Family Division of the High Court · Decided 14 May 2025
XCV v XC W
Feedback & support[2025] SGHCF 30 · Case no. District Court Appeal No 85 of 2024 (Summons No 299 of 2024) · 13 paragraphs
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Official text from eLitigation
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[1] The parties married in India on 8 June 1997. Both were Indian nationals who relocated to Singapore that year and became Singapore citizens in 2005. They have two adult children born in 1998 and 2001, respectively. The appellant husband, aged 58, is an information technology engineer earning about $5,000 monthly and the respondent wife, aged 51, is a finance manager with a monthly salary of $6,600. During the marriage, the respondent was a homemaker who occasionally worked part-time.
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[2] On 18 December 2018, the appellant filed for divorce in India. Two days later, the respondent filed for divorce in Singapore. The Singapore proceedings were stayed by consent, and the divorce was finalised in India on 6 January 2020. No application was made to the Indian courts for ancillary matters to be determined. More than two years later, on 26 August 2022, the appellant commenced FC/OSF 54/2022 (“OSF 54”) for leave to file an application for financial relief under s 121B of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“WC”). In his supporting affidavit for leave, he stated that he was “only requesting for the division of the matrimonial properties located in Singapore”. The properties comprised a Housing Development Board flat (the “HDB Flat”) and a condominium unit (the “Condominium”), both jointly owned by the parties. Having obtained leave, the appellant filed FC/OSF 58/2022 (“OSF 58”) for financial relief under s 121B of the WC on 9 September 2022.
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[4] As a preliminary matter, the appellant seeks leave to adduce further evidence in HCF/SUM 299/2024 (“SUM 299”) including:
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[5] SUM 299 must be, and is, dismissed. The evidence sought to be admitted could have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the hearing below and there is no justification for raising it at this stage. The appellant attributes this omission to inadequate advice from his previous solicitors. I will address these allegations shortly. The evidence, even if admitted, would not have influenced the result of this appeal.
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[7] Counsel for the appellant, Mr Kalamohan, advances several arguments regarding the alleged inadequacies of the appellant’s previous legal representation. Since commencing proceedings in 2022, the appellant has been represented by four different law firms, as follows:
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[9] The appellant, having initiated divorce proceedings in India and sought a stay of the Singapore proceedings, inexplicably failed to pursue ancillary matters in India during the divorce proceedings. It was only two years after the divorce that he applied in the Singapore courts for the division of their assets, including those in India. Mr Kalamohan attributed the delay to the appellant’s “ignorance” of the law.
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[11] The Court of Appeal has consistently emphasised, albeit in the context of criminal cases, that grave allegations which attack the reputation of counsel should not be lightly made and, if made at all, must be supported by strong and cogent evidence: see, for example, Thennarasu s/o Karupiah v Public Prosecutor [2022] SGCA 4 at [15] and Muhammad Salleh bin Hamid v Public Prosecutor [2025] 1 SLR 554 at [4]. It is inappropriate for the appellant to ground his appeal on allegations of his previous solicitors’ incompetence or his periods of self-representation. The appellant had multiple opportunities to present evidence supporting the exercise of the Singapore court’s jurisdiction over the Indian Assets, but he relied instead on arguments unsupported by fact or law. Accordingly, the appeal regarding the division of Indian Assets is dismissed.
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[12] The appellant’s second ground of appeal concerns the division of matrimonial assets in Singapore. The DJ, following the trends set out in BOR v BOS and another appeal [2018] SGCA 78, deemed it equitable to award the respondent 45% of the matrimonial assets for a 23-year, single-income marriage. The DJ then applied two adjustments to the respondent’s share: a 5% uplift for the appellant’s non-compliance with his disclosure obligations, and a further 2.5% uplift to account for the appellant’s rent-free occupation of the Condominium (from 2016) and the HDB Flat (from mid-2022), to the exclusion of the respondent and the children.
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[15] Regarding the uplift for rent-free occupation, Mr Kalamohan submits that the respondent had “voluntarily left with the children” rather than been “forced out of the matrimonial flat”. He claims to have photographs showing that the respondent damaged the HDB Flat, necessitating repairs to make it habitable again. He describes the respondent as “calculative and manipulative” and accuses her of being “intent on fleecing the appellant”. The respondent refutes these claims and cites my decision in TRS v TRT [2017] SGHCF 3, where I held that rent-free occupation simply means that one party occupies it to the exclusion of any benefit to the other, regardless of whether such exclusion was forced.
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[16] The DJ found that the contemporaneous police reports corroborated the respondent’s account that she and the children were “effectively forced out of the HDB Flat” by the appellant’s harassing tactics and changing of locks. I find no reason to disturb the DJ’s findings of fact. Moreover, even if the respondent and the children had left of their own accord, the appellant’s exclusive occupation of both properties remains undisputed. Indeed, he had resided in the HDB Flat and rented out the Condominium, whereas the respondent and the children had to seek rental accommodation elsewhere. Therefore, the DJ’s decision to award a 2.5% uplift to the respondent’s share was reasonable and appropriate.
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[17] Next, Mr Kalamohan submits that “the percentage divided by the DJ [was] not coherent when calculating figures”. First, he claims that the DJ used different dates for the parties’ Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) values, with the respondent’s CPF being valued as at 1 January 2020 and the appellant’s being valued as at 1 January 2021. This assertion is incorrect as the DJ’s notes of evidence make clear that she adopted the values as at 1 January 2020 for both parties. Second, he argues that the value of the respondent’s Prudential insurance policy should have been taken as at 2023 instead of 1 January 2020. Although the courts typically adopt insurance policy surrender values as at the ancillary matters hearing date, I agree with the respondent that there were compelling reasons for the DJ’s departure from the starting position. This case is distinguishable from typical Singapore divorces as the parties had been divorced for over three years before the hearing on division of matrimonial assets commenced. It would have been unjust and inequitable to account for any increases in the insurance policy’s surrender value after January 2020 (which was when their divorce was finalised in India).
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[18] Next, the appellant challenges the DJ’s decision to consider the outstanding loan on the Condominium’s mortgage on December 2023 instead of January 2020. He argues that the lower outstanding amount in 2023 reflects his timely repayments of the mortgage since 2020, without the respondent’s contribution.
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[20] I find that the DJ’s adoption of the December 2023 values for both the property valuation and outstanding mortgage was appropriate and correct. The appellant’s complaint about bearing the mortgage payments alone must be viewed against other factors:
Accordingly, there is no basis to interfere with the DJ’s findings on the valuation dates.