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Grounds publishedDecided 22 Apr 2024

Singapore International Commercial Court

Navayo International AG and another v Ministry of Defence, Government of Indonesia

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[2024] SGHC(I) 10Case no. Originating Summons No 2 of 2023 (Summonses Nos 11, 589, 606 and 607 of 2023)

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  1. [1] The plaintiffs, Navayo International A.G. (“Navayo”) and MEHIB – Hungarian Export Credit Insurance Pte Ltd (“MEHIB”), are respectively a company incorporated under the laws of Liechtenstein in the business of creating end-to-end secured communication systems, and a Hungarian state-owned entity incorporated under the laws of Hungary carrying on business as an export credit insurance provider (together, the “Plaintiffs”). The Chief Executive Officer of Navayo is Mr Gabor Kuti (“Kuti”).

  2. [4] On 20 April 2023, the proceedings were transferred in their entirety to the Singapore International Commercial Court (the “SICC”) and re-assigned the case number SIC/OS 2/2023 (“OS 2”). The MOD subsequently filed a fourth application in SIC/SUM 11/2023 (“SUM 11”) on 9 May 2023 seeking a retrospective extension of time to make its application in SUM 589.

  3. [6] By agreement of the parties, we first heard on 11 and 12 September 2023 the applications for (a) an extension of time to file SUM 589 (ie, SUM 11); (b) leave to file further affidavits (ie, SUM 606); and (c) sealing and redaction orders (ie, SUM 607); with (d) the substantive hearing of SUM 589 held over to a later date, depending on whether the extension of time was granted. This judgment sets out our determination of those preliminary questions.

  4. The facts

  5. The background to the parties’ dispute

  6. The SatKomHan Programme

  7. [8] On or around 7 January 2015, the Indonesian Ministry of Communications and Information was notified that the “Garuda 1” – which was an Indonesian satellite that provided communications services to Asia – had deorbited from its GSO 123 East Longitude orbital slot (the “Orbital Slot”). This information was conveyed to the MOD on 26 June 2015.

  8. [9] The MOD was tasked with “ensuring that Indonesia’s rights on the [Orbital Slot], and its associated L-band spectrum, were secured”. In that connection, the Government of Indonesia (through the MOD) instituted a new policy to “develop and operate communication satellites as well as ground facilities” called the “SatKomHan Programme”. The SatKomHan Programme – which was led by the MOD – was aimed at establishing a “Mobile Satellite Service” that was intended to “provide (a) military communications, and (b) telecommunications in rural and frontier areas of Indonesia”.

  9. [10] The MOD had little experience in the satellite sphere, and so it appointed “experts” to support the MOD in the implementation of the programme. These experts were:

  10. (a) Thomas van der Heyden (“Thomas”). Thomas is variously described as a “satellite” consultant, Director, and the Chief Technology Officer of PT Dini Nusa Kusama (“PT DNK”), which is an Indonesian private company in the business of providing satellite communications;

  11. (b) Surya Cipta Witoelar (“Surya”). Surya was then the President Director of PT DNK; and

  12. (c) Kanaka Hidayat (“Kanaka”), who was a representative from another Indonesian company known as PT Len Industri (Persero) (“PT Len Industri”).

  13. [11] PT DNK informed the MOD that it was necessary that Indonesia have a legitimate satellite contract (to fill the Orbital Slot) in place prior to a meeting of L-band spectrum satellite operators in December 2015, lest it risk losing the Orbital Slot and the corresponding L-band spectrum rights. On 20 May 2015, a presentation was given by Thomas and Surya to Rear Admiral Agus Purwoto (“Agus”), the then-Director General of the Defence Forces of the MOD; other MOD officials, who are unidentified in the evidence; and a Lieutenant Colonel Jon Keneddy Ginting (“Ginting”), of whom more will be said later. After this presentation and following a tender process, a contract dated 1 December 2015 (the “SatKomHan Contract”) was executed between the MOD – represented by Rear Admiral Leonardi, the then-Head of the Defence Facilities Agency within the MOD (“Leonardi”) – and Airbus Defence and Space SAS (“Airbus”), a French aerospace vendor, to procure a new L-band mobile capable GEO satellite for operation at Indonesia’s assigned orbital position. The expected launch of the satellite was estimated to be in the fourth quarter of 2019.

  14. [12] While expressed to be intended as a binding contract, the SatKomHan Contract also said that it was to be superseded by a “Detailed Contract” containing complete and detailed contractual terms and conditions together with annexes, to be “constructed and agreed based on the Contract” and “planned to be signed on March 2016 [sic] subject to budget availability”. It is however not clear what happened in that respect; so far as appears from the available evidence before us, the detailed contract never eventuated.

  15. [13] Given that the satellite was expected to be launched only in late-2019, Indonesia was without a presently operating satellite station at its assigned Orbital Slot. To fill this gap, a leasing agreement was signed on 6 December 2015 with Avanti Communications Ltd (“Avanti”), a satellite operator based in the United Kingdom, for the use of Avanti’s Artemis satellite (which was expected to be in orbit by 2016) (the “Artemis Lease”). Looking ahead for the moment, the Artemis satellite was moved to the Orbital Slot in November 2016, and substantial lease payments were made to Avanti.

  16. The Navayo Agreement

  17. [14] According to the evidence, the SatKomHan Contract comprised four elements – the Space Segment; the Ground Segment; the User Segment; and the Support Segment. While it was originally intended that Airbus would enter into subcontracts with vendors for the supply of equipment and services for the SatKomHan Contract, the MOD eventually decided to enter into direct contracts with vendors (including contracts for the User Segment).

