High Court · Decided 19 August 2024
Cachet Multi Strategy Fund SPC on behalf of Cachet Special Opportunities SP v Feng Shi and others
Feedback & support[2024] SGHCR 8 · Case no. Originating Claim No 10 of 2022 (Summons No 475 of 2024)
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Introduction
- [2]
[2] This is an application by the claimant for production of 14 categories of documents pursuant to O 11 r 3 of the ROC 2021. The second defendant, who is the respondent in the application, takes objection to the majority of the requests on the basis that they relate to internal correspondence and the exceptions under rr 5(2)(a) and (b) do not apply. The second defendant has also argued that six of the 14 categories are requests for documents subject to legal privilege, and that he does not have possession or control of documents in the remaining eight categories other than what has already been disclosed in the proceedings.
- [3]
[3] As the parties’ arguments pertained to the rule in O 11 r 5(2), which does not appear to have been the subject of a reported judgment thus far, and other points of law largely pertaining to legal privilege, I reserved judgment. I did so in particular to more carefully consider the scope of O 11 r 5(2), which appeared to me to be a significant departure from the previous regime of discovery of documents, considering the frequency with which private and internal correspondence were adduced under that regime. Having considered the submissions and the requested categories of documents, I dismiss the application. These are the reasons for my decision.
Summary of pleadings
- [4]
[4] The claimant in Originating Claim No. 10 of 2022 (“OC 10”) is Cachet Multi Strategy Fund SPC on behalf of Cachet Special Opportunities SP (“Cachet”), a hedge fund incorporated in the Cayman Islands. The third defendant is Haven Global Network Pte Ltd (“Haven”), a Singapore-incorporated company. The first defendant is Mr Feng Shi, also referred to as Tristan Shi (“Mr Shi”). Mr Shi was the co-founder, Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), Chairman, majority shareholder, and director of Haven since 1 August 2018. The second defendant is Mr Alex SK Liu (“Mr Liu”), a co-founder and director of Cachet.
- [5]
[5] Cachet entered into a Subscription Agreement dated 3 September 2018 (the “Subscription Agreement”) with Haven, to subscribe for a 10% shareholding in Haven at a price of US$20m (the “Investment Sum”). Pursuant to the Subscription Agreement, Cachet paid the full Investment Sum to Haven on or around 5 October 2018. Cachet’s founder and Chief Executive Officer, Ms Angela Chow (“Ms Chow”) was also appointed a director of Haven.
- [6]
[6] Cachet claims that prior to its entry into the Subscription Agreement, from in or around April 2018 to September 2018, Mr Shi made several representations to induce Cachet to invest in Haven (the “Alleged Representations”). In summary, the Alleged Representations by Mr Shi were:
(a) Haven was undertaking a project (the “Haven Project”) which involved the development of a peer-to-peer crypto financial products marketplace platform (the “Blockchain Platform”) built on blockchain and smart contract technologies, for the purpose of launching insurance products. The Blockchain Platform could be rolled out by September 2018 or November 2018.
(b) AXA General Insurance Co., Ltd (“AXA”), an international insurance company, would participate in the Haven Project by issuing insurance products on the Blockchain Platform.
(c) A document titled “Preliminary Financial Statements” (the “Financial Statements”), which purported to set out Haven’s financial position as of 30 June 2018, had been audited by PricewaterhouseCoopers and signed off by them.
(d) Mr Shi had as of 30 June 2018 already made a capital contribution of US$1.15m in cash to Haven (the “Capital Contribution”).
(e) The individuals Mr Bryan Liu, Mr Ivan Kim and Mr Daniel Kim were Haven’s full-time staff with whom Haven had entered into employment contracts (the “Employment Contracts”).
- [7]
[7] Cachet claims that it entered into the Subscription Agreement relying on the truth of the Alleged Representations and having been induced to do so by them. According to Cachet, since late 2018, it gradually discovered that the Alleged Representations were false and made by Mr Shi fraudulently. Specifically:
(a) No Blockchain Platform was launched by September or November 2018, or at all. What Haven subsequently purported to run was a business in online poker and/or gambling.
(b) AXA never agreed to issue insurance products through the Blockchain Platform.
(c) PricewaterhouseCoopers did not audit or sign off on the Financial Statements.
(d) No Capital Contribution was made by Mr Shi as at 30 June 2018. To date, Mr Shi has only contributed US$200,000 into Haven.
(e) Mr Bryan Liu, Mr Ivan Kim and Mr Daniel Kim were never employed by Haven and no employment contracts were entered into with them.
- [8]
[8] According to Cachet, Mr Liu was aware at the material time that the Alleged Representations were false and made by Mr Shi fraudulently. Cachet reasons that because Mr Liu was a co-founder and director of Haven and “actively involved in the Haven Project since its inception”, Mr Liu must therefore have been aware of “material aspects” of Mr Shi’s and Cachet’s discussions, including the Alleged Representations.
