Family Division of the High Court · Decided 17 January 2024
WJZ v W JY
Feedback & support[2024] SGHCF 2 · Case no. District Court Appeal No 105 of 2022
✱ What happened, in plain English
There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.
Ask about this judgment →Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Appeal
Background
- [3]
[3] H and W were married on 29 January 1992 in India. Their marriage was registered at the Singapore Marriage Registry on 14 May 1992. Soon thereafter on 28 May 1992, W returned to India. She would return to Singapore sporadically. Most of the time, she stayed in India whereas H stayed in Singapore.
- [4]
[4] Sometime on 15 August 1993, the parties bought an executive maisonette (the “Flat”) for $375,000 using $109,927 from H’s CPF funds and $35,000 in cash and registered it in the names of both parties.
- [5]
[5] In May 1994, W came back to Singapore. She returned to India sometime in August/September 1994 after she discovered that she was pregnant and encountered complications with the pregnancy. As medical expenses in Singapore were expensive, and W’s parents and relatives were in India, W wanted to have the baby delivered in India. After H had discussions with his parents, he thought it best to allow W to seek treatment in India. H and W left for India together for consultation with a renowned gynaecologist in Chennai. W was placed under his care. She later gave birth to S on 9 May 1995 in India.
- [6]
[6] On 13 August 1996, H’s father wrote to W telling her that life in Singapore was much better than in India and that she should settle down in Singapore. H’s father expressed his hope that W and H could resolve their “petty differences soon” and “settle in life for healthy growth of the child [sic]”.
- [7]
[7] In January 1999, W and S came to Singapore together with W’s parents. H had advised her parents to come to Singapore as they were grieving the loss of their son (W’s brother). During this visit from January 1999 to April 1999, W worked as a relief teacher and S was enrolled in a kindergarten.
- [8]
[8] When H moved to New York to work, he rented out the Flat from June 2000 until it was sold in 2007. H was thus away from Singapore for a considerable period of time.
- [9]
[9] W next returned to Singapore on 24 September 2004 with S at the request of H’s father, who was seriously ill at that time and wanted to see his grandson. However, H’s father passed away before W and S could arrive in Singapore. W stayed until the funeral rights were over but left soon to return to India. She next arrived for the anniversary prayers in September 2005, 2006 and 2007. Each of these visits lasted 6 to 10 days.
- [10]
[10] After September 2007, the parties were no longer in any meaningful relationship or contact. However, H remained in contact with S. This could be seen from the long messages exchanged between H and S from November 2016 to 2017 .
- [11]
[11] When W's father passed away on 2 January 2018, the financial support and assistance from W's father to maintain W and S ended. W commenced MSS 3132/2018 in August 2018 seeking maintenance. Some four months later on 12 December 2018, H decided to filed for divorce.
- [12]
[12] Interim Judgment (“IJ”) was granted on 13 February 2019 on the grounds of four years of separation. By the time IJ was granted, S was already more than 21 years of age.
H’s submissions
- [13]
[13] H’s counsel submitted at the appeal before me that the parties led separate lives since the marriage in 1992 with very little interaction. From 1992 to September 2007, W stayed intermittently for short periods in Singapore. For the most part of the marriage, the parties lived apart and led independent lives in different countries. W spent no real meaningful time with H as she was living primarily in India. They had separate bank accounts with no accountability to each other for any of their expenses. According to H, W never regarded Singapore as her home in the first place and chose to separate S from H.
- [14]
[14] H’s counsel contended that after September 2007, the parties no longer intended to participate in the joint accumulation of any matrimonial assets for the family. They no longer spent time together as a family. They had no marital relationship and no right to conjugal rights since September 2007. The marriage was over for all intents and purposes according to H’s counsel. The Flat was sold after both parties separated in September 2007. No monies were refunded to W as she made no direct contributions towards the purchase of the Flat, where she hardly stayed although they had possession of the Flat for about 14 years.
- [15]
[15] H’s counsel emphasised repeatedly at the appeal hearing before me that although the marriage lasted some 27 years “on paper”, the parties in reality spent only 492 days together. Based on the H’s characterisation of the 27 years marriage “on paper”, they were essentially “married” for 16 years from January 1992 to September 2007, and thereafter separated for 11 years before IJ was granted in February 2019.
- [16]
[16] Whilst H laid the blame entirely on W for the breakdown of communication and the separation and loss of contact that followed, W offered her own explanation for the marital breakdown.
W’s submissions
- [17]
[17] W stated in her affidavit that the marriage irretrievably broke down as a result of H’s adulterous and abusive nature. W had filed a police report against H for slapping her face and pulling her hair on 11 December 1993. W had also written a short letter dated 27 March 1994 to the officer-in-charge of Ang Mo Kio Police Station advising that further to the last complaint made, H had picked a quarrel with her on the morning of 26 March 1994 and hit her several times. She further informed the officer-in-charge that she had decided to go back to India and gave her address in India should the officer decide to contact her for further details.
- [18]
[18] W’s mother filed an affidavit in support to state that H would often assault and abuse W every now and then and that W’s attempts to return to H were in vain due to H’s exacerbating violent behaviour. Further, H was never interested in committing and forming a family of his own. The marriage was forced upon by H’s parents as his parents were never agreeable to H marrying his mistress.
- [19]
[19] W alleged that she came home one day and found H in bed with a woman and that devastated her. H was also violent towards her. If these allegations were true, it would be understandable why W preferred to stay almost permanently in India rather than to be with H in Singapore.
- [20]
[20] W said that they lived together from the inception of marriage in 1992 to 2007 . W’s counsel submitted that their living separate lives towards the later part of the marriage (ie after 2007) was not her choice. When W tried to contact H, he refused to answer her calls. In the words of W’s counsel, H “ghosted” W. W wanted to save the marriage but failed.
- [21]
[21] W’s mother stated that during the lifetime of her late husband, he assisted to pay for S’s education and monthly expenses. After he passed away, W had to borrow moneys from family friends. According to W’s mother, W fought till the end to save her marriage but all her efforts were in vain.
- [22]
[22] At this ancillary hearing, I do not need to make findings on the cause of the divorce which was already granted on the basis of 4 years of separation. Suffice to say that there may be more than meets the eye and that perhaps all the blame should not be placed on W for the long period of separation before H finally decided to file for divorce.
Circumstances relating to the sale of the Flat and the purchase of the disputed property (“Disputed Property”)
H’s contentions
- [23]
[23] In June 2007, H had a heart attack. The Flat was unoccupied. Both parties decided to sell the Flat. W wanted to go to India. W found it inconvenient to handle the sale and she wanted H to sell the Flat. Shortly before W left Singapore permanently in September 2007, she signed a Power of Attorney (“POA”) dated 27 September 2007 in favour of H for the sale of Flat. Of the 14 years that the jointly owned Flat was in their possession, H highlighted that W only spent 294 days in the Flat.