  18. [15] The User Segment “comprised end-user terminals (such as mobile phones) which would receive the signals and data from the satellite, and the programmes associated with the operation of such terminals”. The vendor with which the MOD contracted was Navayo. There were executed:

  19. (a) An “Agreement for the Provision of User Terminals and Related Services and Equipment” between Navayo and “Government of Indonesia / Ministry of Defence” dated 1 July 2016, expressed to be “[f]or incorporation into the SatKomHan Satellite System Agreement dated December 1, 2015” (the “Original Agreement”); and

  20. (b) An amendment to the Original Agreement dated 15 September 2016 (the “Amendment Agreement”).

  21. We will refer to both agreements jointly as the “Navayo Agreement”. Both agreements were in fact signed by the MOD on 12 October 2016, and backdated to their respective dates.

  22. [16] Under the Original Agreement, Navayo contracted to:

  23. The contract price was US$34,194,300.00. The “Deliverables” referred to were:

  24. [17] In summary:

  25. (a) Schedule 1 was a Statement of Work, set out in eleven items;

  26. (b) Schedule 2 was an itemised breakdown of the price and a payments programme;

  27. (c) Schedule 3 contained a scheme for the timing of the Deliverables against particular payment amounts, with what were referred to in the agreement as “Milestones” and a pro forma “Certificate of Conformity” by which Navayo would certify that “the Milestone(s) set forth in the attached invoice have been duly met and that the Work has been performed in accordance with the Contract terms”. The Certificate of Conformity provided for signature by Navayo’s authorised signatory, but there was no provision for signature on behalf of the MOD as some kind of acceptance or acknowledgement of the work performed by Navayo; and

  28. (d) Schedule 4 was a pro forma invoice.

  29. Annex A, which was titled the “Detailed Specification”, followed these Schedules.

  30. [18] The body of the Original Agreement provided, among other things, that:

  31. (a) Navayo should deliver the Deliverables to the MOD’s designated facility and notify the MOD of “the total achievement of each milestone or phase of work … including completion of any Deliverable, together with the documentation including results of acceptance testing specified in Annex A (Statement of Work)”;

  32. (b) Within ten days of performance or delivery, the MOD was to “conduct such inspections and testing as it determines to be appropriate” and either accept the Deliverables or require that deficiencies be remedied; and

  33. (c) Navayo was to provide pro forma invoices, and then to invoice the MOD four times per year in the form of the Schedule 4 invoice. The MOD would then pay within 30 days of the date of the invoice.

  34. The Certificate of Conformity in Schedule 3 was not specifically referred to in the agreement, but inferentially was to accompany the invoicing when a Milestone was achieved.

  35. [19] The Original Agreement named persons to whom any notice required to be given under the agreement “or in connection with the matters contemplated by it” should be given. The persons on the MOD side were:

  36. [20] On the Navayo side, the persons were:

  37. (a) Kuti;

  38. (b) One Dr Zoltan Karparti, Navayo’s Chief Operating Officer; and

  39. (c) One Mr Peter Sooki.

  40. [21] The Amendment Agreement changed the contract price to US$29,900,000.00 and slightly altered the invoicing arrangement. More significantly, it replaced:

  41. The statement of work now had eight items. The Schedule 2 breakdown and payments programme and the Schedule 3 milestones reflected the new items and contract price. Schedule 3 also recorded, amongst other things, that Navayo had already “completed considerable terminal development and specifications work”. The change in the Schedule 4 invoice appears to have been in the wire transfer information.

  42. The invoices by Navayo for work done

  43. [22] As indicated in the amended Schedule 3, Navayo had begun work before the actual signing of the Navayo Agreement. In the period from 2 November 2016 to 30 June 2017, Navayo submitted four invoices to the MOD. Each was in the form of the Schedule 4 pro forma invoice.

  44. [23] The first, an invoice bearing serial number 0048-08-2016 and dated 2 November 2016 (“Invoice 1”), was for a total of US$5,800,000.00. It stated that it was for “Milestone 1 (work completed in 2016)”, and detailed the work as including the completion of “line items” in the Statement of Work Deliverables item numbers 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6. For example, the first amount was for “Completion of Statement of Work (SoW) Deliverable No. 1 – SatSleeve Development / Line item 1 – “Requirement specification””, in the sum of US$2,000,000.00, which appears to be the line item “Requirement Specification” under the (new) Schedule 3 item number 1 “SatSleeve Development”, with a box indicating the timing of a payment amount of US$2,000,000.00 in mid-2016. In the space for Notes in the pro forma invoice, it was said that the amounts were chargeable to the “Airbus Satellite Program under [the SatKomHan Contract]”, and:

  45. [24] It appears that the invoice was first sent to the MOD with a letter dated 18 October 2017, accompanied by a Certificate of Conformity dated 18 October 2017; after some discussion as to its form, it was replaced by a corrected invoice.

  46. [25] In relation to Invoice 1, Navayo obtained from the MOD a document entitled “Certificate of Performance”. As a number of such certificates were issued, we will refer to each as a “COP”, collectively as “COPs” or the “COPs”, and this particular COP as “COP 1”. At its head it bore an MOD logo and a reference to the Airbus contract and the “SatKomHan Contract Office”, followed by the title “CERTIFICATE OF PERFORMANCE FOR NAVAYO INTERNATIONAL AG’S 1ST MILESTONE DATED SEPTEMBER 15, 2016”. It then read:

  47. [26] The document was signed by Ginting as “SatKomHan Program Office Authorized Signatory”.

  48. [27] Navayo submitted three further invoices:

  49. (a) An invoice bearing serial number 0050-01-2017 and dated 6 January 2017 (“Invoice 2”) was for another US$5,800,000.00, upon reaching Milestone 2 by completion of line items in the Statement of Work Deliverables items 3, 4 and 5.

  50. (b) An invoice bearing serial number 0051-03-2017 and dated 10 March 2017 (“Invoice 3”) was for US$2,300,000.00, upon reaching Milestone 3 by completion of line items in the Statement of Work Deliverables items 1, 2 and 6.

  51. (c) An invoice bearing serial number 0052-06-2017 and dated 30 June 2017 (“Invoice 4”) was for US$2,100,000.00, upon reaching Milestone 4 by completion of line items in the Statement of Work Deliverables items 2, 5 and 6.

