High Court · Decided 25 July 2024
Wuhu Ruyi Xinbo Investment Partnership (Ltd Partnership) v Shandong Ruyi Technology Group Co Ltd and another
Feedback & support[2024] SGHCR 7 · Case no. Originating Application No 222 of 2023 (Summons No 643 of 2024)
✱ What happened, in plain English
There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.
Ask about this judgment →Laws this judgment relies on
Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
Background
The Production Order and the Unless Order
- [4]
[4] At the heart of the dispute in these proceedings are shares held by the second respondent, a company incorporated in Luxembourg, in one SMCP SA (“SCMP”). According to the claimant, these shares were pledged as security by the second respondent for a debt owed by the first respondent to the claimant, under an agreement between the claimant, the first respondent and the second respondent (“the Guarantee”). Apparently unbeknownst to the claimant, the second respondent also pledged some 28m of its SCMP shares (“the Pledged Shares”) as security under bonds (“the Bonds”) which it had issued and later defaulted on. The trustees for the holders of the Bonds, GLAS SAS (London Branch) (“GLAS”), took possession of the Pledged Shares in October 2021. After the claimant came to learn of the Bonds and the Pledged Shares, and out of interest in the second respondent’s remaining SCMP shares that were not pledged as security under the Bonds (“the Remaining Shares”), the claimant issued notices for the transfer of the Remaining Shares to its nominee. This transfer was later challenged by GLAS in proceedings before the English courts. The details of the English proceedings are immaterial for present purposes, save that, in October 2022, GLAS obtained in the English courts a summary judgment against the second respondent in respect of the debt owed by the second respondent under the Bonds, and therefore became a creditor of the second respondent.
- [5]
[5] The Remaining Shares later became the subject of the arbitration (“the Arbitration”), which outcome is being challenged in SUM 952. The underlying arbitration agreement is contained in the Guarantee, which provided for disputes to be resolved by arbitration at the Jining Arbitration Commission (“JAC”) in the People’s Republic of China. At the time when SUM 2987 was heard, the claimant’s case was that the parties had entered into a memorandum signed in or around June 2019 (“the Memorandum”) to vary the identified arbitral institution from the JAC to the Beihai Court of International Arbitration (“BCIA”), and it was pursuant to this varied arbitration agreement that the Arbitration was later commenced against the first and second respondents in November 2022. As I point out later, there appears to have a change in the claimant’s position on when this component of the arbitration agreement was varied (see [107] below). Be that as it may, through the Arbitration, the claimant obtained an award (“the Award”) in January 2023 in which it was adjudged as having rights to the Remaining Shares. The Award recorded, among other things, that in the Arbitration, the second respondent had no objections to the reliefs claimed by the claimant, as well as the evidence submitted by the claimant.
The claimant’s attempts at compliance with the Unless Order
- [11]
[11] Zhang then stated:
(a) Category 1 – Communications between the claimant (which includes the claimant’s representatives and lawyers) and the second respondent and/or any of its representatives (including Ms Qiu Chen Ran (“QCR”), who was a director of the second respondent at the material time, and Mr Qiu Yafu (“QYF”), who is QCR’s father and also ultimate controller of the group of companies of which the first respondent is part) regarding the need for and negotiation and execution of the Memorandum, including communications relating to the purported deficiency of the JAC and the circumstances which necessitated a variation of the agreed arbitral institution to the BCIA.
(b) Category 2 – Communications from the claimant (which includes the claimants’ representatives and lawyers) to the second respondent and/or QCR and QYF and/or He Hanchu (“HHC”), who was the lawyer who acted for the second respondent in the Arbitration, or any other person from HHC’s law firm (hereafter collectively referred to as “the second respondent and/or the second respondent’s purported representatives), in respect of each of the following time periods and subject matter:
(i) Category 2(a) – prior to the commencement of the Arbitration, alleging a dispute and demanding reliefs from the second respondent and/or the second respondent’s purported representatives, whether in the nature of a demand letter or otherwise;
(ii) Category 2(b) – after the commencement of the Arbitration, notifying the second respondent and/or the second respondent’s purported representatives of the commencement of the Arbitration; and
(iii) Category 2(c) – after the commencement of the Arbitration, in relation to any matter arising out of or in connection with the Arbitration, including but not limited to matters such as the terms of reference, list of issues, administrative matters and logistics of the hearing(s) for the Arbitration.
