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Grounds publishedDecided 28 Feb 2025

Family Division of the High Court

XIK v XIL

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[2025] SGHCF 16Case no. Divorce (Transferred) No 688 of 2023

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Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The parties were married on 23 February 2013. The plaintiff wife (“the Wife”) is a 41-year-old Singapore citizen who holds the position of a business manager in a company (“Company F”) set up by the parties. Before that, she worked as an account manager in a multimedia company, and as a curator in an art gallery, until the parties’ first child was born in July 2013. The defendant husband (“the Husband”) is a 45-year-old Australian citizen who has been involved in a number of companies in different capacities, including as a director and/or shareholder. The parties have two sons, aged 11 and eight (“C1” and “C2”, respectively, and collectively, the “Children”). The Children reside with the Wife in Singapore, while the Husband works in Papua New Guinea (“PNG”).

  3. [2] The Wife commenced divorce proceedings on 17 February 2023, and Interim Judgment (“IJ”) was granted on 24 August 2023, dissolving the marriage of about ten and a half years.

  4. [3] The parties were able to reach an agreement in relation to the issues of the custody, care and control of, and access to, the Children. Orders were made by consent in the IJ to grant joint custody of the Children to the parties, and care and control of the Children to the Wife, with liberal access to the Husband. The issues before the court concern the division of the matrimonial assets, and maintenance for the Children and the Wife.

  5. Division of the matrimonial assets

  6. [4] Generally, the operative date for the identification of the pool of matrimonial assets is the date that IJ is granted (ARY v ARX and another appeal [2016] 2 SLR 686 at [31]), and the date for the valuation of the matrimonial assets is the date of the ancillary matters (“AM”) hearing or the date closest to the AM hearing, save for balances in bank and Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) accounts, which should be valued as at the date of the IJ, given that the matrimonial assets are the moneys and not the bank and CPF accounts themselves (UYP v UYQ [2020] 3 SLR 683 at [4]). This is not in dispute between the parties. I will therefore adopt the IJ date of 24 August 2023 for the purpose of identifying the pool of matrimonial assets, and the first AM hearing date of 25 July 2024 (or a date closest to it for which evidence of the value of the asset concerned is available) for the purpose of valuing the matrimonial assets, other than the balances in the parties’ bank accounts and CPF accounts, which will be valued at 24 August 2023 (or a date closest to it for which evidence of the balance in the account concerned is available).

  7. [5] Regarding the exchange rate, I adopt the conversion rate of 1 SGD : 0.739658 USD and 1 SGD : 2.6626279 PGK, as agreed by the parties in their Joint Summary. For the Singapore dollar to Australian dollar exchange rate, both parties relied on searches from Xe, an online currency converter, as of 25 April 2024. However, there was a discrepancy in the rates reported by the parties. The Wife stated the exchange rate to be 1 SGD : 1.11845 AUD in the Joint Summary although the results of her search, last updated on 25 April 2024, showed a rate of 1 SGD : 1.12977 AUD. The Husband’s search was last updated on 24 April 2024 and showed a rate of 1 SGD : 1.13044 AUD. As the parties had agreed to rely on searches as of 25 April 2024, I adopt the exchange rate reflected on the Wife’s search results, which was last updated on 25 April 2024, at 1 SGD : 1.12977 AUD.

  8. [6] I turn now to consider the disputed assets.

  9. Disputed assets

  10. Shares in [Company G]

  11. (1) Background and expert valuation

  12. [7] A significant point of contention between the parties is the valuation of the Husband’s 10,988,909 shares in [Company G], an Australian public unlisted company operating a global recruitment marketplace. The Wife initially proposed a value of $491,256.16, based on a share price of A$0.05 as reflected in [Company G’s] Consolidated Financial Report for the year ending 30 June 2023. This figure aligned with the “Share price at grant date” on 1 July 2020. In stark contrast, the Husband submitted that the shares had no value, contending that the company was not profitable and that he could not realise any value from those shares. In the alternative, the Husband submitted that the [Company G] shares should be valued based on [Company G’s] net asset value of $22,165 as at the financial year ending 30 June 2023, in proportion to the Husband’s shareholdings (10,988,909 out of 120,347,397 shares). This would result in the Husband’s 10,988,909 shares having a value of $2,023.88.

  13. [8] It was pointed out to the parties at a hearing on 8 October 2024 that the valuation of shares that are not publicly traded are typically undertaken with reference to expert evidence. It may not be a simple matter of taking the share offering price or the net asset value, particularly when the last set of financial statements in evidence, for the year ending 30 June 2023, indicated that there were recent capital funding activities. Various factors, such as the company’s viability, the market availability for these shares and the difficulty of selling the shares as a result of transfer restrictions (if any), may have to be considered. Subsequently, the parties agreed to jointly appoint an expert to conduct an expert valuation on the Husband’s [Company G] shares. The parties also agreed to a set of Terms of Reference dated 21 November 2024 (“Terms of Reference”) for the conduct of the expert valuation and to be bound by the value of the [Company G] shares as determined by the expert.

  14. [9] Mr Brett Plant (“Mr Plant”), a director of Advisory Partner Connect Pty Ltd, was appointed as the expert valuer. Mr Plant issued an Indicative Valuation Report, which was exhibited in an affidavit filed on 11 December 2024 on behalf of the parties (“Valuation Report”), providing an indicative fair market value of the shares held by the Husband as at 25 July 2024 at between A$55,149 and A$74,271.

  15. (2) Parties’ submissions

  16. [10] The parties tendered further submissions on the value of the [Company G] shares in the light of the Valuation Report. The Wife submits that the value of the [Company G] shares should be taken to be the highest value of A$74,271. This is because [Company G’s] normalised revenue was observed to be increasing each financial year. In the alternative, the Wife submits that the middle value of A$64,710 should be taken, referring to the approach adopted by the court in WUA v WUB [2024] SGHCF 10 (“WUA v WUB”). Using the Wife’s exchange rate of 1 AUD : 0.900854 SGD (as at 20 May 2024), the Wife submits that the value of the [Company G] shares would be $58,294.26. The Husband submits that it would be reasonable to take the average of Mr Plant’s valuation at A$64,710. Using the Husband’s exchange rate of 1 SGD : 1.13044 AUD (as at 25 April 2024), the value of the [Company G] shares would be $57,243.20.