  52. All had the same note as the note in Invoice 1 (see [23] above). It was noted in the Award that all four invoices were accompanied by a Certificate of Conformity.

  53. [28] In relation to each of these invoices, there was again obtained from the MOD a COP, in the terms set out above but referring to the relevant Milestone and invoice. The COPs relating to Invoice 2 (“COP 2”) and Invoice 3 (“COP 3”) were dated “January 2017” and “March 2017” respectively (without specifying the date). However, the evidence is that COP 2 and COP 3 were in fact both signed sometime in April 2017 by Colonel Masri Adenan (“Masri”) as the “SatKomHan Program Office Authorized Signatory”. The COP referring to Invoice 4 (“COP 4”) was dated 31 July 2017 and signed by Ginting in the same capacity.

  54. [29] As will be seen from the Award (which we discuss below), the COPs were instrumental to the Plaintiffs obtaining the Award in their favour, but on the MOD’s case in these proceedings they were part of the fraud that tainted the Arbitration and the Award. We will return later to consider in greater detail the circumstances in which the COPs were obtained.

  55. The Navayo Agreement is terminated

  56. [31] None of the invoices was paid. There was correspondence and a number of meetings concerning payment, but these did not result in payment. The Award noted that by a letter dated 28 May 2018, Navayo terminated the Navayo Agreement due to non-payment of the invoiced sums.

  57. The SatKomHan Programme is terminated

  58. [32] The evidence on the termination of the SatKomHan Programme was sparse. It was said that “it subsequently transpired that [the] Indonesian government did not in fact have in place the necessary budget for the SatKomHan Program (including the Artemis Lease)”, and that “[t]his consequently led to [the] termination of the entire SatKomHan program on 15 October 2018.”

  59. The arbitral proceedings

  60. [33] The Navayo Agreement provided for a dispute resolution procedure, culminating in arbitration administered by the International Chamber of Commerce and in accordance with its Rules. The place of arbitration was to be Singapore.

  61. [35] In due course the Tribunal was constituted, comprising Mr Ciccu Mukhopadhaya as President, Ms (then Professor) Lucy Reed, and Mr Nicholas Hough Stone. The procedural history was complex, but it is sufficient for our purposes to note that there were pre-hearing written submissions by the parties, an evidentiary hearing on 18 and 19 September 2020, followed by written closing submissions. The Award was issued on 22 April 2021.

  62. [36] The Plaintiffs were represented in the Arbitration by Drew & Napier LLC, and also by Viktor Szoenyi Law Firm for Navayo. The MOD was represented by Schinder Law Firm, along with representatives from the Indonesian Attorney General’s Office, and also by Dr Herald Sippel of Sippel Law as lead counsel for the MOD’s legal team. In support of its case, Navayo relied on a witness statement of Kuti; the MOD did not call any witnesses, but according to the Award cross-examined Kuti extensively. We will say more concerning the MOD’s legal representation during (and its conduct of) the Arbitration later in this judgment.

  63. The Award

  64. [37] By Terms of Reference dated 29 August 2019, the parties framed nine issues for the Tribunal’s determination.

  65. Issue One

  66. [38] The first was, in brief, whether the reference to arbitration by the Plaintiffs had been premature because the pre-arbitration dispute resolution procedures had not been satisfied. After an extensive discussion, it was held that they had been satisfied.

  67. Issue Two

  68. [39] The second was whether MEHIB was “a valid claimant”, and it was held that it was.

  69. Issue Three

  70. [40] The third was whether the Navayo Agreement had been validly terminated by Navayo, and it was held that it had been.

  71. Issue Four

  72. [41] The fourth was whether the MOD had been excused from performance by any reasons beyond its control: the Tribunal noted that it appeared that the contentions in the Statement of Defence in that regard had not been pursued, but nonetheless considered the issue and rejected the MOD’s position.

  73. Issue Five

  74. [42] The fifth was whether the MOD had been entitled to suspend Navayo’s work under the Navayo Agreement, and had valid cause to do so: again, the Tribunal noted that this defence had not been pursued, but considered it nevertheless. It held that the MOD did not have a right to suspend the work but had effectively done so with financial consequences.

  75. Issues Six and Seven

  76. [43] The Tribunal jointly considered the sixth and seventh issues, which related to the claims for the amounts in Invoices 1 to 5. As to Invoices 1 to 4, the Tribunal began its analysis and its decision was as follows:

  77. [44] The Tribunal then referred in more detail to Invoices 1 and 2. The Tribunal’s reasoning may be summarised as follows:

  78. (a) Navayo had provided the invoices and Certificates of Conformity.

  79. (b) The MOD “has not contended nor placed on record any document notifying of any deficiencies in the Deliverables in Milestone 1”, nor did the MOD “lead any oral evidence to assert any such deficiencies”.

  80. (c) The COPs had been issued, by which the MOD “accepted and admitted the liability to pay” the invoices; and other correspondence showed the same.

  81. (d) Among the correspondence referred to was an email of 25 December 2016 from Thomas “to GoI/MoD officials in the SatKomHan program” (copied to Kuti and others) which “makes it clear that [Thomas] … found the Milestone 2 Deliverables to be in compliance with the requirements of the Agreement. At this stage, there was no dispute as to the payment obligations of the Respondent.”

  82. (e) There was a further email of 18 January 2017 from Thomas in reply to an enquiry from MEHIB on the same day regarding payment. In his reply, Thomas said that the MOD was arranging for payment and noting that he was copying his reply to Major General Bambang Hartawan (“Hartawan”) (the Director General of the Ministry of Defence responsible for the programme) and Leonardi (who was described as “the head of all Ministry procurements”) as they were “personally involved on a daily basis in taking care of this problem”. The Tribunal noted that Thomas’ email was copied to “[t]he responsible GoI/MoD officials”, and no “concerns or dispute as to [the MOD’s] responsibility to pay Invoice No. 2 [were] mentioned”.

