High Court · Decided 4 August 2026
Samsung E&A (Thailand) Co, Ltd and another v Linklaters LLP and others
Feedback & support[2026] SGHCR 31 · Case no. Originating Application No 9 of 2026 (Summons No 1526 of 2026)
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] HC/SUM 1526/2026 (“SUM 1526”) is an application by the claimants (“Claimants”) in HC/OA 9/2026 (“OA 9”) to compel the defendants (“Defendants”) to produce 34 categories of documents. In OA 9, the Claimants are applying for injunctions to disqualify the first to third defendants, who are solicitors of an international law firm operating across jurisdictions, from acting for the fourth defendants in an arbitration.
- [2]
[2] SUM 1526 was heavily contested in many respects. Arguments raised included whether a Singapore court has the supervisory power to restrain solicitors from acting in a Singapore-seated arbitration based on conflict of interest; the materiality of the documents sought; whether the documents were protected by legal advice privilege; whether there was waiver of that privilege; whether judicial inspection should be ordered; and whether this is a special case for the production of internal and private correspondence.
Facts
The parties
- [4]
[4] The first claimant, Samsung E&A (Thailand) Co., Ltd. (“Samsung Thailand”), is a company incorporated in Thailand engaged in engineering, procurement, construction, project management and commissioning services for energy, oil and gas projects. The second claimant, Saipem Singapore Pte. Ltd. (“Saipem Singapore”), is a company incorporated in Singapore providing engineering services for the design, construction and operation of complex infrastructure and plants in the energy sector. Together, the Claimants form part of a consortium (“Consortium”) that also includes Petrofac South East Asia Pte. Ltd. (“PSEAL”) and PSS Netherlands B.V. (“PSSBV”), which are co-claimants in the underlying arbitration but are not parties to OA 9.
- [5]
[5] The first, second, and third defendants are Linklaters LLP (“Linklaters UK”), Linklaters Singapore Pte. Ltd. (“Linklaters Singapore”), and Linklaters (a Hong Kong Partnership) (“Linklaters HK”) (collectively, “Linklaters”), being the various entities through which the Linklaters international law firm operates across different jurisdictions. The fourth defendant, Thai Oil Public Company Limited (“Thai Oil”), is a company incorporated in Thailand and publicly listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. Thai Oil is the respondent in the underlying arbitration. Linklaters has advised Thai Oil on the Project since before the EPC Contract was signed, with the Thai Oil team (“Linklaters Thai Oil team”) comprising lawyers across its London, Singapore and Hong Kong offices.
The EPC Contract and Parent Company Guarantees
- [6]
[6] On 19 October 2018, Thai Oil entered into a contract (“EPC Contract”) with the Consortium for the design, engineering and construction and delivery of a complete and operational project known as the Clean Fuel Project (the “Project”), a large-scale oil refinery upgrade in Thailand. Under the EPC Contract, each of the Consortium members are jointly and severally liable to Thai Oil for “the performance of the Contract and any and all obligations to be performed or amounts to be paid by the Consortium or by any of the Consortium Members”.
- [7]
[7] Further, the EPC Contract required each company comprising the Consortium to provide to Thai Oil “Parent Company Guarantees”, which would be issued by the ultimate parent company of each of the Consortium members. Three set of Parent Company Guarantees were issued accordingly:
(a) Samsung E&A Co., Ltd. (“Samsung Parent”), the parent company of Samsung Thailand, gave two parent company guarantees in favour of Thai Oil: one dated 18 November 2018 in respect of Samsung Thailand’s performance of the EPC Contract, and another also dated 18 November 2018 in respect of PSSBV’s performance of the EPC Contract.
(b) Saipem S.p.A. (“Saipem Parent”), the parent company of Saipem Singapore, gave parent company guarantees in favour of Thai Oil, including: one dated 14 November 2018 in respect of Saipem Singapore’s performance of the EPC Contract, and another also dated 14 November 2018 in respect of PSSBV’s performance of the EPC Contract.
(c) Petrofac Limited, the parent company of PSEAL, gave parent company guarantees in favour of Thai Oil, including: one dated 30 October 2018 in respect of Petrofac Limited’s performance of the EPC Contract, and another also dated 30 October 2018 in respect of PSSBV’s performance of the EPC Contract.
The commencement of the EPC Arbitration
Petrofac’s financing difficulties and the Restructuring
- [9]
[9] Separately, Petrofac Limited had been experiencing financial difficulties since as early as September 2023 and pursued a restructuring of its liabilities (“Restructuring”). A potential restructuring was first announced in high level terms by way of a public announcement dated 27 September 2024, and the restructuring was then formally announced on 23 December 2024. A potential restructuring was first announced in high level terms by way of a public announcement dated 27 September 2024, and the restructuring was then formally announced on 23 December 2024. During this process, Thai Oil participated as Petrofac Limited’s single largest creditor by virtue of the counterclaims advanced in the EPC Arbitration. Thai Oil voted against Petrofac Limited’s restructuring plan and Petrofac Limited ultimately went into administration on 28 October 2025, with James Robert Bennett and Matthew James Cowlishaw of Teneo Financial Advisory Limited (“Teneo”) appointed as Joint Administrators. Additionally, PSEAL was placed into interim judicial management on 9 May 2025 and judicial management on 7 July 2025.