(c) Category 3 – Communications in respect of any matter arising out of or in connection with the Arbitration from the claimant to the BCIA.
The claimant’s explanation for Category 1
- [14]
[14] Category 1 dealt with communications between the claimant and the second respondent regarding the execution of the Memorandum (see the GD at [18(a)] and [39]–[41]). The key point of Zhang’s explanation in the Affidavit is that the agreement for the variation of the agreed arbitral institution from the JAC to the BCIA had been reached at an in-person meeting on 9 April 2022 (“the 9 Apr Meeting”).
- [15]
[15] The parties said to be present at the 9 Apr Meeting are: (a) QCR; (b) QYF; (c) Ms Wang Yan (“Wang”), the claimant’s representative; (d) Ms Su Xiao (“Su”), also the claimant’s representative; (e) Mr Ma Wenguang (“Ma”), a lawyer who went on to act for the first respondent in the Arbitration; (f) Wei; (g) Mr Liang Shuang (“Liang”), the claimant’s legal advisor; and (h) Zhang herself.
- [16]
[16] According to Zhang, Ma had raised at the 9 Apr Meeting that the JAC may not be able to decide disputes arising under the Guarantee and proposed a change of the agreed arbitral institution to the BCIA, which was more reputable. The attendees agreed, and Wang was responsible for drafting the Memorandum to effect this agreement. On or about 11 April 2022, Wang arranged for the parties’ representatives to execute the Memorandum “in person”.
- [17]
[17] The remaining parts of Zhang’s explanation in the Affidavit goes on to make the following points: (a) the parties’ “main mode” of communication was through physical meetings, telephone conversations or WeChat; and (b) “any” WeChat messages concerning the issue of the Memorandum would have been lost because Wang had changed her mobile phone and so WeChat messages on her old phone cannot be retrieved from the new phone. I set out these parts of the Affidavit in full:
The claimant’s explanation for Categories 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c)
- [18]
[18] Category 2(a) dealt with communications between the claimant and the second respondent relating to the dispute under the Guarantee prior to the commencement of the Arbitration (see the GD at [18(b)(i)] and [42]–[44]). Zhang explained that discussions relating to the claimant’s interests in the Remaining Shares had taken place at in-person meetings between the claimant’s representatives (Wang and Su) and the second respondent’s representative (QCR). In particular, this issue was also discussed at the 9 Apr Meeting. At that meeting, Wang informed the other attendees that one of the claimant’s shareholders had given instructions for the claimant to exercise its rights to the Remaining Shares pursuant to the Guarantee. However, the attendees had differing views on how this was to be done. Wang therefore proposed that the Arbitration be instituted for the claimant’s rights and interests in the Remaining Shares to be determined.
- [19]
[19] Similar to the above (at [17]), Zhang explained that it was not the usual practice for parties to follow up by e-mail on what they had discussed at their in-person meetings. Zhang further explained that the claimant has tried to retrieve the WeChat messages for the relevant periods of time but is unable to do so because Wang has changed her mobile phone and so messages sent or received on the old phone can no longer be accessed. Zhang then stated:
- [21]
[21] Category 2(b) dealt with communications between the claimant and the second respondent after the commencement of the Arbitration, and specifically, those which involve the claimant notifying the second respondent of the commencement of the Arbitration (see the GD at [18(b)(ii)] and [45]). Zhang explained that documents relating to the second respondent being notified of the Arbitration “have been disclosed”, which she identified to be an e-mail sent by the BCIA to the second respondent contained in the SLOD. Zhang further explained: “As far as I am aware, there was no (and no need for) separate communication between the Claimant and the second respondent on this”.