  83. (f) Finally, the Tribunal also referred to an internal letter from Hartawan to the Minister of Defence dated 20 January 2017, requesting payment of the various overdue invoices, including Invoice 1.

  84. [45] For Invoice 3, the Tribunal referred to (a) the submission of the invoice and a Certificate of Conformity on 10 March 2017; (b) Thomas’s acknowledgement of receipt with the note that “you guys at Navayo are doing a super job”; and (c) a letter from Leonardi to Kuti concerning the outstanding invoices “with copies to several MoD officials” which “again acknowledged liability to pay for Invoices Nos. 1 to 3 and expressed regret for the payment delays”. The terms of the letter were set out, and included, “[a]s you know we have provided you signed acknowledgements on each of the three invoices when you were in Jakarta with us last week”, an apparent reference to the COPs. The Tribunal did not otherwise refer to COP 3.

  85. [46] As for Invoice 4, the Tribunal referred to the invoice; the accompanying Certificate of Conformity; a letter to Hartawan requesting a clear commitment to pay all invoices; and COP 4. Although under a separate heading, the Tribunal then referred to correspondence and meetings concerning payment of all invoices, with the conclusion that with regard to all the invoices, there was no denial of liability, but rather an acknowledgement of liability to pay them. The correspondence from the MOD was:

  86. [47] Thus, in relation to Invoices 1 to 4, the Tribunal’s conclusions were as follows:

  87. [48] The Tribunal then referred to and addressed certain points regarding an “Advance Payment Bond” and a “Performance Bond” to be procured by Navayo. The conclusion was that the claimants were “entitled to full payment of Invoices Nos. 1 to 4.”

  88. [49] Finally, with regard to Invoice 5, the Tribunal considered and rejected the claim for the invoiced amount for lack of proof of entitlement to payment of the amounts claimed in the invoice. For the present proceedings, no more need be said of that claim.

  89. Issues Eight and Nine

  90. The Plaintiffs’ action to enforce the Award

  91. [51] Following receipt of the Award in their favour, the Plaintiffs sent letters of demand for payment of the sums due under the Award, but there was no response from the MOD.

  92. [52] As a result, the Plaintiffs brought proceedings in Indonesia to enforce the Award. On 30 December 2021, the Central Jakarta District Court issued an exequatur award (the “Exequatur Award”) declaring that the Award could be enforced in Indonesia. On 31 January 2022, the MOD filed a challenge against the Exequatur Award (the “Challenge”). We say more about the Challenge later on in this judgment. The Central Jakarta District Court has held a number of hearings in the proceedings, but the evidence does not show the outcome of the Challenge.

  93. The MOD’s applications

  94. SUM 589: The MOD’s application to set aside the enforcement order

  95. [57] SUM 589 was filed at around midnight on 6 March 2023 (or the morning of 7 March 2023). The exact timing is significant, and we will go to it in more detail later.

  96. [58] The supporting affidavits initially filed by the MOD in support of SUM 589 were:

  97. [59] The Plaintiffs, for their part, responded by way of an affidavit by Kuti filed on 20 April 2023.

  98. [60] Between 9 May 2023 and 11 May 2023, the MOD filed the following affidavits in further reply:

  99. [61] The MOD sought subsequently to rely on the following further affidavits (the “Further Affidavits”) in support of SUM 589, all of which were dated 27 June 2023:

  100. Leave to file and rely on the Further Affidavits was the subject matter of SUM 606.

  101. SUM 606: The MOD’s application for leave to file further affidavits and grounds in support of its setting-aside application

  102. [63] SUM 606 was supported by Kiki’s 2nd Affidavit dated 6 March 2023. Further evidence in respect of SUM 606 was given in Kiki’s 3rd Affidavit and Idris’ 2nd Affidavit (both dated 9 May 2023).

  103. [64] Whether the MOD was entitled to file and rely on the Further Affidavits is also a matter that we will return to at [237]–[241] below.

  104. SUM 607: The MOD’s application for sealing, redaction, and confidentiality orders

  105. [65] By SUM 607 filed on 6 March 2023, the MOD applied for orders that the proceedings herein be heard otherwise than in open court, and for sealing and redaction orders. SUM 607 was supported by Idris’ 1st Affidavit dated 6 March 2023.

  106. SUM 11: The MOD’s application for a retrospective extension of time to file SUM 589

  107. [67] The following affidavits were filed by the MOD in support of SUM 11:

  108. SUM 589 was filed out of time

  109. The preliminary issue of whether the court should have regard to the MOD’s further affidavits

  110. [68] As earlier noted, we had regard, de bene esse, to the Further Affidavits (enumerated at [61] above) which the MOD purported to file in support of SUM 589 (and in respect of which leave to file was sought in SUM 606). In our view, reference to those affidavits was necessary for the fair disposal of the MOD’s application for an extension of time in SUM 11.

  111. [69] Following the transfer of the proceedings to the SICC, a case management conference (the “CMC”) was held on 11 May 2023. The parties’ proposal for a preliminary hearing on questions other than the substantive merits of SUM 589 was debated. It was pointed out that whether there was an arguable case of fraud was material to whether the MOD should be granted the extension of time to file its setting-aside application, so that a decision in SUM 606 would affect the material on which the MOD could rely in both SUM 11 and SUM 589:

  112. [70] Later on in the CMC, it was pointed out that the 16 weeks permitted for the filing of the Further Affidavits would expire on 27 June 2023, prior to the anticipated date for the preliminary hearing. It was agreed that the affidavits should be filed but sealed without access granted to any other party or the court unless SUM 606 was allowed.