  17. (3) Analysis and decision

  18. [11] I accept Mr Plant’s valuation of the Husband’s [Company G] shares. I find it reasonable to take the average of the higher and lower ends of Mr Plant’s valuation range, as both parties have submitted. This avoids the extremes of either estimate and reduces the risk of overstating or understating the value of the [Company G] shares. This works out to A$64,710, being the average of A$55,149 and A$74,271. Using the exchange rate of 1 SGD : 1.12977 AUD (see [5] above), I value the shares at $57,277.14.

  19. Shares in [Company H]

  20. [12] The Husband owns 7.5m shares in [Company H], a company in the mining sector listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (“ASX”). When [Company H] was listed on the ASX, the Husband was required by the ASX to enter into a Deed of Restriction. The Deed of Restriction provided that the Husband cannot dispose of, create a security interest in, or do anything that had the effect of transferring effective ownership of the [Company H] shares during an escrow period of 24 months from the date of listing on 9 November 2023 (the “escrow period under the Deed of Restriction”), failing which the Husband would cease to be entitled to any dividends or distributions or to exercise any voting rights for so long as the breach continues.

  21. (1) Parties’ submissions

  22. [13] The Wife submits that the Husband’s [Company H] shares should be valued at $3,983,128.39, based on the share price of A$0.60 as at 5 April 2024 and at the exchange rate as at 25 April 2024.

  23. [14] The Husband submits that a valuation that is as close to the date of the AM hearing should be adopted. Hence, he contends that the [Company H] shares should be valued at $3,184,599.60, based on the share price of A$0.48 as at 14 May 2024 and at the exchange rate as at 25 April 2024.

  24. [15] The Husband also highlights that the value of the [Company H] shares is extremely volatile, due to the inherent risks of the mining project. The extreme volatility stems from the fact that the gold mine was challenging to operate and required significant future investment before it would be profitable, a challenge two previous owners were unable to overcome. Natural disasters, political instability in PNG and the introduction of a PNG National Gold Corporation Bill are anticipated to have effects on the value of [Company H] shares. This is exemplified by how the total value of the shares fell by about $800,000 in three weeks, from $3,983,128.39 as at 25 April 2024 to $3,184,599.60 as at 14 May 2024. Given the volatility of the value of the [Company H] shares and his inability to liquidate them until November 2025, the Husband submits that the distribution of the shares should be made in kind.

  25. (2) Analysis and decision

  26. Shareholdings and/or directorships in PNG companies

  27. (1) Parties’ submissions

  28. [17] The Wife contends that the Husband has shares and/or directorships in the following companies incorporated in PNG which are of unknown or undisclosed value: (a) JKAT Investments Limited; (b) Manus Island Environmental Services Ltd; (c) Manus Island Commercial Fisheries Limited; (d) GW Project Services Limited; (e) HDI Orion Joint Venture Limited; (f) Harbourside Hotel Limited; and (g) Samel Energy (PNG) Limited (“Samel Energy”) (collectively, the “PNG Companies”). She further submits that although the Husband has provided some evidence of de-registration of the companies in his Fifth Ancillary Matters Affidavit dated 22 May 2024 (“DAM5”), there is still no evidence of his dealings in these companies. She highlights, in particular, that the Husband remains a substantial shareholder of Samel Energy.

  29. [18] In turn, the Husband asserts that he never received any remuneration from the PNG Companies. He submits that the PNG Companies have been deregistered, or that he has been removed as a director and/or shareholder, or that he has given instructions to be removed as a director and/or shareholder, and that no value is to be ascribed to the various PNG Companies.

  30. (2) Analysis and decision

  31. [19] After a review of the evidence, I find, on balance, that the Husband has no assets in the PNG Companies. JKAT Investments Limited, Manus Island Environmental Services Ltd, Manus Island Commercial Fisheries Limited and HDI Orion Joint Venture Limited are all deregistered companies. There is no evidence that any of these deregistered companies have any value. The Husband owns no shares in GW Project Services Limited and Harbourside Hotel Limited. He has given instructions to be removed as a director in the former, and has already been removed as a director of the latter. As for Samel Energy, the parties agreed to the Husband obtaining a statement from the Investment Promotion Authority (“IPA”) of PNG, a government office responsible for the administration of PNG’s business laws, to address the issue of the status of Samel Energy. By way of an affidavit filed on 13 December 2024, the Husband exhibited a letter dated 4 December 2024 from the representative director and company secretary of Samel Energy, which, when read with a letter from the IPA, confirms that Samel Energy is a dormant company. The dormant status of Samel Energy was subsequently accepted by the Wife. As there is no evidence that Samel Energy has any value, I assign a nil value to the shares of the PNG Companies which the Wife claims are owned by the Husband and of unknown or undisclosed value.

  32. Family Trust

  33. (1) Parties’ submissions

  34. [20] The Wife contends that the Husband failed to disclose the full value of assets held by a trust (the “Family Trust”), which she argues is the Husband’s alter ego. It appears that the basis of the Wife’s claim is that the Family Trust is holding matrimonial assets or that the trust properties comprise matrimonial assets. She alludes to her request for disclosure of the share certificates of the Husband’s shares in [Company G], which revealed that they were held by the Family Trust. The Wife asserts that the Husband was evasive about the holdings of the trust and its true value. In reply, the Husband maintains that he provided full disclosure, including a letter from the Chairman of [Company G’s] Board confirming the Family Trust’s holding of 10,988,909 shares. He argues that the Wife’s decision not to pursue further discovery concerning the Family Trust indicates a lack of genuine concern about hidden assets.

  35. (2) Analysis and decision

  36. [21] A review of the evidence shows that the Family Trust holds both the Husband’s 10,988,909 shares in [Company G] and his 7.5m shares in [Company H]. The Husband disclosed these shareholdings in his First Affidavit of Assets and Means dated 29 September 2023 (“DAM1”), albeit as personal holdings rather than Family Trust assets. This initial characterisation, while not accurate, does not necessarily indicate an intent to conceal. The Wife has not provided any substantive evidence or explanation to support her claim of additional undisclosed matrimonial assets within the Family Trust. Pertinently, following the disclosure of the trust in the Husband’s response to discovery requests on 17 November 2023, the Wife did not make any request for discovery in relation to the Family Trust but now alleges that there are undisclosed matrimonial assets within the Family Trust. This inaction undermines her claims that the Husband’s disclosure was deficient. By not availing herself to the opportunity to seek clarification or request additional information earlier, the Wife’s current assertions that there are additional undisclosed matrimonial assets held by the Family Trust are not tenable. On balance, I find that other than the shares in [Company G] and [Company H], which have been accounted for and included in the pool of matrimonial assets, there is no evidence to show that there are any hidden or undisclosed matrimonial assets held by the Family Trust. Accordingly, I assign a nil value to this item.

