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Grounds publishedDecided 11 Apr 2025
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Family Division of the High Court

WGM v WGN

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[2025] SGHCF 23Case no. Divorce (Transferred) No 2222 of 201410 paragraphs

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  1. [1] This is the applicant husband’s application for the court to determine the operative date for determining the pool of matrimonial assets (the “Determination Date”) and the operative date for valuing the pool of matrimonial assets (the “Valuation Date”). The default position for the Determination Date and the Valuation Date is the interim judgment (“IJ”) date and the ancillary matters hearing date, respectively – except for bank accounts and Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) accounts, which are to be valued at the IJ date. Although the operative dates are typically determined at the ancillary matters hearing, the applicant seeks a determination now because of the unusual circumstances of this case.

  2. [4] In the meantime, in May 2020, the applicant discovered that the older child was not his biological child. On 30 June 2020, the applicant filed FC/SUM 1731/2020 (“SUM 1731”) to set aside clause 3 of the IJ on the basis that there was fraudulent non-disclosure by the respondent in failing to disclose to him that the older child was not his biological child throughout the marriage and at the time the deed and IJ were entered into. The respondent maintained that she had long disclosed to the applicant that the older child was not his biological child. Nevertheless, the court found that it was unlikely that the respondent had made such a disclosure and set aside clause 3 of the IJ on the grounds of fraudulent non-disclosure on 3 December 2021. The respondent filed an appeal against the decision but withdrew it subsequently. Since clause 3 of the IJ was set aside, the parties filed their first affidavit of assets and means on 24 October 2023 in preparation for the ancillary matters to be heard.

  3. [7] The respondent’s position is that the present application is premature, and that the Determination Date and Valuation Date should be determined at the ancillary matters hearing. The respondent relies on rr 22(2) and 22(3)(c) of the Family Justice Rules 2014, saying that the court will only have the benefit of both parties’ affidavits and oral evidence at the ancillary matters hearing. The respondent claims that the applicant only commenced the present application to evade the court’s orders of production of documents in SUM 2185 and SUM 2186 because he wants to conceal evidence of his dissipation of matrimonial assets. The respondent says that the applicant should not be allowed to deprive her of the “fruits of her litigation” (citing VOC v VOD [2021] SGHCF 14 at [13]) by allowing the Determination Date and Valuation Date to be fixed on a date that would result in the applicant being able to avoid complying with the orders in SUM 2185 and SUM 2186. Furthermore, the respondent says that the applicant has attempted to justify the application by referring to his alleged compliance with the IJ, yet the applicant had applied to set aside the IJ in his application vide SUM 1731. Therefore, the applicant should not be permitted to “have his cake and eat it”.

  4. [9] The applicant claims that the Determination Date should be the IJ date, ie, 10 July 2014. He says that the writ of divorce was filed on 15 May 2014, which was not long before the IJ and the final judgment was three months after the IJ, thus there is no significant difference in the pool of matrimonial assets between those dates. The applicant claims that “there are no cogent reasons to depart from the IJ date” as the parties’ marital union had ended on the IJ date and their relationship after the divorce is “not relevant at all”. The applicant asserts that there is no reason to use a date more than six years after their divorce, especially since both parties had remarried not long after. He also claims that it is prejudicial to his current spouse to include assets acquired by him for the benefit of his new family in the pool of matrimonial assets with the respondent.

  5. [10] The respondent says that the Determination Date should be no earlier than March 2020 because this was when the parties’ relationship broke down and the applicant “forced” the respondent to stop working at the Company. She relies on CLD v CLE at [23] (referring to ARY v ARX and another appeal [2016] 2 SLR 686 at [34]), which states that the crux of the assessment is when the marriage can be treated as “practically at an end”. There are three indicia in this inquiry – that there is “no longer any matrimonial home, no consortium vitae and no right on either side to conjugal rights” (CLD v CLE at [23]). The respondent says that the first factor is irrelevant as the parties did not own any matrimonial home even during the marriage. She claims that the parties continued to have consortium vitae even after the divorce was finalised in October 2014 and that consortium vitae only terminated after the parties’ fallout around March 2020. She substantiates her argument by saying that they continued to interact with each other regularly on a cordial basis after their divorce and ran the Company together as the boss and the “madam boss”. The respondent listed her contributions to the Company and exhibited her messages with the applicant, claiming that they “still intermingled both their business interest and their family life” even until the end of 2019.