  113. [71] At the hearing on 11 and 12 September 2023, there was substantial disagreement over whether the application for an extension of time was to be decided on the basis that, for that limited purpose, the MOD had an arguable case of fraud. On behalf of the MOD, it was said (with some justification) that that had been established (or agreed by Navayo’s counsel) at the CMC, and that the MOD’s written submissions reflected its belief that it had demonstrated an arguable case of fraud, although also to some extent entering upon the merits of its case.

  114. [72] On behalf of the Plaintiffs, however, reliance was placed on the reference by their counsel, Mr Yong, to SUM 607 (which was the MOD’s application for sealing and redaction orders) and not SUM 11 (which was the application for an extension of time) (see [69] above). The Plaintiffs’ position was that the strength of the MOD’s case, as a factor in whether an extension of time should be granted, remained at large.

  115. [73] Submissions were received on the materials as they then stood. The Further Affidavits had by then been filed. In our view, the better course in the circumstances was to have regard to them de bene esse in our deliberations, and the parties were so informed by way of a letter from the court dated 2 October 2023. The Further Affidavits were unsealed, and we received further written submissions, the last on 7 November 2023, on whether, in light of the Further Affidavits, the MOD had demonstrated a prima facie or arguable case of fraud and/or corruption.

  116. The MOD’s submissions

  117. [75] That SUM 589 was filed within time was, however, contradicted by Kiki and Idris, both of whom said that SUM 589 was filed at 12.06am on 7 March 2023 and that the MOD therefore sought a short extension of time to regularise the filing. It was also contradicted later in the MOD’s written submissions when it was accepted that SUM 589 “was filed at 12.06 am on 7 March 2023”. In oral submissions, after an initial assertion that SUM 589 was filed within time, counsel for the MOD, Mr Francis Xavier SC, rather equivocally submitted that “even on [his] submission that SUM 589 was filed on time, [the MOD] would require an extension of time to cover the six minutes”. There, it was effectively left.

  118. The times of service in contention

  119. [77] Section 14 SIA relevantly provides that:

  120. [78] Section 16 (1) SIA explains that:

  121. Service of the Enforcement Order and the filing of SUM 589

  122. [83] On 14 February 2023, the Registry advised the Plaintiffs that:

  123. [84] There was no more direct evidence of the delivery of the documents to the Indonesian MFA, including whether the Singapore MFA in turn drew the Indonesian MFA’s attention to s 14 SIA. So far as appears, the acknowledgement of receipt by the Indonesian MFA was not otherwise received by the Registry.

  124. [85] Other than the reference to the documents having been conveyed to the Supreme Court of Indonesia, little is known of their actual handling within Indonesia until they were received by the MOD. They may have been handled in the manner described by Bayu (which we discuss at [131]–[132] below) but in the absence of more concrete evidence, such a conclusion would be purely conjectural. However they were handled within Indonesia, it took some seven months from their conveyance to the Supreme Court of Indonesia until their receipt by the MOD itself.

  125. [86] The little that is known is drawn from Idris’ third affidavit. Idris is a First Marshal of the Indonesian Air Force and the Chief of the Legal Bureau of the MOD. It was his evidence that:

  126. (a) SUM 607 and its supporting affidavit were filed first, with the necessary steps for filing being completed by 11.55pm. Confirmation of filing was issued at 11.58pm.

  127. (b) SUM 606 and its affidavits were filed next, with the necessary steps for filing being completed by around 11.56pm. Confirmation of filing was issued at 12.02am on 7 March 2023.

  128. (c) SUM 589 and its affidavits were the last to be filed, with the necessary steps for filing being completed by 11.59pm. However, the uploading process took some time because there were two different affidavits with voluminous exhibits. Confirmation of filing was only issued at 12.06am on 7 March 2023.

  129. [89] There was no explanation in the evidence of why the filing of the summonses was left to so late.

  130. SUM 589 would have been filed out of time even on the assumption that service out was effected on 19 December 2022

  131. [90] Although the MOD accepted in its written submissions that SUM 589 was filed at 12.06am on 7 March 2023, it was said that the necessary documents had been uploaded on 6 March 2023 and the minor delay of six minutes was due to the processing time of the system. If this was a submission that SUM 589 had in fact been filed on 6 March 2023 because Johnny had taken all the necessary steps he needed to before the stroke of midnight, counsel did not make this argument in oral submissions.

  132. [91] From ordinary experience, uploading SUM 589 and its affidavits would not be instantaneous – as Johnny said, it took some time. The process of uploading could be interrupted by a problem with the documents or a computer problem, and as a matter of common sense the filing cannot be regarded as completed until the uploading process has been successfully completed.

  133. [92] The waters were muddied, however, by the Plaintiffs’ reference to O 63A r 10(1)(a) of the ROC 2014 in support of their contention that SUM 589 was only filed on 7 March 2023. They argued that the provision states that a document is deemed to have been filed on the date and time that it was received in the computer system of the electronic filing service provider. We understood that submission to be that an application is only filed at the time uploading is complete. But the rule does not say that. O 63A r 10(1)(a) of the ROC 2014 provides that:

  134. [93] However, even if it could be said that the first part of the transmission of SUM 589 and its affidavits was received in the computer system prior to midnight on 6 March 2023, that does not avail the MOD. There were three documents – SUM 589 and the affidavits of Kiki and Dedy. It has not been shown that the first part of SUM 589, out of the three documents, was received in the computer system before midnight.

  135. [95] It follows that even on the assumption that service was effected on 19 December 2022, the filing of SUM 589 was out of time – perhaps by only a few minutes, but out of time nonetheless. The MOD was accordingly exposed to the need for an extension of time to file SUM 589. It may be said that the delay was only by a few minutes, and that the Plaintiffs could not have been prejudiced by the summons being filed a few minutes after midnight rather than a few minutes before midnight. However, the default in filing cannot be so easily pardoned without an explanation of why the filing was left to almost literally the very last minute, or why Johnny was instructed at about 11.00pm to “hold back on the filing of the summonses for the time being”.