  37. Alleged dissipations

  38. (1) Parties’ submissions

  39. [22] The Husband contends that a sum of $69,786.16 should be notionally added back to the matrimonial pool. This sum consists of 51 expenditures incurred over six months between March 2023 and August 2023, after the commencement of divorce proceedings. He characterises these expenditures as “the Wife’s extravagant and flagrant withdrawal of funds” made without his consent. The Wife counters that these expenditures “were incurred in the ordinary course of the family’s lifestyle”, albeit during ongoing divorce proceedings, and were not “artificially inflated to deplete the matrimonial assets”. She categorises the disputed expenditures as:

  40. (a) household furnishings (the “Furnishings”), totalling $21,792.44;

  41. (b) the Children’s expenses, including holidays, staycations and concert tickets (“Children’s Expenses”), totalling $10,206.07; and

  42. (c) luxury items from Hermes, Cartier, Watch Exchange and other boutiques and online retailers for designer wear and accessories (“Luxury Items”), amounting to $30,508.76, and expenditures at clubs, and on flowers and alcohol (“Wife’s Other Expenses”), amounting to $7,277.89, totalling $37,786.65.

  43. [23] On the Wife’s part, she seeks to claw back $12,100 expended by the Husband for purchases of Ethereum after the IJ was granted. The Husband maintains that the purchases were made on behalf of his brother at the latter’s request and that the funds are no longer in his possession.

  44. (2) The applicable law

  45. [24] The Court of Appeal in TNL v TNK and another appeal and another matter [2017] 1 SLR 609 (“TNL v TNK”) at [24] (the “TNL dicta”) provided guidance on when the values of certain assets may be added back into the pool of matrimonial assets:

  46. [25] In UZN v UZM [2021] 1 SLR 426 (“UZN v UZM”), the Court of Appeal explained that the basis for adding sums back into the pool of matrimonial assets under the above circumstances is that the consent of the other party was not obtained, rather than a suspicion of concealment (UZN v UZM at [64]). The Court of Appeal held that expending a large sum of money when divorce is imminent, without more, is not in itself a “wrongful dissipation” (UZN v UZM at [63]). In expounding on the basis for adding sums back into the pool of the matrimonial assets under the TNL dicta, the court gave the example of a mother using a sum of $35,000 to pay for their child’s school fees in an overseas institution, which is not a “wrongful dissipation” intended to put assets out of the reach of the other party. Nevertheless, the father may argue that he never agreed that the child should have an overseas education and that his consent was not given for the sum of $35,000 to be withdrawn for this purpose at a time when divorce was imminent, such that the TNL dicta would apply (UZN v UZM at [64]). The Court of Appeal emphasised that a dissipation falling within the TNL dicta is not necessarily a culpable act and may also not involve a non-disclosure (UZN v UZM at [65]).

  47. (3) Analysis and decision

  48. [26] In determining whether to add back the sums expended by the parties to the pool of matrimonial assets pursuant to the TNL dicta, I consider the timing and substantiality of the impugned expenditures, and the consent (or absence thereof) of the spouse who is disputing the expenditures, as follows.

  49. [27] First, the impugned expenditures must be incurred during the relevant period, namely when (i) the divorce proceedings are imminent or (ii) after IJ but before the ancillaries are concluded (TNL v TNK at [24]) (“the relevant period”). Expenses incurred prior to the relevant period that constitute wasteful whittling away of matrimonial assets may be considered when assessing the parties’ contributions to the marriage (UZN v UZM at [67]).

  50. [28] Second, the expenditure must be substantial. The assessment of what constitutes a substantial expenditure that can be accounted for under the TNL dicta is necessarily a context-dependent inquiry. The Court of Appeal in TNL v TNK observed that what constitutes a substantial sum is a question of fact and emphasised that daily, run-of-the-mill expenses are generally excluded (TNL v TNK at [24]). In the circumstances of the present case, I consider the following factors to be relevant:

  51. (a) First, the quantum of the impugned expenditure, evaluated in connection with the nature and purpose of the expenditure. This contextual analysis recognises that the same amount can be considered substantial in one context but not significant in another context.

  52. (b) Second, the quantum of the sums of similar expenditures (if any) before and during the relevant period.

  53. (c) Third, the aggregation of expenses of a similar nature incurred within the relevant period, if such aggregation more accurately reflects the true nature and extent of the impugned expenditure. Depending on the facts, the court may find no distinction in substance between multiple, temporally proximate purchases of items of similar nature, and a single purchase of all items on one occasion. For example, in UTN v UTO and another [2019] SGHCF 18 at [46]–[49], the court aggregated five payments made to a third party, ranging from $1,500 to $27,400, and added back the aggregate sum to the pool of matrimonial assets under the TNL dicta. Four of the payments were found to be made sufficiently close in time to the filing of the divorce, and one was made before the ancillaries were concluded.

  54. [29] Third, the spouse claiming that an expenditure should be added back to the matrimonial pool must not have expressly or impliedly consented to the expenditure. Evidence of express consent can include contemporaneous affirmations or support for the expenditure in dispute. Even in cases where that spouse did not explicitly consent, his or her actions may suggest the presence of consent, such that the circumstances would justify an inference of implied consent.

  55. [30] Implied consent may be inferred from the family’s spending history, although this is not the only way of showing implied consent. The typicality of an expenditure that reflects the financial circumstances and lifestyle of the family, and the continuation of established expenditure patterns, would tend towards the expenditure not being construed as a dissipation of assets. Indeed, if an impugned expenditure falls within the usual pattern of expenses of the family, the tacit acceptance of similar expenditures in the past would suggest that the other spouse did in fact impliedly consent to incurring the impugned expenditures. However, this inference of implied consent is not immutable, for example, if a spouse provides evidence demonstrating that the implied consent to the family’s customary spending habits has been explicitly revoked. By adopting this approach, parties to a marriage can be assured of a mutual understanding of evolving financial expectations as the marriage approaches its dissolution, thereby avoiding potential surprises.

