General Division of the High Court · Decided 29 July 2026
A co-founder shut out of a company's management and profits won his oppression claim
Goh Bin Seng v Yeo Neng Jian Stephen and others
Feedback & support[2026] SGHC 157 · Case no. Originating Claim No 402 of 2024
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A co-founder shut out of a company's management and profits won his oppression claim
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [2], [312]
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] In HC/OC 402/2024, the Claimant, Mr Goh Bin Seng (“Mr Goh”), seeks relief for oppression under s 216 of the Companies Act 1967 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CA”). The oppression is said to arise from the actions of the first and second defendants, Mr Yeo Neng Jian Stephen (“Mr Yeo”) and Mr Ong Yong Sheng (“Mr Ong”) respectively, in excluding Mr Goh from the management and operations of the third defendant, Cleanmage Pte Ltd (“Main Co”). Main Co was viewed by parties as the “mother company” for the group of companies under the Cleanmage group, which also included the fourth defendant, Cleanmage Landscape Pte Ltd (“Landscape Co”), the fifth defendant, Cleanmage Pestcare Pte Ltd (“Pestcare Co”), and the sixth defendant, Cleanmage Facilities Management Pte Ltd (“FM Co”).
- [2]
[2] After considering the evidence and the parties’ submissions, I grant judgment in favour of Mr Goh as I find that he has successfully established his claim for oppression. Mr Goh and Mr Yeo were the co-founders of the Cleanmage group of companies, and their relationship was founded on legitimate expectations that both Mr Goh and Mr Yeo would be jointly involved in Main Co’s management and derive broadly equal financial benefits from the operations of the Cleanmage group of companies as a whole. These legitimate expectations were breached when Mr Yeo and Mr Ong purported to dismiss Mr Goh from Main Co and exclude him from receiving his rightful share of the profits of the Cleanmage group of companies.
- [3]
[3] I set out the detailed reasons for my decision below.
Facts
The parties
- [4]
[4] The Cleanmage group of companies comprises Main Co, Landscape Co, Pestcare Co and FM Co. I refer to these companies collectively as the “Cleanmage Group” for convenience.
- [5]
[5] The Cleanmage Group is in the business of facilities management, with each company in the group carrying out specific aspects of the work. For example, cleaning is handled by Main Co, landscaping by Landscape Co, and pest management by Pestcare Co. While Mr Goh, Mr Yeo and Mr Ong collectively own all of the shares of the companies in the Cleanmage Group, Mr Goh and Mr Yeo were the co-founders of Main Co and the central protagonists in this case.
- [6]
[6] The claimant, Mr Goh, holds 50% of the shares in Main Co, 20% of the shares in Landscape Co, 45% of the shares in Pestcare Co and 25% of the shares in FM Co. Mr Goh is currently the sole director of Pestcare Co.
- [7]
[7] The first defendant, Mr Yeo, holds the other 50% of the shares in Main Co. He also holds 80% of the shares in Landscape Co, 25% of the shares in Pestcare Co and 45% of the shares in FM Co. Mr Yeo is currently a director of Main Co, Landscape Co and FM Co.
- [8]
[8] The second defendant, Mr Ong, holds 30% of the shares in Pestcare Co and 30% of the shares in FM Co. Although he does not hold any shares in Main Co, Mr Ong has been a director of Main Co since July 2020. He is also a director of Landscape Co and FM Co.
- [9]
[9] In the following paragraphs, I lay out a brief background to the present dispute. As the business relationship between Mr Goh and Mr Yeo spanned more than 15 years, I do not propose to deal with all the events that transpired between them. I will instead focus on the milestones in their commercial journey together as they expanded the business of the Cleanmage Group from cleaning to landscaping, pest control and integrated facility management, before turning to consider the key events that led to Mr Goh’s purported termination from Main Co in April 2023.
Background to the dispute
Formation of Cleanmage LLP
- [10]
[10] Mr Goh and Mr Yeo first became acquainted during National Service in 2000. As they both shared an entrepreneurial mindset, they stayed in touch and discussed potential business ideas through the years.
- [12]
[12] In the initial phases, neither Mr Goh nor Mr Yeo drew a salary from Cleanmage LLP, and no formal agreements concerning the relationship were entered into. Both ran the business of Cleanmage LLP in an informal manner, working together to divide their respective job scopes and balance their work for Cleanmage LLP with their full-time jobs. It was generally agreed that the responsibilities and the workload were to be shared equally.
Incorporation of Main Co
- [13]
[13] On 8 September 2008, Mr Goh and Mr Yeo decided to incorporate Main Co with an initial paid-up capital of $20,000, which was derived from the profits of Cleanmage LLP. Main Co was incorporated so that the business could secure a higher Building and Construction Authority (“BCA”) workhead grading, which would enable it to tender for more corporate or commercial cleaning jobs. At the time of incorporation, Mr Goh and Mr Yeo each held 50% of Main Co’s shares and both were appointed directors of Main Co.
- [14]
[14] Mr Goh and Mr Yeo continued to run Main Co in addition to their full-time jobs until 10 June 2009, when Mr Yeo left his job at the landscape company and joined Main Co full-time at a monthly salary of around $2,500. Mr Goh continued working full-time as an accountant. The parties do not dispute that at this stage, Mr Yeo took on a heavier responsibility for Main Co’s affairs. However, Mr Goh remained involved and continued to attend to Main Co’s matters after work, on weekends or during his vacation leave.
- [15]
[15] On or around 8 April 2010, Mr Goh also resigned from his full-time job and joined Main Co at the same monthly salary of $2,500.
- [16]
[16] Again, no formal agreement was entered into between the parties regarding their relationship inter se or the manner in which Main Co’s affairs were to be managed. Neither Mr Goh nor Mr Yeo had any formal employment contract with Main Co. Mr Goh was broadly in charge of operations and administration (given his accounting background), while Mr Yeo took charge of business development and also handled operations at some sites. In practice, both parties took charge of separate work sites, consulted each other and jointly made all major decisions for Main Co.
- [17]
[17] Over the years, Mr Goh and Mr Yeo contributed equally to Main Co’s paid-up capital to further improve its BCA grading and in turn increase the value of contracts that Main Co could tender for. Since the end of 2018, Main Co’s paid-up capital has been $500,000.
Incorporation of Landscape Co
- [18]
[18] In 2015, Mr Yeo suggested expanding the business to take on landscaping work, as he saw demand for these services from Main Co’s existing clients. Mr Yeo surmised that he and Mr Goh could benefit from forming a team to take on such work in-house, as any Main Co contracts involving landscaping services could then be subcontracted to the related company instead of third parties.
- [19]
[19] Landscape Co was incorporated on 10 December 2015. Landscape Co was incorporated as a separate company as the National Parks Board required the majority of a company’s revenue and contracts to be related to landscape services before it could be placed on the Landscape Company Register. A company placed on the Landscape Company Register would in turn enjoy benefits such as higher foreign worker quotas as well as the recognition that it was a genuine service provider with trained landscape employees.
- [20]
[20] Mr Goh and Mr Yeo each contributed half of the $50,000 initial paid-up capital of Landscape Co, and they each owned 50% of the shares of Landscape Co. Both were appointed directors of Landscape Co and they each drew a monthly salary of $1,300 from Landscape Co, on top of their monthly salary from Main Co.
- [21]
[21] Although Landscape Co was incorporated as a separate company, Mr Goh and Mr Yeo agreed that Main Co would provide support to Landscape Co by: (a) allowing Landscape Co to tap into Main Co’s resources (such as its office space and lorry); and (b) subcontracting any Main Co contracts involving landscaping works to Landscape Co at a fixed price of 90–95% of the landscaping component of the contract, with Main Co retaining a small 5–10% as an administrative fee.
- [22]
[22] Given Mr Yeo’s prior experience with landscaping work, he took full charge of Landscape Co’s affairs, while Mr Goh focused on Main Co’s work. There was again no formal agreement regarding the relationship between Mr Goh and Mr Yeo in Landscape Co, or the manner in which the affairs of Landscape Co were to be managed.