- [10]
[10] Throughout the Restructuring, Linklaters acted for Petrofac Limited and Petrofac International (UAE) LLC (“PIUL”), a subsidiary of Petrofac Limited and a 36% shareholder in PSSBV. Linklaters has also, at all material times, acted for Thai Oil in the EPC Arbitration. From October 2023, Linklaters was also instructed to advise and act for Petrofac Limited and the Petrofac group (“Petrofac Group” or “Petrofac entities”) in relation to negotiations with Samsung Thailand, Saipem Singapore and their parent companies; it should be noted that Linklaters was previously engaged by Petrofac Limited in November 2021 in a refinancing and capital raise (“November 2021 Refinancing”). The Petrofac team within Linklaters (“Linklaters Petrofac team”) comprised lawyers in its London office, drawn from its Restructuring and Insolvency, Litigation, Arbitration and Investigations, Banking, and Corporate departments. Linklaters was therefore, at all material times, acting concurrently for Thai Oil in the EPC Arbitration and for the Petrofac Group in connection with the Restructuring.
Linklaters’s management of the potential conflict
- [11]
[11] Around the time when Linklaters UK was instructed by Petrofac Limited in October 2023, a letter of engagement dated 14 November 2023 was signed. The letter stated that the scope of Linklaters’s engagement was limited to contingency planning for Petrofac Limited in relation to itself and to any of its subsidiaries as required, and “other matters connected with or in relation to the financial position of Petrofac Limited and the Group”. The primary point of contact at Linklaters UK in relation to the Restructuring was Matthew Harding (“Mr Harding”) (a Partner in the Restructuring and Insolvency team), supported by Christopher Stevenson (“Mr Stevenson”) (a Partner in the Litigation, Investigations and Arbitration team) and Tom Thorne (a Partner in the Corporate team).
- [12]
[12] In March 2024, Petrofac Limited asked Linklaters UK to review the underlying documentation in relation to the Project. Following this, Linklaters UK quickly informed Petrofac Limited that Linklaters had identified a potential conflict through their prior engagement advising Thai Oil on the Project. On or around 22 March 2024, Mr Harding informed Petrofac Limited that as a result of Linklaters’ prior role acting for Thai Oil on the Project, Linklaters could not advise Petrofac Limited or the Petrofac Group in relation to any dispute with Thai Oil or any claims related to the Project. Simmons & Simmons LLP (“Simmons”), who were the Petrofac Group’s retained litigation advisers on other matters, were engaged by the Petrofac Group on these matters instead and Mr Harding promptly facilitated a briefing of Simmons on elements of the Restructuring that would be relevant to their role. The Petrofac Group subsequently engaged Simmons in March 2024 as its legal advisers in respect of the Project and the EPC Arbitration.
- [13]
[13] On the same day (ie, 22 March 2024), Linklaters also implemented information barriers between the Linklaters Petrofac team and the Linklaters Thai Oil team to protect each client’s confidential information held in electronic form. According to Linklaters, the information barriers mean that those working in the Linklaters Petrofac team cannot access any information on the Thai Oil matter, and vice versa. Any attempted unauthorised access would be detected and restricted, and centrally investigated and managed by the Linklaters’s Legal and Risk team. The General Counsel of Linklaters, Mr Matthew Middleditch (“Mr Middleditch”) has deposed on affidavit that there are no reports of attempted unauthorised access. Mr Stevenson also sent an email on 8 October 2024 reminding the Linklaters Petrofac team of the arrangements agreed with Petrofac and highlighting the importance of confidentiality (this was the only email of such reminders that was disclosed). Further, Mr Harding’s affidavit evidence is that he and Mr Stevenson were in “regular communication with [Linklaters’s] Legal and Risk team to manage [the conflict] and ensure that all efforts were made to ensure that the appropriate measures were kept in place”.
- [14]
[14] By an email dated 3 May 2024, Linklaters informed Thai Oil that it would not be able to advise Thai Oil in relation to Petrofac's financial matters. The email referred to earlier discussions between Linklaters and Thai Oil, but such communications have not been disclosed. Nevertheless, Linklaters, the Petrofac Group and Thai Oil have stated on affidavit that Thai Oil and the Petrofac Group agreed to the limitation on Linklaters’s retainers. However, the documents disclosed by the Defendants in this regard consist only of one-way communications from Linklaters to Thai Oil (including an email dated 16 January 2025 from Linklaters to Peangpanor Boonklum, a director of Thai Oil, who was appointed by PTT Public Company Limited (“PTT”), a 45.03% shareholder of Thai Oil). No documents from Thai Oil or the Petrofac Group evidencing their agreement or consent to the information barriers and limitation of retainer have been disclosed.