  56. [31] The frequency, consistency and reasonableness of expenditures are also relevant in determining the scope of implied consent. To illustrate, while a spouse may have impliedly consented to an annual purchase of a new smartphone, this implied consent cannot justify acquiring one such device every month. Even if the purchase of a new phone is not considered an unusual expense for the family, the dramatic escalation in the frequency of such financial outlays fundamentally alters the nature of the expenditure, providing a basis for the excess expenditures to be clawed back. Expenditures that are not part of the family’s regular expenses, or those that are disproportionately high, are therefore subject to particular scrutiny, since the larger the sum expended, the less likely it is that the other spouse had impliedly consented to it.

  57. [32] In essence, while implied consent derived from established spending patterns provides a starting point for analysis, it must be evaluated in light of the changing circumstances surrounding the impending divorce. This follows from the need to balance expectations from the family’s pre-existing financial norms against the need to protect the parties’ interests as the marriage concludes.

  58. [33] Having set out these broader considerations, I now turn to each category of disputed expenditures of both the Wife and the Husband. The central focus of the inquiry is on whether the parties consented to the impugned expenditures, given that neither party has identified any of the sums involved as being non-substantial in quantum.

  59. (A) The Furnishings expenditures

  60. [34] The Furnishings expenditures, totalling $21,792.44, consist of purchases of furniture from various shops and household accessories like speakers. These expenditures were incurred between March 2023 and August 2023, when the divorce was imminent and fall within the relevant period. These are not daily, run-of-the-mill expenses, and they add up to a substantial quantum. However, I find that the Husband had impliedly consented to this set of expenditures. The Wife and Children were moving into new rental accommodation under a new tenancy agreement for two years, and the family had to furnish their new home after moving in. I am unable to accept the Husband’s argument that the expenses for Furnishings were incurred without his consent. The family’s past rental selections reveal an emphasis on the standard of their accommodation, with not insignificant expenditure spent on rental in more upscale districts. The expenses for Furnishings are not unreasonable or inconsistent with the standard of housing that the family was accustomed to. I therefore decline to add the Furnishings expenditures back into the pool of matrimonial assets.

  61. (B) The Children’s Expenses

  62. [35] The Children’s Expenses, totalling $10,206.07, consisted of the purchase of tickets to a Coldplay concert, two staycations, a holiday to Bali, holiday shopping and purchases for what appear to be sporting gear and equipment. These expenditures, incurred between April 2023 and August 2023 when the divorce was imminent, fall within the relevant period. Such discretionary expenditures for leisure and entertainment within a short span of a few months are substantial. Considering the family’s lifestyle and the typicality of such expenditure prior to the breakdown of the marriage, I find, however, that the Children’s Expenses were not incurred without the consent of the Husband.

  63. [36] The evidence shows a pattern of family spending on holidays and travel before the breakdown of the marriage. The Wife gave evidence that the Husband would fund family trips to Europe, Dubai, Milan and Paris, and this is not disputed by the Husband. This pattern of international travel suggests that the Bali holiday and staycations align with the family’s customary spending on holidays. Corroborating this pattern is a social media post by the Wife in July 2016, documenting that C1 received a business class flight as a birthday gift, illustrating the family’s propensity for luxury travel experiences.

  64. [38] Considering the family’s income bracket and lifestyle, which includes driving higher end cars, dining out and international travel outside of Asia, I am not persuaded that the Children’s Expenses for staycations, regional travel to Bali, or the purchase of sporting gear and equipment were incurred without the Husband’s consent. I find that such expenditures are consistent with the usual course of child-rearing within the context of this family. Consequently, I decline to add the Children’s Expenses of $10,206.07 back into the matrimonial pool.

  65. (C) The Wife’s Personal Expenses

  66. [39] I now turn to the Wife’s expenditure on the Luxury Items and the Wife’s Other Expenses (collectively, the “Wife’s Personal Expenses”), totalling $37,786.65. They were incurred between March 2023 to August 2023, when the divorce was imminent and fall within the relevant period. Upon consideration of the factors set out at [26]–[32] above, I conclude that these sums are substantial and were incurred without the Husband’s consent, save for one exception. I explain.

  67. [40] The Wife’s Personal Expenses consist of purchases from designer wear boutiques, clothing retailers, clubs, bars, alcohol shops and flower shops. I consider these expenses collectively and as an aggregation, as this would more accurately reflect the true nature and extent of the impugned expenditures. These expenses share similar characteristics, in the sense that they comprise discretionary spending on luxury goods and entertainment incurred within the relevant period. In my view, the quantum of each of these expenditures, whether evaluated on its own in conjunction with the nature and purpose of the expenditure, or in light of similar expenses in the past, is clearly substantial. The Wife rightly did not dispute this. However, the Wife claims that the disputed expenditures “were incurred in the ordinary course of the family’s lifestyle”.

  68. [41] The Wife asserts that the Husband previously lavished her with gifts, including a Cartier timepiece, a diamond ring, numerous handbags and shoes. However, this fact alone does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the Wife’s Personal Expenses during the relevant period were consistent with her previous lifestyle. Even accepting that the Wife possessed some luxury goods, including branded watches, jewellery, shoes and bags, it is striking that she has produced no evidence on how often she indulged in such purchases. It is telling that, save for some photographs, the Wife has not been able to produce any receipts or bank statements to show previous similar expenditures to substantiate her claim that the impugned expenditures between March and August 2023 “were incurred in the ordinary course of the family’s lifestyle”. There is no evidence to support the frequency of her expenditures between March 2023 and August 2023, nor their consistency with previous analogous expenditures. Her expenditures of $8,500 at Watch Exchange, $6,270 at Hermes and approximately $5,317 at Cartier, which form part of a series of 17 purchases that the Wife herself categorised as “luxury/branded items” over six months during the relevant period, appear to be disproportionate to any established pattern of gift-giving or personal spending. The social media posts from 2014 to 2021 exhibiting gifted items or the Wife’s use of branded goods fall far short in establishing that the purchases that she made for herself from March 2023 to August 2023 were aligned with the family’s typical spending profile for luxury goods and entertainment. Furthermore, it is doubtful if evidence of the Husband’s gifts to the Wife assists the Wife, given that the Luxury Items were purchases made personally by the Wife for herself using funds that were matrimonial assets.