- [22]
[22] Category 2(c) dealt with communications between the claimant and the second respondent after the commencement of the Arbitration, and specifically, in connection with matters arising out of or in connection with the Arbitration (see the GD at [18(b)(iii) and [45]). For communications on the subject matter of Category 2(c), Zhang also repeated what she has said earlier about the parties “main mode” of communication, which encompassed the use of WeChat messaging, and the loss of WeChat messages due to Wang changing her mobile phone:
- [23]
[23] In SUM 346, the Liquidator pointed to two sets of documents in the SLOD which it said showed that there were other documents responsive to Category 2(c) which the claimant has not produced. The first set comprised an e-mail from the BCIA to the second respondent referring to “your [the second respondent’s] application” for a simplified procedure and a subsequent e-mail from the BCIA to the parties referring to the parties’ “joint” application for a simplified procedure. The second set was an excerpt from the transcript of the hearing of the Arbitration which referred to the parties’ “joint” request” for a sole arbitrator. The Liquidator argued that both sets of documents showed that the claimant and the second respondent must have exchanged correspondence with each other before proceeding with these joint applications. In particular, it was curious why the application for a simplified procedure initially brought only by the second respondent subsequently morphed into a joint application by the parties. The Liquidator argued that it was inexplicable that the parties, which were large corporations, would have made the joint applications without exchanging any prior written correspondence. Zhang dealt with this issue in the Affidavit and gave the following explanation:
(a) The reference to “your [the second respondent’s] application” for a simplified procedure in the e-mail from the BCIA to the second respondent was in fact a reference to the parties’ joint application for a simplified procedure, which the BCIA had referred to in its later e-mails to the second respondent.
(b) As a result of the loss of messages due to the change of mobile phones, the claimant has not been able to retrieve the relevant WeChat records or messages regarding the application for a simplified procedure. Nevertheless, in or around January 2024, the claimant reached out to one Jing Lin (“Jing”), who is a secretary of the BCIA and had handled administrative matters in relation to the Arbitration. Jing provided to the claimant his WeChat messages with: (i) HHC (the second respondent’s lawyer in the Arbitration: see [12(b)] above) regarding the “summary procedure application form” and (ii) Zhang Tongtong, another secretary from the BCIA who had dealt with matters in the Arbitration. Screenshots of both these messages have been disclosed in the 2SLOD.
(c) There were “some communications” between Liang (the claimant’s legal advisor: see [15] above) and HHC on WeChat on matters relating to the Arbitration. However, Liang has since replaced his phone and these messages have been lost. Nonetheless, the claimant has managed to obtain screenshots of two of these messages, both of which have been produced in the 2SLOD – the first was exchanged on 7 December 2022 and provided by Jing to the claimant (as HHC had sent this to Jing); the second was exchanged on 30 December 2022 and provided by HHC to the claimant.
(d) The claimant’s position is that the abovementioned messages exchanged between Jing and HHC as well as Zhang Tongtong, as well as the messages exchanged between Liang and HHC (one of which was provided by Jing) show that the application for a simplified procedure that the BCIA referred to had all along been a joint application.
(e) Also, in or around January 2024, the claimant reached out to Wei, who acted for the claimant in the Arbitration. In respect of Wei’s position, Zhang stated the following:
The claimant’s explanation for Category 3
- [24]
[24] Category 3 dealt with communications from the claimant to the BCIA in respect of any matter arising out of or in connection with the Arbitration (see the GD at [18(c)] and [45]). Zhang explained that Wei has advised that there was no written correspondence between the claimant and the BCIA in connection with the Arbitration, and where needed, the claimant’s representatives would contact the BCIA through its secretaries via a designated telephone number, in accordance with the ordinary practice of the BCIA. However, due to the passage of time, Wei no longer retains telephone records showing the calls he had made to the BCIA. Wei further advised that, where needed, he had attended in person at the BCIA when dealing with matters in the Arbitration, such as when he tendered the evidence required for the Arbitration.
- [25]
[25] In SUM 346, the Liquidator argued that there was incomplete production vis-à-vis Category 3 because it sighted a document in the SLOD, which was the BCIA’s e-mail to Wang (the claimant’s representative in the Arbitration) on 10 January 2023 (“the 10 Jan E-mail”) seeking clarification on two questions relating to the Arbitration. According to the Liquidator, based on the documents produced, the next communication in time after the 10 Jan E-mail was an e-mail from the BCIA to the parties informing the parties of the outcome of the Arbitration. The Liquidator argued that “presumably”, prior to the latter e-mail from the BCIA, there must have been earlier correspondence from the claimant to the BCIA responding to the BCIA’s queries, which the claimant has failed to produce.
