
- [35]
[35] In Broadley Construction Pte Ltd v Alacran Design Pte Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 110 (“Broadley”) the Court of Appeal said (at [28]):
- [36]
[36] That was a case of failure to speak to correct a statement made to the alleged representor; it was held that a reasonable person would not have understood that, by remaining silent, the alleged representor assented to the correctness of the statement. In a case of failure to disclose facts, silence can produce a false representation that a previous statement is true if there is a duty to disclose facts which, if disclosed, would materially affect the truth of the previous statement; or if there is no previous statement, if there is a duty to disclose the facts, failure to disclose them can produce a false representation that the facts do not exist.
- [37]
[37] The consideration in Audi Construction Pte Ltd v Kian Hiap Construction Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 317 (“Audi Construction”) was in the context of estoppel or waiver by election. The Court said, at [61], that whether there is a duty to speak must be decided “having regard to the facts at hand and the legal context in which the case arises”, and:
- [38]
[38] In similar vein, in the context of estoppel by silence, in The Lutetian [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 140 at 157 Bingham J (as his Lordship then was) said that “the duty necessary to found“ such an estoppel “arises where a reasonable man would expect the person against whom the estoppel is raised, acting honestly and responsibly, to bring the true facts to the attention of the other party known by him to be under a mistake as to their respective rights and obligations”. That the other party was known to be under a mistake came from the facts of that case; the expectation of the reasonable man can also arise where that is not known, although it is likely to be more difficult to conclude that there was a duty to speak.
- [39]
[39] Silence of itself conveys nothing, and the better expression is failure to speak, or failure to disclose. As noted in Audi Construction, a duty to speak or disclose is not a legal duty (such as the duty of care in tort). Where there is not a relationship which is accepted to call for disclosure, the finding of a duty to speak or disclose is conclusory, an expression of the court’s assessment of whether the reasonable person would view the failure to speak or disclose as a representation. And ordinarily, if there is a representation by failure to disclose facts, it will be false, a misrepresentation, because the facts which should have been disclosed would falsify the previous statement or do exist. For representation by failure to disclose, representation and misrepresentation run together.
- [40]
[40] A recent summary in the High Court decision in Fuji Xerox Singapore Pte Ltd v Mazzy Creations Pte Ltd and others [2021] SGHC 193 at [52] includes that silence can constitute a misrepresentation when there is “active concealment of a particular state of affairs”, referring to Wee Chiaw Sek Anna v Ng Li-Ann Genevieve (sole executrix of the estate of Ng Hock Seng deceased) and another [2013] 3 SLR 801 (“Wee Chiaw”) at [65]. Where active concealment specifically the allegation in the plaintiffs’ pleading of their case, it must be asked how it fits with finding a duty to disclose. That is best done in conjunction with consideration of Wee Chiaw in connection with dishonest intention to mislead.
Must active concealment be with dishonest intention to mislead?
- [41]
[41] In Wee Chiaw the husband said in correspondence leading to a separation agreement that he had the financial means to provide for the needs of the children. It was argued for the wife that this was a deliberate concealment of the husband’s other assets, and a misrepresentation, because it implied that the husband had no other financial means beyond those required for the care of the children, but he omitted to reveal the existence of two agreements bringing substantial funds to him. The argument was rejected.
- [42]
[42] The Court of Appeal first said, at [65]:
- [43]
[43] The Court said, however, that the correspondence related specifically to provision for the needs of the children, and (also at [65]) that:
- [44]
[44] The defendants submitted, citing this passage, that any misrepresentation said to arise from active concealment required proof of “a fraudulent and dishonest intention”. The language in Wee Chiaw was that the concealment had to be deliberate and dishonest with the intention of misleading the other party, which I shorten to dishonest intention. The defendants referred also to Trans-World (Aluminium) Ltd v Cornelder China (Singapore) [2003] 3 SLR(R) 501, which the plaintiffs had cited as a basis for the misrepresentations (see [31] above); the cited passage from that case at [66] is:
- [45]
[45] The plaintiffs did not submit otherwise. Having themselves cited Wee Chiaw at [65], they said that the focus was on intention and that “the relevant question in finding whether there is any active concealment is to ask whether there is any intention to mislead the victim”. They submitted that the principal issue to be determined in relation to the question of active concealment was whether the defendants intended to mislead the plaintiffs into thinking that the 8 November, 14 November and 15 November representations were true. Their submission then was that (for reasons they gave) there was concealment of the Material Facts and the Further Material Facts, and dishonesty in that the defendants “could not have honestly believed that the various representations they had made were true” so that it was clear that “there was active concealment by the Defendants, to make out a case of misrepresentation by omission”.
- [46]
[46] The defendants had submitted that s 2 of the MA, being concerned with non-fraudulent misrepresentation, was therefore of no relevance in the proceedings. The plaintiffs went on to agree: they submitted that it followed that “the reliefs sought under Section 2 of the Misrepresentation Act… do not arise in the present case”. In short, the plaintiffs stuck to their pleaded case of representation by active concealment, and appeared to accept that for active concealment it was necessary that the defendants dishonestly concealed the truth with the intention to mislead the plaintiffs. Consistently with this, they disclaimed any relevance of s 2 of the MA – although not spelled out, because the dishonest intention found as part of the representations would mean that the representations were not made innocently. While fraud in the traditional sense of making a representation knowingly or believing that it is untrue, or recklessly, not caring whether it is true or false, is conceptually distinct from dishonest intention, it is not easy to see that there could be deliberate and dishonest concealment with the intention to mislead unless the representor knew, believed, or at least suspected that what was being conveyed was false.