  69. [42] The Wife’s assertion that “the specific [Luxury Items] purchased are not identifiable” is also problematic. There is no explanation or information on what the Wife paid for, and no trace of any of these Luxury Items that she bought. Like the items exhibited in the social media posts, none of the luxury purchases made from March 2023 to August 2023 have been disclosed in the list of the Wife’s assets or otherwise accounted for. If the Wife had disclosed the Luxury Items purchased, the usual course of action would have been to include the value of the Luxury Items in the pool of matrimonial assets as assets held by the Wife, unless they have no value. In this regard, the Wife’s case is that the Luxury Items she purchased are not identifiable. She did not advance a case that they have no value.

  70. [43] In respect of the Wife’s Other Expenses, while there is evidence of previous spendings on flowers of $56 and wine of $124.40 and $92.15, those amounts are nowhere close to the almost $1,300 on two orders of flowers, $530 on alcohol, and around $2,000 spent at bars or clubs during the relevant period. These expenses, like the purchases of the Luxury Items that the Wife failed to account for, deplete the pool of matrimonial assets. They appear not to be incurred in the ordinary course of the family’s lifestyle, but rather what could be a coping mechanism for the emotional distress and devastating consequences caused by the marital breakdown, or an indulgence unleashed as a final flourish in the last stages of a failed marriage.

  71. [44] As I noted above at [30]–[31], expenditures that are not part of the family’s regular expenses, or those that are disproportionately high, are subject to particular scrutiny. In this regard, I find that the Wife’s Personal Expenses incurred during the relevant period are disproportionate to any established pattern of gift-giving or personal spending even when the marriage was intact, and that the Husband did not consent to the Wife’s Personal Expenses. Accordingly, except for one item of payment to Foodpanda in the amount of $372.54, which in my view falls within the category of daily, run-of-the-mill expenses and therefore should be excluded, the Wife’s Personal Expenses should be returned to the pool of matrimonial assets. The sum that should be returned to the pool of matrimonial assets is $37,414.11 ($37,786.65 less $372.54).

  72. (D) The Husband’s Ethereum Purchase

  73. [45] The Husband’s expenditure on Ethereum purchases for his brother from 28 June 2023 to 9 September 2023 were made after the divorce proceedings were commenced on 17 February 2023 and during the relevant period. The Husband claims that he no longer controls or possesses the purchased Ethereum. This expenditure resembles the Wife’s expenditure on the Luxury Items. The Ethereum is not included in the Husband’s list of assets or otherwise accounted for. The Ethereum purchases, which cumulatively added up to $12,100, have resulted in a corresponding depletion of matrimonial assets. Upon consideration of the factors set out at [28] above, I conclude that these expenses are substantial. Here, there is no evidence to suggest that the Wife consented to or was even aware of those transactions. Given these circumstances, I find that this $12,100 expenditure is a substantial sum spent without the express or implied consent of the Wife and should be added back into the pool of matrimonial assets for equitable distribution.

  74. Drawing of adverse inference against the Husband

  75. (1) Parties’ submissions

  76. [46] The Wife submits that an adverse inference ought to be drawn against the Husband for his failure to provide full and frank disclosure of his assets, income and means, and urges the court to draw an adverse inference that the Husband earns far more than he has disclosed.

  77. [47] First, the Wife refers to the Husband’s transfers of a total of $12,100 to Hako Technology Pte Ltd from 28 June 2023 to 9 September 2023. The Husband avers that these funds were used to purchase Ethereum for his brother. The Wife submits that the Husband’s denial that he holds any cryptocurrency and that he had used the cryptocurrency account to purchase cryptocurrency for this brother calls into the question the completeness of his disclosure. She further submits that it is not untenable that the Husband has other undisclosed sources of funds. She argues that the Husband’s response is unsatisfactory because she does not know the value of cryptocurrency the Husband possesses, and the Husband has not substantiated his response.

  78. [48] Second, the Wife refers to the Husband’s shares in [Company H], which the Husband had originally averred were worth nothing. The Wife submits that after discovering that the shares in [Company H] were listed on the ASX and worth $4m, she then suspected that the PNG Companies, particularly Samel Energy, held value that the Husband did not disclose. In this regard, it may be recalled that the Wife’s original position was that Samel Energy was a live company but she eventually accepted that it was a dormant company (see [19] above).

  79. [50] The Husband submits, in response, that he had answered the Wife’s interrogatories and that he had disclosed all his cryptocurrency transactions. The Husband asserts that he could not prove a negative (that he did not hold any cryptocurrency) beyond confirming on affidavit that he did not hold any cryptocurrency, and there was accordingly no substratum of evidence to draw an adverse inference against him.

  80. [51] Further, the Husband submits that he made full and frank disclosure of his holding of shares in [Company H] in DAM1 (dated 29 September 2023), and that [Company H] was only listed on the ASX on 9 November 2023. The shares in [Company H] started to have value only after [Company H] was listed, and once this was highlighted to the Husband, he filed affidavits on the value of the [Company H] shares. Therefore, there was no sum of moneys that is unaccounted for to warrant the drawing of an adverse inference. In relation to the PNG Companies, the Husband submits that most of them have been deregistered or the Husband is no longer involved with them, and Samel Energy, the only company that may have been still re-registered, was inactive as its last annual return was dated 30 November 2020. Therefore, there was no substratum of evidence to draw an adverse inference against him.

  81. (2) The applicable law

  82. The Appellate Division of the High Court added that there must be some evidence suggesting that the person has sought to conceal or deplete assets which should be included in the matrimonial pool (WRX v WRY at [38], citing BOR v BOS and another appeal [2018] SGCA 78 (“BOR v BOS”) at [75]). The adverse inference drawn is that the non-disclosing party has more assets that are not before the court, and hence, what is disclosed does not fully reflect the true extent of the material gains of the marital partnership which is to be divided by the court (WRX v WRY at [38]).

  83. (3) Analysis and decision

  84. [53] The Wife has sought to have the court draw adverse inferences against the Husband on several grounds. After careful consideration, I find no basis to draw such inferences.

  85. [54] The Husband has deposed that he does not hold any cryptocurrencies and only used his CoinHako account to purchase Ethereum for his brother at the latter’s request. This explanation adequately accounts for why the Ethereum was not included in the Husband’s list of assets. While I have found this purchase to be a substantial expenditure made without the Wife’s consent after the divorce was imminent and added it back to the matrimonial pool (see [45] above), I do not find it to be evidence of asset concealment warranting an adverse inference to be drawn.