- [15]
[15] Following the limitation of Linklaters' retainer, Thai Oil appointed Polaris Advisory Asia Pte. Ltd. (“Polaris”) to advise on the Petrofac Group’s “financial matters due to conflicts”. Thai Oil subsequently appointed Humphries Kerstetter LLP (“Humphries Kerstetter”) from around January 2025 to advise on the Restructuring and Thai Oil's position, rights, and options as a creditor of Petrofac Limited.
- [16]
[16] In November 2025, Thai Oil commenced four separate arbitrations against Samsung Parent and Saipem Parent under the Parent Company Guarantees issued in connection with the EPC Contract. I pause to note that the Claimants highlight that Thai Oil did not commence any corresponding arbitration against Petrofac Limited under the parent company guarantees issued by it, notwithstanding that Petrofac Limited had issued guarantees in respect of both PSEAL's and PSSBV's performance of the EPC Contract and despite Petrofac Limited having previously indicated its intention to pursue such proceedings. The Defendants’ explanation is that it was commercially rational not to pursue an insolvent entity and that Petrofac Limited was not a party to the EPC Contract.
Claimants’ discovering the conflict and taking steps to disqualify Linklaters
- [17]
[17] The issue of conflict first came to the attention of the Claimants in or around October 2024, when they identified that Linklaters was acting for both Thai Oil in the EPC Arbitration and for the Petrofac entities in the Restructuring. Mayer Brown International LLP (the Claimants’ advisers in the Restructuring), King & Spalding LLP (Samsung Thailand’s former lawyers in the EPC Arbitration), Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP (“WilmerHale”) (Samsung Thailand’s present lawyers in the EPC Arbitration), and Three Crowns LLP (“Three Crowns”) (Saipem Singapore’s lawyers in the EPC Arbitration) wrote to Linklaters stating that Linklaters’s conflict was causing concern and asked on what basis Linklaters was able to act in both capacities simultaneously.
- [18]
[18] Around November and December 2025, extensive correspondence ensued between WilmerHale and Three Crowns on the one hand, and Linklaters on the other. In that correspondence, the Claimants called upon Linklaters to withdraw from acting for Thai Oil in the EPC Arbitration. Linklaters declined to do so, maintaining that no conflict of interest arose and that any risk of prejudice was adequately addressed by information barriers erected within the firm between the Linklaters Thai Oil team and the Linklaters Petrofac team.
- [19]
[19] During the course of that correspondence, it emerged that Mr Harding had joined a call on 3 November 2025 with WilmerHale and Three Crowns to discuss coordination on handover and litigation support issues relating to the EPC Arbitration. According to the Claimants, lawyers from the Linklaters Petrofac team may have drafted or commented on documents relating to litigation support for the EPC Arbitration. The Claimants contend that these matters directly contradicted Linklaters’ assurances that the Linklaters Thai Oil team and the Linklaters Petrofac team were operating in complete separation from one another.
- [20]
[20] Having failed to resolve the matter through correspondence, the Claimants raised the conflict issue before the Tribunal in the EPC Arbitration at the First Procedural Hearing. The Tribunal acknowledged the seriousness and urgency of the matter. It noted that there was an advantage in the issue being determined by a court rather than by the Tribunal itself, given that the resolution of the issue would likely require consideration of privileged and confidential information that it would be inappropriate for the Tribunal to receive. The Tribunal accordingly indicated that it would be preferable for the matter to be dealt with by way of court proceedings.
- [21]
[21] The Claimants thereafter commenced OA 9 seeking, among other relief, injunctions disqualifying Linklaters from continuing to act for Thai Oil in the EPC Arbitration.
The parties’ cases in OA 9 and SUM 1526
Claimants
- [22]
[22] The first ground is that Linklaters is in a position of an actual and irreconcilable conflict of interest by reason of its concurrent representation of Thai Oil and the Petrofac entities. They submit that Thai Oil and the Petrofac entities are not merely unrelated clients whose interests happen to diverge on discrete matters. Rather, their interests are directly and fundamentally adverse to one another in relation to the very same dispute. Thai Oil’s counterclaims in the EPC Arbitration, estimated at US$3.88 billion, constitute the single most significant liability facing the Petrofac group in the Restructuring. The restructuring plan that Linklaters was promoting on behalf of Petrofac Limited expressly sought to compromise and release those very liabilities. Linklaters was therefore simultaneously advancing Thai Oil’s claims in the arbitration and working to discharge those same claims in the Restructuring. The Claimants submit that this is not a case of a technical or theoretical conflict capable of being managed by information barriers, but a case of Linklaters acting on both sides of the same fundamental dispute.