Mr Yeo’s request for more Landscape Co shares in 2018
- [23]
[23] On 20 March 2018, Mr Yeo asked Mr Goh to transfer an additional 30% of the shares in Landscape Co to him, such that Mr Yeo would hold 80% of the shareholding in Landscape Co. Mr Yeo asserted that if Mr Goh still “treat[ed] [him] as a partner”, Mr Goh should “be fair to” him and make the share transfer as Mr Goh was not involved in Landscape Co’s operations, while Mr Yeo intended to inject more capital into Landscape Co as Landscape Co was “losing money”.
- [24]
[24] Mr Goh initially did not agree, as he felt that he had also contributed to Landscape Co and taken on more responsibilities in Main Co since Mr Yeo was busy with Landscape Co. Mr Goh’s view was that if the parties no longer held the shares in Landscape Co equally, “more issues and disputes will arise” since they would have to be much more careful about separating Landscape Co’s affairs from Main Co’s affairs (where the shareholding remained 50-50). However, Mr Yeo insisted that the 80-20 split was “a fair deal” given the amount of work that he had put into Landscape Co.
- [25]
[25] On 22 March 2018, Mr Goh suggested that Mr Yeo could purchase the requested shares from him at a price proportionate to Landscape Co’s paid-up capital, ie, $15,000. Mr Yeo replied that it was not necessary for him to pay Mr Goh for the share transfer, since Mr Yeo would also contribute equal capital to the incorporation of a separate company the parties were discussing, this time to expand into pest control operations (what would eventually become Pestcare Co). As Mr Yeo and Mr Goh had agreed that they would hold the shares in Pestcare Co on an 80-20 basis in Mr Goh’s favour, Mr Yeo pointed out that the two sums in share capital contributions would effectively offset each other.
- [26]
[26] Following these exchanges, on or around 26 March 2018, Mr Goh transferred 30% of the shares in Landscape Co to Mr Yeo for a nominal consideration of $1.
Debarment of Landscape Co, Mr Goh and Mr Yeo from public sector contracts
- [27]
[27] In or around June 2018, Mr Yeo caused Landscape Co to withdraw a tender it had submitted to the Housing and Development Board (“HDB”) as he had provided an unusually low quotation based on materials that were not compliant with the HDB’s tender specifications. This resulted in Landscape Co and its directors (including any other companies Landscape Co’s directors also held directorships in) being debarred from tendering for any contracts with public sector agencies for one year from 5 October 2019. At the relevant time, Mr Goh and Mr Yeo were the directors of Landscape Co.
- [28]
[28] When Mr Goh and Mr Yeo found out about the debarment, they realised that as long as either remained a director of Main Co, Main Co could not tender for any government contracts. As a solution, Mr Goh proposed that he and Mr Yeo should step down as directors of Main Co, appoint a nominee director to act on their joint instructions during the debarment period, and reappoint themselves after the debarment period ended. Mr Yeo agreed to this proposal, on the condition that Mr Goh placed a bond of $150,000 with him to safeguard Mr Yeo’s position in Main Co. Mr Goh agreed, and both Mr Goh and Mr Yeo resigned as directors of Main Co in or around July 2020.
- [29]
[29] At around the same time, Mr Ong, then the Deputy Operations Manager of Main Co, was appointed the sole director of Main Co.
- [30]
[30] Mr Goh and Mr Yeo also signed an undated members’ resolution resolving that they be reinstated as directors with effect from the date of execution of Form 45 (Consent to Act as Director and Statement of Non-Disqualification to act as Director). This was based on their prior understanding that they would be reappointed as directors of Main Co following the debarment period. For reasons that will become clear later, this resolution was never put into force.
- [31]
[31] Even after their resignation, Mr Goh and Mr Yeo continued to manage Main Co’s affairs as de facto directors, including approving and authorising payroll, salary increments and bonuses for all employees (including Mr Ong), acting as signatories for Main Co’s corporate bank account and declaring and paying dividends to themselves as shareholders.
Expansion into pest control and incorporation of Pestcare Co
- [32]
[32] In or around 2018, Mr Goh and Mr Ong obtained Vector Control Technician licences from the National Environmental Agency (“NEA”) to carry out pest control services for Main Co. This was another way to maximise profits by having pest control works conducted in-house whenever these were required by Main Co’s clients, without having to subcontract such work to third parties.
- [33]
[33] In or around March 2018, at the same time that Mr Yeo sought an 80% shareholding in Landscape Co, he encouraged Mr Goh to set up a company to carry out pest control services, and to do so soon “to build up a base tapping on cleanmage resources.” However, Pestcare Co was not incorporated at this point in time as Mr Goh and Mr Yeo disagreed over whether the new company should be incorporated at this early stage, or only after there was sufficient revenue from pest control services to hire at least one worker.
- [34]
[34] On 25 May 2020, Mr Yeo again pushed Mr Goh to incorporate Pestcare Co. He also reiterated the parties’ previous understanding for Pestcare Co’s shares to be held in an 80-20 split in favour of Mr Goh, and suggested that Mr Ong could assist with Pestcare Co on a temporary basis. Mr Goh agreed, and Pestcare Co was incorporated on 15 July 2020 with Mr Goh as its sole director. Mr Yeo’s stated rationale for incorporating Pestcare Co as a separate company was so “if anyt[in]g happens at least [they could] abandon and move on.”
- [35]
[35] Mr Goh and Mr Yeo’s understanding was that they would each contribute $25,000 to the initial paid-up capital of Pestcare Co, hold the shares in an 80-20 split in favour of Mr Goh, and that Main Co would provide initial support to Pestcare Co. This was achieved by: (a) allowing Pestcare Co to tap into Main Co’s resources (such as its office space, van and Mr Ong’s assistance); and (b) subcontracting any pest control works in Main Co’s contracts to Pestcare Co on a similar arrangement as Landscape Co (ie, Main Co would subcontract pest control works to Pestcare Co at a fixed price representing 90–95% of the pest control component of the contract, with Main Co retaining the remaining 5–10% as an administrative fee). Neither Mr Goh nor Mr Yeo would receive salaries or directors’ fees from Pestcare Co until certain revenue targets were achieved.
- [36]
[36] Post-incorporation, Mr Goh was primarily responsible for running Pestcare Co, with assistance from Mr Ong until sometime in August 2023.
- [37]
[37] Despite the parties’ earlier understanding that they would each contribute equally to Pestcare Co’s paid-up capital (which had formed part of the basis for Mr Goh’s agreement to transfer 30% of the Landscape Co shares to Mr Yeo for $1), Mr Yeo initially refused to contribute his share as he said he lacked confidence that the company was ready. Instead, Mr Yeo proposed on 22 May 2021 that he could assist Mr Goh with Pestcare Co’s business in exchange for more shares in Pestcare Co.
- [38]
[38] Mr Goh ultimately acceded to Mr Yeo’s proposal for the former to transfer 30% of Pestcare Co’s shares to Mr Ong and 5% more to Mr Yeo, resulting in Mr Yeo holding 25%, Mr Ong holding 30% and Mr Goh holding 45% of the shares in Pestcare Co on 11 November 2021.
Incorporation of FM Co
- [39]
[39] In the meantime, Mr Goh and Mr Yeo also discussed setting up a separate company to take on integrated facilities management work. Mr Yeo saw that there was increasing demand for such services, and his plan was for the new FM Co to be able to bid for such works, which would include cleaning, landscaping, pest control, and mechanical and electrical (“M&E”) works. Mr Yeo’s vision was for the respective companies in the Cleanmage Group to take on various aspects of this work at a price that would be “very competitive to the rest”, since the relevant works would not need to be subcontracted to third parties.