- [47]
[47] Despite the common ground between the parties, I have some difficulty with dishonest intention as a necessary ingredient in finding representation by failure to disclose in these proceedings.
- [48]
[48] The point of a representation is what is conveyed to the representee, and ordinarily whether a representation was made is determined objectively from what was said, written or done; the alleged representor’s intention has no relevance, although it may come in at the later stage of whether the representation was made with the intention that it be acted upon by the representee, or as part of whether it was made fraudulently. When the question is whether a representation was made by failure to disclose, it remains to be determined objectively, as was said in Audi Construction (see [35] above) according to how a reasonable person apprised of the relevant facts would view the silence in the circumstances. The alleged representor’s intention still does not make or unmake whether the representation is made.
- [49]
[49] Further, there may be failure to disclose material facts where the alleged representor is forgetful, misguided, or obtuse; whether there was a representation is nonetheless judged according to the understanding of a reasonable person in the position of the alleged representee (see for example Property Alliance Group Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2018] 1 WLR 3529 at [122]–[132] in connection with implied representations). There can be estoppel by negligence, and Handley, Estoppel by Conduct and Election (2nd ed, 2016) at para 3-007 points out that it is not the negligence that estops, but “the representation implied from the negligence, where there is a duty to speak”.
- [50]
[50] What is meant by active concealment, so as to make a difference? The expression as taken up in Wee Chiaw was exemplified by Gordon v Selico Co Ltd [1986] 1 EGLR 71 (“Selico”), described as a case in which the landlord deliberately covered up an extensive outbreak of dry rot in his flat, intending to deceive long-term lessees of the flat. In that case it was said at first instance that the concealment of the dry rot was a false representation by conduct, and that appears to have been taken as a given on appeal. Such positive action may be described as active concealment, but in the present case there is nothing like the covering up of dry rot in Selico, but rather simple failure to disclose the Material Facts and the Further Material Facts. That indeed was the situation in Wee Chiaw: the discussion in terms of active concealment may have been provoked by the wife’s submission, as recorded at [64], that there had been deliberate concealment by the former husband, but in fact there was no more than his failure to disclose the additional sources of funds.
- [51]
[51] A true case of active concealment of the Selico kind may be seen as giving rise to a duty to speak or disclose because the reasonable person would regard failure to disclose dry rot which the landlord had deliberately covered up as a representation, in the circumstances, that there was no dry rot; or it may be regarded as a particular class of misrepresentation by conduct. But I do not think that Wee Chiaw requires that all cases of misrepresentation by failure to speak or disclose be cast in the mould of active concealment, or that (whatever may be the position in a true case of active concealment) dishonest intention is a necessary ingredient in all cases where representation by failure to speak or disclose is alleged. The representor’s state of mind may be a relevant matter in the reasonable person’s assessment of a duty to speak or disclose, as in The Lutetian (above, at [38]), but there can be representation without dishonest intention.
- [53]
[53] The parties, or at least the plaintiffs, may have misunderstood Wee Chiaw; I do not think it requires that “misrepresentation by omission” (see [42] above) must in all cases be by active concealment. It may be better understood to say that the husband’s non-disclosure was not a case of active concealment at all, with the additional observation about dishonest intention meaning that it also could not have been fraudulent; that there was some running together appears from the further discussion at [66], in which it was said that the husband could not have intended to mislead the wife if he did not even realise that the other funds were matrimonial assets to begin with and that the wife must prove that he “had the requisite fraudulent intent“. The plaintiffs should be held to their pleaded case, but in the circumstances I propose to address whether representations of fact were made by considering, apart from dishonest intention, whether representations were conveyed by failure to disclose facts which the defendants were under a duty to disclose, and separately to address dishonest intention.
Were representations of fact made?
The 8 November Representations
Events to 9 November 2017
- [55]
[55] In the pleadings, it was alleged and admitted that the Reservation Agreement was executed on 8 November 2017. It bore that date. In evidence, it emerged that it was executed on 9 November 2017. It was not suggested that anything turned on this.
- [56]
[56] Mr Meury and Mr Lew were well known to each other. In early September 2017, Mr Lew asked Mr Meury for information on the Villa, and for his assistance in a potential purchase of the Villa. On 7 September 2017, he emailed Mr Meury setting out an offer of US$5m for an immediate cash settlement. The offer was said to be on “a walk in walk out basis”, and to be open for seven days only.
- [57]
[57] The Nargolwalas said that the first they heard anything from Mr Meury about the possibility of selling the Villa for US$5m was on 6 October 2017, when Mr Nargolwala received an email from Mr Meury. From the terms of the email, which referred as if already known to “the Australian potential Buyer” having booked the Villa again and suggested that “we come back with another offer for him”, that may not be correct. Mr Meury said in his affidavit only that he “kept the Nargolwalas informed of this”, that is, the Lew offer, “but they were expecting more for the Villa”, and that he sent the emails of 6 and 9 October 2017 next mentioned. It is not clear what, if anything, happened in the period from 7 September 2017.