  86. [55] In relation to the shares in [Company H], they were disclosed by the Husband in DAM1. At that time, the shares were not listed. They were subsequently listed on the ASX and brought to the attention of the court by the Wife when she filed her fourth affidavit. Thereafter, the Husband filed an affidavit setting out the listing and valuation of [Company H]. It would indeed have been less unsatisfactory had the Husband made the disclosure that he would be coming into money on his own accord. That having been said, the eventual disclosure negates any basis for an adverse inference to be drawn, given that the material gain of the marital partnership in respect of those shares has already been duly reflected by the inclusion of these shares in the pool of matrimonial assets. Further, as the Appellate Division of the High Court held in CVC v CVB [2023] SGHC(A) 28 at [97], belated disclosure is not non-disclosure. As for the shares of the PNG Companies, I have assessed them to have no value, including those in Samel Energy (which the Wife ultimately accepted as a dormant company (see [19] above) with no value), and they similarly provide no basis for an adverse inference to be drawn against the Husband.

  87. [56] The Wife submits that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Husband due to his substantial financial capacity and potential “undisclosed sources of funds”. However, I find these arguments unpersuasive for several reasons. Firstly, the legal threshold for drawing an adverse inference requires a substratum of evidence establishing a prima facie case that the non-disclosing party has more assets that are not included in the pool of matrimonial assets. Mere assertions of financial capacity, and speculative claims about undisclosed funds, do not meet this threshold. Secondly, the Husband’s financial capacity is, in itself, not a valid basis for drawing an adverse inference. Financial capacity speaks to potential earning power or wealth, but does not necessarily indicate hidden assets or income. Thirdly, the Husband has been transparent about his income from the outset, having disclosed his income and allowances in DAM1, and there is nothing concrete to suggest any concealment of other income sources.

  88. [58] In summary, the burden of proof in establishing the grounds for an adverse inference to be drawn lies with the party seeking to draw the adverse inference. In this case, the Wife’s broad averments and speculative assertions, without substantiating evidence, are insufficient to meet this burden or to establish a prima facie case of asset concealment.

  89. The total pool of matrimonial assets and liabilities

  90. [59] Having dealt with the disputed items, a summary of the pool of matrimonial assets, including the assets with undisputed valuations, is as follows:

  91. Division of the matrimonial assets

  92. [60] Having identified and valued the pool of matrimonial assets, I now determine the proportion in which it is to be divided.

  93. Parties’ submissions

  94. [61] Both parties agree that this is a single-income marriage, with the Husband as the sole breadwinner and the Wife as the homemaker. Consequently, they are agreed that the approach in TNL v TNK should apply. The Husband also cites the case of BOR v BOS, where it was observed by the Court of Appeal that in relation to marriages of a shorter duration of around ten to 15 years, the trend appears to be towards awarding the non-income earning party about 25% to 35% of the matrimonial pool.

  95. [62] The Wife seeks 45% of the matrimonial assets, basing her claim on several factors. She cites her sacrifices, including frequent travel and temporary relocations for the Husband’s work, significant indirect contributions in supporting the family, contributions to the parties’ joint OCBC account “[w]henever possible”, and her sole effort in acquiring assets held in her sole name. She points to her role as the primary caregiver of the Children since their infancy, outlining comprehensive childcare responsibilities. The Wife avers that the Husband was “largely absent” due to his work rotations, before he ultimately decided to reside in PNG, leaving the Wife to shoulder the caregiving responsibilities with the assistance of a domestic helper. While the Wife does not deny that the Husband loves the Children deeply and enjoys spending time with them, she cites WGE v WGF [2023] SGHCF 26 (“WGE v WGF”) (at [159]) to make the point that that does not equate to the Husband being an involved father.

  96. [63] The Wife also seeks to draw parallels between her case and BOR v BOS, where the wife there was awarded 35% of the matrimonial assets. The Wife argues that the Husband has consistently been absent from Singapore due to his work commitments and she had to face challenges like managing the household, supervising the helper and managing [Company F] alone. The Wife distinguishes her case from VIG v VIH [2021] 3 SLR 1145 (“VIG v VIH”), where the wife was awarded 30% of the matrimonial assets. She argues that her contributions are distinct from those of the wife in VIG v VIH, citing her involvement in [Company F] as the sole director and shareholder of the company. According to her, the Husband injected capital into the company but he leveraged on her Singapore citizenship for tax benefits. She explains that the Husband channelled his salary into [Company F], and both parties drew salaries from the company to enjoy tax reliefs under this arrangement. She also received various dividends ranging from $125,177 to $180,000 from 2020 to 2023. The Wife contends that she managed the company’s operations by acting on the Husband’s instructions, and beyond that, she carried out tasks such as searching for rental spaces and liaising with its corporate service provider, and shouldered all the risks associated with the company. She also refers to MZ v NA [2006] SGDC 96 (“MZ v NA”), where a wife in an 18-year marriage who assisted with administrative and accounting tasks associated with her husband’s business was awarded 45% of the matrimonial assets. The Wife argues that she should be awarded 40% of the matrimonial assets. Citing s 112 of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“Women’s Charter”), the Wife seeks an additional 5% on top of the 40%, bringing her total claim to 45%, to secure suitable accommodation for herself and the Children.

  97. [64] The Husband, while agreeing that this was a single-income marriage, contends that he should be awarded 80% of the matrimonial assets. He argues that he made 100% of the direct and indirect financial contributions, including assets in the Wife’s name. He asserts that the Wife’s claims of financial contributions are inconsistent with her status as a stay-at-home parent and her pre-marital debts. The Husband further emphasises that the bulk of the money in the Wife’s bank account(s) were derived from dividends declared by [Company F], which were generated by the Husband’s sole efforts.

  98. [65] The Husband also argues that he has made substantial indirect non-financial contributions. He contends that he was a “hands-on father” who did his fair share of caring for the Children when they were young. He was involved in the Children’s enrolment in school, facilitated and supported C1’s speech therapy sessions, and brought the Children on outings and played with them. He highlights that prior to his relocation to PNG, the parties were joint caregivers, and he was always present for the Children, as evidenced by his close bond with them.