- [40]
[40] On 22 May 2021, Mr Yeo suggested to Mr Goh that the shares in the new FM Co should be held in a 51-49 split to prevent a deadlock. Mr Yeo also proposed that Mr Ong should be given some shares in FM Co in the form of 5% upfront and another 5% if FM Co hit a revenue target of $1 million. On his part, Mr Goh suggested that to reduce the risk of one company’s affairs affecting the other companies, either Mr Goh and Mr Yeo should be reinstated as directors of Main Co while Mr Ong should be appointed the sole director for FM Co, or both Mr Goh and Mr Yeo should be appointed as directors of FM Co while Mr Ong remained the sole director of Main Co.
- [41]
[41] Mr Yeo agreed to the latter proposal. Mr Goh and Mr Yeo were accordingly not reinstated as directors of Main Co. FM Co was incorporated on 6 June 2022 with a share capital of $10,000, which was not paid up at the point of incorporation. At the initial stage, Mr Goh and Mr Yeo each held 45% of FM Co’s shares, and Mr Ong held the remaining 10%. Despite the earlier agreement between Mr Goh and Mr Yeo that both should be appointed as directors of FM Co, Mr Yeo was appointed the sole director of FM Co.
Mr Yeo and Mr Ong’s demand for more FM Co shares in 2023
- [42]
[42] On 18 March 2023, in an email titled “Goh bin seng 1976 last chance to redeem sins”, Mr Yeo asked Mr Goh to transfer 20% of the shares in FM Co to Mr Ong as the latter “will be assisting on the tenders and documentations works [sic] on the back end.” Mr Yeo insisted that Mr Ong’s additional shares should come from Mr Goh’s existing shares in FM Co, as Mr Yeo “will take charge of the cfm management in terms of coordinations works [sic] till a management [team] is form[ed]”, while Mr Goh “will be doing nothing”. Mr Yeo told Mr Goh that while he could choose not to agree to his proposals, “when things become ugly its [sic] no turning back”.
- [43]
[43] Despite Mr Goh’s protests that he was prepared to contribute to FM Co but that it was Mr Yeo and Mr Ong who “want[ed] to cut [him] off”, Mr Yeo insisted that Mr Goh had to “comply to what is written here” as this was his “last chance to work with us”. Mr Goh ultimately transferred the requested shares to Mr Ong on 18 April 2023 for a nominal consideration of $1. Following this transfer, Mr Goh held 25% of FM Co’s shares, while Mr Yeo and Mr Ong held 45% and 30% of FM Co’s shares respectively.
Breakdown of relationship between Mr Goh and Mr Yeo
Allegations of non-contribution and unreasonable behaviour
- [44]
[44] Although Mr Goh and Mr Yeo steadily expanded the Cleanmage Group’s business together over the years, it was by all accounts a rocky relationship. Mr Goh had a bad temper and was prone to outbursts, while Mr Yeo often belittled Mr Goh’s contributions and his lack of entrepreneurial drive.
- [45]
[45] Things started to come to a head in 2018, when Mr Yeo grew increasingly frustrated with what he felt were Mr Goh’s minimal contributions to the Cleanmage Group. Mr Yeo believed that he was primarily responsible for the Group’s growth and success, but that he was forced by their 50-50 shareholding to share the fruits of his labour equally with Mr Goh. Mr Yeo vented his frustrations at Mr Goh over several emails.
- [46]
[46] On his part, Mr Goh sought to draw clearer lines between Main Co and Landscape Co’s affairs once Mr Yeo became the 80% shareholder of Landscape Co in 2018. Mr Goh prevented Landscape Co from using Main Co’s office supplies and vehicles and even chased one of Landscape Co’s employees, Ms Sia Jing Rong (“Ms Sia”), out of Main Co’s office in June 2019, all of which led to significant strains in relations.
Clashes with Mr Nguyen
- [47]
[47] The cracks in the relationship between Mr Goh and Mr Yeo deepened with the actions of Mr Nguyen Van Tung (“Mr Nguyen”), a Vietnamese Operations Executive (“OE”) who joined Main Co in or around early 2017. Mr Nguyen grew close to Mr Goh, who even allowed him to stay rent-free in Mr Goh’s parents’ HDB flat at Fajar Road (“Fajar Property”).
- [48]
[48] Sometime in 2018, Mr Yeo became unhappy with Mr Nguyen as the latter refused to assist him with Landscape Co’s work and failed to follow his instructions. Mr Yeo became so upset with Mr Nguyen after one incident that he sent several messages in an internal group chat demanding that Mr Nguyen return to Main Co’s office and threatening to terminate his employment with immediate effect if he did not respond. Mr Nguyen did not reply to these messages.
- [49]
[49] After what he perceived as Mr Nguyen’s insubordination, Mr Yeo confiscated the van and mobile phone that Main Co had issued to Mr Nguyen. Mr Goh then allowed Mr Nguyen to use his personal car to move between work sites. When Mr Nguyen returned to Vietnam on home leave in 2018, Mr Yeo reassigned Mr Nguyen’s larger vehicle to Mr Ong. After Mr Nguyen returned from Vietnam, he took back possession of the larger vehicle without first seeking Mr Yeo’s approval. This further aggravated Mr Yeo, who demanded that Mr Nguyen return the vehicle and threatened to report him to the police.
- [50]
[50] The clashes with Mr Nguyen reinforced Mr Yeo’s unhappiness, as he felt that Mr Goh had allowed an employee to come between them as business partners. In Mr Yeo’s view, Mr Nguyen would not have dared to defy him if not for Mr Goh’s support. Although Mr Nguyen ultimately resigned from Main Co in June 2019, Mr Yeo continued to bring up the incidents involving Mr Nguyen on multiple occasions, criticising both Mr Nguyen for “trying to screw [Main Co] up” and Mr Goh for allowing him to do so.
Passing of Mr Yeo’s mother in 2020
- [51]
[51] After Mr Yeo’s mother passed away in or around the second half of 2020, the relationship between Mr Yeo and Mr Goh deteriorated further. It appears that Mr Goh had, in one of his outbursts, directed curses at Mr Yeo’s family members, including Mr Yeo’s mother. Mr Yeo also felt that Mr Goh had been disrespectful at his mother’s wake. In a series of email diatribes, Mr Yeo blamed Mr Goh for his mother’s passing and made several offensive personal allegations against Mr Goh. Mr Yeo continued to accuse Mr Goh of being responsible for his mother’s passing in their email correspondence over the next few years.
- [52]
[52] By the end of 2020, the relationship between Mr Goh and Mr Yeo had deteriorated to the point where both could not even tolerate being in Main Co’s office at the same time. Their communications with each other were fraught and riddled with vulgarities and personal attacks. Main Co’s staff also found themselves caught between the two bosses and their frequent disagreements. Somewhat surprisingly, the personal animosity between Mr Goh and Mr Yeo did not affect the business of the Cleanmage Group, which continued to grow. Nevertheless, it was clearly a matter of time before parties headed towards a complete breakdown in their relationship.
Mr Goh’s exclusion from Main Co’s affairs
Mr Goh’s purported termination in January 2022
- [53]
[53] On 29 January 2022, Mr Yeo sent an email to Mr Goh at one of the corporate email accounts used by Mr Goh (“Admin Email Account”), stating that Mr Goh “is no longer related to [Main Co]” and that he should not touch anything belonging to Main Co from 29 January 2022, as Main Co “suspect [sic] [Mr Goh’s] illegal activities with Vietnamese Bryan since 2018 and [Mr Goh was] demoted from [sic] immediate effect”. Despite this email, which Mr Yeo appeared to have sent in a fit of pique, Mr Goh continued his work in Main Co with no further protest from Mr Yeo. Both parties even incorporated FM Co together less than six months later, on 6 June 2022.
- [54]
[54] It was only towards the second half of 2022 that Mr Yeo and Mr Ong began to cut Mr Goh off from Main Co’s affairs in earnest.
Restricting Mr Goh’s access to Main Co’s email addresses
- [55]
[55] In or around September 2022, Mr Ong changed the password of Main Co’s email account used for operations (“Operations Email Account”) without informing Mr Goh, even though Mr Goh was in charge of Main Co’s operations and this email account dealt with emails from Main Co’s clients regarding operational matters. Mr Ong also stopped his usual practice of sending Mr Goh screenshots of the emails received at this account.