- [58]
[58] Taking matters up at 6 October 2017, there was a follow-up telephone discussion between Mr Meury and the Nargolwalas on that day, after receipt of the email. Mr Nargolwala said that Mr Meury mentioned that an Australian individual might be interested in purchasing the Villa and that his budget was US$5m; he did not mention the individual’s name, but said that the individual was looking at other properties in Phuket and asked if the Nargolwalas “would be keen to put forward an offer to sell the Villa for USD 5 million”. Mr Nargolwala responded that he believed that the Villa could fetch a substantially higher price and was not prepared to sell it for the US$5m.
- [59]
[59] Mr Meury emailed again on 9 October 2017. He wrote that he had spoken to the potential purchaser, who had reiterated that his offer was US$5m and funds could be paid with seven days, and that the potential purchaser was looking at other villas but he believed they liked the Villa a great deal and “we possibly could still make a deal with them”. He suggested that the potential purchaser “would possible [sic] accept an asking price of US 5.5 Mio”.
- [60]
[60] Again there was a follow-up telephone call from Mr Meury, taken by Mrs Nargolwala. Mr Meury said that he believed that the Australian individual would be prepared to “up his budget to USD 5.5 million to purchase the Villa”. Mrs Nargolwala said that she was prepared to discuss this with Mr Nargolwala, but only if there was a clear indication of the price being offered for the Villa.
- [61]
[61] Mr Meury spoke again with Mr Lew, and by a WhatsApp message Mr Lew told him he would offer US$5.25m. On 11 October 2017 Mr Meury emailed the Nargolwalas with “the latest answer and offer from our guests”, that “he would agree today to split the difference on walk in, walk out basis – and offer US 5,250,000 – in your account, with a settlement within 14 days”. He said that “[h]e will need an answer today as he likes to leave back to Melbourne tomorrow, with a closed deal”.
- [62]
[62] Mr Nargolwala was in New York, and did not see the email until later. Again there was a follow-up telephone call from Mr Meury, taken by Mrs Nargolwala. She was in the midst of leaving Singapore to be with her seriously ill mother in India. Mr Meury said that the potential purchaser (again, not identified) was prepared to pay US$5.25m “net” for the Villa on a walk in walk out basis, that the money would be deposited within 14 days, and that the potential purchaser wanted to complete the deal in 14 days. Mrs Nargolwala told Mr Meury that she needed an offer letter in writing, with detail.
- [63]
[63] According to Mr Meury in his affidavit, in this conversation Mrs Nargolwala said that they were in principle agreeable. Mrs Nargolwala denied this, and Mr Daniel for the plaintiffs said that that was not an issue before me and the plaintiffs did not say that she said there was an agreement in principle.
- [65]
[65] Following the conversation with Mr Meury, as Mrs Nargolwala left for the airport she sent a brief email to Mr Nargolwala which included, “Daniel [Mr Meury] called to say that the buyer has agreed to the sale. I asked for an offer letter with details including name and contact details of the buyer. Also steps for proceeding. Apparently Solomon? Has a lawyer in Singapore but maybe best to use Anurag in BKK.” Anurag was Mr Anurag Ramanat, a Thai lawyer.
- [66]
[66] Later on 11 October 2017, Mr Meury again emailed the Nargolwalas, but not with the clarification. The email included:
- [67]
[67] The reference to passing documents was understood by the Nargolwalas as a reference to documents held by the Resort, relating to the establishment and operation of the villas. In fact, Mr Meury entered the Villa and collected documents held there by the Nargolwalas, which he gave to Mr Lew. This was not known to the Nargolwalas at the time.
- [69]
[69] The hesitancy is evident in Mr Nargolwala’s reply to Mr Meury, on 12 October 2017: “I will be back in Singapore and will call you then. Hopefully by then we will have a better idea on progress. I can then pass the bank details to you.” It is also evident in an exchange of emails with Mr Zeman.
- [70]
[70] Late on 11 October 2017, Mr Zeman emailed to Mr Nargolwala, “Congratulations! I hear you sold Villa 29 to my friend. He is definitely not an easy guy but at least it’s done”.
- [71]
[71] Mr Nargolwala’s reply on 12 October 2017 was, after a greeting:
- [72]
[72] Mr Zeman responded to this last email:
- [73]
[73] According to Mr Nargolwala, this email gave him some cause for concern. Mr Lew had apparently told Mr Zeman that he had offered US$6m, and Mr Nargolwala wondered whether Mr Meury was being truthful about the price offered by Mr Lew, and entertained doubts about whether Mr Lew was a serious buyer. He said in evidence that he told himself that he would find out in due course, and was going to be speaking with Mr Meury when back in Singapore.
- [74]
[74] Mr Meury had emailed a short reply to Mr Nargolwala’s email of 12 October 2017, saying that the purchaser had just left the Resort, would pass on the copy of the documents to his lawyer in Singapore and they would be in touch with Kuhn Anurag for any queries, and “aimes [sic] to have all settled soonest”. On his return to Singapore, on 14 October 2017 Mr Nargolwala telephoned Mr Meury. His account of the conversation, which was not challenged in cross-examination, was:
- [75]
[75] There was then a few days silence. Probably following a telephone call from Mr Nargolwala, on 17 October 2017 Mr Meury emailed to say that he had not heard back from Mr Lew “but he assured me yesterday that he will contact his lawyer right away once he is back in Melbourne”. Mr Meury asked whether Mr Nargolwala would like to pass on his bank account details and his lawyer contact details so that they could be sent to Mr Lew since he would be travelling to India soon. Mr Nargolwala replied, also on 17 October 2017, “I would rather not pass any details to him until we know he is serious and has put us in touch with his lawyer. After that, the details can be passed through his lawyer.” Mr Meury replied in turn, that he understood and “will keep you informed once I hear back from them”.