- [9]
[9] On 18 April 2019, Cachet rescinded the Subscription Agreement and demanded that Haven return the Investment Sum within five days (the “Demand”). At a board meeting of Haven on 29 April 2019, Ms Chow also made it clear that Haven should return the Investment Sum to Cachet, failing which Cachet would commence legal proceedings against Haven. Cachet claims that Haven, under the influence and/or direction of Mr Shi, Haven and Mr Liu (whom Cachet refers to as “Co-Conspirators”), refused to comply with the Demand. This led Cachet to commence SIAC Arbitration No. 283 of 2019 against Haven on 2 September 2019 (the “Haven Arbitration”). In the Haven Arbitration, Cachet sought the return of the Investment Sum primarily on the basis that it had been induced to invest in Haven by various fraudulent misrepresentations, including the Alleged Representations.
- [10]
[10] Cachet further claims that instead of repaying the Investment Sum, Haven, Mr Shi and/or Mr Liu sought to use the Investment Sum to enrich themselves. They allegedly did this by, amongst other things, causing payments to be made from Haven’s bank account for purported “business expenses” or “salary payments”; refusing disclosure of Haven’s employment contracts; paying Mr Shi and Mr Liu sign-on bonuses and extravagant salaries; attempting to remove Ms Chow as an authorised signatory of Haven’s bank account; causing payments to be made from Haven’s bank account on 29 August 2019; and causing or participating in Mr Shi’s refusal to pay the balance Capital Contribution to Haven.
(a) Haven was to pay Cachet S$1,112,587.12 as Cachet’s legal and other costs of the Haven Arbitration.
(b) Haven was to bear the final costs of the Haven Arbitration, including the amount paid by Cachet thus far towards the costs of the Haven Arbitration, which is S$147,751.46.
(c) Haven was to pay Cachet simple interest at the rate of 5.33% per annum on the above sums, running from 26 November 2021 to the date of payment.
(d) Haven was to pay Cachet S$2,470,783.56, representing the interest on the Investment Sum at the rate of 5.33% per annum from 18 April 2019 to 11 August 2021, being the date on which Cachet successfully recovered the Investment Sum from Haven (see [12] above).
- [15]
[15] Cachet alleges that to date, Mr Shi has not complied with the Deed Award, and further that Haven, under the influence and/or direction of Mr Shi, Haven and Mr Liu as co-conspirators, have “failed, refused and/or neglected to procure Mr Shi to do the same”. According to Cachet, it also commenced enforcement proceedings in California on 15 October 2020 to enforce the Deed Award against Mr Shi (the “US Enforcement Proceedings”) and successfully obtained a judgment by the Superior Court of California against Mr Shi on 3 November 2021 (the “Californian Judgment”). Mr Shi has not complied with the Californian Judgment. According to Cachet, it expended US$13,295.65 in the US Enforcement Proceedings.
- [16]
[16] In OS 10, Cachet claims that (a) Mr Shi is personally liable for fraudulent misrepresentation; and (b) Haven, Mr Shi and Mr Liu are co-conspirators who conspired to defraud and/or mislead Cachet into investing in Haven and thereafter illicitly enrich themselves (the “Alleged Conspiracy”). Specifically in respect of the Alleged Conspiracy, Cachet claims that Haven, Mr Shi and Mr Liu conspired:
(a) to have Mr Shi make the Alleged Representations to fraudulently induce Cachet’s investment, and thereafter refuse to procure Haven to return the Investment Sum and instead illicitly enrich themselves with the Investment Sum;
(b) in relation to the Deed Arbitration, to have “caused, persisted and/or participated in” Mr Shi’s defence of the Deed Arbitration and his failure or refusal to comply with the Deed Award;
(c) in relation to the Haven Arbitration, to cause Haven to “vigorously contest Cachet’s claim in the Haven Arbitration”, with Mr Shi and Mr Liu giving evidence on behalf of Haven “in an attempt to cover up and conceal the fraud and Conspiracy perpetrated on Cachet”; and
(d) to cause Haven to fail, refuse and/or neglect to comply with the Interim Award and the Final Award, and Mr Shi to fail, refuse and/or neglect to comply with the Deed Award and the Californian Judgment.
- [17]
[17] Cachet seeks damages for conspiracy and/or fraudulent misrepresentation from Mr Shi, Mr Liu and Haven, comprising:
(a) S$1,260,338.58 and interest on this amount, being the sums due and owing to Cachet from the Haven Arbitration;
(b) S$2,470,783.56, representing the interest on the Investment Sum;
(c) S$170,351.66 and interest on this amount, being the sums due and owing to Cachet from the Deed Arbitration;
(d) HK$352,431.33 and interest on this amount, being the sum Cachet expended in the Hong Kong Enforcement Proceedings; and
(e) US$13,295.65 and interest on this sum, being the sum Cachet expended in the US Enforcement Proceedings.