- [56]
[56] During the same period, Mr Goh was also excluded from emails received at the Admin Email Account. This account was used by Main Co for its administrative matters, including the renewal of business licences and to receive general inquiries including requests for quotes. This email account was manned by Main Co’s Admin & Business Development Executive Trang Boi Nghi (“Ms Trang”), and the usual practice was for her to take screenshots of emails received and send them to Mr Goh via WhatsApp. Sometime in 2022, Ms Trang ceased sending information or emails from the Admin Email Account to Mr Goh, and also stopped sending quotations and tender documents or updating Mr Goh on final prices quoted or tendered.
- [57]
[57] Mr Goh suspected that Mr Yeo had instructed Mr Ong and Ms Trang to cut him off. Although Mr Yeo did not expressly admit that he had instructed them to do so, Mr Yeo sent an email to Mr Goh on 11 December 2022 to say that “I will 100% support [Mr Ong] and join him for sure! Getting rid of villains [ie, Mr Goh] is our mission!”
Mr Yeo’s instructions to Main Co staff not to consult Mr Goh
- [58]
[58] On 3 November 2022, arising from a dispute involving Main Co’s hostel deposit policy, Mr Yeo sent several messages in an internal WhatsApp group with Main Co’s employees, in which he claimed that Mr Goh was not a part of Main Co’s management, threatened severe consequences for any employee who took instructions from Mr Goh and demanded that the employees report to him exclusively.
- [59]
[59] In particular, Mr Yeo sent the following messages:
- [60]
[60] In January 2023, when one of Main Co’s human resource (“HR”) executives, Ms Chan Chee Sian (Cassandra) (“Ms Chan”), wanted to check with Mr Goh on certain administrative matters, she was reprimanded by Mr Yeo, who told her:
Failure to consult or inform Mr Goh of management decisions relating to Main Co
- [61]
[61] From around 2022, Mr Yeo and Mr Ong also stopped consulting Mr Goh on various substantive decisions relating to Main Co.
- [63]
[63] Further, two Main Co clients were diverted to FM Co (where Mr Goh held a lower percentage of shares) without consulting or informing Mr Goh:
(a) Nanyang Institute: Main Co had an existing contract with Nanyang Institute of Management Pte Ltd (“Nanyang Institute”) from 17 May 2010, which was due to expire in March 2023. On 6 March 2023, Nanyang Institute entered into a contract with FM Co for the provision of cleaning, landscaping and pest control services, which FM Co then subcontracted to Main Co, Landscape Co and Pestcare Co respectively, while retaining 5–10% of the fees.
(b) Bio Techne: While Main Co did not have a prior contract with Bio Techne Singapore Pte Ltd (“Bio Techne”), Bio Techne had written to Main Co’s email address on 17 February 2023 to ask for a quotation. Mr Ong then provided a quotation in FM Co’s name, and the contract for the provision of cleaning, landscaping and pest control services was ultimately entered into with FM Co on 5 May 2023. These services were similarly subcontracted to the other entities in the Cleanmage Group (save for Pestcare Co, whose involvement the parties dispute), while FM Co retained 5–10% of the fees.
Removal from WhatsApp group chats
- [64]
[64] In or around September 2022, Mr Ong exited his existing WhatsApp group chats with Mr Goh, which were used to discuss Main Co’s internal management matters, including payroll.
- [65]
[65] As Mr Goh was in charge of Main Co’s operations, he was also in various WhatsApp group chats with Main Co’s clients for operational matters, such as issues at cleaning sites that required attention. He was progressively removed from these group chats from December 2022.
- [66]
[66] From May 2023, Mr Goh was either removed from internal group chats with other Main Co employees, or other employees left internal group chats relating to sites that Mr Goh was a part of.
Exclusion from management reports, administrative accounts and main email account
- [67]
[67] Prior to 2023, U Ventures Pte Ltd (“U Ventures”), which was providing accounting and bookkeeping services to Main Co, had sent Main Co’s quarterly management accounts and financial reports to Mr Goh, Mr Yeo and Mr Ong. U Ventures ceased sending these reports to Mr Goh in or around April 2023. In or around February 2023, Mr Ong also removed Mr Goh’s access to Main Co’s CorpPass account, thereby preventing Mr Goh from managing digital access services for Main Co.
- [68]
[68] In or around April 2023, Mr Yeo and Mr Ong removed Mr Goh’s access to another one of the Cleanmage Group’s corporate email accounts (“Info Email Account”). This was significant as the Info Email Account was the email address on Mr Goh’s business card, and it was the email address primarily used by Mr Goh to manage Main Co’s affairs, including for administrative access to Main Co’s systems.
- [69]
[69] In the same period, Mr Ong also removed Mr Goh’s administrative rights to: (a) Main Co’s payroll system WhyzeHR, which Mr Goh used to handle payroll matters for Main Co; and (b) Main Co’s accounting software Xero, after he suspected that Mr Goh had been disrupting access to these systems. By September 2023, Mr Goh only had administrative access to Pestcare Co’s Xero accounting records, but had completely lost access to Main Co’s accounting records.
Warning letters
- [70]
[70] During the same period that Mr Goh was being progressively excluded from Main Co’s affairs, Main Co purported to issue Mr Goh four warning letters for his behaviour (“Warning Letters”):
(a) On 7 November 2022, Mr Ong issued a warning letter to Mr Goh for his “non-ethical attitude” in threatening to dismiss Main Co’s HR executive Ms Chan over a disagreement regarding the salary reimbursement to a cleaner in Main Co (“First Warning Letter”). The First Warning Letter was framed as “the last and final warning” and emphasised that Mr Goh had to “correct your attitude if you wish to continue to stay in the company”.
(b) On 25 November 2022, Mr Ong issued a second warning letter to Mr Goh for further “bad behaviour” towards Ms Chan. This incident arose from Mr Goh’s alleged instructions to Ms Chan to deduct rental payments for the Fajar Property from the Main Co employees’ salaries, as Mr Goh had allowed some cleaners to stay there. Mr Ong characterised Mr Goh’s behaviour as harassing Ms Chan to do “unauthorised work” and “refus[ing] to go through the correct chain of command for authorisation” (“Second Warning Letter”). Similar to the First Warning Letter, the Second Warning Letter emphasised that this was Mr Goh’s “last final warning” and Mr Goh had to “correct [his] attitude if [he] wish[ed] to continue to stay in the company.”
(c) On 4 January 2023, a third warning letter was issued alleging that Mr Goh had deliberately caused difficulty in the processing of Main Co employees’ salaries for December 2022, which resulted in delays to the payroll affecting all of Main Co’s employees (“Third Warning Letter”). According to Mr Yeo and Mr Ong, Mr Goh had a practice of raising discrepancies with respect to the salaries of a few employees of Main Co just hours before the payroll cut-off time. This had an impact on payroll processing for the entire company as the employees’ salaries were compiled into two large Excel files (one for Singaporeans and one for foreign workers) for GIRO processing purposes. Just like the earlier warning letters, the Third Warning Letter was framed as a “last final warning” and emphasised that Mr Goh had to “correct [his] attitude if [he] wish[ed] to continue to stay in the company”.
(d) On 12 April 2023, a fourth warning letter was issued implicitly accusing Mr Goh of sabotaging Main Co’s operations (“Fourth Warning Letter”). Unlike the earlier warning letters, this letter made no explicit assertion that Mr Goh was responsible for any misconduct. It was addressed as a “warning” to Mr Goh but the contents went no further than to suggest that “there may be acts of sabotage […] within our company”, that “sabotage can take many forms, including intentionally damaging company property, interfering with computer systems, or purposely disrupting work processes”, and that “if you or any other employee are found to be engaging in sabotage, you will face serious consequences, including termination of employment and potential legal action”. This was related to Mr Ong and Mr Yeo’s suspicions that Mr Goh had removed U Ventures’ access to Xero and Main Co’s access to WhyzeHR sometime in April 2023.