  136. SUM 589 was filed out of time because service on the MOD was effected on 26 April 2022

  137. [96] In Humpuss Sea Transport Pte Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) v PT Humpuss Intermodal Transportasi TBK and another [2015] 4 SLR 625 (“Humpuss”), the issue before the court was the validity of personal service of a writ of summons in Indonesia. In holding the service valid, Steven Chong J (as he then was) restated the law on service out of jurisdiction. The starting point was that the court’s jurisdiction over foreign defendants was conferred by statute, and that service in accordance with the Rules (specifically the then O 11) was a condition precedent to the exercise of that jurisdiction (at [100]). It flowed from this (at [101]):

  138. Chong J went on to say that “[a]s a corollary of the fact that the validity of service is a matter for the lex fori, the provisions of foreign law are relevant only insofar as our laws make compliance with foreign law relevant” (at [103]).

  139. [97] In Pacific Assets Management Ltd v Chen Lip Keong [2006] 1 SLR(R) 658 (“Pacific Assets”), to which Chong J referred in Humpuss, it was said succinctly that “[t]his court as the lex fori follows its own rules of evidence and procedure, and not those of the foreign country” (at [14]).

  140. [98] In the present case, the court’s jurisdiction over a foreign State is conferred by s 11 SIA and service on the State is governed specifically by s 14 SIA. Section 14 SIA provides in mandatory terms that the writ or other document required to be served for instituting proceedings against a State must be served by being transmitted between the respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs. It is then said that service is deemed to have been effected when the writ or document is received at the State’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

  141. Whether service had to comply with Indonesian law

  142. [101] We begin by addressing the first step in Mr Xavier’s submission. There were three strands to this submission.

  143. [102] The overarching strand was that international comity was to be considered in the interpretation of Singapore’s statutes, and this called for service of court papers on a foreign State to be performed in a manner compatible with the laws and regulations of that State. The MOD referred to:

  144. (a) Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Interpretation (LexisNexis, Eighth Ed, 2020) (at para 6.1);

  145. (b) Two Singapore decisions, namely, Burswood Nominees Ltd (formerly Burswood Nominees Pty Ltd) v Liao Eng Kiat [2004] 2 SLR(R) 436 (at [30]) and Q & M Enterprises Sdn Bhd v Poh Kiat [2005] 4 SLR(R) 494 (at [25] and [66]); and

  146. (c) Decisions from Canada, Hong Kong, and Australia, and in particular on the decision of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in General Dynamics United Kingdom Ltd v State of Libya [2022] AC 318 (“General Dynamics”).

  147. [103] In General Dynamics, in deciding that proceedings to enforce an arbitral award under the New York Convention fell within the scope of the equivalent to s 14(1) SIA, the majority said that the question “is to be decided having regard to the ordinary meaning of the statutory provision, its purpose, and its legal context, including considerations of international law and comity” (at [39]).

  148. [104] The second strand of Mr Xavier’s submission rested on the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (the “VCCR”), articles of which are given the force of law in Singapore by s 4(1) of the Diplomatic and Consular Relations Act 2005 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “DCRA”). The argument went as follows:

  149. (a) Article 5(j) VCCR states as one of the “consular functions”:

  150. (b) The Singapore MFA is “bound by the VCCR” because “the Diplomatic and Consular Corps, carriage of the DCRA, and all Overseas Singapore Missions are the responsibility of the Minister of Foreign Affairs” pursuant to the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Ministerial Responsibility) Notification 2020.

  151. (c) The VCCR also has the force of law in Indonesia pursuant to the Law of the Republic of Indonesia No 1 of 1982.

  152. [105] The MOD buttressed the VCCR argument by the international comity strand, submitting that giving effect to the operation of the VCCR (and in any event effecting service in a manner compatible with Indonesia’s laws and regulations) was required by considerations of international comity. The MOD referred in this regard to the Hague Convention of 15 November 2015 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (to which Singapore acceded in 2023), Article 5 of which provides that service should be by a method prescribed by the country of service’s internal law, or a method requested by the applicant “unless such a method is incompatible with the law of the State addressed”.

  153. [107] Cut down to its essence, there were really two arguments being made: one resting on the VCCR as the relevant Singapore law (other than s 14 SIA) by which the validity of the service on the MOD was to be determined; and the other being an interpretation of s 14 SIA as the relevant Singapore law by which the validity of the service was to be determined. In both cases, the MOD argued that the deeming of service upon receipt at the foreign State’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (pursuant to s 14(1) SIA) is at odds with international comity.

  154. [108] As a starting point, we do not agree that the provision for service on a foreign State as set out in s 14 SIA – including the provision for deemed service – derogates from international comity. The purpose of the provision should first be appreciated.

  155. [109] In Josias Van Zyl, Kannan Ramesh J (as he then was) said (at [36]):

  156. [110] Ramesh J referred again to “the underlying purpose” of s 14 later on in his judgment (at [45]):

  157. [111] This passage was taken up in CNX, where it was described as noting that States require more time to react to proceedings (at [30]). Although spoken in relation to enforcement proceedings, the observation applies generally.

  158. [112] The preamble to the European Convention on State Immunity (the “ECSI”), which Ramesh J referred to in Josias Van Zyl (see [109] above), expresses the member States’ desire “to establish in their mutual relations common rules relating to the scope of the immunity of one State from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State”, and was “designed to ensure compliance with judgments given against another State”. Article 16 of the ECSI provides:

  159. [113] In Josias Van Zyl, Ramesh J also referred to the Explanatory Report to the ECSI (the “Explanatory Report”) (see [109] above). It was stated in the Explanatory Report (at para 64) that:

  160. [114] The import of Article 16 was enacted in the United Kingdom, as a ratifying member state of the ECSI, in s 12 of the State Immunity Act 1978 (c 33) (UK) (the “UK SIA”) and adopted in Singapore in s 14 SIA. It is designed to foster – rather than conflict with – harmonious international relations. This was recognised in General Dynamics, which the MOD referred to for the observation (at [39]) that considerations of international law and comity came into the interpretation of s 12 UK SIA. However, the MOD did not go far enough. The majority went on to say (at [43]) that:

  161. [115] In our view, s 14 SIA conforms to comity by providing certainty in how a foreign State is to be subject to proceedings brought in the forum State: there is to be service of the document on the foreign State by transmission to its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the State has two months during which the Ministry – as a responsible organ of the government – can see to it that the document is sent to the appropriate person, department, or other body in the government so that the person/department/body can then respond to it. As the Explanatory Report notes (at para 64), the two-month period “should be sufficient to permit the Foreign Ministry to give notice to the competent authority in its own State, and for the necessary consultations to take place in that State”.