- [24]
[24] H submitted that W knew that she had no interest of any kind in the Flat as she had made no direct or indirect contributions to its purchase nor looked after the Flat from the time of its purchase until she left Singapore in September 2007. That was why W made no inquiry as to what happened to the Flat after she signed the POA. After she gave H the POA, H alleged that W made no further contact with him.
- [25]
[25] When W travelled to Singapore sometime after 2007 to renew her re-entry permit permanent residence status, H alleged that W made no contact with him nor made any inquiry regarding the sale of the Flat or its sale proceeds. Furthermore, W did not follow up on an alleged oral promise by H to purchase a house to replace the Flat that was to be sold. H denied making such an oral promise to W.
- [26]
[26] W claimed that she lived in the Flat with S until the Flat was sold in March 2008. If that was the case, H’s counsel submitted that she would have known of the exact date of sale and also recovered whatever she had contributed towards the purchase of the Flat.
- [27]
[27] H alleged that W’s assertion that she came to Singapore in 2008 to look after him after his surgery was a fabrication, although H admitted that he had a surgical procedure done in August 2008. If W’s assertion was true, she would have known that the Flat was sold and she could have found out the details from the Housing and Development Board (“HDB”) if she wanted to. In short, H contended that W did not look after him even if W did return to Singapore in 2008.
- [28]
[28] When W came to Singapore in 2017 with S, who enrolled to study at Technische Universität München in Singapore (“TUM Asia”) for his postgraduate (MSc) study on a scholarship, she also made no attempt to inquire about the sale of the Flat or follow up on her claims about her alleged 50% interest in the Flat.
- [29]
[29] It was only after S discovered in 2018 that H was living in a landed property that W commenced MSS 3132/2018 seeking a lump sum of $3,000,000 (disguised as a claim for maintenance) to buy a property in Singapore, despite 11 years of absence from the marriage. In the 11 years since W departed from Singapore, she required no maintenance for herself or S and led an independent life away from Singapore. H submitted that W’s claim for maintenance is for future speculative wants, to be unjustly enriched and for H to be a sponsor and guarantor for the rest of her life.
- [30]
[30] H contended that he did not use any part of the sale proceeds of the Flat towards the purchase of the Disputed Property. This was hotly contested by W at the appeal. I will examine this in more detail later.
W’s contentions
- [31]
[31] W submitted that the Flat was turned into an investment asset for rental when H was working in New York. Before the POA was prepared, there were prior discussions about selling the Flat. H persuaded her to sell the Flat and they viewed some private properties including one at Thomson Road. W claimed that H told her to sign a POA and made an oral promise to buy a private property and a bigger home for them after the sale of the Flat. In S’s email to H on 13 Oct 2007, S had even asked H, “Did you search for any new house?”. W’s counsel stressed that the only reason W agreed to sell the Flat was because of H’s promise to buy another property for them. Without the oral promise made by H, W would not have agreed to sell the Flat and would not have given H the POA. In essence, W is saying that H deceived her into giving him the POA.
- [32]
[32] W asserted that monies from the sale of the Flat were used by H towards the purchase of the Disputed Property. W argued that H would not be able to finance the purchase of the Disputed Property without using the proceeds of sale of the Flat.
- [33]
[33] W maintained, contrary to what H had said, that she had tried to reach and keep in touch with him after 2007. To support her assertion, W relied on emails from S to H dated 10 April 2008, 9 May 2010, 8 July 2011 and 16 July 2016. W further relied on her SMS, emails and voice messages to him (the last of which was mentioned generally in one of her emails but not exhibited). W’s reliance on her emails to H included one email on 28 March 2008 and two emails on 9 and 12 April 2010 (which were exhibited). In her email to H dated 28 March 2010 , W had even ended with the words “With Luv”. She wrote:
Dear [H],
Sairam. Trust by Gods grace all are fine at your end.
I have been expecting your call for a long time. I am writing this to decide on conducting of Pranavs Upanayanam. Swamy and Sankaracharya has advised that Upanayanam should be conducted latest by 15 years of age. According to Vedic rites a boy should be initiated bramacharyam before 15 years of age.
The auspicious dates available for us is 28th April and 16th May. As this is Utharayana punya kalam, it will bring good for the family esp. for pithrukkal.
Please let me know ammas and your convenience, so that I can do the needful.
[S] will be happy if you call him and speak to him. He has done extremely well in the exams and you can be proud to note that he has secured A + in all the papers.
With Luv
[W].
- [34]
[34] Clearly, W wanted H to fly to India and perform the “Poonul” or thread ceremony as a father. W made several attempts to call H for this significant societal event and wrote emails to him about it. But H refused to respond and showed no interest in attending and performing the important ceremony for S. From the contents of her email as set out above, W still regarded themselves as a married couple. According to W, she had returned to Singapore in 2011 and stayed with H’s mother. Accordingly, W denied H’s allegations that after signing the POA in September 2007, she completely left him and no longer had contact with him.
- [35]
[35] S’s letter to his father H dated 16 Jul 2016 some 2½ years before H filed for divorce is also quite telling as to whether H had “ghosted” W and S, whether the oral promise alleged by H was a pure fabrication, whether H had showed W and S several houses at that time of the POA, whether H had provided any financial support to W and S, and whether W had alienated S from H. S wrote as follows and I set it out in full:
Sairam,
I was pretty surprised to see you replying to my mail. Thanks for your compliment that I am more intelligent than I look.
Well as you said, you sent me messages on Facebook and LinkedIn. It was a bolt from the blue. You never bother to call me or know what I am doing all these years and suddenly you want me to patch up with you.
As you say your father and your mother were good enough to look after you. The reason being your father looked after your mother so well and that he was able to fulfil all your necessities. You were very lucky to have a good father like that. My mother did take up the responsibility of being both father and mother to me. I am very privileged to have her as my mother.
You might beat around the bush saying several reasons. You say that there were several hindrances between you and me. You knew the school which I was studying and in fact you came with my mother once. If you really loved me, then why didn’t you come and meet me. You never looked after my necessities. Tell me one thing that you have done to me as a father. Have you ever paid a single fee for my school and college so far. Was there any hindrance for that? Did anyone prevent you from doing that?
You said that I did not wish you for a single fathers day. But did you live up to be a good father. Ask yourself. You had never bothered to wish for any of my birthday except for my eighteenth. Had someone stopped you from doing that?
In 2007, you showed us several houses and promised to buy in my mothers and my name. Did you fulfil that? NO. Post that incident you never kept in touch for ages. The scar of abandonment and treachery still remains in my heart. After so many years you want me to start friendship with you after all that has happened. So how do you expect me to react.
I had called and sent you so many mails for you to perform my upanayanam. You never bother to respond even once. Whenever my mother had called, you never picked up the phone. And suddenly after all this you want me to forget and talk to you. As a father you failed to do that duty also.