  6. [12] The next issue is the determination of the Valuation Date. The default position for the valuation of matrimonial assets is the date of the ancillary matters hearing, save for the parties’ bank accounts and CPF accounts which are to be valued at the IJ date (UYP v UYQ [2020] 3 SLR 683 at [4]).

  7. [13] The applicant claims that the court should depart from the starting position and value all the matrimonial assets including the non-money assets (eg, investments, insurance policies, shares in the Company and properties) at the IJ date. He cites two cases in which the court departed from the default position. In TDT v TDS and another appeal and another matter [2016] 4 SLR 145 (“TDT v TDS”) at [50], the court held that it was appropriate to value the company’s shares on a date prior to the breakdown of the parties’ marriage as there was a “not negligible possibility” that the husband had managed the company’s finances to the wife’s detriment. The husband also alleged that the wife had diverted the business of the company. In Wan Lai Cheng v Quek Seow Kee and another appeal and another matter [2012] 4 SLR 405 (“Wan Lai Cheng”) at [71], the court valued the matrimonial properties at a date before the ancillary matters hearing because the husband had increased the liabilities of the matrimonial assets in a manner that was not done for the family’s benefit.

  8. [14] Further, the applicant raises four arguments in support of his position. First, he says that the parties had considered the value of the matrimonial assets when they entered into the Deed in April 2014. Both parties had agreed to divide the matrimonial assets based on the values at that time. Second, he claims that the appropriate date to value the assets should be the IJ date, prior to the civil proceedings between the parties in February 2020. He refers to TDT v TDS and says that the Valuation Date should be “a date prior to any actions being taken by parties which may affect the value of the assets”. Third, the value of the Company and the parties’ personal assets have changed over the past ten years. The applicant says that he had dealt with his assets without considering the possibility that these assets would one day be valued differently from the IJ date. Fourth, he says that his use of his personal funds after the divorce cannot be treated as a dissipation of the pool of matrimonial assets. He emphasises that the respondent had already received the sum of $9.3m under clause 3(d) of the IJ, as found by the Appellate Division on 26 October 2023.

  9. [15] The respondent’s position is that the Valuation Date should be the date of the ancillary matters hearing because the applicant does not have “cogent reasons” to depart from the default position. She says that since the Company was incorporated during their marriage, it is trite that the shares of the Company form part of the pool of matrimonial assets. She claims that the rapid increase in the related-party transactions in the short span of three years (between 2019 and 2022) suggests that the applicant has been diverting the financial resources of the Company to related parties under his influence or control to reduce the matrimonial assets for division. She says that it would be “eminently unfair” to her should the valuation of assets not take into account her contributions towards the Company’s assets and share value even after their marriage ended in 2014.

  10. [16] The cases cited by the applicant are of little assistance because the facts of the present case differ significantly from those cases. In TDT v TDS and Wan Lai Cheng, the court departed from the default position to account for the party’s possible dissipation of assets between the time of the breakdown of the marriage and the ancillary matters hearing. In other words, the parties alleging the dissipation in those cases were asking for the operative date to be earlier than the ancillary matters hearing date. Ironically, the respondent in this case is arguing that the operative date should be the ancillary matters hearing date so that the applicant cannot take advantage of his alleged dissipation of matrimonial assets after their divorce. This raises the question of whether there were even any matrimonial assets to be dissipated between 2019 and 2022.