- [18]
[18] Mr Liu’s defence is that while he was a “co-founder” and director of Haven, he was not on equal terms with Mr Shi. Mr Liu was the Chief Strategy Officer and his role was to give input on general product design. His focus was on the technical aspects of Haven’s operations, such as developing the Blockchain Platform, while Mr Shi as CEO had the final say on all matters, including business decisions, and had sole purview of investor relations. Mr Liu was not privy to specific promises and timelines communicated by Mr Shi to investors, including the Alleged Representations. Even if Mr Liu was aware of the Alleged Representations, he was not in a position to know if they were true or not, being uninvolved in the business, financial and human resource aspects of Haven.
- [19]
[19] On the Haven Arbitration, Mr Liu takes the position that the decision by Haven to resist the Demand was “spearheaded by Mr Shi who was the CEO”, and that Mr Liu was not even aware of the Alleged Representations at this time let alone that they were false or made fraudulently. In any case, it was reasonable for Mr Liu to have acted as he did because he was acting as a director in the ordinary course of his duties when Haven resisted the Demand. As one of the directors in Haven which was resisting the claim, Mr Liu gave evidence in the Haven Arbitration to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, as did other directors such as Mr David Hong and Mr Hanh Huyunh Huu. Cachet’s allegations on the findings of the Tribunal on the Alleged Representations do not pertain to Mr Liu. As to the Deed Arbitration, this did not concern Mr Liu as the proceedings were between Cachet and Mr Shi. Mr Liu denies the existence of any conspiracy against Cachet.
- [20]
[20] Only Mr Liu has participated in OS 10 thus far. On 6 May 2022 and 14 July 2022, judgment was entered against Haven and Mr Shi respectively, for failure to file their respective notices of intention to contest or not contest the proceedings. It is not disputed that on 9 March 2023, Haven was struck off.
Application for production
- [21]
[21] In Summons No 475 of 2024, Cachet seeks, amongst other things, production of documents listed in two Schedules (the “Schedule 1 Documents” and the “Schedule 2 Documents” respectively). The Schedule 1 Documents consist of six requests, and the Schedule 2 Documents consist of eight requests. I understand the documents to have been grouped into these two Schedules based broadly on the nature of Mr Liu’s objections to production.
- [23]
[23] I will elaborate on the parties’ submissions within the analysis below.
Applicable principles
- [24]
[24] I propose to begin by summarising the applicable principles on applications for specific production under O 11 r 3 of the ROC 2021. Having done this, I will address the specific legal issues that arose during the course of argument in this application. Chief amongst the issues raised were (a) the sufficiency of an averment on affidavit that requested documents are subject to legal privilege and hence protected from production, having regard to the recent decision of the High Court in Lutfi Salim bin Talib and another v British and Malayan Trustees Ltd [2024] SGHC 85 (“Lutfi”); and (b) the scope of the rule in O 11 r 5(2) against ordering production of private or internal correspondence and the exceptions to the rule.
Principles on specific production
- [25]
[25] The principles from the cases on an application for specific production of documents under O 11 r 3 of the ROC 2021 may be summarised as follows:
(a) The requesting party applying for production of requested documents must satisfy three conditions under O 11 r 3(1):
(i) First, he must properly identify the requested documents, pursuant to O 11 r 3(1)(a). This requirement serves a practical function. The requested documents must be identified with sufficient particularity so that the producing party will know what documents are being requested and can ascertain whether the documents are in that party’s possession or control: Eng’s Wantan Noodle Pte Ltd and another v Eng’s Char Siew Wantan Mee Pte Ltd [2023] SGHCR 17 (“Eng’s Wantan Noodle”) at [48].
(ii) Second, he must show that the requested documents are material to the issues in the case, pursuant to O 11 r 3(1)(b). Materiality is determined by reference to the pleaded cases of the parties, from which the issues in the case are to be discerned. There must be a demonstrable nexus between the requested documents and at least one of the issues. In addition, the requested documents must satisfy the threshold of materiality, which is a higher or stricter threshold than the test of relevance and necessity under the revoked Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC 2014”). Specifically, the threshold of materiality requires the requested documents to have a significant bearing on an issue in a case, such that it could potentially affect the court’s ultimate decision: Eng’s Wantan Noodle at [49(a)]–[49(b)].
(iii) Third, he must provide sufficient evidence that the requested documents are in the possession or control of the requested party. The requesting party must have a reason or some basis for his belief that the documents are in the possession or control of the requested party. The reason and the basis for the belief should be set out in his supporting affidavit: Jeffrey Pinsler, SC, Singapore Civil Practice, Volume II (LexisNexis, 2022) (“Singapore Civil Practice”) at para 30-69). But the condition is arguably not difficult to satisfy. A deposition in the requesting party’s supporting affidavit to the effect that the requested documents are in the possession or control of the requested party is usually enough to constitute “sufficient evidence” of the same: Eng’s Wantan Noodle at [50].