Mr Goh’s purported termination in April 2023
- [71]
[71] Shortly before the Fourth Warning Letter was issued, Mr Yeo suggested to Mr Goh on 18 March 2023 that he should cease managing Main Co’s operations as Main Co’s employees were beginning to ignore him because he was acting problematically. Mr Yeo asked Mr Goh to consider taking up a “Quality Control role” instead. This was around the same time that Mr Yeo demanded that Mr Goh transfer 20% of the FM Co shares he held to Mr Ong, as Mr Goh “will be doing nothing” for FM Co.
- [72]
[72] On 29 April 2023, less than two weeks after Mr Goh had transferred the requested FM Co shares to Mr Ong for $1 and the Fourth Warning Letter was issued (see [42]–[43] and [70(d)] above), Mr Ong issued a letter of termination to Mr Goh via email, stating that Mr Goh’s “services were no longer required at [Main Co]” (“29 Apr 2023 Termination Letter”). Notwithstanding this letter, which Mr Goh claimed he did not receive, Mr Goh continued to manage some of Main Co’s operations and continued to receive his monthly salary of $20,000 from Main Co.
- [73]
[73] On 2 May 2023, in response to an email from Mr Goh asking why his access to the Info Email Account had been removed, Mr Yeo copied Mr Ong and referred Mr Goh to the 29 April 2023 Termination Letter. Mr Yeo informed Mr Goh that he had 24 hours to remove his personal belongings, that he was not allowed to enter Main Co’s office or access Main Co’s property, and that he must return all company property to the “management” with immediate effect.
- [74]
[74] The 29 April 2023 Termination Letter was also included in another email sent by Mr Ong to Mr Goh on 15 August 2023, which attached a “letter regarding Termination of Salary payment” (“Salary Termination Letter”). The Salary Termination Letter stated that although Main Co had, as “a gesture of goodwill”, continued to pay Mr Goh his monthly salary despite his termination in April 2023, his salary payments would cease with effect from 1 August 2023.
- [75]
[75] On 12 August 2023, the lock to Main Co’s Woodlands Office was changed after Mr Yeo and Mr Ong realised from closed circuit television (“CCTV”) footage that Mr Goh had returned to Main Co’s office on non-working days, looked through documents at Mr Ong’s desk and tampered with the CCTV. Mr Ong gave Mr Goh a deadline of 31 August 2023 to remove his belongings, failing which his room would be cleared and his belongings would be left outside the office.
- [76]
[76] As Pestcare Co’s equipment and consumables were stored in Main Co’s Woodlands Office, Mr Goh also lost easy access to these materials which he needed to continue to run Pestcare Co’s operations. After Mr Goh’s repeated requests, Mr Ong finally moved some of Pestcare Co’s equipment and consumables into a cupboard outside Main Co’s Woodlands Office in October 2023.
- [77]
[77] In August 2023, Mr Ong removed Mr Goh from the list of signatories to Main Co’s bank accounts. With this, Mr Goh lost access to Main Co’s bank accounts and Main Co’s finances became completely controlled by Mr Yeo and Mr Ong.
Events after Mr Goh’s exclusion from Main Co
- [78]
[78] A number of significant events took place after Mr Goh’s exclusion from Main Co in April 2023.
Mr Yeo and Mr Ong are appointed directors of Main Co, FM Co and Landscape Co
- [79]
[79] First, Mr Yeo was reappointed as a director of Main Co pursuant to a director’s resolution dated 16 August 2023. Mr Goh was not informed of this in advance. Although Mr Yeo had to step down later as Mr Goh refused to vote in favour of his re-election at Main Co’s Annual General Meeting on 24 October 2023, Mr Yeo was reappointed as a director of Main Co pursuant to another director’s resolution dated 13 June 2024, for the professed purpose of conducting the present litigation. Pursuant to director’s resolutions on the same date, Mr Ong was also appointed as a director of Landscape Co and FM Co allegedly for the same purpose.
Mr Yeo and Mr Ong’s salaries are increased
- [80]
[80] Sometime after July 2023, Mr Ong’s salary from Main Co was increased from $3,600 per month to $4,500 per month without Mr Goh’s knowledge or consent. In January 2024, Mr Ong’s salary was further increased to $8,000 per month, again without consulting Mr Goh. Mr Ong also received bonuses and incentives of $9,000 for the financial year (“FY”) ending on 31 December 2023 and $8,000 for FY 2024.
- [81]
[81] In January 2024, Mr Yeo’s monthly salary from Main Co was increased from $20,000 to $25,000, again without Mr Goh’s knowledge or consent. In addition, Mr Yeo received a further $25,000 in bonuses, profit-sharing, commission and incentive payments from Main Co for FY 2024, which Mr Goh was not previously aware of.
Reduced dividends declared by Main Co from FY 2023
- [82]
[82] From FY 2018 to FY 2022, Main Co had continuously declared and paid substantial dividends of between $350,000 to $500,000 each year to Mr Goh and Mr Yeo as equal shareholders. However, for FY 2023 (the same year that Mr Goh was purportedly terminated from Main Co), only $50,000 in dividends were declared and paid to each shareholder, even though Main Co’s revenue and profit had continued to grow:
- [83]
[83] No further dividends have been declared or paid to date.
Withdrawal of support for Pestcare Co
- [84]
[84] Shortly after Mr Goh’s purported termination from Main Co, Main Co and Mr Ong withdrew their support for Pestcare Co, which Mr Goh continued to run as the sole director and largest shareholder.
- [85]
[85] Mr Ong had previously assisted Mr Goh with Pestcare Co’s operations in accordance with the previous understanding between Mr Goh, Mr Yeo and Mr Ong for Mr Ong to assist in running Pestcare Co in exchange for the transfer of 30% shareholding from Mr Goh to Mr Ong. On 12 August 2023, Mr Ong messaged Mr Goh to say that he was “out” of Pestcare Co.
- [86]
[86] Around the same time, Main Co stopped subcontracting pest control works from its new contracts to Pestcare Co, even though Main Co continued to subcontract landscaping works under the same contracts to Landscape Co. This included an HDB “Term Contract for Conservancy Services and Related Works at HDB Properties (2023 to 2026)” valued at $462,863.84, for which the pest control services were subcontracted to a third party.
- [87]
[87] On 28 August 2023, Mr Ong asked Mr Goh if he was going to resign, and made it clear that Mr Ong was “not going to take over [Pestcare Co] with just 30% shares”. Mr Goh explained that it was difficult for him to continue operating Pestcare Co on his own, as he now had no salary from Main Co, no access to Main Co’s office and resources, and no new pest control work from Main Co to sustain the business.
- [88]
[88] In the meantime, Pestcare Co lost its sole remaining technician, Mr Zulkifli bin Jaafar (“Mr Jaafar”), after Mr Ong approached him to join Main Co. On 23 August 2023, Mr Ong sent Mr Goh a message to inform him that “Zul will come back to [Main Co] since [I was] the one that find him [sic]”. On 5 September 2023, Mr Jaafar gave formal notice of his resignation to Mr Goh, with his last day at Pestcare Co being 5 October 2023.
- [89]
[89] From October 2023, Pestcare Co’s operations were further disrupted when Main Co sent its pest control team to the same sites which Main Co had previously subcontracted to Pestcare Co. This resulted in two teams arriving at the same sites to perform pest control works – one from Pestcare Co arranged by Mr Goh, and another team from Main Co with Mr Jaafar. Pestcare Co was ultimately forced to cease work for these sites after Mr Yeo and Mr Ong sent Main Co’s clients a name list which only authorised Mr Ong and Mr Jaafar to perform pest control works at the sites and changed the password for accessing the work systems, thereby preventing Mr Goh from closing off work orders.