- [76]
[76] Mrs Nargolwala’s mother passed away, and Mr Nargolwala travelled to India for the obsequies. While he was there, probably early in the week of 23 October 2017, there was a WhatsApp message exchange with Mr Meury:
- [77]
[77] Matters stood thus when Mr Larpin first entered the scene.
- [78]
[78] Mr Larpin had been interested in purchasing a property in Phuket for some time. On 24 October 2017, in an online search while in Thailand, he became aware that Villa 11 at the Resort was on the market through Mr Martin Phillips’ agency. He contacted Mr Martin Phillips, and arranged to view it and other villas on the next day. The viewing included meeting Mr Lyndon Phillips, the brother of Mr Martin Phillips and the General Sales Manager at the Resort, and ended with interest in purchasing both Villa 11 and the Villa. Mr Larpin was told that the asking price for the Villa was US$8.5m. (Hereafter I will refer to Mr Martin Phillips as Mr Phillips, and to his brother as Mr Lyndon Phillips).
- [79]
[79] In the course of the viewing, Mr Lyndon Phillips told Mr Larpin that he had heard about another party being interested in purchasing the Villa, and making an offer. The name of the other party was not mentioned, nor was it said that the owner of the Villa had accepted the offer or that there was a concluded agreement for the sale of the Villa. Mr Larpin said that he did not pay much attention to the “offer” because if he was being shown the property, he considered that it must still be for sale, and it “also sounded like the usual real estate agent pressure tactic of referring to multiple ‘offers’”; therefore he did not ask any follow-up questions about the offer.
- [80]
[80] On 26 October 2017, Mr Larpin emailed Mr Phillips that he was “prepared to make a firm offer shortly” for the two villas “and close a deal as soon as next month”, subject to receiving information on a number of matters including confirmation of the asking prices. Mr Phillips contacted Mr Nargolwala on the same day. He emailed that he “[had] a client who viewed V29 yesterday and seems prepared to make a very favourable offer and complete, subject to DD, quite quickly”.
- [81]
[81] That led to arranging a telephone call, before which Mr Phillips also forwarded the content of Mr Larpin’s email (but without disclosing his identity) and said that the client “has been quoted US$8.5 million”. In the subsequent telephone conversation, Mr Phillips said that he was in touch with someone who might be interested in purchasing the Villa, although he did not give details of the person or the price the person might be willing to offer for the Villa, and asked about documents and information; Mr Nargolwala told him to liaise with Mr Meury to get the documents and information. A tentative arrangement was made for Mr Phillips to meet the Nargolwalas in Singapore on 29 October 2017. Mr Nargolwala emailed Mr Phillips, copied to Mr Meury, confirming that Mr Meury should provide the documents and information. This was done.
- [82]
[82] A purchase of the Villa by Mr Lew re-emerged. On 27 October 2017, Mr Meury emailed to the Nargolwalas:
- [83]
[83] Later on the same day, Mr Meury’s assistant sent contact details for Mr Lew’s lawyers to the Nargolwalas, being Thai lawyers not Singapore lawyers.
- [84]
[84] In fact, no funds had been transferred by Mr Lew as stated in the email of 27 October 2017, although it is not clear that at the time the Nargolwalas knew this. Whether or not they did, they said in their evidence that in discussions returning from India or when arriving back in Singapore on 28 October 2017, they concluded that Mr Lew was not a serious buyer. They decided (in Mr Nargolwala’s words) that they were not going to waste any more time in relation to Mr Lew or (in Mrs Nargolwala’s words) that Mr Lew was someone that they no longer wished to transact with. Mr Lew was supposed to have appointed Singapore lawyers, but had appointed Thai lawyers, and Mr Nargolwala said that he thought that Mr Lew had been lackadaisical and that upon his own 14 day timeline having expired (that is, settlement by 25 October 2017), and having got wind of another potential buyer, Mr Lew had simply acted in haste; he said that they thought that, as had happened with expressions of interest on some earlier occasions, Mr Lew was simply testing the market without a serious or specific interest in purchasing the Villa.
- [85]
[85] The Nargolwalas did not respond to Mr Meury’s email. In Mr Meury’s affidavit, he says that in the evening of 5 November 2017 Mrs Nargolwala “informed me that as Mr Lew had failed to proceed within his own timeline of 2 weeks, they were no longer interested, as the deadline had already passed”. Mrs Nargolwala’s account, which I accept, is more detailed. Mr Meury called her on 5 November 2017 to ask if the Nargolwalas “would still be interested in selling the Villa to Lew, even though Lew had failed to act diligently”. She told him that they were no longer interested in dealing with Mr Lew. She said also that they had received another offer for the Villa and that matters were at quite an advanced stage; Mr Meury “did not say anything much in response, and simply said something to the effect that he understood and the call ended quite quickly”.