(b) The requested party may challenge the application on the basis that any of the requirements under O 11 r 3(1) have not been met. Specifically, he may file an affidavit to state any of the following grounds of objection (Lutfi at [20]):
(i) the requested documents do not exist;
(ii) the requested documents are protected from production (eg, by legal privilege);
(iii) the requested documents have never been in his possession or control;
(iv) the requested documents were but no longer are in his possession or control, in which case the respondent should explain what has become of such documents; or
(v) the requested party does not know or cannot confirm (i) whether the requested documents were ever in his possession or control; or (ii) what has become of the requested documents that were previously in his possession or control.
- [26]
[26] In the exercise of its powers in an application for specific production, the court is required under O 11 r 1(2) to have regard to two sets of governing principles:
(a) first, as a set of overarching “constitutional principles” (Dai Yi Ting v Chuang Fu Yuan (Grabcycle (SG) Pte Ltd and another, third parties) [2023] 3 SLR 1574 at [13]), the Ideals set out in O 3 r 1(1) which are those of fair access to justice; expeditious proceedings; cost-effective work that is proportionate to the nature and importance of the action, the complexity, difficulty and novelty of the claim, and the value of the claim; the efficient use of court resources; and the aim of achieving fair and practical results; and
(b) second, specific to the context of production, the principles under O 11 r 1(2)(a) and (b) that (i) a claimant is to sue and proceed on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the defendant’s case; and (ii) a party who sues or is sued in court does not thereby give up the party’s right to privacy and confidentiality in the party’s documents and communications.
- [27]
[27] It is fair to say that the introduction of the Ideals and the principles under O 11 r 1(2) that guide the exercise of the court’s powers in an application for production reflects a sea-change in the philosophy behind the discovery of documents. As the CJC explained in its report (Civil Justice Commission, Civil Justice Commission Report (29 December 2017) (Chairperson: Justice Tay Yong Kwang) (the “CJC Report”), Chapter 8, para 2), the principle that a claimant should proceed on the strength of his case and not the weakness of his opponent’s is intended to discourage speculative litigation pursued on the hope that discovery will yield a “smoking gun”. The principal consideration appears to be the Ideal of proportionality. On the one hand, as Chua Lee Ming J observed in Lufti at [34], it is a rare case in which the further pursuit of specific documents actually results in the uncovering of a “smoking gun”. On the other hand, as observed in the CJC Report (Chapter 8, para 2), discovery is expensive, time consuming and labour intensive. Putting these considerations together, the CJC considered there to be sufficient justification for the existing practice on the discovery of documents to be “changed significantly”: CJC Report, Chapter 8, para 1.
- [28]
[28] To the principles outlined in the cases above, I would venture to add several observations on the requirements of materiality, and possession or control.
- [29]
[29] I begin with materiality. Under O 24 r 5(3) of the ROC 2014, the test in the context of applications for specific discovery was that of relevance, which could take one of two forms: direct relevance or indirect relevance: Dante Yap Go v Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG [2007] SGHC 69 (“Dante Yap Go”) at [18]–[31]. A document would be directly relevant if it is one on which the party relies or will rely; or if it could adversely affect his own case, adversely affect another party’s case, or support another party’s case (O 24 r 5(3)(a) and (b)). A document would be indirectly relevant if it may lead the party seeking discovery of it to a “train of inquiry” resulting in him obtaining information which may adversely affect his own case, adversely affect another party’s case, or support another party’s case (O 24 r 5(3)(c)).
- [30]
[30] The test of relevance in the ROC 2014 has been replaced with that of materiality in the ROC 2014. Materiality is not defined in O 11 r 3(1)(b) beyond the prescription that the requested documents must be “material to the issues in the case”. The definition of materiality is therefore more succinct but at the same time its meaning is less easy to discern. In my view, the reference to “the issues in the case” at least makes it clear that the focus in the assessment of materiality should be the pleadings in the case, which provide the “architectural blueprint” of parties’ cases at trial: Dante Yap Go at [21]. In this respect, the approach under the ROC 2021 and that under the ROC 2014 has not changed. Under both sets of rules, there must be a “demonstrable nexus between the documents sought to be discovered to the pleaded cases of the relevant parties to the main action”: Dante Yap Go at [20]; Tan Chin Seng and others v Raffles Town Club Pte Ltd [2002] 2 SLR(R) 465 at [18].
- [31]
[31] This does not itself explain the nature and degree of the connection required between the request and the pleaded issue. As observed in Eng’s Wantan Noodle at [49(a)], the academic commentaries are aligned that the test of materiality “mandates a higher or stricter threshold than the relevance-necessity test under O 24 of the ROC 2014”. In my view, this understanding of materiality is wholly supported by the CJC’s explanation of the changes to the regime for the production of documents and the introduction of the Ideals, which encourage the pursuit of fair but also practical results. The new regime seeks to make “the current full discovery … rare exceptions rather than the norm”: CJC Report, Chapter 8, para 2. The understanding of materiality as involving a higher or stricter threshold promotes that objective.