“If you need a father, you got to try harder”, for what. Aren’t you ashamed to ask such a question. First you prove to be a good father, then I will be a good son.
You say your mother has dementia. But the veracity is that when I said hello, you immediately banged the phone. You could not talk to me. You were scared to talk because of the guilt that you CHEATED us. You are clueless to answer about this.
I am an adult not a child. My mother has never interfered in any decision of mine. Till date she hasn’t spoke anything ill about you.
Please remember, my mother will always be a part of me. Her association with me is so thick that no one can break it.
Remember one thing I wasn’t robbed from you. But your egoism is the one that separated us. Today I am a very happy child. I have my mother, my grand parents, my relatives and friends who are ready to do anything for us.
I, as a Bal Vikas student strictly adhere to the principles of right conduct and truth. Swami has made me understand the difference between good and bad. Despite all these I will always be a good son to you and fulfil all duties.
Warmest regards
[S]
[emphasis in original omitted; emphasis added in italics]
My views
- [36]
[36] I am inclined to accept W’s version of events that after the Disputed Property was purchased, H avoided telling her about it. He refused to answer her calls and did not disclose the existence of the Disputed Property to her. I also find it strange that W would have intended the marriage to be over and stopped contacting H immediately after having given the POA to H, thereby choosing to give up all her interest in the Flat and the proceeds of its sale. This situation as painted by H’s counsel is too unrealistic to be believable. Contrary to H’s allegations, there is evidence to show that W had tried to contact H by email after September 2007 and that she obviously did not regard the marriage to have ended for all intents and purposes as of September 2007.
- [37]
[37] In fact, on 21 Nov 2007, H and W signed a document “SELLER(S) DECLARATION AND AUTHORISATION FOR RESALE OF AN HDB/HUDC FLAT” (“Declaration”) in person. If W was totally disinterested in the marriage and had given up all interest in the Flat after giving the POA as contended by H, I do not think W would have bothered to sign this Declaration. In March 2010, W wanted H to be present as S’s father for the important “Poonul” ceremony to be held in India, which I understand is a grand event where the father puts a thread on his son. W wrote a warm and sincere letter requesting H’s presence at the ceremony stating that “it will bring good for the family”. W still regarded themselves as one family. But H chose not to attend. This invitation by W for H to go to India to perform the ceremony for S as his father showed that W continued to reach out to H as her husband and the father to S, their son. H chose instead to distance himself from W and S.
- [38]
[38] I pause here to point out that in ancillary proceedings to divide matrimonial assets, matrimonial assets secretly accumulated or purchased by one party in the course of a marriage must be disclosed to the court. The lack of knowledge of the existence of a matrimonial asset by any one party does not mean that it conveniently disappears from the pool of matrimonial assets. The same applies to monies secretly accumulated in the course of a marriage by a party and kept by that party in an undisclosed bank account. It must also be disclosed if they are matrimonial assets. I find that H’s attempts to keep the Disputed Property a secret from W was calculated to deny W her entitlement to a share of that asset at the ancillary hearings. H had also avoided contact with W after getting the POA from W so that he would not have to account to her as to how he had used up the entire proceeds of sale of the Flat. H took advantage of W because W was in India and he had already obtained the POA from her before she left for India. H kept the entire proceeds of sale of the Flat and I find (as I shall explain later) that he had used matrimonial assets to purchase the Disputed Property without informing W about it. H kept it a secret from W. W only found out much later in 2017 that H had purchased the Disputed Property in his sole name.
Decision of the District Judge on the division of matrimonial assets
- [39]
[39] The District Judge found that the only matrimonial asset to be considered was their Flat which was their matrimonial home. The other two properties in India were not part of the matrimonial pool and W’s counsel offered no cogent or legitimate legal arguments as to why they should be included in the matrimonial pool for division. One of them was inherited by H and had not been transformed or improved in the course of the marriage. The family had not lived in it and W made no improvements or contributions to this inherited property. As for the other property, W simply asserted that it was H’s property without any basis and she failed to provide any proof of his ownership.
- [40]
[40] The District Judge noted that the Flat was purchased by the parties in 1993 and sold by H in 2008 pursuant to a POA executed by W in favour of H. The parties jointly owned the Flat.
- [41]
[41] More than a decade had passed before W raised the issue of the sale proceeds of the Flat. The District Judge considered it to be an afterthought for W to now claim that the sale proceeds of the Flat had been utilised towards the purchase of the Disputed Property for which she is now seeking a share. The District Judge found that W made no direct or indirect contribution to the Disputed Property. In all likelihood, she chanced upon the Disputed Property and sought to capitalise on its appreciation and monetary gain. Her conduct was inequitable.
- [42]
[42] For all intents and purposes, whilst the parties remained legally married, their union and consortium were in reality over. They led separate lives and in separate countries, to the complete oblivion of the other. Neither party owed the other any obligation or accountability. On the facts, the District Judge found that it would be appropriate for a clean break to be made once and for all.
The Appeal
- [44]
[44] One of the main factual issues in dispute during the Appeal is whether the net proceeds of sale of the matrimonial Flat had been used in the purchase of the Disputed Property. This spawned the issue of whether the completion of the sale of the matrimonial Flat was earlier or later than the completion of the purchase of the Disputed Property.
Completion dates for the sale of the Flat and the purchase of the Disputed Property.
- [45]
[45] One would have imagined that there should not be any dispute over the completion date for the sale of the Flat and similarly, the completion date for the purchase of the Disputed Property as both these dates would be well documented. But these completion dates were in serious dispute between the parties.
- [46]
[46] W contended that the completion of the sale of the Flat took place earlier on 11 March 2008 whereas the completion of the purchase of the Disputed Property took place 6 days later on 17 March 2008. As such, the net proceeds of sale of the Flat, their matrimonial flat, were available to H and he had in fact used the proceeds of sale to pay in part for the purchase of the Disputed Property.
- [47]
[47] On the other hand, H contended that the completion of the purchase of the Disputed Property was on 14 March 2008 whereas the sale of the Flat was completed three days later on 17 March 2008. Hence H argued that he could not possibly have used the proceeds from the sale of the Flat to purchase the Disputed Property because the completion date for the purchase of the Disputed Property was 3 days earlier than the completion date for the sale of the Flat.
- [48]
[48] H provided a chronology of events from the grant of the POA to the completion date for the sale of the Flat as follows :
(a) In September 2007, W granted a POA to H to sell the Flat.
(b) The option to purchase was granted to the purchaser on 23 October 2007;
(c) On 25 February 2008 (I note that H made a typographical error in stating the date as 25 March 2008 when it should have been 25 February 2008 based on the documents exhibited), HDB wrote to H and the buyers fixing an appointment for completion on 17 March 2008 at 3.45pm.