  99. [66] The Husband cites ABX v ABY and others [2014] 2 SLR 969 (“ABX v ABY”) and VPM v VPL [2024] SLR(FC) 158 in support of his submission that an award of 25% of the matrimonial assets to the Wife should serve as a starting point. Both cases involved single-income marriages of similar duration (around ten and 11 years respectively). The wife in each of these cases were awarded 25% of the matrimonial assets. The Husband further submits that the Wife’s entitlement here should be adjusted downwards to 20% based on two further arguments.

  100. [67] Firstly, he cites the Wife’s disruptive behaviour, which he claims not only damaged him personally and professionally, but also made it difficult for him to spend time with the family in Singapore. He refers to various allegations he had made in his Defence and Counterclaim (Amendment No. 1) dated 19 July 2023 (“Counterclaim”), such as how the Wife (i) unilaterally cancelled the Husband’s permanent residency application, reinstated it, and cancelled it again; (ii) made frequent calls to the police regarding the Husband that led to multiple visits by the police to the family’s residence; (iii) sent the Husband’s mother over a hundred emails between August 2017 to February 2022; and (iv) sent the Chairman of the Board of [Company G], the Husband’s former employer, more than 2000 emails. The Husband adduced evidence to show that the emails to his mother were of an offensive character and those to the Chairman of the Board of [Company G] contained personal attacks on the Chairman and his family. The Husband contends that these actions ultimately forced him to leave [Company G] and seek work in PNG. Consequently, he was unable to be in Singapore for extended periods from 2020 to 2023 due to his work in PNG and the COVID-19 pandemic, but he maintained regular contact with the Children.

  101. [68] Secondly, the Husband relies on what he submits to be similarities between the present case and Tay Ang Choo Nancy v Yeo Chong Lin and another (Yeo Holdings Pte Ltd, miscellaneous party) [2010] SGHC 126 (“Yeo Chong Lin (HC)”) and Yeo Chong Lin v Tay Ang Choo Nancy and another appeal [2011] 2 SLR 1157 (“Yeo Chong Lin (CA)”). In Yeo Chong Lin (HC), the court found the husband’s contributions to the accumulation of matrimonial assets to be extraordinary, resulting in a more favourable division for the husband. The division ratio of 65 : 35 in favour of the husband was upheld on appeal. The Husband argues that similar considerations should apply here, justifying a reduction in the Wife’s share to 20%.

  102. The applicable law

  103. [69] The law on the division of the matrimonial assets and the consideration of direct and indirect contributions in a structured approach was encapsulated in the Court of Appeal’s decision in ANJ v ANK [2015] 4 SLR 1043 (“ANJ v ANK”). In TNL v TNK, the Court of Appeal held that the structured approach in ANJ v ANK should not be applied to single-income marriages, where roles of the spouses are divided along more traditional lines, ie, where one spouse is the sole income earner and the other plays the role of homemaker (at [43] and [46]). The Court of Appeal observed that in long single-income marriages, the precedent cases show that the courts tend towards an equal division of the matrimonial assets, but different considerations may attach in short single-income marriages (TNL v TNK at [48]). The Court of Appeal in TNL v TNK identified what appeared to be an outlier to the trend that tended towards an equal division of the matrimonial assets in long marriages (at [52]), namely in the case of Yeo Chong Lin (CA). In Yeo Chong Lin (CA), which concerned a marriage of 49 years, the Court of Appeal found that the value of the matrimonial pool was approximately $69m (Yeo Chong Lin (CA) at [70]–[71]) and upheld the High Court’s apportionment of the assets at 35 : 65 in favour of the husband (Yeo Chong Lin (CA) at [82]). As observed by the Court of Appeal in TNL v TNK at [52], Yeo Chong Lin (CA) involved a unique set of facts and a major factor that featured in the analysis was the exceptionally large size of the asset pool.

  104. [70] In BOR v BOS, the Court of Appeal provided context to the terms “short single-income marriages” and “long single-income marriages” in noting that in TNL v TNK itself, the marriage involved was around 35 years long and the cases which the court there referred to as relevant precedents involved marriages of between 26 to 30 years (at [111]). The court made the observation that the trend in “moderately lengthy marriages”, which applies to marriages in the range of around 15 to 18 years, was to award the homemaker about 35% to 40% of the matrimonial assets (BOR v BOS at [113], citing ATT v ATS [2012] 2 SLR 859 at [18]). The court also found that for marriages of shorter duration of around ten to 15 years, the trend appeared to be towards awarding the non-income earning party about 25% to 35% of the pool of matrimonial assets (BOR v BOS at [113]).

  105. [71] On the facts of BOR v BOS, the marriage lasted 11 years and four months (at [5]). The wife was a homemaker, and the husband was a business consultant who had relocated to China for work, leaving the wife to reside in Singapore with their two sons (at [4]). The court found that the wife was solely responsible for caring for the two sons, the father’s aged parents and the father’s daughters from a previous marriage while the father was overseas. Even allowing for the assistance of domestic helpers, her indirect contributions were given considerable weight, and the appropriate apportionment was for the wife to receive 35% of the matrimonial assets (at [114]).

  106. Analysis and decision

  107. [72] Both parties agree that the present case involves a single-income marriage, rendering the structured approach in ANJ v ANK inapplicable. They also agree on the relevance of BOR v BOS, which suggests that for marriages lasting from ten to 15 years, the non-income earning party typically receives 25% to 35% of the matrimonial assets. The question is whether the Wife’s entitlement should deviate from this range, with the Wife seeking an upward adjustment to 45% and the Husband advocating for a downward adjustment to 20%.

  108. [73] I do not think that the Husband’s account that he made all the direct and indirect financial contributions to the family can be seriously disputed. On the Wife’s own case, she left her previous employment after C1 was born in July 2013 and did not re-enter the work force thereafter. She admits that other than the salary she drew and the dividends she received from [Company F], which consisted of funds injected by the Husband, she did not have any additional sources of income. While the Wife maintains that she has set up a website to showcase her artwork from late 2021, she claims to have sold only four out of 19 art pieces and to have received “just a few hundred dollars”. She also admits that prior to the marriage, she had a debt of around $5,000 which was paid off by the Husband. This suggests that she did not enter the marriage with any savings that she could draw from to contribute financially to the family.