- [86]
[86] Mr Zeman made a similar inquiry. On about 7 November 2017 he called Mrs Nargolwala, asking about the Villa and suggesting that they consider selling it to Mr Lew; according to Mrs Nargolwala, he “even asked how much would Lew need to offer so that Kai and I would be prepared to sell to Lew”. She replied to Mr Zeman “pretty much what [she] had said to Meury”.
- [87]
[87] So far as the evidence shows, there was otherwise no further contact between Mr Meury and the Nargolwalas concerning a purchase by Mr Lew, or with the Nargolwalas concerning a purchase by Mr Lew in any other way, until after 8 November 2017. The next contacts were an enquiry from Mr Zeman on 9 November 2017, and then on 14 November 2017, see [126] and [135] below.
- [88]
[88] The purchase of the Villa by Mr Larpin proceeded. The events can be told in summary, for this part of this judgment ending with the execution of the Reservation Agreement on 9 November 2017.
- [89]
[89] Mr Phillips and the Nargolwalas met in Singapore on 29 October 2017. An arrangement was made for Mr Phillips’ agency fees. Mr Larpin’s offer of US$7.9m was acceptable to the Nargolwalas. In the course of the meeting, the Nargolwalas told Mr Phillips that another potential buyer had made an offer to purchase the Villa but had failed to follow up, referring to the failure to produce an offer document and his Singapore lawyers information, and that they had concluded that he was not a serious buyer.
- [90]
[90] A draft Reservation Agreement was proposed by Mr Phillips. There was disagreement over its terms between the Nargolwalas’ lawyers and Mrs Te Lagger, to whom Mr Larpin had left following through the purchase, including the Nargolwalas’ continued wishes that Singapore law should govern the transaction and that they should not warrant the physical condition of the Villa. This caused discontent on Mr Larpin’s part at the delay and what he considered lawyers’ rigidity, to the point that Mr Larpin withdrew his offer. Mr Phillips brought about direct contact between the Nargolwalas and Mrs Te Lagger, and the purchase came back on track. The Reservation Agreement was signed on 9 November 2017.
- [91]
[91] The Reservation Agreement was entered into between the Nargolwalas as Sellers and Quo Vadis as Reservation Holder. It recites the Sellers’ shareholdings and directorships in Querencia (called “the Company”) and the interest thereby indirectly held in the Villa (called “the Property”); the Reservation Holder’s wish to acquire all issued shares in Querencia (called “the Sale Shares”) and the Sellers’ wish to sell them to it; and that the parties:
- [92]
[92] Clause 1 of the Reservation Agreement is the basis of the Reservation Agreement Representation. The clause provides:
- [93]
[93] Clause 2 provides for the holding of a “reservation deposit” of US$790,000 by a stakeholder. The substance of cl 3 is that the Sellers will not offer or sell the Sale Shares to anyone else for the period until 30 November 2017, and the substance of cl 4 is that the parties will use their best endeavours to agree on fair and reasonable terms and conditions of the Transaction Documents, which are to include certain stated matters. Three of the matters are that completion will occur by no later than 30 November 2017, or such other date as the parties may agree; that if completion does not occur by 30 November 2017 or such other agreed date, the balance of the reservation deposit will be released to the Reservation Holder; and:
- [94]
[94] Clause 6 includes that, where the Transaction Documents have been entered into, the reservation deposit will be applied as part of the Consideration. By cl 7.1, the governing law is Singapore law. The substance of cl 10 is that the agreement is legally binding until terminated pursued to its terms or the Transaction Documents have been signed, and that it will automatically terminate if the parties cannot agree on the Transaction Documents by 30 November 2017.
The pleaded representations
- [95]
[95] I have set out the 8 November Representations as pleaded at [28] above; for convenience, I repeat them:
- [96]
[96] The Reservation Agreement Representation was part of the earlier pleading:
- [97]
[97] When the terms of the Reservation Agreement Representation are written into the 8 November Representations, and there is some simplification of the grammar, there are two representations, each with more than one element in its content. They are, with the common introduction, that by actively concealing the Material Facts from the plaintiffs, read with the Reservation Agreement Representation, the defendants represented:
(a) that as at 8 November 2017 there were no issues in relation to them selling the Villa, through the Querencia Shares, to the plaintiffs, and there were no possible adverse claims in respect of the Villa, and the Querencia Shares, by any third party (“Representation 1”); and
(b) that as at 8 November 2017 pursuant to cl 1.1 of the Reservation Agreement, the Villa through the Querencia Shares could be sold to Quo Vadis on an as-is where-is basis, and the consideration of US$7.9m was based on the assumption that the Villa, through the Querencia Shares, could be acquired from the defendants on a debt-free basis, free from any encumbrance (“Representation 2”).
Were the representations conveyed?
- [98]
[98] For this, it is necessary to have regard to the Material Facts, which were pleaded at some length. They fell under two heads.
- [99]
[99] First, it was said that “from early September to November 2017” Mr Meury “had been communicating with Mr Lew, and the Defendants, in respect of Mr Lew’s intention to purchase, and the Defendants’ intention to sell, the Villa, through the Querencia Shares”. Particulars were given, involving reference to Mr Lew’s email of 7 September 2017 to Mr Meury with a US$5m offer; Mr Meury’s email to Mr Nargolwala of 6 October 2017; the telephone conversation between Mr Meury and the Nargolwalas on 6 October 2017; and Mr Meury’s email of 9 October 2017 to the Nargolwalas and the ensuing telephone conversation.