(d) On 5 March 2008, HDB wrote again to H and the buyers fixing an earlier appointment for completion on 11 March 2008 at 4.15pm.
(e) On 11 March 2008, H was present at the HDB’s office but the buyer failed to turn up. H nevertheless signed the documents prepared by HDB. No completion took place according to H.
(f) On 12 March 2008 HDB wrote to H to re-schedule completion on the same day at 1.30pm. HDB also provided the completion accounts in another letter dated 12 March 2008. However, H did not receive the mail of the same date and did not go for the completion. HDB then refixed the date to the original date, ie 17 March 2008, for completion.
- [49]
[49] I pause here to point out that H did not exhibit any letter from HDB dated on or after 12 March 2008, which refixed the completion to the new date of 17 March 2008 as H had alleged. I have grave doubts that such a letter from HDB existed. If it existed, H would have exhibited it together with the other letters of HDB referred to above.
- [51]
[51] H further postulated that if completion had taken place on 11 March 2008 and not on 17 March 2008, then why was his CPF used to purchase the Flat refunded to him only on 1 April 2008? According to H, if completion had taken place on 11 March 2008, this sum would have been received on the same day as the cash proceeds. H’s reasoning unfortunately does not take him very far because if on his case, completion of the sale of the Flat took place on 17 March 2008, then H should have received the refund of his CPF on 17 March 2008. H did not. According to him, the CPF refund was much later on 1 April 2008.
- [52]
[52] As for the date of completion of H’s purchase of the Disputed Property, H relied on a letter dated 14 March 2008 from his lawyers acting for him in the conveyance, Matthew Chiong Partnership (“MCP”), to evidence that it took place on 14 March 2008. This is probably an error as the other documents written by MCP which W exhibited had pointed to completion taking place on 17 March 2008. I also noticed some handwritten remarks with the date “17/3/08” being penned on two places in that letter, which appear to support the likelihood of an error in the completion date stated therein.
- [53]
[53] H claimed that on 13 March 2008 (the day before the completion date on 14 March 2008), he had already made all payments towards the purchase of the Disputed Property. He further claimed that he took possession of and moved into the Disputed Property on the day that the completion took place (ie 14 March 2008).
- [54]
[54] I shall now deal with the documents referred to by W to support her position that the date of completion of the sale of the Flat was 11 March 2008 and not 17 March 2008.
- [55]
[55] The Instrument of Transfer for the purposes of the Land Titles Act 1993 (2020 Rev Ed) (“LTA”) shows the date of transfer of title to the Flat to the new owners as 11 March 2008. The solicitor for the transferees Ms [A] had on 11 March 2008 certified that the citizenship and other particulars of the transferees had been verified by her from their National Registration Identity Cards that were produced and shown to her and she had found them to be correct. This necessarily means that the buyers were in fact present before their solicitor for verification of their particulars on the date fixed for completion on 11 March 2008, contrary to the bald assertion of H that the buyers were absent for completion. The fact that H might not have seen the buyers at the place and at the time that H went for completion of the sale of the Flat on 11 March 2008 does not mean that the buyers were not present for the completion (perhaps at a different time on that same day).
- [56]
[56] The Certificate of Stamp Duty for the Instrument of Transfer is also dated 11 March 2008. On 11 March 2008, an official receipt for the sum of $8,660 was issued to H by the agent, one Ms Patrina Wong from Linkvest Network Services, for payment of commission for the sale of the Flat.
- [57]
[57] Based on the above documents referred to by W, I find that the sale of the Flat was completed on 11 March 2008 and not 17 March 2008 as alleged by H. The documents relied upon by W are in my view far more reliable to establish the actual date of completion of the sale of the Flat.
- [58]
[58] Since H did not contend that completion of the sale of Flat took place on 12 March 2008 (which would not be helpful to H as it would still be earlier than 14 March 2008, being the date of completion of the Disputed Property as alleged by H), I do not need to deal with the letter from HDB dated 12 March 2008, which stated that the completion of the resale transaction had been fixed on the same day at 1.30pm.
- [59]
[59] If H wanted to put it beyond doubt that he did not use any of the sale proceeds of the Flat for the purchase of the Disputed Property, he could simply exhibit his bank statement to show that the actual date of his receipt of the net proceeds of sale of the Flat into his bank account was later than the completion date of the purchase of the Disputed Property. But H chose not to disclose his bank statement to show when he received the cash portion of the net proceeds of sale of the Flat.
- [60]
[60] I turn next to consider the documents set out below, some of which were referred to by W to evidence the completion date for H’s purchase of the Disputed Property as 17 March 2008 and not 14 March 2008 as contended by H.
- [61]
[61] The Instrument of Transfer for the purposes of the LTA transferring the land comprising the whole of the Disputed Property to H was dated 17 March 2008.
- [62]
[62] The Instrument of Mortgage for the purposes of the LTA where H mortgaged the Disputed Property to Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Ltd (“OCBC”) to secure a total loan of $1,521,870 (comprising a housing loan of $1,360,000 plus a short-term loan of $161,870) to H and one SB as co-borrowers was also dated 17 March 2008. A letter from MCP to the seller’s lawyers Messsrs Loh Eben Ong & Partners forwarding documents for completion was also dated 17 March 2008. MCP’s letter dated 26 March 2008 to IRAS also stated that the completion date for the Disputed Property was 17 March 2008. IRAS would need to know when H’s liability to pay property tax for the Disputed Property should begin. H started paying property tax for the Disputed Property with effect from 18 March 2008 as he was charged $1,795.81 for 9 months and 14 days of property tax from 18 March 2008 to 31 December 2008 in the completion accounts presented by MCP to H. Importantly, OCBC in its letter dated 17 March 2008 stated that the sum of $161,870, referred to as a “SHORT TERM LOAN” secured on the mortgage of the Disputed Property, was disbursed on 17 March 2008. OCBC charged interest on the “SHORT TERM LOAN” with effect from 17 March 2008 at 3.821% per annum on the principal sum of $161,870 .
- [63]
[63] Clearly, there could not be any completion without the disbursement of the short-term loan from OCBC so that the sellers of the Disputed Property would receive the whole selling price before they transferred the title to the property to H.
- [64]
[64] Based on the reliable documents referred to above at [61] and [62], I find that the completion for the purchase of the Disputed Property took place on 17 March 2008 and not 14 March 2008 as contended by H.
- [65]
[65] Accordingly, I find that the completion of the purchase of the Disputed Property took place six days after the completion of the sale of the Flat. The inference I draw is that the net proceeds of sale of the Flat were available for H to use for his purchase of the Disputed Property. The next question is whether he had in fact used any part of those proceeds of sale of the Flat to do so.