- [26]
[26] In connection with this, Zhang explained that Wei has advised that the two questions posed in the 10 Jan E-mail had been addressed at the hearing of the Arbitration, and the 10 Jan E-mail was merely intended to put on record the questions that were asked at the hearing. Wang had forwarded the 10 Jan E-mail to Wei, and Wei spoke with the BCIA over the phone and gave the necessary confirmation to Zhang Tongtong, the BCIA’s secretary, on the questions asked. Zhang added that Jing had also separately communicated by WeChat with Liang regarding the issues in the 10 Jan E-mail, and Jing had provided to the claimant a screenshot of this message, which has been disclosed in the 2SLOD. Zhang then went on to state the following:
The applicable principles
- [28]
[28] The court further set out the following analytical framework applicable to the question of whether a party’s breach of its obligations to produce documents should result in striking out (see DNG at [102]):
- [32]
[32] The High Court’s grounds of decision in Lutfi was published on 25 March 2024, the same day I heard and decided SUM 643. Lutfi was therefore not cited to me by the parties, and I also did not have the benefit of the High Court’s guidance in Lutfi when arriving at my decision in SUM 643. The parties had cited Natixis and the test which the parties accepted as applicable in SUM 643 was that of a “reasonable suspicion” and I also relied on the “reasonable suspicion” test in deciding SUM 643. An issue therefore arises as to whether my decision is now indefensible given the principles set out by the court in Lutfi on affidavits relating to the production of documents filed in proceedings under the ROC 2021. I will deal with this issue later. For now, it suffices for me to state that I would have reached the same conclusion in SUM 643 even if I had applied the “plain and obvious” test in Lutfi (see [53] and [64] below).
The submissions
The issues
- [40]
[40] With the framework set out by the High Court in DNG ([27] above) as well as the above observation in mind, the following issues arose for determination in SUM 643:
(ii) Whether the claimant has provided a sufficient explanation in the Affidavit for its loss of P&C of the Messages?
(i) Whether the claimant’s breach had been intentional and contumelious?
(ii) What ought to be the consequences attaching to that breach?
Whether the claimant has breached the Unless Order
The affidavits and the documents produced by the claimant
(a) In connection with the Other Written Communications – I note the claimant appears to take the position that the Other Written Communications do not exist, though there is no support in the affidavits for that position, and I also found that the explanations offered by the claimant in connection with that position to be somewhat questionable. However, this did not, in my view, surmount the requisite threshold for the conclusive effect of Zhang’s depositions in the Affidavit to be displaced and warrant a finding that the Other Written Communications exist, whether on the basis of a “reasonable suspicion” or a “plain and obvious” test (see [53] below).
The Other Written Communications
(1) Whether the matters relied on by the claimant lend support to its position that the Other Written Communications do not exist
- [45]
[45] As I will explain, the matters which the claimant has relied on do not lend support to the claimant’s position that the Other Written Communications do not exist. I begin by considering Wei’s confirmation regarding written communications, of which there are two. The first confirmation given by Wei is found in the 26 Mar Affidavit in which Wei stated: “I do not have any other written communications with [the second respondent] and/or its representatives … relating to the Arbitration”. The second confirmation is stated through Zhang in the Affidavit, in which it is said that Wei has confirmed to the claimant that the parties’ had discussed their decision to pursue the joint applications for a simplified procedure and a sole arbitrator through physical meetings, telephone discussions and/or WeChat messages.