- [100]
[100] Secondly, it was said that on or around 11 October 2017 the defendants:
- [101]
[101] This was described as the “Alleged Agreement”. Again particulars were given, involving reference to Mr Lew’s WhatsApp message to Mr Meury of 11 October 2017 with a US$5.25m offer; Mr Meury’s email to the Nargolwalas of 11 October 2017 and the ensuing telephone conversation with Mrs Nargolwala; Mrs Nargolwala’s email to Mr Nargolwala of 11 October 2017, said to show that the Nargolwalas knew of Mr Lew’s “involvement, and identity”; a meeting between Mr Meury and Mr Lew in which Mr Meury said that the Nargolwalas were in principle agreeable to the offer at US$5.25m “but wanted it in writing to consider further”; Mr Meury’s email to the Nargolwalas of 11 October 2017; Mr Nargolwala’s email to Mr Meury of 12 October 2017; and Mr Meury giving Mr Lew the package of documents on 12 October 2017.
- [102]
[102] These Material Facts include some matters not known to the Nargolwalas, which cannot be the subject of non-disclosure. In submissions, the thrust was that they showed that Mr Lew had done more than expressed an interest, that there was more than a negotiation in that there was a “deal” at least in communication of an in principle acceptable price and discussion of lawyers, and that there was arguably an agreement to sell to Mr Lew.
- [103]
[103] I deal in turn with Representation 1 and Representation 2. But first, there must be explored the part played by “read with the Reservation Agreement Representation”.
- [104]
[104] The Reservation Agreement Representation has two limbs, essentially that the Villa could be sold to Quo Vadis on an as is where is basis, and that the consideration was “based on the assumption” that it would be purchased by Quo Vadis free from any encumbrance. It appears that these were intended to be previous statements, on the explanation in Broadley, and that it must be asked whether there was a duty to disclose the Material Facts as facts that would materially affect their truth: if there was, the failure to disclose brought a representation that the previous statements were true. Representation 2 fits that mould. Representation 1 does not. To say that pursuant to cl 1.1 of the Reservation Agreement the Villa could be sold to Quo Vadis on an as is where is basis, or that the consideration for the sale was based on the assumption of a purchase free from any encumbrance, is very different from saying that there were no issues in relation to the defendants selling the Villa and no possible adverse claims in respect of the Villa by any third party. At least for Representation 1, the part played by the words “read with the Reservation Agreement Representations“ is not clear, other than as general background, and Representation 1 is in the category of a representation that facts do not exist produced by silence or failure to disclose them – that is, a representation that there were no issues in relation to the defendants selling the Villa to Quo Vadis through the Querencia shares and there were no possible adverse claims in respect of the Villa or the shares by any third party.
- [105]
[105] There is an immediate difficulty with Representation 1. It is in generous and uncertain terms: what is meant by “no issues in relation to” selling the Villa, and how wide is “no possible adverse in respect of ‘the Villa’ from any third party”? The representation as pleaded is far wider than could come on any view from failure to disclose the Material Facts, which are concerned with the “issue” or “possible adverse claim” of an arguable agreement to sell to Mr Lew, not with any and every “issue” that could arise in relation to selling the Villa or any and every possible adverse claim by any third party. If the defendants had said to Mr Larpin that there was an arguable agreement to sell to Mr Lew, and given chapter and verse, that would have told him nothing about other “issues” or “possible adverse claims”, and they would have been entitled to say that they made no representation as to other issues or possible adverse claims.
- [108]
[108] The understanding of the reasonable person apprised of the relevant facts is formed against this background and, to repeat, takes account of all the circumstances and not just those put forward as the Material Facts. The circumstances include that Mr Larpin and Mr Nargolwala were well qualified and successful in their respective fields of business, and not novices in property transactions.
- [109]
[109] Until 11 October 2017 there was undoubtedly nothing more than offers by Mr Lew. Mr Meury’s second email of 11 October 2017 was still no more than confirmation that Mr Lew offered the increased price of US$5.25m, and in the conversation between Mr Meury and Mr Nargolwala on 14 October 2017 the detailed offer letter was still required and other terms and conditions remained to be agreed. Neither happened. No offer letter was received despite request, and Mr Lew was indeed lackadaisical in comparison with his holding out of immediate payment and settlement within 14 days, at least until Mr Meury said on 27 October 2017 that Mr Lew was ready to settle and even then it was still without terms and conditions other than price. The plaintiffs placed weight on Mr Nargolwala’s reference to a “deal” in the WhatsApp message to Mr Meury, submitting that this meant that there was more than a negotiation; however, that places unjustified weight on his use of the word, the “deal” was to him a stage in the negotiation and, as Mr Nargolwala said when cross-examined, “nothing was concluded”. It may be observed that in his evidence, Mr Larpin also referred to his agreement with the Nargolwalas on price as a “deal”, at the time when there was still disagreement on the terms of the draft Reservation Agreement, and he said of withdrawing his offer “that the conditions were not met to conclude the deal, so I said let’s forget it”. Pots and kettles come to mind.