Use of the net proceeds of sale of the Flat for the purchase of the Disputed Property
Completion accounts for the sale of the Flat
- [66]
[66] The HDB’s letter dated 12 March 2008 setting out the completion accounts is a good starting point as it shows the following breakdown of the amount of net proceeds of sale of the Flat (including how much was refunded to H’s CPF Ordinary Account from the net proceeds of sale and the balance amount that was paid to H and W in cash as joint owners):
Declared Resale price of the Flat $433,000.00
Less
(a) Outstanding loan $148,755.91
(b) CPF Refund to H $162,543.15
CPF Refund to W $0.00
(c) Deposit $5,000.00
(d) Resale Levy $0.00
(e) Penalty Fee $453.50
Total Deductions $316,752.56
Cash amount payable to H and W $116,247.44
- [67]
[67] The $5,000 deposit referred to in the completion account had been paid by the buyers to H earlier, comprising $1,000 as the option fee and $4,000 for the buyers’ exercise of the option. W submitted that the cash deposit of $5,000 plus the cash amount payable to H and W of $116,247.44 (ie a total cash amount of $121,247.44) as the net cash proceeds of sale of the Flat were both kept by H and nothing was given to her.
- [68]
[68] H did not dispute that he took the cash amount of $121,247.44, being the total net proceeds of sale of the Flat. According to H, when the Flat was sold in March 2008, there was “a disbursement of $116,257.83 towards the Parties’ joint account which [H] then withdrew and used it for his trading purposes.” The burden is on H to establish that fact, a burden which he has failed to discharge. H provided no bank statements to evidence that the withdrawn sum had been used for his trading purposes. I do not believe H’s bald assertion that he had withdrawn the whole amount from the joint account of H and W and used it for his trading purposes.
- [69]
[69] I will deal in more detail later with a different amount of $162,543.15 from the net proceeds of sale of the Flat that was paid directly into H’s CPF Ordinary Account as a refund. Suffice to say now that it was subsequently withdrawn by H to repay in full a Short-Term Bridging Loan taken from OCBC at that time to fund in part the purchase of the Disputed Property.
Completion accounts for the purchase of the Disputed Property
- [70]
[70] For clarity, I set out below the completion accounts for the purchase of the Disputed Property provided by MCP in their letter dated 10 March 2008 for completion on 17 March 2008:
Purchase price of the Disputed Property $1,700,000.00
Less:
5% deposit paid $85,000.00
H’s CPF lump sum withdrawal $5,130.00
Housing Loan from OCBC Bank $1,360,000.00
Short Term Loan from OCBC Bank $161,870.00
______________________
$88,0000.00
Add:
Property tax from 18 March 2008 to 31 December $1,795.81 2008 (9 months & 14 days) @ 190 per month
Solicitor’s Tax Invoice $1,297.72
CPF Board’s solicitors’ bill $460.00
Stamp fees on Mortgage $500.00
Stamp fees on Option to Purchase $45,600.00
_______________________
$137,653.53
Less:
Payment was made by H (vide POSB $45,600.00 cheque No xxxxxx dated 1.2.2008)
________________________
Amount in cash payable by H latest by 11.00am $92,053.53 on 14 March 2008 per directions of MCP
- [71]
[71] H was given a $200 discount by MCP and he paid up $91,853.53 on 13 March 2008 according to some contemporaneous notes written on the completion document.
- [72]
[72] H stated in his document “Ancillary Matters Fact and Position Sheet” dated 12 August 2022 that he made a total cash contribution of $130,600 towards the purchase of the Disputed Property. From the completion accounts, I can see that this comprised the $85,000 initial 5% cash deposit he paid plus the $45,600 stamp fees on the Option to Purchase, making a total of $130,600.
- [73]
[73] In my view, the entire $130,600 was paid by H prior to him receiving the net proceeds arising from the completion of sale of the Flat on 11 March 2008. First, of the 5% cash deposit of $85,000, 1% or $17,000 was paid by H at the time the option was granted to H to purchase the Disputed Property on 28 January 2008, and the subsequent 4% or $68,000 was paid by H at the time he exercised the Option to Purchase on 1 February 2008. These two events took place well before the completion of sale of the Flat on 11 March 2008. I therefore accept that the $85,000 came from the cash accumulated by H during the marriage period prior to the date of completion of sale of the Flat.
- [74]
[74] The important question is whether these $85,000 of cash savings of H will nevertheless constitute matrimonial assets, where both parties have a share in them. I find that they are matrimonial assets because they were accumulated by H during the period of the marriage which commenced from as far back as January 1992. Even going by H’s case that they separated in September 2007, I do not think that it would have been possible for H to have accumulated this large sum of $85,000 between the start of their separation in September 2007 to 28 January 2008/1 February 2008 (when the two payments of 1% and 4% of the purchase price for the Disputed Property totalling $85,000 were made), which is a mere short period of 4 months. As all assets and savings accumulated during the period of the parties’ marriage constitute matrimonial assets, H cannot deny that he had in fact used $85,000 of matrimonial assets in the nature of his cash savings accumulated during the period of their marriage to pay the 5% deposit for the purchase price of the Disputed Property. The same applies to the other payment of $45,600 by H with the POSB cheque dated 1 February 2008. I infer again that this sum must have come from his cash savings accumulated during the period of their long marriage commencing from as far back as January 1992, and must be regarded as the matrimonial assets of both parties. Again, H could not have accumulated this cash savings of $45,600 in the very short period of time from the start of their separation in September 2007 to 1 February 2008, when this payment was made.
- [75]
[75] In any event, even H’s cash savings accumulated during the subsequent period of separation should be regarded as matrimonial assets, as defined in s 112(10) of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“the Charter”). The reason is that the parties must still be legally regarded as married until interim judgment for divorce is granted to the parties.
- [76]
[76] If H had wanted to stop the joint accumulation of matrimonial assets earlier, he should have applied for his divorce sooner (ie as soon as the 4 years’ separation period was fulfilled when he could then be legally entitled to apply for divorce on this ground). H should not have waited until after 11 years of separation to do so. H should not be allowed to use that as a basis now to say that because he had been tardy in applying for divorce, he is to be treated in a better position than one who had not delayed applying for divorce as soon as it was possible to do so after 4 years of separation. H essentially is asking this court to grant him a notional interim judgment immediately upon the commencement of the parties’ separation in September 2007, such that their joint accumulation of assets stopped immediately upon the first day of their separation. I reiterate that I am not prepared to place H, who had been tardy in taking divorce action, in a far more advantageous position than one who had promptly taken action to apply for divorce immediately upon reaching 4 years of separation, in which case the earliest possible grant of interim judgment would probably be in 2012. Here, H wants the court to grant him notional interim judgment in September 2007, being the first day of separation, so that he can achieve his aim of having the Disputed Property (purchased after the start of separation) fall outside the pool of matrimonial assets.