- [23]
[23] The second ground is that Linklaters has come into possession of the Consortium’s confidential, commercially sensitive and privileged information in the course of its representation of the Petrofac entities, and that there is a real and sensible possibility that this information may be disclosed or misused to the detriment of Samsung Thailand and Saipem Singapore. Linklaters itself acknowledged in its letter of 5 December 2025 that it had come into possession of such information. The source and nature of that information is significant: PSEAL was the lead Consortium member during the formative years of the Project and holds a substantial body of documents and information directly relevant to the key issues in the EPC Arbitration, including the causes of delay, the Consortium’s internal assessments, its claims strategy, and its evaluation of Thai Oil’s counterclaims. The Claimants submit that the information barriers described by Linklaters are inadequate to address this risk, both because they were described only belatedly and in general terms, and because the conduct of Linklaters’s own personnel demonstrated that those barriers had already been breached or were incapable of being maintained given the interconnection between the two matters.
- [24]
[24] The Claimants further submit that the prejudice they face is not confined to the risk of misuse of confidential information. They contend that Linklaters’s dual representation has compromised their ability to communicate freely and cooperate with the Petrofac entities on matters relevant to the EPC Arbitration, given that any such communication risks being tainted by Linklaters’s position on both sides. They also contend that Linklaters’s inside knowledge of the Petrofac restructuring gives Thai Oil forensic advantages that cannot be neutralised by any lesser remedy than disqualification.
- [25]
[25] In respect of the production application in SUM 1526, the Claimants argue that the documents sought are material to the issues of breach of confidence and conflict of interest:
(a) On breach of confidence and whether there is a real and sensible risk of misuse, the Claimants submit that the issues include: (i) what is the information within the possession or control of Linklaters; (ii) whether this information is confidential; (iii) what measures have been taken to prevent the flow of information to the Linklaters Thai Oil team; (iv) whether such measures have been adequate to ameliorate the default position that information flows within a firm.
(b) With respect to whether the proper administration of justice requires Linklaters to be restrained from acting, in the interests of the protection of the integrity of the judicial process including the appearance of justice, the issues include (i) the extent to which Linklaters’s respective retainers for Thai Oil and the Petrofac entities were limited; (ii) the extent to which Linklaters’s respective retainers can even be limited; (iii) what measures have been taken to prevent the flow of information to the Linklaters Thai Oil team; (iv) whether such measures have been adequate to ameliorate the default position that information flows within a firm.
- [26]
[26] The Claimants argue that production should be ordered as it is undesirable for OA 9 to be decided on the state of the current evidence, which is based on averments on affidavit which are “uncorroborated” and “unsupported” by documentary evidence. For many categories of internal documents sought, the Claimants also highlight that this is a case of informational asymmetry which would fall within the “special case” exception.
- [27]
[27] On the assertions of privilege relied on by the Defendants, the Claimants submit that the Defendants have failed to particularise and furnish evidence for why certain documents are privileged, and that this justifies heightened scrutiny in respect of the Defendants’ assertions of privilege. Further, the Claimants suggest that where there is a dispute over whether documents are privileged, the Court has the power to inspect the documents to ascertain if they are privileged. Judicial inspection can also be accompanied with a “Hollander order”, which is an order that alleged privileged material be disclosed to a confidentiality club for the applicant’s solicitors to ascertain if the documents are privileged. Finally, in respect of some of the categories sought, the Claimants also assert that the Defendants have waived privilege by disclosing certain documents in OA 9.
Defendants
- [28]
[28] The Defendants contend that the issue in OA 9 is whether “there is a real and sensible possibility of Samsung Thailand and Saipem Singapore’s confidential and privileged information being disclosed or misused”. It is not the Claimants’ case that there has been actual or suspected disclosure or misuse of confidential and privileged information belonging to the Claimants by Linklaters’s Petrofac team (whether innocently or maliciously). Linklaters denies that it possesses the Consortium’s confidential, commercially sensitive, and privileged information relating to the Project. Linklaters’s information relating to the Project is generic only and does not go into the merits of any party’s position in the EPC Arbitration. Further, the Defendants contend that there is no real and sensible possibility of the Claimants’ confidential and privileged information being disclosed and/or misuse as measures were put in place to prevent disclosure and/or misuse of any confidential information belonging to the Claimants. In any event, the legal test does not extend to disclosure; rather, the concern for breach of confidentiality is misuse.
- [29]
[29] Further, in so far as the Claimants rely on its assertion of conflict of interest, civil courts are not the appropriate forum for a determination of whether there is a conflict of interests under a solicitor’s legal professional conduct rules, especially in the context of an application for an injunction. In any event, Linklaters’s concurrent representation of Thai Oil and the Petrofac entities does not constitute an actual conflict of interest because both Thai Oil and Petrofac Limited have agreed to Linklaters’s respective retainers being limited. Further, Petrofac Limited appointed Simmons to advise them in relation to the Project and the EPC Arbitration, while Thai Oil appointed Humphries Kerstetter to advise them on the Restructuring and Thai Oil’s position, rights and options as a creditor of Petrofac Limited.