- [32]
[32] It will also be observed that the scope of specific production is narrower than that under the ROC 2014 in one obvious way, which is the rule in O 11 r 5(1) that prohibits the court from ordering, except in a special case, production of any document that “merely leads a party on a train of inquiry to other documents” – in other words, indirectly relevant documents. The concept of materiality is therefore narrower than that of relevance in at least this specific regard.
Framing of requests for documents in an application for specific production
- [37]
[37] Cachet’s requests for documents are all framed in a similar way, being requests for “documents created and/or transmitted” within a specified range of dates, “relating to” or “evidencing” a range of topics and issues. Two representative examples are Requests 1 and 2:
- [38]
[38] It is not disputed, and should also be clear from the earlier summary of the pleadings, that the various topics and issues that the requests pertain to – such as “Alex’s role and involvement in conducting Haven’s defence of the Haven Arbitration”; or “Tristan’s Capital Contribution in Haven” – are mentioned in or arise from the pleadings. In framing the requests, however, Cachet’s approach is to seek all documents created and/or transmitted within a specified date range “relating to” each of these topics or issues. A preliminary question that arises whether this approach is generally capable of satisfying the requirement of materiality.
- [41]
[41] I do not think it is technical or pedantic to take issue with the language used to connect the requested documents and the particular pleaded issue or averment, such as “relating to”, “in connection with” or “in support of”. If the request as framed, whether by virtue of such language or some other device, is so broad as to encompass documents that are not the proper subject of specific production, the request cannot be granted. In this regard, I repeat the observation of the learned assistant registrar in EQ Capital at [62], that “[i]f the issue is that the classes cannot be defined with any greater level of specificity because the averment itself is vague and nebulous, then the proper course would be to seek particulars before discovery. Without specificity, there cannot be specific discovery.”
- [42]
[42] The present requests are framed not by reference to a quoted averment in the pleadings, but rather topics or issues arising from the pleadings. In my view, the point of principle remains generally applicable. Whether the contents of the request are directly quoted or paraphrased from the pleadings, the onus remains on the requesting party to ensure that the entirety of the class of requested documents satisfies the requirements of specific production. Insofar as the request seeks documents simply “relating to” a topic or issue – such as “Alex’s role and involvement in conducting Haven’s defence of the Haven Arbitration”; or “Tristan’s Capital Contribution in Haven” – it potentially “casts a net which is much wider than that permitted by the tests for [materiality] set out in the Rules” (to paraphrase EQ Capital at [62]). That is because the language of the request is broad enough to contemplate the production of documents that are only tangentially related to the pleaded issue, and therefore likely to have little bearing on parties’ rival cases on the issue or the adjudicative outcome.
- [43]
[43] For this reason alone, I would have had trouble accepting Cachet’s argument that the classes of documents as framed were capable of meeting the threshold of materiality. However, given that Mr Liu largely focused his objections on other matters such as legal privilege and the rule against production of internal correspondence, I do not decide the application on this basis.
Non-production of documents under O 11 r 5
Sufficiency of averments on legal privilege on affidavit in an application for specific production
- [44]
[44] One of the grounds on which Cachet disputed Mr Liu’s assertion of legal privilege over the Schedule 1 Documents was that Mr Liu had made “broad, sweeping, wholly unsubstantiated and unsworn assertions” in his reply affidavit that all the documents were privileged. At the hearing, I requested Mr Ho to address me on the High Court’s decision in Lutfi at [32]–[34], which appeared to me to impinge on Cachet’s argument.
- [48]
[48] Having said that, I do not think Lutfi should be understood to detract from the important and well-established position that it is for the party asserting privilege to demonstrate that the preconditions for privilege to subsist are present: ARX v Comptroller of Income Tax [2016] 5 SLR 590 (“ARX”) at [50]. This means that where litigation privilege is asserted by the requesting party, it is for the requesting party to show that (a) there was a reasonable prospect of litigation at the time the document was prepared or created; and (b) the document was created for the dominant purpose of litigation: Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 367 at [69]–[77]. Where legal advice privilege is asserted, the onus similarly rests on the requesting party to show that (a) the advice was rendered by a legal professional; (b) the legal professional was acting as legal adviser when he provided the advice; and (c) the communications must have been made in confidence: ARX at [43]. In other words, it will not suffice for the requested party to make a bare assertion of privilege, without satisfying the court of a prima facie case that the requirements for privilege to subsist are met: ARX at [44]–[45]. It can typically do so by “swear[ing] the affidavit of documents claiming legal professional privilege in a way which leads the court to the conclusion that the claim is properly made”: ARX at [45], quoting Australian Hospital Care (Pindari) Pty Ltd v Duggan (No 2) [1999] VSC 131 at [67]. Once the requested party has successfully done that, the evidentiary burden falls on the requesting party disputing the claim of privilege to rebut the prima facie case: ARX at [50]. And it is at this stage that Lutfi applies, and requires the requesting party to demonstrate that notwithstanding the averments on affidavit by the requested party, it is plain and obvious, from the documents that have been produced, the requested party’s affidavits or pleadings, or some other objective evidence before the court, that the requested documents are not privileged from production.