- [77]
[77] I next consider H’s CPF withdrawal of $5,130 to pay for the purchase of the Disputed Property. I note that he had only $5,780.75 in his CPF Ordinary Account as at 13 February 2008, which was before the completion of the sale of the Flat. Therefore, the CPF refund from the sale of the Flat had not taken place yet. As can be seen in the completion accounts, H thus arranged to withdraw almost the entire sum available to him in his CPF Ordinary Account at that time to help him pay for the purchase of the Disputed Property on its completion date fixed on 17 March 2008.
- [78]
[78] The sum of $5,130 accumulated in H’s CPF Ordinary Account constitutes a joint matrimonial asset of both parties used to pay for the purchase of the Disputed Property as I infer that H accumulated this sum during the period of the marriage. I note that H used up $109,927 as a principal amount withdrawn from his CPF Ordinary Account at the time when H and W purchased the Flat sometime in August 1993. Assuming that he withdrew almost all his money in his CPF Ordinary Account at the time they purchased the Flat, then the remaining sum of $5,780.75 available in his CPF Ordinary Account as at 13 February 2008 must have been accumulated during the period between August 1993 and 13 February 2008, which was almost the entire period of their marriage before their separation in September 2007. In any case, the aforementioned period of accumulation would fall well within the period of the marriage ending on the date of IJ. For the same reasons, I find that the $5,130 amount withdrawn from H’s CPF Ordinary Account constitutes a joint matrimonial asset used to purchase the Disputed Property.
- [79]
[79] H next took a Housing Loan from OCBC Bank of $1,360,000, which was 80% of the purchase price of the Disputed Property. H also had to take a Short-Term Loan from OCBC Bank of $161,870 as the refund of CPF monies to H’s CPF Ordinary Account from the net proceeds of sale of the Flat could not be re-disbursed out by CPF in time for H to use them to pay for the purchase of the Disputed Property at the time of its completion. SB was the co-borrower with H and also a guarantor for both the Housing Loan and the Short-Term Loan. The monthly instalments for the Housing Loan were $5,520.33 per month at that time.
- [80]
[80] According to the completion accounts prepared by MCP for the purchase of the Disputed Property as shown above at [70], MCP required H to pay the balance sum of $92,053.53 at the latest by 11.00am on 14 March 2008.
- [81]
[81] H was subsequently given a $200 discount by MCP and he paid up $91,853.53 on 13 March 2008 according to contemporaneous notes written on the completion accounts. Since the sale of the Flat was completed two days earlier on 11 March 2008, H clearly had available for his use the balance from the net proceeds of sale of the Flat of $116,247.44, quite apart from the $5,000 cash deposit that was paid to H earlier, to pay this cash sum of $91.853.53 as required by MCP.
- [82]
[82] H did not exhibit any bank statement to show that he had cash savings in his bank account before his receipt of the cash portion of the net proceeds of sale of the Flat of $116,247.44 that sufficed to pay the sum of $91,853.53 to MCP on 13 March 2008. The burden is on him to do so. I therefore find on a balance of probabilities that he paid the balance sum of $91,853.53 in cash to MCP for the purchase of the Disputed Property by using part of the net cash proceeds of $116,247.44 that H received from the sale of the Flat, which was completed two days earlier on 11 March 2008. Even if I am wrong on this, and that H in fact had further accumulated cash savings to pay the sum of $91,853.53 to MCP, I am still inclined for the same reasons to infer that these further cash savings were matrimonial assets that he accrued during the period of his marriage before their separation in September 2007. In essence, H on either event had used matrimonial assets accumulated prior to their separation in September 2007 to pay the balance sum of $91,853.53 in cash for the purchase of the Disputed Property.
- [83]
[83] How was the quantum of the Short-Term Loan for the purchase of the Disputed Property derived? H had obtained a CPF statement dated 13 February 2008 which showed that he should be expecting a refund to his CPF Ordinary Account of a sum of at least $161,870.09 from the net proceeds of sale of the Flat sometime after the completion of its sale. The $161,870.09 comprised $109,927 as the principal amount withdrawn for the purchase of the Flat and accrued interest up to January 2008 of $51,943.09. H therefore took a short-term bridging loan of $161,870 from OCBC, which he hoped to repay with the subsequent CPF refund from the net proceeds of sale of the Flat to his CPF Ordinary Account.
- [84]
[84] As expected, the total refund to H’s CPF Ordinary Account from the net proceeds of sale of the Flat was slightly higher being a sum of $162,543.15, as can be seen in HDB’s letter dated 12 March 2008 for the completion accounts.
- [85]
[85] After the CPF refund to H’s CPF Ordinary Account had taken place, H instructed MCP to request the CPF Board to release his CPF monies to repay in full the Short-Term Loan from OCBC Bank of $161,870 with accrued interest. On 25 March 2008, MCP wrote to the CPF Board’s lawyers Messrs Joseph Tan Jude Benny for the release of a sum of $161,870 from H’s CPF Ordinary Account by 31 March 2008 towards full repayment of the Short-Term Loan from OCBC. On 2 April 2008, OCBC Bank informed both borrowers, H and SB, that OCBC Bank had received $161,886.90 (ie with accrued interest) towards the redemption of the Short-Term Loan and this loan had been “fully settled on 2 April 2008”.
- [86]
[86] The Short-Term Loan was a bridging loan from OCBC specifically to cover the short period of about 3 weeks between the refund of CPF monies from the net proceeds of sale of the Flat on 12 March 2008 to the release of the same on 2 April 2008. The Short-Term Loan was taken up at that time to help pay for the purchase of the Disputed Property. Accordingly, I find that matrimonial assets in the form of H’s refunded CPF’s monies, which originated from the net proceeds of sale of the matrimonial Flat, had once again been used to pay for the purchase of the Disputed Property. For all intents and purposes, the Short-Term Loan was merely to facilitate that.
- [87]
[87] From the above, I therefore conclude that almost the entire net proceeds of sale of the Flat (both the cash payment to H of $116,247.44 and the CPF refund to H’s CPF Ordinary Account of $162,543.15) had been used by H in his purchase of the Disputed Property and they were all matrimonial assets. Since the other cash savings of H used to pay for the purchase of the Disputed Property (which included the cash sum of $130,600 referred to above at [72] to [75]) were also matrimonial assets as explained earlier, I find that the purchase of the Disputed Property was entirely funded with matrimonial assets of both parties accumulated during the period of their marriage.
Burden of Proof
- [88]
[88] Ultimately, H who was still in a subsisting marriage in 2008, who had full control of the sale of the Flat as he had the POA from W to do so, and who necessarily had all the knowledge of the sale transactions involving the matrimonial Flat and his purchase of the Disputed Property in his own name, and who had kept W ignorant of both of these property transactions, must in my view bear the burden of proving that he had not used matrimonial monies to purchase the Disputed Property. Not only has he failed to discharge that burden, for the reasons I have stated above, I find that W has succeeded in proving through the documents furnished through the discovery process that H had in fact used matrimonial monies to purchase the Disputed Property.