- [30]
[30] In respect of SUM 1526, the Defendants submit that the documents sought are immaterial to OA 9 and that the requests amount to a fishing expedition, effectively seeking disclosure of Linklaters’s entire files for both Petrofac and Thai Oil, the vast majority of which would be immaterial, irrelevant, unnecessary, and in most instances privileged and confidential. The Defendants further submit that the requests are misconceived in their framing, as some of the categories sought do not even address the Claimants’ stated concern: namely, the leakage of confidential and privileged information from the Linklaters Petrofac Team to the Linklaters Thai Oil Team, and thereafter to Thai Oil; instead, they instead capture entirely irrelevant flows of information, such as communications from Thai Oil to Petrofac or from Petrofac to the Linklaters Petrofac Team, neither of which is of any concern to the Claimants or relevant to OA 9. The Defendants also note that the Claimants have not even exhaustively identified the confidential and privileged documents or information said to be at risk, despite this being their burden to establish, and that in the absence of such identification, materiality cannot be established in relation to most if not all of the categories sought.
- [31]
[31] The requests are said to be a further attempt to prove actual misuse of confidential information, a case which the Claimants do not in fact advance in OA 9 and which therefore cannot justify the production sought. Finally, the Defendants submit that the evidence before the court already comprises affidavits filed by representatives of Petrofac, Thai Oil, Simmons, and Teneo. Together with third party confirmations, these are sufficient to demonstrate that there is no real and sensible possibility of misuse of the Claimants’ privileged and confidential information, and that the inference to be drawn from the evidence is that it was not necessary for Linklaters to have received any information confidential to the Claimants in the first place.
- [32]
[32] The Defendants also assert privilege in respect of many of the categories sought and deny that there has been implied waiver of privilege as, among other reasons, it is not for Linklaters as solicitors to waive that privilege. Furthermore, as a matter of principle, professional conduct rules governing solicitors are not intended to govern civil proceedings between private parties, and the proper forum for determining whether such rules have been breached is the Law Society through its disciplinary processes, not the court.
- [33]
[33] The Defendants further highlight that the Claimants were neither clients nor former prospective clients of Linklaters in relation to the Project. The burden of proving a real and sensible possibility of misuse rests on the Claimants, and where information is lawfully possessed and there is no intention to improperly use or disclose it, no breach of confidence arises.
Issues to be determined
- [34]
[34] The broad issues that arise for determination in SUM 1526 include:
General principles governing production applications
- [35]
[35] Order 11 r 3(1) of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”) requires an applicant seeking specific production to establish that: (a) there is sufficient evidence that the documents exist which the other party has not disclosed; (b) the documents sought are material to the issues in the action; and (c) there is sufficient evidence that the requested documents are or have been in the possession or control of the other party (Eng’s Wantan Noodle Pte Ltd and another v Eng’s Char Siew Wantan Mee Pte Ltd [2023] SGHCR 17 (“Eng’s Wantan Noodle”) at [48]).
The requirement of materiality
- [36]
[36] In relation to the requirement of materiality, it will be satisfied if there is a “demonstrable nexus” between the requested documents and at least one of the issues as determined by reference to the pleaded cases of the parties. The requested documents have a significant bearing on an issue in the case such that it could potentially affect the court’s ultimate decision (Eng’s Wantan Noodle at [49]). In DFD v DFE and another [2025] 3 SLR 362 (“DFD”) (at [26]), it was observed that the “issues in the case” for the purpose of O 11 r 3(1) are identified with reference to the factual positions taken by the parties in support of their respective cases in the legal proceeding with which the production of documents is requested. The “issues in the case” are also identified from written statements in which the parties set out all the relevant facts which they intend to rely on and make good in the legal proceeding. In proceedings commenced by originating applications, ordinarily, the closest functional equivalent of pleadings would be the affidavits filed by the parties in support of or responding to the application (DFD at [26]). For completeness, while the Claimants sought to argue that that the materiality requirement differed between production applications commenced by originating claim and those commenced by originating application, there is nothing in the ROC 2021 that suggests that the materiality requirement should be applied less rigorously to production applications commenced within an originating application.
- [37]
[37] Implicit in the statements of principle in Eng’s Wantan Noodle and DFD is that an issue identified in their pleadings or affidavits must be a material issue, in the sense that the resolution of that issue would likely affect the claim, defence or the relief sought. This is a corollary to the trite rule that each pleading must contain, and contain only, the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence; expressed another way, the pleading “must contain material facts and not just any fact” (Hyflux Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) and others v KPMG LLP [2024] SGHC 176 at [5], citing Multi-Pak Singapore (in receivership) v Intraco [1992] 2 SLR(R) 382). It follows that if an issue identified by a party seeking production is immaterial to the claim, defence or relief sought, production cannot be ordered in respect of that issue even if the documents sought have a demonstrable nexus to that identified issue.