- [49]
[49] For completeness, I address Cachet’s reference to United Overseas Bank Ltd v Lippo Marina Collection Pte Ltd and others [2018] 4 SLR 391 (“Lippo”) and specifically its reference to the remark by Aedit Abdullah JC (as he then was) at [42] that “[t]he essential question is whether the claim of privilege is expressed clearly in some form, so that the matter can be readily determined by the court”. Abdullah JC made this remark in the context of his consideration of whether the absence of a supporting affidavit by the defendants who were asserting legal privilege prevented their invocation of privilege: Lippo at [41]. Abdullah JC held that while the “best form” for the assertion of privilege would be by way of a supporting affidavit, privilege could also be asserted without an affidavit, as long as the circumstances manifested a clear invocation of that privilege. Hence, privilege was not excluded simply because such a supporting affidavit had not been filed: Lippo at [42]. In other words, Abdullah JC was concerned with the necessity of a supporting affidavit in the assertion of privilege, not the sufficiency of the supporting affidavit for the purpose of satisfying the court that privilege was rightly asserted: Lippo at [43]. I therefore do not think Lippo is directly relevant to the above discussion, which only concerns the latter aspect.
Proscription on ordering production of private or internal correspondence
- [50]
[50] I now address O 11 r 5(2), which states:
- [51]
[51] It is useful to outline the genesis of O 11 r 5(2) at this point. In the CJC Report, the CJC explained that Rule 5 (in the form drafted at the time) was introduced to prohibit the production of “a document that is part of a party’s private or internal correspondence except in a special case”. It also explained that “special case” was “deliberately left undefined to allow for flexibility and good sense should a rare case emerge”: CJC Report, Chapter 8, para 5.
- [53]
[53] It will be observed that the rationale identified by the CJC for the introduction of O 11 r 5(2) was that of preventing a party from being inundated with large amounts of internal correspondence that would ultimately have little probative value. The commentaries have identified a second purpose of O 11 r 5(2), and that is to give effect to the principle in O 11 r 1(2)(b) that a party who sues or is sued in court does not thereby give up his right to privacy and confidentiality in his documents and communications: Singapore Civil Procedure 2024 at para 11/5/3; Singapore Civil Practice at paras 30-101 to 30-102. The learned authors of Singapore Rules of Court: A Practice Guide (2023 Edition) (Chua Lee Ming editor-in-chief) (Academy Publishing, 2023) (“Practice Guide”) explain (at para 11.017) that one of the purposes of O 11 r 5(2) is to narrow the scope of disclosure due to its highly intrusive nature. They cite the CJC’s observation that discovery is “highly intrusive into privacy and confidentiality (even if the browsing of a party’s documents is done by that party’s solicitors and their assistants)” and that “[i]n today’s context, it is even more so since discovery can encompass all the documents and the messages stored in a person’s mobile phone and other electronic devices”: CJC Report, Chapter 8, para 2.
- [55]
[55] As to the width of the rule in O 11 r 5(2), it will be observed that the subject matter of the rule is broadly framed, as “any document that is part of a party’s private or internal correspondence”, regardless of the form it is in or the medium in which it is stored. The reference to “any document that is part of” such correspondence means that the rule is broad enough to encompass enclosures or attachments to emails, or any such material transmitted to the receiving party in the course of correspondence. The commentaries are broadly aligned on the meanings of “private correspondence” and “internal correspondence”, and I accept these general definitions as being sufficient for present purposes, but leave their precise contours to be defined in another case:
(a) Private correspondence refers to communications which are intended to be private as between the persons who corresponded with each other: Singapore Civil Practice at para 30-104; Practice Guide at para 11.017.
(b) Internal correspondence refers to correspondence that is internal to the party from which the document is requested, such as emails between individuals and/or departments in the organisation, and not intended to be received by persons outside the party: Singapore Civil Practice at para 30-104; Practice Guide at para 11.017.
(c) The categories of private correspondence and internal correspondence can overlap; it is entirely possible for a communication to be both private correspondence and internal correspondence: Singapore Civil Practice at para 30-104.
- [56]
[56] There are two exceptions to O 11 r 5(2). I begin with the exception in O 11 r 5(2)(b), which has a more immediately obvious meaning. This is a species of document that is already susceptible to disclosure in general production, pursuant to O 11 r 2(1)(b). A “known adverse document” is defined in O 11 r 2(2) as including documents which a party ought reasonably to know are adverse to the party’s case. This means that “known adverse documents” are not limited to adverse documents that the party is actually aware of, but include adverse documents that the party could have knowledge about through reasonable checks and searches: Response to Feedback at para 75. Whether a document is a known adverse document is a matter of objective assessment: Response to Feedback at para 75. The category is more limited than the discoverable documents under O 24 rr 1(2)(b)(i) and 5(3)(b)(i) of the ROC 2014, as it requires that the document be adverse, and not merely have the potential to be adverse: Singapore Civil Procedure 2024 at para 11/2/6.