- [110]
[110] After Mr Meury’s email of 27 October 2017, to which the Nargolwalas did not respond having decided that they did not wish to deal further with Mr Lew, nothing further was heard from Mr Meury until after 8 November 2017 except the inquiry on 5 November 2017 asking whether the Nargolwalas would still be interested in selling the Villa to Mr Lew. This was quite inconsistent with Mr Lew asserting an existing agreement to sell the Villa to him. Aside from Mr Meury, Mr Zeman’s inquiry on 7 November 2017 was also inconsistent with Mr Lew asserting an existing agreement to sell the Villa to him – even asking how much more Mr Lew would need to offer to persuade the Nargolwalas to sell. It would be inferred that Mr Meury and Mr Zeman made their inquiries after speaking with Mr Lew, and their inquiries reflected that Mr Lew did not tell them that he thought he had an existing agreement to purchase the Villa, but wanted to revive the negotiations. The answer to both inquiries was negative, and at least by the time the Reservation Agreement was executed there were no complaints or other approaches. To a reasonable person in the position of the Nargolwalas, or assessing their position, as at 8 November 2017 there was no more than failed negotiations with a potential purchaser.
- [111]
[111] In the midst of this, on 11 October 2017 Mr Nargolwala was told by Mr Zeman that he had heard, and had been told by Mr Lew, that the Villa had been sold to Mr Lew, and on 27 October 2017 he was told by Mr Meury that Mr Lew said he was ready to settle and had transferred the purchase money (which he had not). Taken alone, these matters could arguably convey that Mr Lew thought he had an agreement to purchase the Villa, although perhaps subject to doubt because the price was not that discussed. But they were not alone. They were accompanied by Mr Lew’s failure to provide the offer letter, by his delay in giving his lawyer details so that transaction documents with other terms and conditions could be settled, and of particular significance by the tame enquiries by Mr Meury on 5 November 2017 and Mr Zeman on 7 November 2017 on whether the Nargolwalas would still be interested in selling the Villa to Mr Lew. These enquiries were of particular significance, representing the position as it had come to be whatever had passed beforehand. The circumstances were not such that as at 8 November 2017 a reasonable person would say that there was an issue in relation to selling the Villa or a possible adverse claim to the Villa, or an arguable agreement to sell the Villa to Mr Lew, which should be disclosed to Mr Larpin lest he be misled in his own negotiations towards purchasing the Villa; or that it was represented by failure to disclose the Material Facts that there was no such arguable agreement.
- [112]
[112] I move to Representation 2. An exploration of its meaning is also necessary. It begins with “Pursuant to clause 1.1 of the Reservation Agreement…”. What part do those words play? Do they mean a representation that cl 1.1 of the Reservation Agreement has the wording or wording to the effect then stated? I do not think that was intended – cl 1.1 does not have the words “could be sold”, and that would be meaningless in the plaintiffs’ case. Rather, unless they are meaningless they must be intended to state the effect of cl 1.1, being (in short) that the Villa could be sold to Querencia and the consideration was based on the particular assumption.
- [113]
[113] If that be so, the representation is not a representation of fact; it is a representation as to the effect in law of cl 1.1. Even then, the words expressing the assumption cannot readily be seen as stating an effect in law beyond that the consideration is agreed to be based on the assumption – the falsity of which was not alleged.
- [114]
[114] The way the plaintiffs put it in closing submissions was in the more concise form that by entering into the Reservation Agreement and failing to disclose the Material Facts, the defendants represented that the Villa could be acquired free from any encumbrance; and they went on to say that it could not, because it was “arguable that Mr Lew had an interest in, or a right to acquire the shares”, which they said was an encumbrance. But cl 1.1 does not say that, or have that effect. It says that the Villa “shall be sold on an as-is where-is basis”, but that is an expression of a term of the proposed sale, neither a statement of fact nor a statement of what would occur – the sale might never come about, if the Transaction Documents were not agreed by 30 November 2017. It says that the consideration is based on an assumption, relevantly that the Villa would be acquired free from any encumbrance, but the assumption of no encumbrance is the antithesis of the fact of no encumbrance – it means that if in fact there is an encumbrance, there will be legal consequences. At best, there were contractual promises by the defendants, and the effect of cl 1.1 was promissory.
- [115]
[115] The plaintiffs submitted that a promissory statement can be a representation of fact, because there can be inherent in it the implied factual statement that the promisor has the honest belief in, or the expectation based on reasonable grounds, of performance of the promise. A statement of honest belief that something will happen in the future, or that there are reasonable grounds for saying that it will, can be found in a statement as to a future state of affairs, see for example Forum Development Pte Ltd v Global Accent Trading Pte Ltd [1994] 3 SLR(R) 1097; Tan Chin Seng v Raffles Town Club Pte Ltd [2003] 3 SLR (R) 307; Deutsche Bank AG v Chang Tse Wen [2013] 1 SLR 1310; and generally Andrew Phang Boon Leong, The Law of Contract in Singapore (Academy Publishing, 2012) at para 11.034. But caution must be exercised in finding similar representations of fact in a promissory statement, because a contractual promise carries its own consequences if it is not fulfilled – a promisor may undertake a contractual obligation in hope, rather than belief or expectation, that he will be able to fulfil it, he and the opposite party both relying on the contractual obligation as the measure of their relationship and on their contractual remedies.