Ratio of financial contributions
- [89]
[89] In the absence of income tax statements, I will use the accumulated compulsory CPF contributions (computed on the basis that no party had withdrawn any of their CPF savings to purchase any property) for the entire period of the marriage up until the date of IJ as a rough and ready proxy to establish the total amount of monies each party is likely to have earned from their employment during the whole period of their marriage. Their total earnings from their employment are usually spent on their family expenses, and if not spent but saved or wisely invested, these earnings will morph into their matrimonial assets, whether they be in the form of monies saved in their bank accounts, or shares and property investments or other types of assets as the case may be. Their total earnings from employment therefore broadly represent their respective financial contributions to the marriage. The ratio of their respective total CPF contributions accumulated during the period of marriage (with the withdrawn sums for purchase of property and accrued interest added back) will effectively represent the ratio of their entire aggregated employment income during the marriage or their financial contributions to the marriage.
- [90]
[90] W’s CPF as of 14 May 2019 was $4,275.74. H’s CPF as at 21 May 2019 comprised: (a) a total of $38,883.53 in his Ordinary Account, Special Account, Medisave Account and Retirement Account, (b) a sum of $10,000 used in Investment; and (c) $174,915.93 used in the purchase of property with accrued interest of $54,463.70. The total sum in H’s CPF if nothing was withdrawn for the purchase of property or other investments would have been a total of $278,263.16.
- [91]
[91] The ratio of H’s and W’s accumulated CPF (if nothing was withdrawn) as at May 2019, which was close to the date of IJ in February 2019, works out to be $278,263.16 [H]: $4,275.73 [W] and the ratio is 98.5% [H] : 1.5% [W]. As a broad brush analysis, I will adopt the CPF ratio as a proxy to represent the ratio of their respective financial contributions being in the same ratio of 98.5% [H] : 1.5% [W]. W also did not dispute that H had earned far more than herself throughout the entire marriage, and hence, H’s total financial contributions to the marriage was far more substantial than hers.
- [92]
[92] There are however two factors that need to be considered. One is that H was trading to earn extra income for the family but he had instead sustained a loss of a large sum of $480,000 during his trading. This in effect would have dented his total earnings, and hence, his financial contribution to the family, as he was effectively earning negative income when he lost money. Instead of making positive financial contributions, he was making negative financial contributions to the family through his losses. If these trading losses are taken into account, it would have reduced H’s share in the ratio of financial contributions.
- [93]
[93] On the other hand, W had very supportive parents who gave her financial support to maintain S and herself in India for many years as H did not contribute financially to their maintenance. I accept that W’s father had been the main benefactor of W in providing financial support to her all these years since H failed to maintain W and S, as he should have. W thus applied for backdated maintenance for S from the age of 5 years old (in the year 2000) to 21 years old (in the year 2016), ie a total of 16 years in these ancillary proceedings, which I shall deal with later in this judgment.
- [94]
[94] I regard all the monies given to W by her father to support her for all the 16 or so years that H had refused to provide maintenance for W and S, as gifts to W during the marriage. These gifts strictly speaking belonged to W exclusively (see the definition of matrimonial assets in s 112(10) of the Charter) and remain outside the pool of matrimonial assets. But W had instead applied and used these gifts from her father to support the family (ie herself and their son S). In doing so, she was in fact making financial contributions to the marriage using these gifts bestowed on her by her father. It is as if her father was her employer paying her wages, which she then wholly applied for the use of the family and her child. As such, these gifts to W, which W used for the welfare of the family, would have correspondingly increased W’s share in the financial contributions.
- [95]
[95] On account of these two factors, I have decided as a broad-brush approach to give a 10% uplift to W’s share of the financial contributions, which will vary the ratio to 88.5% [H] : 11.5% [W].
- [96]
[96] I made some very rough estimates before arriving at this 10% uplift. I used $300 per month as the estimated amount needed to support W and S in India which W’s father would probably have provided, and this would have added up to about $57,000 over 16 years. I tried to estimate by reverse engineering from the CPF contributions to obtain what H would have earned in total from his employment and then subtract the trading loss of $480,000 from that estimated total earning of H from his employment during the course of the marriage. After doing these approximate calculations, the uplift was slightly more than 10%. I then adopted a 10% uplift as the adjustment needed to account for the trading loss of $480,000 and W’s application of the gifts from her father for the maintenance of herself and S.
Non-financial contributions
H’s non-financial contributions
- [97]
[97] I give credit to H for all his efforts in looking after the Flat and later the Disputed Property almost single handedly, whilst W spent most of her time with S in India. H would have to spend time and effort to maintain these properties, get repairs done from time to time, deal with agents and tenants when he was renting out the Flat, attend to the collection of rents and deal with the administrative matter of handing and taking over when tenancies expire and new tenants move into the Flat. His efforts in looking after the properties would have continued until the Flat was sold in 2008, and as for the Disputed Property, it would have continued throughout the whole period of separation up to the date of IJ.
- [98]
[98] Being away from S who was in India, H obviously did not have much opportunity to make any substantial non-financial contributions in terms of attending to the needs of S as he was growing up.
W’s non-financial contributions
- [99]
[99] W had been the main caregiver of S since his birth, with minimal assistance from H. She cared for S and took care of all his needs. For the times she was with H, she also took care of H and the household.
- [100]
[100] Apart from the short stint of 6 months in 1998 when she took up employment in Botswana, W singlehandedly brought up S in India. Her indirect contributions by way of looking after the welfare of S would count for the entire period of the marriage up to September 2007 as well as during the period of separation from September 2007 all the way to the time S reached adulthood.
Ratio of non-financial contributions
- [101]
[101] After considering the submissions of the parties at the appeal and having read the affidavits of the parties, I am of the view that the ratio of the non-financial contributions of the parties should be tilted in favour of W and a just and fair ratio in all the circumstances of the case is 15% [H] : 85% [W].
Overall ratio for H’s and W’s contributions to the marriage
- [102]
[102] I apply equal weightage to both the financial and non-financial contributions. There are no good reasons or any special circumstances that will justify an application of an unequal weightage.
Contributions
H
W
Weightage applied
Financial
88.50%
11.5%
50%
Non-Financial
15.00%
85.00%
50%
Final Ratio
51.75%
48.25%
- [104]
[104] Using a broad-brush approach and with the above computations as a guide, I assess the final ratio for the division of all the items in the pool of matrimonial assets to be 52% [H] : 48% [W], which I believe represents a just and equitable overall ratio for the division of matrimonial assets in all the circumstances of this case.
- [105]
[105] I shall now turn to consider what items are in the pool of matrimonial assets to be divided in the proportion as determined above.