  162. [116] We turn then to the deeming mechanism in s 14(1) SIA. In our view, there is no occasion to treat it as merely raising a rebuttable presumption because of comity considerations. On the contrary, the deemed effective service on receipt of the document at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the foreign State (in association with the two months then allowed for the State to respond) provides certainty in the interests of both the serving party and the State. It respects the foreign State’s sovereignty and conduces to good international relations; at the same time, the serving party is not held hostage to the foreign State’s (perhaps idiosyncratic) rules on service. The foreign State is also relieved from the operation of the serving State’s ordinary rules of service, which may be inappropriate for the foreign State’s bureaucratic needs. If the deemed service were merely in the nature of a rebuttable presumption, there would be no certainty at all and much room for confusion and conflict.

  163. [118] That is not a correct view of the deeming mechanism in s 14(1) SIA. A deeming provision can also “simply state the effect or meaning which some matter or thing has” without any artificiality or fiction: we take these words from the learned discussion by Windeyer J in the High Court of Australia in Hunter Douglas Australia Pty Ltd v Permanent Blinds (1970) 122 CLR 49 (at 65–66). That is the case with s 14(1) SIA. It states the legal result (ie, that service is deemed effected, for the purposes of the Singapore courts’ exercise of jurisdiction) upon occurrence of a particular event (ie, receipt of a document at a foreign State’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs). In addition to there being no reason to treat the deeming as merely raising a rebuttable presumption for reasons of comity, there is, in our judgment, no room to displace the effect that the receipt of the document was intended to have in the particular circumstances listed in s 14(1) SIA – in short, the meaning and purpose of s 14(1) is clear. Nor do we think that it makes sense to say that the presumption is rebutted by the VCCR making the laws of the foreign state applicable. If it does, that is not rebuttal of a presumption – it is giving the VCCR an effect which trumps s 14(1) SIA. For the reasons that follow, we do not think that the VCCR has such an effect.

  164. [120] The MOD’s argument took Article 5(j) of the VCCR as establishing a mandatory method of service of foreign process that extends to service on a State (see [104] above). The Plaintiffs submitted that this was contrary to authority, referring to Cosmetic Care Asia Ltd and others v Sri Linarti Sasmito [2021] SGHC 157 (“Cosmetic Care”) and Regina (Sandiford) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2014] 1 WLR 2697 (“Sandiford”).

  165. [122] Sandiford was more complex. In considering the UK Government’s obligation to fund legal expenses for a British national in criminal proceedings in Indonesia, the UK Supreme Court considered Articles 5(i) and 5(m) of the VCCR. Article 5(i) is concerned with representing or arranging appropriate representation for nationals of the sending State before the tribunals and other authorities of the receiving State. Article 5(m) is a catch-all of other functions entrusted to a consular post. Referring to these functions, their Lordships noted it was common ground that the UK could use its diplomatic or consular agents to fund the defence in Indonesia of a United Kingdom citizen. Importantly, it was held that the VCCR “permits, but it is not suggested that it obliges, the exercise of any such functions” (at [24]–[25]).

  166. [124] First, even if Article 5(j) was applicable in this case – that is, a case involving service under s 14 SIA as distinct from service under the ROC 2014 – it would only require that the transmission of documents by the Singapore MFA to the Indonesian MFA be compatible with Indonesian law, because on the MOD’s own argument, that was the consular function being exercised. It was not suggested that there were any Indonesian laws specifically governing the conduct of such transmissions.

  167. [125] Second, Article 5(j) is not applicable in any event because the transmission of documents pursuant to s 14 SIA is not an exercise of a “consular function” within the meaning of Article 5(j) of the VCCR. The transmission of documents under s 14 SIA is its own procedure and may (or may not) be carried out with consular involvement. However, mere consular involvement in the performance of some act cannot suffice to make that act a “consular function” subject to the constraints of the VCCR.

  168. [126] Section 14(1) SIA requires that the document be transmitted from one Ministry (in the sending State) to another Ministry (in the receiving State). It does not say how that should be done, but on the MOD’s argument it would have to be done in the exercise of a consular function because the Singapore MFA performs consular functions. Again, on the MOD’s argument, it would mean that in every case of service of a writ or other document required to be served for instituting proceedings against a State, the service would have to be in a manner compatible with the laws and regulations of the receiving State. That cannot stand with the explicit and mandatory stipulation in s 14(1) SIA that service is deemed to have been effected when the writ or document is received at the Ministry to which it is transmitted. On the MOD’s argument, when the VCCR was given the force of law in Singapore by the DCRA in 2005, it effectively repealed the provision for service on a foreign State in s 14(1) SIA, and consequently the two months allowed by s 14(2) SIA. The time for the State’s response would be left to be found elsewhere in Singapore law.

  169. [127] That is not a result we can agree with. It may be that Article 5(j) does not address service of foreign process (as Cosmetic Care suggests), but it also does not address service of process on a foreign State (which is specifically governed by s 14 SIA). The form of transmission in s 14(1) SIA is prescribed by Singapore law, and its performance is completed upon receipt of the relevant documents by the receiving Ministry. The fact of the receiving Ministry’s receipt is all that is required to trigger the deeming effect of s 14(1) SIA. There is no question of compliance with an international agreement or compatibility with the laws and regulations of the receiving State.