- [38]
[38] What constitutes a material issue is determined by reference to the requirements to succeed in a claim or defence or to obtain a specific relief. On a broader level, this requires parties to be clear in their pleadings or affidavits about what their cases are, the causes of action and their constituent elements, and the reliefs sought, which would in turn shed light on the material issues that are in play.
- [39]
[39] In particular, specific production will not be ordered to aid a non-existent cause of action. This principle was illustrated in Manuchar Steel Hong Kong Limited v Star Pacific Line Pte Ltd [2014] SGHC 181, where the applicant sought pre-action discovery of all documents relating to the hire, use or operation of a vessel by the respondent or its servants or agents. The applicant wanted the documents to determine if the respondent was part of a single economic entity with another company, SPL Shipping Limited. The applicant hoped to use the information in the documents to commence proceedings against the respondent to enforce two arbitral awards which it had obtained against the SPL Shipping Limited.
- [40]
[40] Lee Kim Shin JC dismissed the application. One of the grounds was that the applicant could not establish that its intended cause of action against the respondent was recognised at law under either the International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) or general company law. The court observed that the authorities established “beyond doubt” that an arbitral award cannot impose enforceable obligations on strangers to an arbitration agreement, and hence the applicant’s attempt to enforce the arbitral awards against the respondent was not viable at law (at [76]). It followed that the court could not order pre-action production in support of that intended cause of action (at [78]–[79]).
- [41]
[41] Likewise, in Aquariva Pte Ltd v Gezel Group Pte Ltd and another [2017] SGHCR 14, the plaintiff sought pre-action discovery to investigate a claim in “fraud”. The assistant registrar dismissed the application and observed that “the law does not recognise a free-standing cause of action in fraud per se” (at [25]). The plaintiff then relied on fraudulent trading under s 340(1) of the Companies Act, but the court held that winding-up proceedings or proceedings against the company were a pre-condition (at [30]). That decision was an example where production was not ordered because the intended cause of action plainly did not exist.
- [42]
[42] While these decisions were situated under the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) and were pre-action discovery applications, I am of the view that the same principle applies to specific production applications under the ROC 2021, and even more so given the more stringent production requirements under the present rules.
Exception to private and internal documents
- [43]
[43] In some situations, notwithstanding that documents may be found by the court to be material, production should generally not be ordered if the documents sought are a party’s private or internal correspondence, unless it is a “special case” or “such correspondence are known adverse documents” (O 11 r 5(2) of the ROC 2021). The purpose of preventing private or internal correspondence from being subject to production orders generally is that such documents “ultimately have little probative value” and that production of such documents is “highly intrusive”. On the second reason, it has been observed that a party who sues or is sued in court does not thereby give up his right to privacy and confidentiality in his documents and communications (Cachet Multi Strategy Fund SPC on behalf of Cachet Special Opportunities SP v Feng Shi and others [2024] SGHCR 8 (“Cachet”) at [53])
- [44]
[44] As for what the terms mean, “private” correspondence refers to communications which are intended to be private as between the persons who correspond with each other, whereas “internal” correspondence refers to correspondence that is internal to the party from which the document is requested, such as emails between individuals and/or departments in the organisation not intended to be received by persons outside the party. The two categories of private and internal correspondence can overlap; a document can be both private and internal at the same time (Cachet at [55]).
- [45]
[45] Notwithstanding the general prohibition against production orders being made in respect of private and internal correspondence, a production may still be made in a special case. As for what amounts to a “special case”, the court in Cachet opined (at [57]):
- [46]
[46] In Invest Partners Capital Group Pte Ltd v Deutsche Bank AG [2026] SGHCR 36, the court opined that one instance in which the court may be prepared to find a “special case” is where a producing party’s reliance on the proscription against the production of “private or internal documents” leads to a perverse result that is unintended by the design of the ROC 2021 and runs contrary to the Ideals therein (at [49]). That being said, the court emphasised that information asymmetry alone cannot warrant the finding of a “special case”. This is because implicit in the notion of information asymmetry is that one party lacks knowledge of certain facts or lacks evidence which are exclusive to the other party in the litigation. That, in itself, should not justify production especially since the ROC 2021 imposes a new regime which operates on the principle that parties litigate on the strength of their cases (at [50]). I agree with this view.