The Flat and the Disputed Property are matrimonial assets
- [106]
[106] For an asset to be considered as a matrimonial asset, the said asset has to fall within the definition of a matrimonial asset under s 112(10) WC before it can be included in the pool of matrimonial assets. This is regardless of whether the asset is jointly or separately owned.
- [107]
[107] Section 112(10) provides, inter alia, that “matrimonial asset” includes “any other asset of any nature acquired during the marriage by one party or both parties to the marriage”, but “does not include any asset (not being a matrimonial home) that has been acquired by one party at any time by gift or inheritance and that has not been substantially improved during the marriage by the other party or by both parties to the marriage”.
- [108]
[108] H admitted that the Flat was their matrimonial flat (by describing it as “the Matrimonial Flat” in his Ancillary Matters Fact and Position Sheet ), although H said that W never regarded the Flat as their matrimonial home because they hardly stayed together in it. According to H, W should not be entitled to any part of the net proceeds of sale of the Flat since W made no direct or indirect contributions of any kind towards the marriage.
- [109]
[109] H said that the Disputed Property was not their matrimonial home. H submitted that it should not be included in the pool of matrimonial of assets because it was bought after the parties had separated in September 2007 .
- [110]
[110] I disagree. H had in fact acquired the Disputed Property by using his cash savings and his CPF monies, which he accumulated during the course of their subsisting marriage (ie from the start of their marriage in 1992 to the time immediately preceding the completion of the purchase of the Disputed Property on 17 March 2008). Furthermore, almost the entire net proceeds of sale of the Flat, their matrimonial home, was used by H to help him pay for the purchase of the Disputed Property. From the totality of the evidence, I find that H purchased the Disputed Property using matrimonial assets that he had accumulated during the marriage. I therefore include the Disputed Property in the pool of matrimonial assets for division.
Operative date for ascertaining the pool of matrimonial assets and the end date for assessing the respective financial and non-financial contributions of the parties
- [111]
[111] By default, both the operative date for ascertaining the items in the pool of matrimonial assets, and the end date or cut-off date for determining the parties’ respective financial and non-financial contributions should be the same.
- [112]
[112] For the division of matrimonial assets, the parties’ financial and non-financial contributions start on the first day of their marriage. Their contributions to the marriage do not end just because they have started living separately for whatever reason. Some married couples may live apart for a period of time because of work commitments or other family commitments (eg looking after aged parents living abroad or looking after children studying abroad) during their marriage. Mere physical separation of the husband and wife during a marriage does not terminate their respective financial and non-financial contributions during marriage, which are relevant considerations for the division of matrimonial assets. Due to marital difficulties, parties may also choose to live apart but stay married and not file for divorce. During that period of their physical separation, young children must still be looked after by either the husband or the wife (as the case may be). That non-financial contribution obviously continues and remains as a contribution to the marriage during the whole period of their physical separation and must be considered for the division of matrimonial assets. Their earnings even though when living apart must continue to be regarded as their financial contributions to the marriage during their period of physical separation.
- [113]
[113] However, there must be an end date or cut-off date for ascertaining their respective contributions, so that the ratio of their contributions (both financial and non-financial) can be determined. By default, the end date or cut-off date for ascertaining the contributions (both financial and non-financial) should be the date of the interim judgment. This makes sense as it will also coincide with the default date for determining the available pool of matrimonial assets for division, which as I shall explain later should be the date of the interim judgment as well.
- [114]
[114] H however submitted that the operative date for determining the matrimonial pool of assets was the point of first separation in September 2007 as if a notional interim judgment had been granted on the first day of separation and the marriage was essentially dissolved immediately upon separation. H seems to have suggested that all assets purchased by one party after the first day of separation belong to that party entirely because separation had commenced, regardless of whether any divorce application had in fact been made and whether any interim judgment had in fact been granted, and regardless of whether the funds to purchase those assets had been accumulated during the period of marriage prior to separation. Together with this, H effectively took the position that all accumulation of assets by the parties cease to be joint accumulations but become independent and separate accumulations of the respective parties the very moment they are first separated. As I understand H’s submissions, joint accumulation of assets essentially ceases on the first day of separation, regardless of whether any divorce application had been filed or whether any interim judgment had been granted by the court.
- [115]
[115] I do not agree with all the above extreme propositions suggested by H’s counsel, which obviously were targeted to exclude the valuable Disputed Property from the pool of matrimonial assets so that W would have no share in it whatsoever.
- [116]
[116] W’s counsel submitted that the operative date for determining the matrimonial pool of assets should be the date of IJ on 13 February 2019.
- [117]
[117] In Oh Choon v Lee Siew Lin [2014] 1 SLR 629 (“Oh Choon”), the court adopted the date of interim judgment as the operative date despite the long period between the breakdown of the marriage and the divorce proceedings. In Oh Choon, the husband moved out of the matrimonial home in 1999 but filed for divorce only 11 years later in 2010. Interim judgment was granted a year later in 2011. Prior to the interim judgment, the husband bought a car and a property in joint names with his mistress. The court did not accept the husband’s argument to use the date of separation in 1999 as the operative date as that would have excluded the car and property from the pool of matrimonial assets. The court adopted the date of interim judgment despite the fact that the parties had already separated for 11 years. The court emphasised (at [14]) that there is no hard and fast cut-off date for the determination of the pool of matrimonial assets and everything would, in the final analysis, depend on the precise facts of the case itself. The court held that the date of the interim judgment was appropriate because there “was a continuous (albeit clearly attenuated) relationship between the [husband and wife] throughout” (at [12]) even after the husband left the matrimonial home and before he filed for divorce. Indeed, after moving out of the matrimonial home, the husband had visited the wife at the matrimonial home monthly and paid her maintenance of $1,200 (at [12]).
- [119]
[119] On the facts of this case, W produced evidence that even as late as March 2010, she had written emails to H ending with affectionate words such as “With Luv” to H. Even if a view is to be taken that the pool of matrimonial assets is to be established on a date when the parties were still keeping in contact, ie, in March 2010 because that was the last email that W sent to H signing off “With Luv”, the Disputed Property (the main asset in contention between the parties as to whether it should be part of the pool of assets) would still fall into the pool of assets to be divided, having been acquired by H well before March 2010.
- [121]
[121] In my judgment, unless the particular circumstances or justice of the case warrant otherwise, the starting point or default position for the operative date to ascertain the pool of matrimonial assets is the date of interim judgment, when the marriage can be treated as “practically at an end” and “it is in the interests of parties to settle all ancillary matters and bring closure to the divorce process” (ARY v ARX [2016] 2 SLR 686 (“ARY v ARX”) at [31] and [34], citing Debbie Ong, “Family Law” (2011) 12 SAL Ann Rev 298 (“Family Law”) at para 15.23). Parties will be able to plan their financial affairs with certainty as they move on to the post-divorce stage of their lives. Counsel will also be better placed to advise parties.
The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.