- [90]
[90] Faced with what he felt was an untenable situation, Mr Goh sought to tender his resignation as Pestcare Co’s director under protest in a letter dated 27 September 2023. This was met with a letter written by Mr Yeo dated 4 October 2023 complaining that Mr Goh’s performance as director “has not met the necessary standards” and that “the majority of shareholders have opted to initiate the closure of [Pestcare Co]”. Nevertheless, Mr Goh remains the sole director of Pestcare Co and has continued managing its affairs, as no alternative local director has been put forward. Moreover, Mr Yeo and Mr Ong did not hold sufficient shares to wind up Pestcare Co.
Registration of the “CLEANMAGE” trade mark
- [91]
[91] On 30 July 2024, Mr Yeo applied to register the “CLEANMAGE” name as a trade mark in his own name for Class 37 goods and/or services, which includes “Cleaning of buildings [exterior surface]; Cleaning of buildings [interior], Disinfecting; Fur care, cleaning and repair; Housekeeping services [cleaning services]; Pest control services, other than for agriculture, aquaculture, horticulture and forestry; Window cleaning” (“Trade Mark”). His application was approved and the Trade Mark was registered in his name on 19 December 2024.
- [92]
[92] Upon discovering this, Mr Goh’s solicitors wrote to Mr Yeo’s solicitors on 24 March 2025 to demand that Mr Yeo transfer the Trade Mark to Main Co, Pestcare Co and FM Co. Mr Yeo’s solicitors insisted that Mr Yeo had registered the Trade Mark “with the intention to hold it on trust for Main Co and transfer it to Main Co”. Nevertheless, it was only after extended correspondence between both sets of solicitors that Mr Yeo transferred the Trade Mark to Main Co on 6 June 2025.
The parties’ cases
- [93]
[93] Mr Goh’s case is that the facts demonstrate a classic case of oppression. The Cleanmage Group was run as a quasi-partnership founded on a relationship of mutual trust and confidence, flowing from its origin in Cleanmage LLP as a “50-50 partnership”. As such, Mr Goh had legitimate expectations to be jointly involved in the management of Main Co, and to receive broadly equal remuneration and financial benefits from the Cleanmage Group of companies as a whole. These legitimate expectations were breached when Mr Yeo and Mr Ong excluded him from Main Co’s affairs and purported to terminate him from Main Co on 29 April 2023. After Mr Goh’s termination, Mr Yeo and Mr Ong enriched themselves by substantially increasing their remuneration from Main Co and diverting corporate opportunities from Main Co to FM Co, whilst they sought to deprive Mr Goh of obtaining any further financial benefit from the Cleanmage Group by obstructing Pestcare Co’s operations, and refusing to declare dividends for Main Co.
- [94]
[94] Mr Yeo and Mr Ong deny that there was a relationship of mutual trust and confidence between Mr Goh and Mr Yeo. Even if there was a quasi-partnership or some other personal relationship between them which may have given rise to certain informal understandings as to participation and profit, they argue that Mr Goh’s termination was justified by his alleged breaches of his duties as a director and employee of Main Co – in particular, his unreasonable and disruptive behaviour towards them, the staff of the Cleanmage Group, as well as third parties such as the Cleanmage Group’s subcontractors.
- [95]
[95] Main Co and Landscape Co have also filed a counterclaim against Mr Goh for his alleged breaches of duties, which include the aforesaid unreasonable behaviour as well as broader allegations that he had misused company resources and incorporated a rival company to compete with Main Co.
Issues to be determined
- [96]
[96] The following issues are to be determined in relation to Mr Goh’s claim for oppression:
(a) whether Main Co and/or the other entities in the Cleanmage Group were quasi-partnerships or otherwise premised upon a relationship of mutual trust and confidence such that legitimate expectations arose as to how the affairs of the Cleanmage Group entities were to be conducted;
(b) if the answer to (a) above is in the affirmative:
(i) what these legitimate expectations were;
(ii) whether Mr Yeo’s and Mr Ong’s actions violated these legitimate expectations in a manner that was commercially unfair to Mr Goh, considering Mr Goh’s own behaviour; and
(iii) finally, the appropriate remedy to be awarded in this case.
- [97]
[97] In relation to Main Co and Landscape Co’s counterclaims against Mr Goh for breaches of his duties as a director and employee, the following issues are to be determined:
(a) whether Mr Goh was a director, de facto director and/or employee of Main Co and Landscape Co at the material times;
(b) if the answer to (a) above is in the affirmative:
(i) what duties Mr Goh owed to Main Co and Landscape Co; and
(ii) whether Mr Goh had breached those duties.
Preliminary Issue: Admissibility and weight of the defendants’ AEICs
- [98]
[98] Before turning to the substantive issues, I deal with Mr Goh’s preliminary objections regarding the admissibility and appropriate weight to be given to some of the evidence adduced by the defendants’ witnesses in their Affidavits of Evidence-in-Chiefs (“AEIC”).
- [99]
[99] Prior to the commencement of the trial, counsel for Mr Goh had given notice of her objections to the contents of the AEICs, including a general objection that:
- [100]
[100] This objection was directed mainly at Mr Ong’s AEIC dated 17 September 2025, which comprised three short paragraphs. The sole substantive paragraph of his AEIC read as follows:
- [101]
[101] Objections were also raised during the trial against the parts of Mr Yeo’s AEIC which sought to: (a) give evidence of matters that were not within his personal knowledge; and (b) refer to the contents of matters deposed in the AEICs of the defendants’ other witnesses, such as Ms Trang and Ms Jace Koh of U Ventures (“Ms Koh”).
- [102]
[102] Counsel for Mr Goh clarified that the objections to the AEICs of Mr Ong and Mr Yeo were twofold:
(a) First, that the evidence was hearsay and therefore inadmissible, as both AEICs gave evidence on matters which were not within their personal knowledge. There were matters in Mr Yeo’s AEIC that Mr Ong would have no personal knowledge of, since Mr Ong only joined Main Co in August 2017 and became a director of Main Co in July 2020. Mr Yeo also admitted during cross-examination that he was not personally involved in some of the incidents which were either detailed or confirmed in his own AEIC, and that his accounts were based on information relayed to him by others such as Mr Ong.
(b) Second, even if the evidence in their AEICs was admissible, it ought to be given no weight as their AEICs contravened the requirements of Registrar’s Circular No. 1 of 2025 (“RC 1/2025”), as well as the principles articulated by the Court of Appeal in Ernest Ferdinand De La Sala v Compania De Navegacion Palomar SA [2018] 1 SLR 894 (“De La Sala”) at [136]–[140].
- [103]
[103] In response, counsel for Mr Ong and Mr Yeo argued that Mr Ong’s AEIC did not constitute inadmissible hearsay because paragraph 3 of his AEIC confined his evidence to the matters in Mr Yeo’s AEIC that were within his personal knowledge. Counsel also submitted that the credibility and weight of Mr Ong and Mr Yeo’s evidence was not affected by any cross-referencing to each other’s AEICs as they could have filed a joint affidavit under O 15 r 21 of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”).
- [104]
[104] Dealing first with the admissibility of Mr Ong’s AEIC that was entirely bare, I agree as a matter of principle that a blanket statement that one witness has read and agrees with the statement of another witness can, depending on the circumstances, amount to inadmissible hearsay. In Singh v Singh [2007] NSWSC 1357, the New South Wales Supreme Court was confronted with a similar case where three deponents adopted the entire contents of another witness’s affidavit without any qualification. In rejecting the offending paragraph of each of the deponents’ affidavits, the court made the following observations at [13]:
- [105]
[105] However, the fact that a witness’s AEIC unreservedly affirms the contents of another witness’s AEIC does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the former is not giving evidence of matters within his personal knowledge. Section 62 of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) (“Evidence Act”) requires that a witness’ AEIC must only contain direct evidence, in that if it refers to facts, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he saw, heard or perceived that fact. In so far as the evidence sought to be adduced is of matters within the witness’s personal knowledge, it would not constitute hearsay simply because it is framed as the wholesale adoption of another person’s account. As the court noted in Commodities Intelligence Centre v Mako International Trd Pte Ltd [2022] 5 SLR 837 (“Commodities Intelligence”) at [33], one witness may well have the same recollection of events as another, and the fact that a witness has had the benefit of reading another witness’ AEIC and recalling events through such lens does not ipso facto render his or her evidence inadmissible or unbelievable. However, the weight to be given to such evidence is another question entirely.