- [116]
[116] It is difficult to find these implied factual statements in Representation 2 when it begins with “Pursuant to Clause 1.1 of the Reservation Agreement….”, and so is an assertion of the effect of the clause. In any event, that was not the case run by the plaintiffs, and their appeal to implied statements of belief or expectation was an afterthought. As stated above, in closing submissions their case was that by entering into the Reservation Agreement and failing to disclose the Material Facts, the defendants represented that the Villa could be acquired free from any encumbrance. The submission abovementioned (at [115]) was in a subsequent written submission concerning promissory statements provided at my request. The plaintiffs did not plead representations of belief in or expectation of an encumbrance-free sale, despite the requirement in O 18 r 12(1)(a) of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) that particulars of any misrepresentation must be given; in JTrust Asia Pte Ltd v Group Lease Holdings Pte Ltd and others [2020] 2 SLR 1256 at [116] it was said that allegations of fraud or misrepresentation must be pleaded with “utmost particularity”. Nothing was asked of the Nargolwalas as to their understanding of cl 1.1 (including, for example, their understanding of “encumbrance”), or their belief in or expectation of its fulfilment by an encumbrance-free sale.
- [117]
[117] Even if Representation 2 was made by failure to disclose the Material Facts, it was not made as an actionable representation of fact. But I go to the substance of the matter, taking the representation as put in closing submissions as a representation that the Villa could be acquired free from any encumbrance. Was there a duty to disclose the Material Facts, such that failure to do so brought that representation? The answer again is no, for at least two reasons.
- [118]
[118] The first is because there was no real significance of the Material Facts to the representation. In short form, on the plaintiffs’ case the Material Facts meant that there was an arguable agreement to sell to Mr Lew. Making that assumption, that did not mean that the Villa could not be acquired by Quo Vadis – it could, as in due course, was held by Simon Thorley IJ and the Court of Appeal. Nor did it mean that the acquisition could not be free from any encumbrance, if for no other reason because as next considered the assumed arguable agreement to sell to Mr Lew was not an encumbrance as referred to in cl 1.1 of the Reservation Agreement. “Encumbrance” was not defined in the Reservation Agreement. Its ordinary meaning in the sale of property is an interest in the nature of a charge. In cl 1.1 it is said that “the Company”, that is, Querencia, is assumed to be acquired debt-free and free from any encumbrance. The reference to the Company is repeated in cl 4 of the Reservation Agreement and its proposed warranty that the Company is debt-free; it is Querencia that is to be free from any encumbrance, and the sensible meaning is that its assets are not to be subject to any interest in the nature of a charge. Just what interest need not be explored; the point is that any encumbrance must be an encumbrance over Querencia meaning its assets. An arguable agreement to sell the shares in Querencia to Mr Lew, a claim not against Querencia but against the Nargolwalas, is not such an encumbrance.
- [119]
[119] In submissions, the plaintiffs relied on the definition of “encumbrance” in the Share Purchase Agreement, being that it:
- [120]
[120] The reliance is misplaced. The extremely wide definition, in a subsequent agreement, cannot be used for an earlier agreement in which the term is not defined. And within the Share Purchase Agreement, the term is used both in relation to the Sale Shares being unencumbered (cll 1.1, 4.2.1, 4.2.2 at [132]–[133] below) and in relation to the Company’s assets being unencumbered (cl 4.2.9 at [133] below), giving point to its use in relation to the Company and not in relation to the shares in Querencia in the Reservation Agreement: even if it could be used, the wide definition does not overcome that in the Reservation Agreement the encumbrance must be an encumbrance over Querencia meaning its assets.
- [121]
[121] The second reason returns to whether there was a duty to disclose the Material Facts as facts indicating an arguable agreement to sell to Mr Lew, considered in relation to Representation 1. I have concluded that there was not. Where the arguable agreement is the encumbrance in question, it follows that there was not a duty to disclose the encumbrance lest Mr Larpin be misled into thinking that he could acquire the Villa free from any encumbrance.
- [122]
[122] For both reasons, by non-disclosure of the Material Facts the defendants did not represent that the Villa could be acquired free from any encumbrance.
Was there dishonest intention?
- [124]
[124] I bear in mind the plaintiffs’ submission, made in relation to the conversation on 15 November 2017 (see [171] below) but also applicable to earlier times, that the Nargolwalas did not disclose their dealings with Mr Lew because it would have revealed to Mr Larpin that they had been prepared to accept a significantly lower price for the Villa than Mr Larpin had offered. The submission was made without the benefit of putting to the Nargolwalas that that was in their minds. It is perhaps a curious submission; underlying it appears to be that a seller should tell a prospective purchaser that the prospective purchaser is paying too much, because the seller would be prepared to take less. It is a submission leading nowhere, because not wanting to disclose preparedness to accept a lower price does not translate to not wanting to disclose the dealings with Mr Lew with the dishonest intention of misleading Mr Larpin into thinking that there was no arguable agreement to sell to Mr Lew. The submission does not alter my conclusion.
Conclusion as to representations of fact
- [125]
[125] Neither Representation 1 nor Representation 2, in the case of Representation 2 as pleaded or as a representation that the Villa could be acquired free from any encumbrance, was made as an actionable representation; including, if it be necessary, that the non-disclosure of the Material Facts was not with dishonest intent.
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