- [48]
[48] The other matter on which the claimant appears to rely in support of its position that the Other Written Communications do not exist is Zhang’s explanation in the Affidavit that the parties’ “main mode” of communication” is limited to in-person meetings, telephone phone calls and WeChat messaging (see [17] above). However, this explanation does not address what had been the mode of communication utilised on the occasions where the Memorandum, the dispute under the Guarantee, or matters relating to the Arbitration (ie, the subject matter of Categories 1, 2(a) and 2(c)) had been discussed. To say that the parties usually do not follow up with their in-person or telephone conversations by e-mail or other forms of written communication apart from WeChat messaging is not to say that there had also been no such other forms of written communication on those occasions now specifically under consideration. How is the court to know whether the parties’ “main mode” of communication had been adopted on those occasions? If the claimant wishes to persuade the court through the Affidavit that there were no other forms of written communications exchanged on those occasions and so the Other Written Communications do not exist, the claimant should expressly state so. The court cannot infer, based on what the claimant has said about the parties’ usual mode of communication, that the parties must also have adopted that same mode of communication on those occasions where the Memorandum, the dispute under the Guarantee, or matters relating to the Arbitration had been discussed. That would be tantamount to reading into the Affidavit what Zhang has not deposed to in writing. For completeness, I note that other affidavits filed by the claimant in reply in SUM 643 – namely, the 15 Mar Affidavit and the 21 Mar Affidavit – do not address the point further. Zhang’s explanation regarding the parties’ “main mode” of communication therefore does not lend support to the claimant’s position that the Other Written Communications do not exist.
(2) Significance (if any) of the absence of support in the affidavits for the claimant’s position that the Other Written Communications do not exist
- [50]
[50] First, if there were indeed no such other forms of written communications exchanged between the relevant parties apart from the Messages, I struggled to see why the claimant could not expressly state so, especially where Zhang (through whom the claimant’s explanations and confirmations in the Affidavit were given) had been one of the attendees at the 9 Apr Meeting where the issue of the Memorandum, the dispute under the Guarantee and the claimant’s rights to the Remaining Shares were allegedly discussed. Put another way, the claimant could have easily supported its position that the Other Written Communications do not exist by specifying the mode of communication adopted on the relevant occasions, but it did not do so.
- [53]
[53] Be that as it may, and despite the questions I have raised above about the claimant’s omission, I do not think it is open to me to find that there is a “reasonable suspicion” or that it is “plain and obvious” that the Other Written Communications exist and must be or have been in the claimant’s P&C, on the basis of the claimant’s omission alone. If I were to rely on the claimant’s omission in making any finding that the Other Written Communications exist – whether on the basis of a “reasonable suspicion” or a “plain and obvious” test – I would effectively be drawing an adverse inference against the claimant pursuant to s 116 of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) (“the Evidence Act”) on the basis of evidence which I am of the view that the claimant has effectively withheld. That is something which I am not permitted to do on the basis of affidavits alone (see s 2(1) of the Evidence Act).
(3) The other arguments made by the Liquidator about Zhang’s explanations in the Affidavit
- [56]
[56] First, the Liquidator placed some emphasis on the part of the Affidavit where Zhang referred to Wei’s confirmation that he had “no other material correspondence … on the matters concerning the Arbitration” [emphasis added] (see [23(e)] above). Placing emphasis on the words “material correspondence”, the Liquidator argued that Wei had withheld other documents which in his subjective view were not material to the Arbitration, which is impermissible as this is not a valid basis on which Wei could withhold those documents, and in any event, Wei, as a PRC lawyer, would not be qualified to make any assessment on the materiality of those documents for the purposes of the claimant’s obligations of production under the ROC 2021.
- [58]
[58] Secondly, the Liquidator argued, although Zhang has stated in the Affidavit that the Memorandum was executed “in person”, she did not go so far as to say that the relevant representatives of the claimant and the second respondent had met in person to execute the Memorandum, and presumably a draft of the Memorandum would have been sent across prior to its execution but the claimant did not provide an explanation of how this draft was sent, and whether any communication relating to the sending of this draft of the Memorandum was in the claimant’s P&C.
