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Grounds publishedDecided 20 May 2024

Singapore International Commercial Court

Kiri Industries Ltd v Senda International Capital Ltd and another

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[2024] SGHC(I) 14Case no. Suit No 4 of 2017 (Summons No 24 of 2023)32 paragraphs

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  1. Introduction

  2. [2] We briefly detail the procedural history of this suit.

  3. [4] The valuation tranche of the proceedings was protracted, concluding on 3 March 2023 with our decision in Kiri Industries Ltd v Senda International Capital Ltd and another [2023] SGHC(I) 4 that Kiri’s shareholding was valued at US$603.8m as of 3 July 2018 (at [5]).

  4. [9] We now give the full grounds for our decision.

  5. The court’s jurisdiction to order different relief

  6. There is jurisdiction if the Buy-Out Order has become ineffective

  7. [13] The Federal Court rejected Stone World’s arguments, holding that it was well within the court’s inherent jurisdiction to make consequential orders to substitute relief, as long as this was to give effect to the court’s original judgment, as opposed to reopening, varying or altering it:

  8. The Buy-Out Order has become ineffective

  9. [16] On the one hand, Senda submitted that it simply could not afford the purchase price of US$603.8m for Kiri’s shares. It offered the following reasons:

  10. (b) Secondly, Senda was unable to raise required financing to purchase Kiri’s shares. Specifically:

  11. (i) Senda had approached five financial institutions to obtain a loan for the required amount, but only one, United Overseas Bank Ltd (“UOB”), offered a loan and that too for only US$100m. The offer was conditional upon a corporate guarantee from Senda’s parent company, Zhejiang Longsheng Group Co, Ltd (“Longsheng”), and a pledge over all the shares in DyStar.

  12. (ii) Senda had engaged SAC Capital Pte Ltd (“SAC Capital”), a firm in Singapore involved in investment banking, to advise on raising the sum of US$603.8m through means other than debt financing. SAC Capital’s preliminary assessment was that Senda would face difficulty in selling its 62.43% shareholding in DyStar to raise funding in view of the ongoing litigation between DyStar’s shareholders (ie, Senda and Kiri). At the very least, this would result in a material reduction in the sale price.

  13. The appropriate relief

  14. [20] Senda and DyStar submitted that Senda’s and Kiri’s shares in DyStar should be sold en bloc. Pertinently, their position was that the sale proceeds should be shared pro rata to their respective shareholdings.

  15. (a) DyStar would buy back 17.57% of Kiri’s 37.57% shareholding (valued at US$282.37m) within one month of the court’s determination of SUM 24.

  16. (b) Senda and/or DyStar would thereafter purchase the remaining 20% of Kiri’s shareholding (valued at US$321.43m) within four months of the court’s determination of SUM 24.

  17. [22] As stated earlier (see [5] above), Kiri did not in fact have an objection in principle to an en bloc sale as suggested by Senda and DyStar. What Kiri did object to was Senda’s proposal for the sale proceeds to be distributed pro rata rather than for Kiri to receive US$603.8m in priority to Senda. We address this issue below (see [52]–[61]).

  18. The scope of the court’s remedial powers for oppression

  19. [24] The starting point is s 216 of the Companies Act, which sets out the court’s remedial jurisdiction for oppression:

  20. [26] A case demonstrating the breadth of the court’s remedial jurisdiction beyond what is expressly listed in s 216(2) is Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd v Zenecon Pte Ltd and others and other appeals [1995] 2 SLR(R) 304, where the court made orders for the oppressing shareholder to pay compensation to the company, and for the controller of the oppressing shareholder to purchase assets owned by the company’s subsidiary (at [75]).

  21. [29] The English courts have considered the propriety of an en bloc sale in several cases.

  22. An en bloc sale was preferable

  23. [38] In short, an en bloc sale was, in our judgment, the best option for all parties. The parties were also broadly on the same page. Having established that this was the preferable option, what remained was for us to determine the terms of the sale, as to which the primary area of contention between the parties was who should have conduct of the en bloc sale, and then the issue of how the sale proceeds should be distributed. We also note the additional issue, unrelated to the terms of the sale, of whether Kiri is entitled to interest on the purchase price.

  24. Who was to have conduct of the en bloc sale

  25. [39] On the first issue of conduct of the en bloc sale, Senda argued that the court should appoint an independent investment bank or financial advisor for this purpose. On the other hand, Kiri submitted that a receiver should be appointed instead. Kiri argued, relying on Otello (at [321]), that such an appointment would be essential to ensure that the sale process would be conducted effectively and transparently.

  26. [40] Much of the dispute on this issue flowed from Kiri’s somewhat confusing position on the appointment of a receiver. Kiri had initially prayed for the appointment of a receiver and manager with broad-ranging powers to manage and control DyStar generally. As Senda rightly pointed out, it would not be appropriate to appoint a receiver and manager to run DyStar’s business and operations when the purpose of such an appointment was really to facilitate an en bloc sale of the shares in DyStar (or to procure a share buy-back, as Kiri initially sought). A receiver appointed for the purpose of facilitating and executing an en bloc sale of the shares ought not to have control and management over the business of DyStar. Mr Dhillon conceded as much at the hearing, clarifying that Kiri was only seeking a receiver for the limited purpose of executing the en bloc sale. In other words, what Kiri sought was a receiver only for the specific purpose of facilitating a sale of Kiri’s and Senda’s shares in DyStar.