Principles governing legal advice privilege
- [47]
[47] Notwithstanding that documents may be found to be material, production should not be ordered if they are protected by privilege. Unlike the rules prohibiting the production of internal or private documents, there are no exceptions to warrant production if a document is found to be privileged and that privilege has not been waived. In light of the issues raised in SUM 1526, I turn to briefly discuss the principles governing the scope of legal advice privilege, what particulars are needed to establish that privilege, implied waiver, and procedural mechanisms to address disputed assertions of privilege such as judicial inspection and Hollander orders, which were argued in relation to the vast majority of categories in SUM 1526.
Scope of the privilege
- [48]
[48] The right to legal advice privilege is statutorily expressed in ss 128, 128A and 131 of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) (“EA”), which provide as follows:
- [49]
[49] Despite the codification of legal advice privilege in ss 128, 128A and s 131 of the EA, it is worth highlighting that common law principles on legal advice privilege remain relevant in Singapore, provided that they are not inconsistent with the EA (Mah Kiat Seng v Attorney-General and others [2022] 3 SLR 890 at [49]–[53]). In RB Investments Pte Ltd v Jason Aleksander Kardachi and others [2023] SGHC 274 (“RB Investments”), the General Division of the High Court (“General Division”) emphasised that common law principles can supplement the statutory provisions in the EA concerning legal advice privilege, provided that they align with the rationale and spirit of that privilege (at [25]).
- [50]
[50] Legal advice privilege exists to ensure full, free and frank communication between clients and their legal advisers, which is crucial for the effective administration of justice. In RB Investments, the General Division emphasised that legal advice privilege supports access to justice by protecting the confidentiality of communications with lawyers, allowing clients to seek legal advice without fear of disclosure (at [27]).
- [51]
[51] To fall under the protection of legal advice privilege, the party asserting privilege must establish on a prima facie basis that the communications in respect of which privilege is asserted were made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, and are confidential in nature (Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken Ab (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd and other appeals [2007] 2 SLR 367 (“Skandinaviska”) at [32], [33] and [35]). The scope of this privilege extends broadly to communications made confidentially for the purposes of legal advice, including those that are part of a continuum of communication between the solicitor and client. The passage below, as set out in the English Court of Appeal decision of Balabel v Air India [1998] 1 Ch 317 (at 330), was cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in Skandinaviska (at [47]):
This passage illustrates the contextual approach to legal advice privilege, protecting communications which are reasonably expected to be kept confidential to ensure full and frank discussion.
- [52]
[52] Two other principles are also relevant in this application. First, legal advice privilege extends to advice received from foreign lawyers acting as legal advisers, and common law rules of privilege pertaining to foreign lawyers will continue to apply in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the EA (CIFG Special Assets Capital I Ltd (formerly known as Diamond Kendall Ltd) v Polimet Pte Ltd and others [2015] SGHC 325 at [58]). At common law, the position is set out in International Business Machines Corp and another v Phoenix International (Computers) Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 413, where the English High Court held that legal advice privilege protected communications that existed between US attorneys and the defendant, which set out the legal position in the UK and the strategy to adopt in relation to the contemplated proceedings. In that case, Aldous J held “the correct approach is to look at the substance and reality of the document, the circumstances in which it came into existence also its purpose” (at 429). The communications were found to be privileged, being “advice given by lawyers in circumstances where litigation was contemplated to enable the recipient to decide what strategy to adopt, both from a legal and business standpoint” (at 429).
- [53]
[53] Secondly, legal advice privilege extends to the communications with in-house counsel. That is made clear by the enactment of s 128A of the EA. Further, that privilege applies not only to communications between in-house counsel qualified in Singapore but also in respect of in-house counsel who are qualified elsewhere. While the Claimants’ counsel disputed this point at the hearing, I do not accept that submission. In s 131(2) of the EA, “legal professional adviser” is defined to mean: (a) “advocate and solicitor”; or (b) “in the case of any communication which has taken place between any officer or employee of an entity and a legal counsel employed, or deemed under section 128A(4) or (5) to be employed, by the entity in the course and for the purpose of seeking his or her legal advice as such legal counsel, that legal counsel”.
- [54]
[54] The term “legal counsel” is defined in s 3(7) of the EA to mean, among other persons in certain public offices, “a person (by whatever name called) who is an employee of an entity employed to undertake the provision of legal advice or assistance in connection with the application of the law or any form of resolution of legal disputes”. No mention is made of any requirement for the “legal counsel” mentioned in s 3(7) of the EA to be qualified in Singapore, or for the legal counsel to only render advice on Singapore law. This broad definition stands in contrast to the references to “advocate or solicitor” in other parts of the EA, which in its plain and ordinary meaning refers to advocates or solicitors of the Supreme Court of Singapore (see s 2(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed)). If Parliament had intended for in-house counsel advising on foreign law to be excluded from the ambit of ss 128A(1) and 131(1) of the EA, it would have expressly included a carve out.
- [55]
[55] Accordingly, in so far as the Defendants’ assertions of legal advice privilege related to advice from foreign lawyers and foreign-qualified in-house counsel, those facts did not prevent privilege from attaching.