- [59]
[59] I disagreed with this submission. Though the Affidavit appears to be silent on whether the parties had synchronously or asynchronously executed the draft in person, there is nothing in Zhang’s explanation in the Affidavit which suggested that drafts of the Memorandum were exchanged in writing prior to the parties executing the draft in person. Whether or not the parties had executed the drafts in person synchronously or asynchronously does not in and of itself have a bearing on whether they would have exchanged drafts of the Memorandum in writing before the meeting – if parties had executed the drafts synchronously, the draft could have prepared there and then and thereafter executed by the parties; if the parties had executed the drafts asynchronously, one side could have executed the draft and then left it somewhere for the other side to subsequently execute it. In my view, it is too much a stretch of the claimant’s explanation that the parties had met in person to execute the Memorandum to also say that the parties must have exchanged drafts of the Memorandum in writing before doing so. An assertion that further documents exist, apart from what has been already produced, cannot be grounded merely on the basis of an assertion that those further documents ordinarily or presumably would have existed; the requesting party must point to something in the circumstances of the case which specifically grounds its suspicion (see, for example, Soh Lup Chee and others v Seow Boon Cheng and another [2002] 1 SLR(R) 604 at [7]). The claimant’s explanation that the parties had met in person to execute the Memorandum is therefore not a reason for the court to find that there must have been prior written communications between the parties through which such drafts of the Memorandum were exchanged.
The Messages exchanged between HHC and Liang on the subject matter of Category 2(c)
- [62]
[62] The claimant did not explain in the Affidavit how and why HHC had provided the screenshot of the 30 Dec Message to the claimant. The claimant also did not elaborate in the Affidavit whether the 30 Dec Message was the only message that HHC had been able to provide to the claimant (such as if it was the only message HHC still retained on his mobile phone); neither was this issue addressed in the other affidavits filed by the claimant in SUM 643. It goes without saying that these are all matters within the claimant’s knowledge and which it was able and ought to clarify, but the claimant chose to remain silent. Given this and the claimant’s ability to procure HHC’s assistance to provide some of the Messages exchanged between HHC and Liang on the subject matter of Category 2(c) (ie, the 30 Dec Message), the only logical inference is that the claimant would similarly have been able to procure HHC’s assistance to provide the remaining of these messages exchanged between HHC and Liang.
- [63]
[63] On the facts known to the court, there is no solicitor-client relationship or the like between the claimant and HHC. The claimant therefore does not appear to have an enforceable legal right against HHC for HHC to provide to the claimant the Messages exchanged between himself and Liang regarding the subject matter of Category 2(c). However, given what appears to be the claimant’s practical ability to obtain from HHC some of these messages exchanged between HHC and Liang, and absent anything to suggest otherwise, it was in my view a fair conclusion to say that the claimant is also in control of the remaining of these messages exchanged between HHC and Liang, which includes but is not limited to the 30 Dec Message (see generally, Natixis ([29] above) at [35]; Dirak Asia Pte Ltd and another v Chew Hua Kok and another [2013] SGHCR 1 at [35]–[36]). To be clear, I am not saying that the claimant is in control of these other messages because they ought in the ordinary course of things exist or because the claimant presumably would be able to obtain HHC’s assistance to provide these other messages. Rather, I was satisfied that these other messages do exist (see [61] above) and I was also satisfied that the claimant is able to procure HHC’s assistance to provide them (see [62] above).
- [65]
[65] I address a further point for completeness. In its written submissions for SUM 346, the Liquidator pointed to three documents produced in the SLOD in arguing that there was incomplete production vis-à-vis Category 2(c), which I have already referred to earlier in these grounds (see [23] above): (a) an e-mail from the BCIA to QCR referring to the second respondent’s application for a simplified procedure in the Arbitration; (b) a subsequent e-mail from the BCIA to the parties informing them that the parties’ joint application for a simplified procedure had been accepted; and (c) a part of the transcript of the hearing of the Arbitration in which reference was made to the parties’ joint application for a sole arbitrator. The Liquidator argued in SUM 346 that the claimant and the second respondent, being commercial entities, would have exchanged written communications before they arrived at the decision to make these applications for a simplified procedure and a sole arbitrator, but yet no such written communications have been produced by the claimant. In the parts of the Affidavit that I have set out earlier, the claimant attempted to address this issue by referring to Wei’s confirmation that the parties’ decision to pursue the applications for a simplified procedure and a sole arbitrator were discussed at physical meetings, over the phone or via WeChat messages.
Categories 2(b) and 3
The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.