- [106]
[106] In the present case, I accept that Mr Ong did seek to limit his evidence to matters within his personal knowledge. Paragraph 3 of his AEIC was not a wholesale adoption of Mr Yeo’s AEIC but rather a confirmation of the matters deposed to in Mr Yeo’s AEIC which Mr Ong was involved in. Mr Ong’s evidence on cross-examination was that he was given a draft copy of Mr Yeo’s AEIC and, in respect of matters that he was personally involved in, adopted Mr Yeo’s evidence as his own without any further comment or amendment as he agreed entirely with Mr Yeo’s account of events.
- [107]
[107] Counsel for Mr Goh is entirely justified in her criticism that the state of Mr Ong’s evidence was far from satisfactory. No attempt was even made at identifying the matters Mr Ong was supposedly involved in, let alone the specific paragraphs of Mr Yeo’s AEIC that Mr Ong was adopting as true and accurate. That being said, I note that this did not prevent counsel from identifying parts of Mr Yeo’s AEIC that were within Mr Ong’s personal knowledge. During Mr Ong’s cross-examination, Mr Goh’s counsel had identified and cross-examined him extensively on the parts of Mr Yeo’s AEIC that gave evidence on matters within Mr Ong’s personal knowledge. I therefore accept that Mr Ong’s AEIC and evidence on oath were admissible in so far as it was effectively limited to matters that did not amount to inadmissible hearsay.
- [108]
[108] As for the admissibility of the parts of Mr Yeo’s AEIC which he conceded he had no personal knowledge of, it is clear that these constitute inadmissible hearsay and should be excluded from Mr Yeo’s evidence. It is no answer for Mr Yeo’s counsel to state that Mr Yeo must have had direct and personal knowledge of events that he had already admitted he was not involved in, simply because Mr Ong reported directly to Mr Yeo and Mr Yeo would have been regularly consulted on or informed of the relevant events as the de facto director of Main Co. The law requires that evidence must come directly from persons with direct and personal knowledge of the matters concerned, and Mr Yeo was certainly not in a position to attest to the truth of incidents which he was not personally involved in, such as the details of what transpired between Mr Goh and Mr Ong. Nevertheless, to the extent that a large portion of these inadmissible parts of Mr Yeo’s AEIC related to incidents involving Mr Ong, which Mr Ong had personal knowledge of, had adopted via his AEIC and was cross-examined by counsel on, these could still form part of the record as Mr Ong’s evidence on oath.
- [109]
[109] Turning to the appropriate weight to be accorded to Mr Ong and Mr Yeo’s evidence, I agree with Mr Goh’s counsel that the manner in which both AEICs were prepared gives rise to serious doubts as to the independence and credibility of the evidence presented. RC 1/2025 sets out the best practices and principles to be adopted for the preparation and drafting of AEICs in civil proceedings. It provides in no uncertain terms that “[w]itnesses should not be asked to state in their AEICs that they confirm the AEIC of another witness”: RC 1/2025 at [14], citing Jasviderbir Sing Sethi v Sandeep Singh Bhatia [2021] SGHC 14 (“Jasviderbir Sing Sethi”) at [57] and [59]). This is exactly what was done in this case. RC 1/2025 also restates “the fundamental principle […] that the witness’ evidence in an AEIC must be his or her independent testimony” (RC 1/2025 at [4], citing De La Sala at [136] and [137]), and witnesses should not collaborate or be informed of the specific contents of other witnesses’ evidence to preserve the integrity of each witness’ independent recollection (RC 1/2025 at [4]).
- [110]
[110] It is clear that none of these best practices were adhered to when it came to the preparation of Mr Ong and Mr Yeo’s AEICs. The manner in which Mr Ong’s evidence was presented to the court was troubling to say the least. Mr Ong stated that Mr Yeo’s AEIC canvassed two different categories of events that Mr Ong was personally involved in: (a) matters that both he and Mr Yeo were involved in; and (b) matters which only Mr Ong was involved in and not Mr Yeo. Mr Ong’s evidence was that for the first category, their evidence was framed in identical terms because they “both have the same mindset”. While this may be somewhat far-fetched, I can accept that this was not necessarily unbelievable: see Commodities Intelligence at [33]–[34]. However, the manner in which Mr Ong’s evidence as to the second category of events (the matters Mr Yeo was not involved in) was given was plainly unacceptable. Mr Ong’s evidence for these incidents was in substance given in Mr Yeo’s words based on Mr Yeo’s draft AEIC that Mr Yeo claimed to have prepared based on information that Mr Ong had previously relayed to him. Mr Ong then read Mr Yeo’s draft AEIC and agreed with Mr Yeo’s accounts of these incidents in their entirety.
- [111]
[111] It is self-evident that evidence given in such a circuitous manner raises serious concerns as to independence, credibility and reliability. Indeed, “allowing witnesses to collaborate on their answers” is explicitly cited in RC 1/2025 (at [9(b)]) as an example of prohibited witness coaching. Given the fact that Mr Ong’s evidence would have been heavily influenced by Mr Yeo’s own account and interpretation of events, I accord little weight to his evidence (save where it is supported by contemporaneous documents) as I do not see how it can, on its own, be considered to be independent and untainted in these circumstances. This means that for the most part, Mr Ong’s evidence cannot be used as corroboration for Mr Yeo’s account of events: Jasviderbir Sing Sethi at [61].
- [112]
[112] In arriving at this conclusion, I am mindful of the fact that Mr Ong had voluntarily excluded himself from the court during Mr Yeo’s cross-examination, to assure the court of his independence. This was done in response to an application by Mr Goh’s counsel, given the irregularities on the face of Mr Ong’s AEIC. However, while this may have insulated Mr Ong’s answers on cross-examination against any potential influence from Mr Yeo’s evidence on cross-examination, it does not change the fact that substantial influence and contamination would have already taken place upstream at the time their AEICs (including their joint correction AEIC and joint supplementary AEIC) were prepared.
- [114]
[114] At this point, it is apposite to reiterate the court’s guidance in Teo Ai Hua v Teo Mui Mui [2011] 3 SLR 935 at [39] and [41] that counsel should avoid the “undesirable drafting shortcut” of a joint factual AEIC as: (a) during a trial, factual witnesses are examined in turn and are never jointly examined; and (b) it is unlikely that a witness will possess the same degree of knowledge of the material facts as another witness, especially when it concerns multiple events spanning over a few years.
- [115]
[115] It appears that the defendants took the evidence of their witnesses and repackaged it in their AEICs in a manner that would present the most convenient narrative for trial. This went beyond including Mr Ong’s testimony concerning matters not within Mr Yeo’s personal knowledge into Mr Yeo’s AEIC. There were also various parts of Mr Yeo’s AEIC which were admissible as they dealt with matters within his personal knowledge, but in which Mr Yeo also sought to confirm the accounts given by other witnesses. Mr Yeo admitted that he had the opportunity to review other witnesses’ AEICs before affirming his own, and this was the reason why he was able to make extensive cross-references to the AEICs of other witnesses in his own AEIC. Needless to say, this raises similar concerns as to the independence, credibility and reliability of the testimony put before the court. Such a practice must be firmly discouraged as it serves to ensure alignment of narratives through contamination and influence, instead of assisting the court to ascertain the truth of what actually transpired between parties. In light of the irregularities in how his AEIC was prepared, I also accord little weight to the parts of Mr Yeo’s AEIC which sought to align his evidence with that of the other witnesses for the defendants.
- [116]
[116] I turn finally to the evidence of Ms Chan, Main Co’s HR executive who was involved in the incidents relating to the First and Second Warning Letters issued to Mr Goh. Ms Chan had resigned from Main Co in February 2023. A draft of her AEIC was prepared but never signed, sworn or affirmed. Before the trial, I granted the defendants’ application, ie, HC/SUM 2838/2025, for her to be ordered to attend court and for her Examination-in-Chief to be conducted orally vide HC/ORC 6596/2025. However, counsel for Mr Yeo and Mr Ong informed me during trial that despite their efforts to contact her and the substituted service of the order to attend court, Ms Chan could not be reached, and she did not attend the trial for examination. As such, her draft AEIC is plainly inadmissible.