  27. [41] The distinction between a receiver for this purpose as opposed to a receiver and manager over DyStar is a matter of fundamental difference for two reasons. First, the appointment is as regards different underlying assets – the company in one case and its shares in the other. Accordingly, a receiver appointed to effect the sale of DyStar’s shares has no relevance to DyStar’s business, and vice versa. Second, a receiver and manager is quite different from a receiver in terms of powers. The distinction is described in the following terms in Thomas Robinson & Peter Walton, Kerr & Hunter on Receivership and Administration (Sweet & Maxwell, 21st Ed, 2020) at paras 2–1, 2–2 and 2–9:

  28. [42] It is apparent from the passage above that a court-appointed receiver is typically appointed for the limited purpose of collecting and realising assets. In the context of the present case, such a court-appointed receiver over the shares in DyStar would simply be tasked to hold Kiri’s and Senda’s shares and to take the necessary steps to realise the value of these shares through an en bloc sale. Such a receiver would have no power over DyStar and its affairs. Conversely, a receiver and manager appointed over DyStar would have the power to take control of and manage its business. However, the receiver and manager appointed over DyStar would have no power over shares in DyStar.

  29. [43] This disposed of much of Senda’s objections, which focused primarily on the damaging effect that the appointment of a receiver and manager over DyStar would have on the company’s reputation, business and operations. Nonetheless, counsel for Senda, Mr Toh Kian Sing SC (“Mr Toh”), continued to express concerns over the appointment of any kind of receiver on the ground that it could possibly trigger certain financial covenants in DyStar’s financing contracts. However, we found this contention to be speculative in the absence of evidence of any such covenants. Mr Toh also expressed concern that a receiver may not have the financial expertise to handle the sale. We address this point below (see [49]).

  30. [44] An important consideration, in our view, was that an appointee should owe duties and responsibilities to the court and fully understand and appreciate his or her role, which a receiver would. It is pertinent in this regard to note the statement of Steven Chong J (as he then was) in Kao Chai-Chau Linda v Fong Wai Lyn Carolyn and others [2016] 1 SLR 21 (at [24]) that court-appointed receivers act as officers of the court in the discharge of their role. While that statement was made in the context of receivers appointed for the purpose of preserving property pending the final resolution of an action, we see no reason why the case should be any different for a receiver who is appointed for the purpose of facilitating and executing an en bloc sale of shares. Any individual intending to be appointed as a receiver by the court, regardless of one’s specific purpose or function, will necessarily have to undertake the responsibility of the office. We note that a receiver would typically be someone qualified to be appointed as a liquidator or a judicial manager under the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (2020 Rev Ed) (“IRDA”). Indeed, the persons nominated by Kiri and Senda to be receivers reflect this. It was not apparent to us that an investment banker or a financial adviser would be willing to undertake the responsibility as officers of the court. Indeed, Mr Toh did not suggest that they would be.

  31. [45] In our judgment therefore, the appointment of an individual (or several individuals) qualified to be a liquidator or judicial manager as a receiver over Kiri’s and Senda’s respective shareholdings in DyStar was appropriate. Mr Toh’s concern was addressed by the fact that a receiver would be able to appoint a financial adviser of the kind proposed by Senda to advise him or her on the process. In any event, it is apparent from their curricula vitae that the nominees of Kiri as well as those of Senda have experience in handling large financial transactions of the character of the en bloc sale.

  32. [47] Kiri nominated Mr Cosimo Borrelli (“Mr Borrelli”) of Kroll Pte Ltd (“Kroll”) to be the receiver, with Mr Matthew Stuart Becker, Mr Lim Loo Khoon and Mr Tan Wei Cheong of Deloitte & Touche LLP (“Deloitte”) as alternate nominees. Senda, on the other hand, nominated Mr Joshua Taylor and Ms Chew Ee Ling of Alvarez and Marsal (SE Asia) Pte Ltd (“A&M”), with Mr Chee Yoh Chuang, Mr Ng Kian Kiat and Mr Gary Goh of RSM Corporate Advisory Pte Ltd (“RSM”) as alternate nominees.

  33. [48] Predictably, each party raised strong objections to the other’s nominees. Senda objected to Mr Borrelli’s independence on the ground that a subsidiary of DyStar had appointed experts from Kroll to act as expert witnesses in separate proceedings. Kiri similarly objected to Senda’s nomination of A&M on the ground that Kiri had engaged the financial advisory services of a related A&M entity. While we found the objections of both parties to be surprising and not of significant weight, we nonetheless declined to consider these nominees on the basis that objections had been raised. In view of the parties’ relationship, which could be described as tense at best, it would facilitate a smoother sale process if the appointed receiver was not someone who had been objected to on the basis of a conflict of interest.