  109. [74] In terms of the parties’ indirect non-financial contributions to the family, it is clear from the evidence that the Wife has been the primary caregiver of the Children since they were born, and that she had managed the household during the course of the marriage. The evidence shows that the Wife has a close and loving relationship with the Children. This is corroborated by the Husband’s concession, although qualified, that the Wife is “a good mother to the Children to a certain extent”. Although the Wife has always had the assistance of a domestic helper, this does not negate her efforts in daily household management. I also note that the family moved briefly to Brisbane after the birth of C2 for the Husband’s work, although the Wife and Children returned to Singapore after six months. The Wife’s indirect contributions to the family were substantial, especially after the Husband moved to work in PNG, and should be duly recognised.

  110. [75] The Husband shared in caregiving responsibilities when he was in Singapore. There is evidence to show that the Husband has played a role in the Children’s lives, such as the Children’s school enrolments and spending quality time with them. The Wife herself does not deny that the Husband loves the Children deeply and spends time with them when he returns to Singapore. On the whole, the evidence shows that although the Husband could not spend as much time with the Children as the Wife because of his work in PNG and his indirect contributions were consequently less than hers, he is a loving and responsible father.

  111. [76] I am unable to agree with the Wife that parallels may be drawn between her and the wife in BOR v BOS. In awarding the wife in that case 35% of the matrimonial assets, the court found that the wife there was not a typical homemaker in a single income family, but rather, that while the husband was overseas, she was solely responsible for caring not only for their two sons, but also the husband’s aged parents and daughters from a previous marriage. The Wife’s assertions about her contributions to managing the household, supervising the helper, caring for two young children and managing [Company F], eg, by obtaining tax concessions by virtue of her citizenship or liaising with [Company F’s] corporate service provider, were of a distinct character from the situation of the wife in BOR v BOS. They do not appear to have required the same extent of time or effort on the Wife’s part, and have not come close to matching the level of time and effort invested by the wife in BOR v BOS.

  112. [79] Another case which is analogous to the present case is ABX v ABY, a case cited by the Husband. The Court of Appeal in UDA v UDB and another [2018] 1 SLR 1015 (“UDA v UDB”) at [64]–[65] referred to ABX v ABY as one of the cases in which the court had exceeded its jurisdiction by dealing with, under s 112 of the Women’s Charter, the rights of spouses and a third party where the third party was seeking a determination of his or her rights, but that point has not arisen in the present dispute. The decision of the court in ABX v ABY relating to the proportion of the matrimonial assets awarded to each of the parties was not discussed in UDA v UDB and was not affected. ABX v ABY was a case which involved a single-income marriage of approximately ten years with two children (at [1], [3] and [61]). For the early years of the marriage, the parties were based in Hong Kong. The wife took care of the household chores with the help of a part-time domestic helper in Hong Kong (at [4]). After the children were born, the wife moved to Singapore together with the children while the Husband remained in Hong Kong for his work for the three years thereafter. While the husband was overseas, the wife took care of the household and the children with the assistance of domestic helpers and her mother-in-law (at [3]–[6]). The wife also contributed US$52,000, which the court regarded as her financial contributions to the general household expenses and the care of the children (at [63]). Further, the wife had asked only for a nominal sum of $1 for her maintenance, which the court took into account as a relevant factor in dividing the pool of matrimonial assets in the proportion of 25 : 75 in favour of the husband (at [63]).

  113. [80] Considering all the circumstances of this case, including the 11-year marriage duration, the fact that the Husband was the sole financial provider for the family, the role that the Wife played as primary caregiver and in managing the parties’ household and [Company F], as well as both parties’ devotion to the Children, and taking into account comparable reasoned decisions such as VIG v VIH and ABX v ABY, I find it appropriate to grant an award to the Wife that is situated below the midpoint of the typical 25% to 35% range. The financial contributions of the wife in VIG v VIH (although not significant when considering the size of the $36.8m pool of matrimonial assets) and her sacrifice of her legal career, warranted a higher percentage award for the wife in that case as compared to the Wife here. However, a more favourable allocation that exceeds the baseline benchmark of 25% within the typical range that was awarded to the wife in ABX v ABY will provide the Wife here with a greater measure of financial stability and put her in a better position to provide for the Children who are in her care and control. All things considered, I find it just and equitable to divide the matrimonial assets in a ratio of 72.5 : 27.5 in favour of the Husband.

  114. [81] As for the Husband’s reliance on Yeo Chong Lin (CA) and Yeo Chong Lin (HC) in support of his submission that the Wife’s entitlement should be adjusted downwards to 20% and his entitlement upwards to 80% in light of his contributions to the accumulation of the pool of matrimonial assets, which he submits “has been nothing short of extraordinary”, I find it to be misplaced. The important factor that featured in the analysis for awarding the breadwinner spouse a larger share in that case was the exceptionally large asset pool of $69m. That rationale can find no application here given the significant difference in the size of the pool of matrimonial assets.

  115. Giving effect to the apportionment of the pool of matrimonial assets

  116. [82] I turn next to consider how the division of the pool of matrimonial assets should be effected. In particular, I address how the Husband’s shares in [Company H] should be divided.

  117. Parties’ submissions

  118. [83] The Wife submits that the balance of her share of the matrimonial assets, after accounting for her retaining all the moneys in her name and the parties’ joint assets, should be paid to her within one month from the expiration of the escrow period under the Deed of Restriction. She urges the court “to fix the value of the [Company H] shares now, but defer the payment”.

  119. The applicable law

  120. Analysis and decision

  121. [87] Although CYH v CYI and WPN v WPO concern the treatment of shares in private companies during the division of matrimonial assets, the present case is analogous to CYH v CYI and WPN v WPO, as the illiquidity of the Husband’s [Company H] shares (until the expiry of the escrow period under the Deed of Restriction) poses a similar problem. To recap, when [Company H] was listed on the ASX, the Husband entered into a Deed of Restriction under which the [Company H] shares cannot be liquidated or otherwise transferred by the Husband before the expiry of an escrow period of 24 months from the date of listing on 9 November 2023. Any valuation ascribed to the [Company H] shares therefore cannot be realised presently. Ascribing a cash value to these shares for payment to the Wife at a later date will result in an unfair situation where the Husband bears all the risks associated with the price volatility of the shares. A party who does not want to bear the risks associated with a price volatile asset can usually convert it to cash or sell the asset to mitigate his or her exposure. However, in the present case, the Husband does not have the option to sell the shares or crystalise the value of the shares to manage or mitigate his exposure to the risks associated with the price volatility of the shares.

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