  170. [128] We therefore do not accept the first step in the MOD’s submission (ie, that service according to Indonesian law was required). Service in accordance with Indonesian laws and regulations was not required.

  171. Whether service complied with Indonesian law

  172. [130] Bayu is a Senior Lecturer/Associate Professor in Law at the Faculty of Law of the Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung, Indonesia. His primary academic interest is in the field of private international law. He has published a textbook and a number of papers on the subject, as well as papers on other international contractual subjects. His advanced law degrees include a LL.M in International Trade Law and Private International Law from the University of Georgia in the United States of America, and a PhD in Law and Legal Science on Private International Law and International Commercial Law from Groningen University in the Netherlands. He has been teaching and researching at the Parahyangan Catholic University since 1979.

  173. [131] Bayu first addressed the process under Indonesian law for the service of foreign court documents on the MOD. He referred to the Plaintiff’s request to the court of “21 February 2022” (which we assume was a reference to SOD 9) and the Registry’s request dated 2 March 2022 that the Singapore MFA “effect service on the MOD at its address”. He said that:

  174. [132] Bayu added that the last-mentioned Memorandum of Understanding (the “MOU”) is “further regulated” by a Cooperation Agreement between the Indonesian MFA and the Indonesian Supreme Court (the “Cooperation Agreement”). According to Bayu, under the MOU and the Cooperation Agreement, the steps for the service of a foreign court document in Indonesia were as follows:

  175. (a) A request for court document delivery from a foreign country is conveyed to the Indonesian MFA through the diplomatic representation of the foreign country in Indonesia.

  176. (b) The Indonesian MFA conveys the request to the Indonesian Supreme Court for consideration.

  177. (c) The Indonesian Supreme Court conveys the request to the relevant District Court.

  178. (d) The District Court thereafter proceeds to serve on the addressed party and obtain a signed proof of receipt. The document has to be served by a court bailiff directly to the addressed party at their permanent or recorded address (as regulated under Article 390(1) of the Civil Procedural Law).

  179. (e) The signed proof of receipt is transmitted from the District Court to the Indonesian Supreme Court.

  180. (f) The Indonesian Supreme Court conveys the signed proof of receipt to the Indonesian MFA.

  181. (g) The Indonesian MFA sends the signed proof of receipt to the diplomatic representation of the foreign country.

  182. [133] Bayu’s evidence is that service of the foreign court document is considered effected upon completion of step (d) above, ie, when the court bailiff has served the document(s) on the addressed party at their permanent or recorded address. The “Civil Procedural Law” to which he referred is also known by its Dutch name “Het Herzeine Inlandsch Reglement” (the “HIR”). Article 390(1) of the HIR, according to Bayu’s translation, provides:

  183. [134] Bayu then considered whether the aforementioned process is mandatory. He concluded that it is, and that that mandatory process is the exclusive method for the service of foreign court documents. His reasoning may be summarised in the following way:

  184. (a) The MOU and the Cooperation Agreement are the only regulations in force in Indonesia regarding the service of foreign court documents. Before the MOU, there were no rules in place on the service of foreign court documents. This led the Indonesian Supreme Court and the Indonesian MFA to institute the MOU, the aim of which was to provide a single coherent set of rules to handle the service of documents containing foreign civil elements. The MOU “standardises both the service of domestic documents abroad, as well as the service of foreign legal documents in Indonesia”, and “is thus regarded as an exclusive reference for and binding upon all parties involved in the service of foreign process in Indonesia”.

  185. (b) This is borne out in the text of the MOU, specifically:

  186. (i) Recitals (b) and (c) therein, which state that the MOU was intended to fill the legal vacuum that existed in relation to the service of foreign court documents in Indonesia and as such, it was necessary to enter into it;

  187. (ii) Article 2(1), which states that the MOU serves as a coordination guideline for the handing of requests for judicial assistance in civil cases from the Indonesian court to the foreign court (and vice versa); and

  188. (iii) Article 2(2), which states that the intention underlying the MOU is to ensure the proper implementation of such judicial assistance.

  189. (c) The principle underlying the MOU and the Cooperation Agreement is the “receipt principle”, being that under Indonesian legal usages, effective receipt is only established the moment a document reaches the final addressee. This principle is accepted not only in matters concerning the formation of contracts, but also in matters relating to the proper service of judicial documents. Receipt provides the opportunity for the addressee to read and respond to the document in a manner consistent with due process and fair notice. It also allows for proof of delivery to be obtained. The concept of deemed service found in s 14(1) SIA does not exist under Indonesian law.

  190. [135] It was Bayu’s evidence that notwithstanding its denomination as a “Memorandum of Understanding”, the MOU and Cooperation Agreement “[reflect] the currently in force and practised Indonesian law for the service of foreign court document [sic]”, and that all parties involved in the service and delivery of documents within Indonesia – which, on his list, includes the Indonesian MFA – are bound to follow their steps and procedures prescribed thereunder.

  191. [136] Accordingly, in Bayu’s view, “the MOD is deemed to have been served when the Court Bailiff has delivered the documents physically to it” (that is, on 19 December 2022), and that the service on the Indonesian MFA could not be regarded as effective service on the MOD.

  192. [137] The Plaintiffs’ response to Bayu’s expert opinion was twofold. First, they argued that his opinion that the MOU and the Cooperation Agreement set out the mandatory and exclusive method for the service of foreign court documents in Indonesia should be rejected as they had been in Humpuss and Cosmetic Care (albeit in relation to an earlier version of the MOU). Secondly, the Plaintiffs submitted that nothing in the MOU (or any other document) states when service on an Indonesian defendant is to be regarded as completed, and that Bayu did not adequately support his opinion that service of a foreign court document is considered effected only when the court bailiff serves the same on the addressed party.

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