- [117]
[117] To the extent that counsel sought to rely on the exception to the hearsay rule under s 32(1)(j) of the Evidence Act, this reliance is misplaced because a draft unsigned AEIC cannot be taken as a statement “made by a person” who subsequently refuses to give evidence under s 32 of the Evidence Act. Applying the principles enunciated by Woo Bih Li J (as he then was) in Tradewaves Ltd v Standard Chartered Bank [2017] SGHC 93 at [90] to the present case, while Ms Chan may well have intended to make the statement, the point remains that she has not made it. I am not satisfied that the draft unsigned AEIC represents her “oral statement [made] to another person who, at the request of the maker of the statement, puts it (or the substance of it) into writing at the time” pursuant to s 32(2) of the Evidence Act, particularly since counsel for Mr Yeo and Mr Ong repeatedly suggested in submissions that the language in their witnesses’ AEICs was similar because the affidavits were drafted by the same solicitors. On counsel’s own account, the draft unsigned AEIC was in substance a document drafted by others for Ms Chan. Accordingly, s 32(1)(j) of the Evidence Act is inapplicable. The consequence is that the alleged incidents in the Warning Letters involving Ms Chan rest on the available documentary evidence and the weight of the evidence from Mr Yeo, Mr Ong and Mr Goh.
The Oppression Claim
Applicable law
- [118]
[118] Section 216(1) of the CA allows a shareholder to seek relief where:
(a) the company’s affairs are conducted or the directors’ powers are exercised: (i) in a manner that is oppressive to the shareholder, or (ii) in disregard of his interests as a member or shareholder; or
(b) an act of the company is done or threatened or a members’ resolution is passed or proposed which: (i) unfairly discriminates against one or more members, or (ii) is otherwise prejudicial to one or more members.
- [119]
[119] The different limbs are not intended to be read disjunctively. In a claim for oppression, the court is chiefly concerned with ascertaining and upholding the commercial agreement between the shareholders of the company, whether this is found in a formal document such as a company’s constitutional documents or a shareholders’ agreement, or in informal understandings that form the basis of the claimant shareholder’s legitimate expectations: Ascend Field Pte Ltd v Tee Wee Sien [2020] 1 SLR 771 (“Ascend Field”) at [29], citing Tomolugen Holdings v Silica Investors Ltd [2016] 1 SLR 373 at [88].
- [120]
[120] For legitimate expectations to be established, vague assurances or mere hopes and aspirations as to how the affairs of the company would be conducted will not suffice. Legitimate expectations must be reasonably clear and straightforward: Oon Swee Gek v Violet Oon Inc Pte Ltd [2024] 6 SLR 313 (“Violet Oon (Merits)”) at [28]. While there need not be the requisite certainty to be enforceable as a contract, there must be “a sufficient degree of agreement” such that departing from it would constitute a breach of good faith: James Borg Olivier v Lord Alfred McCaughran [2025] EWHC 3308 (Ch) at [39].
- [121]
[121] If the court finds that the claimant shareholder’s expectations were legitimate, the key question for determination is whether those expectations have been violated in a manner that is commercially unfair, ie, whether there was a “visible departure from the standards of fair dealing and a violation of the conditions of fair play which a shareholder is entitled to expect”: Over & Over Ltd v Bonvests Holdings Ltd [2010] 2 SLR 776 (“Over & Over”) at [77] and [130], Low Peng Boon v Low Janie [1999] 1 SLR(R) 337 at [43]. Commercial unfairness is the touchstone of a claim under s 216 CA. What is fair will depend on the nature of the company and the relationships among the shareholders themselves: Lim Kok Wah v Lim Boh Yong [2015] 5 SLR 307 (“Lim Kok Wah”) at [102]. The understanding between the shareholders forms the backdrop against which the court determines whether there has been a departure from the shareholder’s legitimate expectations to such an extent that it has become commercially unfair: Ho Yew Kong v Sakae Holdings Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 333 (“Sakae Holdings”) at [172]; DyStar Global Holdings (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Kiri Industries Ltd [2018] 5 SLR 1 (“DyStar Global”) at [114], citing Lim Kok Wah at [103].
- [122]
[122] Whether the company is in fact a quasi-partnership is not a necessary part of the determination under s 216 of the CA but forms a part of the overall assessment of the substance, parameters and objectives of the parties’ commercial agreement: Deniyal bin Kamis v Mapo Engineering Pte Ltd [2023] SGHC 183 (“Deniyal bin Kamis”) at [85]; see also Over & Over at [87]. Nevertheless, a quasi-partnership is an established category of relationship where the shareholders of a company have implicitly agreed to associate on the basis of mutual trust and confidence: Ting Shwu Ping v Scanone Pte Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 95 at [85]–[86]; Lim Swee Khiang v Borden Co (Pte) Ltd [2006] 4 SLR(R) 745 (“Lim Swee Khiang”) at [83]. The lack of probity on the part of the majority may entitle the minority to relief: Lim Swee Khiang at [81].
- [123]
[123] Minority shareholders who set up a business on the basis of mutual trust and confidence are particularly vulnerable as they would have operated on the belief that the majority would take their interests into account and that any disputes would be ironed out, even if these understandings are not documented: Over & Over at [83]. Thus, the court will, in such cases, apply a stricter yardstick of scrutiny and be more ready to examine the parties’ past conduct to ascertain if there are any informal agreements or understandings between them which form the context for considering whether specific conduct is or is not commercially unfair: Leong Chee Kin v Ideal Design Studio Pte Ltd [2018] 4 SLR 331 (“Leong Chee Kin”) at [50].
- [124]
[124] That is not to say that a quasi-partnership is essential for informal understandings between shareholders to arise. Even absent a quasi-partnership, it is the personal relationship between the shareholders which gives rise to the application of equitable considerations such that the court will take informal understandings into consideration in assessing whether there has been commercial unfairness: Deniyal bin Kamis at [87]. The focus is on whether the circumstances of the parties’ personal relationship make it unfair for those conducting its affairs to rely on their strict legal powers and rights: Lim Kok Wah at [102]; Anita Hatta v Lee Siow Kiang Georgia [2020] 5 SLR 304 at [69].
- [125]
[125] Finally, a shareholder is not barred from relief even if he is not a minority shareholder (eg. if he holds 50% or more of the shares). The key is whether he lacks the power to stop the allegedly oppressive acts: Ascend Field at [32]–[34], citing Ng Kek Wee v Sim City Technology Ltd [2014] 4 SLR 723 at [48].
Cleanmage Group was a quasi-partnership
- [126]
[126] Applying the principles to the facts of the present case, I find that the Cleanmage Group was in substance established and run as a quasi-partnership between Mr Goh and Mr Yeo.
- [127]
[127] The most obvious indicium of this is the fact that Main Co, the “mother company” of the Cleanmage Group, was a continuation of a pre-existing partnership between the Mr Goh and Mr Yeo, ie, Cleanmage LLP, and continues to carry on the same business. The following observations by Lady Justice Arden (as she then was) in Strahan v Wilcock [2006] 2 BCLC 555 at [19] aptly describe the genesis of the relationship between Mr Goh and Mr Yeo:
- [128]
[128] Mr Goh and Mr Yeo had started their business together as a partnership, which they converted into Main Co to enable the business to secure a higher BCA workhead grading. Both Cleanmage LLP and Main Co were established by Mr Goh and Mr Yeo after they had discussed business ideas with each other through the years and decided to set up a cleaning business together (see [10]–[11] above).
- [129]
[129] The long history of the parties’ association, characterised by an established pattern of broadly equal responsibility and benefit and a marked lack of any formal documentation or agreements, further supported my finding (see [12] above).
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