(a) The term “special case” should be interpreted with the Ideals set out in O 3 r 1 in mind. The court should discern the Ideals that may be particularly important or relevant to the nature of the proceeding or the type of application at hand: CZD at [19]; Grab Rentals at [18]; Practice Guide at para 11.017.
(b) The term “special case” should also be interpreted having regard to any relevant accompanying or related rules in the ROC 2021: CZD at [20].
(c) The usage of the term “special case” does not ipso facto mean that the rule in the ROC 2021 is more restrictive than its predecessor in the ROC 2014. Regard must be had to how exactly the rules differ, both in terms of content and wording: Wang Piao at [8]–[11].
(d) It may be unwise to articulate a strict or exhaustive definition of a “special case” since this would limit room for “flexibility and good sense should a rare case emerge”: Grab Rentals at [14]–[15], citing the CJC Report (see [51] above). The word “special” evokes notions of exceptionality, peculiarity and distinctiveness, and suggests that some circumstance that is beyond the ordinary ought to be present. The identification of a special case is in the final analysis dependent on the circumstances of the case: Grab Rentals at [15].
- [59]
[59] My views on the meaning of a “special case” in the context of O 11 r 5(2)(a) are as follows. Given the CJC’s explanation that it deliberately left “special case” in O 11 r 5(2)(a) undefined so as to “allow for flexibility and good sense should a rare case emerge”, it would not be prudent to set down any sort of strict or exhaustive definition. But it stands to reason that, having regard to the objectives of the CJC in introducing a more restrictive approach to production, and within that its rationales for further restricting production of private or internal correspondence, the term “special case” must be interpreted restrictively so that the exception does not swallow the rule.
Decision on the requests
- [62]
[62] Having set out the general legal principles that would apply to the application, I turn to consider each request specifically. I begin with the requests for the Schedule 1 Documents.
Schedule 1 Documents
Request 1
- [63]
[63] Request 1 is for “[d]ocuments created or transmitted from 2017 to November 2019 evidencing Alex’s role and involvement in conducting Haven’s defence of the Haven Arbitration”. Mr Liu resists this on the grounds that the documents requested are privileged and that they consist of internal correspondence. Mr Liu has stated on affidavit that the relevant litigation is the Haven Arbitration.
- [64]
[64] I find that this is quintessentially a request for documents that are subject to legal privilege. The very wording of the request suggests that there would have been a reasonable prospect of litigation at the time the requested documents were prepared or created – the litigation being the Haven Arbitration – and that these documents would have been created for the dominant purpose of litigation. I agree with Mr Liu, who was a director of Haven from 10 September 2018 to December 2019, that documents evidencing his role and involvement in conducting Haven’s defence in the Haven Arbitration would, by their nature, comprise communications and other documents prepared for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and legal counsel for the Haven Arbitration, such as communications between him and Haven’s solicitors (Shook Lin & Bok LLP and SSW & Associates) and within the company on the conduct of Haven’s defence, and that such documents would be covered by litigation privilege or legal advice privilege, or both.
- [65]
[65] I also accept Mr Liu’s objection that insofar as Request 1 seeks such documents going as far back as 2017, the timeframe is unjustifiably broad. Going by Cachet’s own case, Cachet only gradually discovered that the Alleged Representations were false since late 2018 (see [7] above). Cachet issued the Demand only on 18 April 2019 and commenced the Haven Arbitration on 2 September 2019 (see [9] above). In fact, Cachet itself has pleaded that the Alleged Representations were made by Mr Shi “from in or around April 2018 to September 2018” (see [6] above). In the circumstances, a request for documents going as far back as 2017 lacks sufficient nexus to the pleadings.
- [66]
[66] Cachet makes two further arguments in its written submissions. First, Cachet argues that there are at least two documents falling within Request 1 that Mr Liu has not disclosed (although they have been disclosed by Cachet), which are not covered by privilege and show that there are other documents in Mr Liu’s possession or control which he has yet to disclose. The first of these is an email from Mr Liu dated 19 August 2019, in which he stated that “In addition to helping Haven develop its products, my role is to ensure the continuity and success of the company including defence against vexatious claims.” The second is an email from Mr Shi to other directors of Haven dated 6 September 2019. In this email, Mr Shi informed the other directors that Cachet had commenced arbitration proceedings against Haven and that he had appointed Shook Lin & Bok LLP to act for Haven, a matter concerning which he “underst[ood] Alex and David to be in agreement”. Mr Shi also stated that “information-sharing in relation to the litigation strategy discussed with [Shook Lin & Bok LLP]” would be “disclosed only selectively” to the board, so as to avoid jeopardising Haven’s position in the arbitration, especially given that Ms Chow, who represented Cachet, remained a director. I leave aside for the moment the questionable probative value of the first email, and the fact that the second email is likely to be subject to litigation privilege, as pointed out by Mr Liu (given that litigation privilege is broad enough to apply to “every communication, whether confidential or otherwise so long as it is for the purpose of litigation” and “protect[s] information and materials created and collected for the dominant purpose of litigation”: Skandinaviska at [44]; see also Colin Liew, Legal Professional Privilege (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2023) (“Colin Liew”) at para 5.360). The more important point is that these documents do not bring Cachet very far at all in showing that there are other documents in Mr Liu’s possession or control that are not subject to privilege, much less that it is plain and obvious that this is the case.