  34. [51] As for the issue relating to the distribution of the sale proceeds and the issue of Kiri’s claim for interest, we reserved our decision to consider the parties’ submissions further. We now address the first of these issues.

  35. How the sale proceeds should be distributed

  36. [59] Mr Toh relied on [47] of Snell (No 2) quoted above, arguing that the court had essentially decided that the parties should share the price actually realised in the event of a winding up, rather than giving priority to the respondents. However, as we pointed out to Mr Toh at the hearing, it is not entirely clear what the court meant by the words “sharing the price actually realised” in this context. Mr Toh’s position, in our view, reads too much into these words. Indeed, as the company was placed in solvent liquidation by the court, that would naturally result in proceeds from the realisation of the assets of the company being shared pro rata to the parties’ respective equity. Perhaps this was what the court had in mind when it said, “sharing the price actually realised”. This would not support Mr Toh’s position given that DyStar has not been placed in liquidation.

  37. [60] Mr Toh then referred to a subsequent judgment of the court in respect of the same matter in Snell v Glatis (No 3) [2020] NSWCA 267 (“Snell (No 3)"), where the court appeared to endorse, in the context of a dispute between the respondents and a different shareholder, a distribution of surplus assets in the liquidation according to allotted shares. We do not see how this decision, relating to a separate dispute in a different context, is relevant to the matters at hand. In so far as Mr Toh seeks to make the general point that there must be pro rata sharing between shareholders where a company is wound up, this again does not assist us, as we are not presently concerned with a winding up. Ultimately, we do not find any assistance in Snell (No 2) and Snell (No 3).

  38. The long stop date for the en bloc sale

  39. Whether there should be part payment to Kiri

  40. [64] Lastly, we address Kiri’s submission that it should be entitled to some form of payment in advance of the en bloc sale, whether by way of a partial buy-back or an advance to serve as part payment for Kiri’s shares. This was raised by Kiri, both at the hearing and subsequently by way of Allen & Gledhill LLP’s letter to the court dated 15 April 2024. This submission was borne out of a concern on Kiri’s part that the acts of oppression will remain unremedied until the completion of the en bloc sale which will take time. Essentially, this was a complaint that Kiri has been kept out of its money due to the lengthy proceedings.

  41. [66] Specifically on the point of prejudice, we also add that the protracted timeframe of these proceedings, which has kept Kiri out of its money, cannot be blamed on Senda alone. It is simply a result of the litigation process, to which both Kiri and Senda have contributed. The answer to this, if the claim has merit, lies in Kiri’s claim for interest, to which we now turn.

  42. Whether Kiri is entitled to interest on the purchase price of its shares

  43. The court’s power to award post-judgment interest on a buy-out order

  44. [68] We will first address the question as to our power to award post-judgment interest in oppression cases.

  45. [70] Senda argues that the court is only permitted to award post-judgment interest in certain situations prescribed in the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”). The material provisions are s 18 and para 6 of the First Schedule to the SCJA:

  46. [76] In fact, the Court of Appeal in Yeo Hung Khiang expressly recognised two ways in which an oppressed shareholder may be compensated for being kept out of his money (at [23]):

  47. (a) First, the court may calculate an interest factor separately from the value of the shareholding. This interest factor may then be added to the value of the shareholding to arrive at a fair price at which the minority’s shares should be purchased. This was in line with the Australian case of Coombs v Dynasty (1994) 14 ACSR 60 (see Yeo Hung Khiang at [20]).

  48. [77] While either alternative is permissible under the court’s discretionary power in s 216(2) of the Companies Act, we are respectfully of the view that the former is more conceptually sound, having regard to the purpose of compensating the oppressed shareholder for being kept out of his money. Given that the valuation exercise is essentially a question of how much the shares are worth at a particular date, it is somewhat contradictory to say that after accounting for the time value of money and subsequent delay, the value of the shares as of that date has increased. It is preferable, in our view, that the interest factor be calculated separately and added to the purchase price.

  49. Whether this court should account for interest in this case

  50. [80] Having established that we have the discretion to account for interest through an adjustment to the purchase price of the shares, we turn to the issue of whether we should exercise that discretion in this case. In light of all the circumstances, we are not inclined to do so.

  51. [81] As a starting point, we note that interest forms no part of our original decision, because Kiri did not ask for it in the first tranche of these proceedings resulting in the Main Judgment. In ordering substitute relief to give effect to that original decision, we are therefore not obliged to give effect to any award of interest (there being none in the Main Judgment to begin with).

  52. Conclusion

  53. [84] In summary, further to our prior orders, inter alia, that the shareholdings of Kiri and Senda are to be sold en bloc and that this sale is to be managed by the Receivers, we make the following orders:

  54. (a) The en bloc sale shall be conducted without a reserve price.

  55. (b) Any proceeds of the sale, after deducting the remuneration for the Receivers and the expenses of the sale, shall be distributed in the following manner:

  56. (i) Kiri shall receive US$603.8m in priority; and

  57. (ii) Senda shall receive the balance of the proceeds of sale.

  58. Annex A: Orders for SUM 24 made on 23 February 2024