- [67]
[67] Second, Cachet submits that even if litigation privilege could be asserted over the documents, the litigation privilege would have expired at the time the Haven Arbitration ended on 26 November 2021. Cachet relies for its argument on the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Blank v Canada (Minister of Justice) [2006] SCC 39 (“Blank”). It argues that while the Singapore courts have yet to definitively speak on the question of whether litigation privilege would cease to subsist after the relevant litigation has ceased, I should follow the approach of the Canadian courts in Blank.
- [68]
[68] On a careful consideration of Blank, I do not think it is necessary for me to make this determination of law. That is because even under the approach in Blank, Cachet is unlikely to succeed in its argument that litigation privilege no longer subsists over the requested documents.
- [69]
[69] In Blank, the respondent sued the government for fraud, conspiracy, perjury and abuse of prosecutorial powers, arising from an earlier failed prosecution of the respondent. The respondent sought from the government records pertaining to the prosecution under a Canadian statute, the Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1. The government refused disclosure on the basis that the documents were privileged. Before the Supreme Court of Canada, the only question was whether the documents were subject to litigation privilege. Giving the lead judgment of the court, Fish J held that the purpose of litigation privilege was to create a “zone of privacy” in relation to pending or apprehended litigation. This meant that “[o]nce the litigation has ended, the privilege to which it gave rise has lost its specific and concrete purpose – and therefore its justification.” (at [34]). But Fish J immediately followed this with an important caveat: “But to borrow a phrase, the litigation is not over until it is over: It cannot be said to have “terminated”, in any meaningful sense of that term, where litigants or related parties remain locked in what is essentially the same legal combat.” (at [34]).
- [70]
[70] Fish J further explained (at [38]–[39]) that litigation privilege may retain its purpose, and therefore its effect, where the litigation that gave rise to the privilege has ended but related litigation remains pending or may reasonably be apprehended. The definition of “litigation” for this purpose would include, at a minimum, “separate proceedings that involve the same or related parties and arise from the same or a related cause of action (or “juridical source”)” and “[p]roceedings that raise issues common to the initial action and share its essential purpose”. On the facts of Blank, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the government’s appeal on the ground that the respondent’s action sought civil redress for wrongful prosecution, and that sprang from a different juridical source and was in that sense unrelated to the litigation from which the privilege claimed was born, which was the criminal prosecution of the respondent (at [43]).
- [71]
[71] In the present case, there can be no doubt that the present proceedings, being OC 10, are related proceedings to the Haven Arbitration in the sense contemplated in Blank. Both Cachet and Haven are parties to OC 10. In OC 10, Cachet seeks damages arising from (amongst other things) the Alleged Misrepresentations, which are also the subject of the Haven Arbitration. Accordingly, to use the language of Blank, OC 10 “raise[s] issues common to” the Haven Arbitration and “share[s] [the] essential purpose” of the Haven Arbitration, which is to recover losses arising from the Alleged Misrepresentations. Applying the approach in Blank, this means that any litigation privilege that subsists in the requested documents should not be considered to have expired for the purposes of OC 10, merely because the Haven Arbitration has come to an end.
- [72]
[72] Because Cachet’s argument on Blank fails even on its own terms, it is unnecessary for me to consider whether Blank forms part of our law of privilege. The question of whether litigation privilege expires, and if so when it should be considered to have expired, is a vexed one (see, for example, Comptroller of Income Tax v ARW and another [2017] SGHC 16 at [34]; and the discussion in Colin Liew at paras 5.50 to 5.71), and should be answered with the benefit of full arguments when it is necessary to do so.
Requests 2 to 6
- [73]
[73] Requests 2 to 6 are for the following documents:
- [74]
[74] Cachet does not dispute that Requests 2 to 6 pertain to internal correspondence, nor would I have considered this seriously disputable. It is plain from the requests that they pertain to discussions within Haven on the various alleged decisions or actions of Haven, Mr Shi and/or Mr Liu on which Cachet bases its claim: (a) the Capital Contributions and how this would be “communicated and/or represented to Cachet”; (b) the decision to resist the Demand and refuse the return of the Investment Sum; (c) the attempts to remove Ms Chow as an authorised signatory of Haven’s bank account; (d) Mr Shi’s liability under the Deed, Deed Award and the Californian Judgment; and (e) Haven’s decision to contest the Haven Arbitration and subsequent non-compliance with the Interim Award and Final Award. This is also clear from the language of each of the requests, which concerns “[i]nternal documents” that have been “created and/or transmitted”. The reference to “communications between Alex and one or more of the Haven members” also reinforces this.
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