Particulars required from a party asserting privilege
- [56]
[56] Another issue raised in SUM 1526 relates to the sufficiency of particulars provided by the Defendants in asserting legal advice privilege. In this regard, I respectfully adopt the principles as summarised in Wesley Widjaja v Ng Wei San (alias Oei Wei San alias Wilson Hasan Widjaja) and others [2025] SGHCR 32 (“Wesley Widjaja”) (at [68]):
(a) Where the production of documents has been applied for or ordered, and a party seeks to withhold those documents on the ground that they are privileged, he should state in his response affidavit that he is resisting production on this ground, and identify the relevant head of privilege. Ideally, privilege should be raised in response to the application for production itself.
(b) The party asserting privilege bears the legal burden of proving, at least on a prima facie basis, that the preconditions for privilege to subsist are present in respect of the documents over which privilege is asserted.
(c) To discharge that burden, the party asserting privilege must place before the court sufficient facts and evidence to support its claim that the preconditions for the relevant head of privilege are met – at least on a prima facie basis, and albeit without disclosing the allegedly privileged material itself. Where the party asserting privilege has chosen not to depose those facts on affidavit, he will need to try to persuade the court that there is sufficient basis, on the undisputed facts, for the court to accept that privilege is established.
(d) If the party asserting privilege succeeds in discharging his legal burden, the tactical burden shifts to the party seeking production to adduce material to rebut this prima facie case. It may do so by arguing that the facts put forward by the party asserting privilege do not support the claim of privilege, or by putting forth other facts that contradict or undermine the factual basis on which privilege is asserted. However, the statement of facts on affidavit by the party asserting privilege will generally be conclusive, unless it is plain and obvious that this is erroneous or incomplete, or that the documents are for some other reason not protected by privilege.
- [57]
[57] In Wesley Widjaja, the court held that the respondents’ assertion of privilege fell far short of what was expected because their affidavits only contained a bare assertion that the dispute documents were “protected by legal advice and/or litigation privilege”. The respondents had taken the position that a category of the disputed documents sought were protected by privilege because their solicitors had been copied in all the correspondence and communications constituting that category. However, there were no further facts and evidence to support the respondents’ claim that the preconditions for the head(s) of privilege they wished to rely on were met, even on a prima facie basis. It was also unclear who those solicitors were until it was clarified at the hearing (at [70]–[71]).
- [58]
[58] I also agree with the court’s suggestion in Wesley Widjaja that the following particulars that should be furnished by a party asserting privilege as a matter of good practice (at [65]), agreeing with the views expressed in Colin Liew, Legal Professional Privilege (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2023) (“Colin Liew”) at paras 3.98 and 3.100–3.103:
- [59]
[59] For completeness, I note that there is a suggestion in Wesley Widjaja that the affidavit of the party asserting privilege “should address all documents that the production order relates to (or should address a particular disputed category of documents in its entirety), and not merely a subset of the documents” (at [61] and [63], citing Wuhu Ruyi Xinbo Investment Partnership (Ltd Partnership) v Shandong Ruyi Technology Group Co, Ltd and another [2024] SGHC 308 (“Wuhu (HC)”) (at [81]–[86]). In this regard, I am of the respectful view that this requirement should be applied in a context-specific manner in production applications. The observation in Wuhu (HC) was not made in the context of allegations of privilege arising in a production application at first instance; rather, the question was whether the respondent had failed to fully comply with the unless order that had been made against it arising from a breach of a production order.
- [60]
[60] In my view, there should be a distinction in the approach that the court should take in a production application vis-à-vis an unless order application stemming from the alleged breach of a production order, or the further breach of an unless order for production. In the former case, the court is asked to consider and scrutinise an applicant’s request for the first time, and in the latter case, the court would have already decided that the requirements for ordering production were met, and determined that the scope of the production order was appropriate. The latter scenario requires a more exacting standard because a respondent is asked to explain why the production order, which was already determined by the court to be appropriate, was not complied with. In contrast, where a production application is being determined for the first time, it may not be appropriate to require a respondent to specific each and every document in respect of which it is asserting privilege, as the scope of documents that are requested may be unduly broad or immaterial to begin with. To provide an example, it would be unsatisfactory for an applicant seeking production to frame its requests extremely broadly to include large portions of privileged material, thereby shifting the onus and placing a respondent in an unfairly prejudicial position where it has to particularise each privileged document that falls within the scope of the request and provide details to such an exacting standard. This cannot be how the production regime under the ROC 2021 is intended to operate. The suggestions in Wesley Widjaja should be viewed as best practices that should be complied with as much as practicable where the interests of justice require, not rigid criteria to be enforced without regard to the specific context of the production application.
- [61]
[61] The common concern in both Wuhu (HC) (at [87]) and Wesley Widjaja (at [62]) appears to be the potential for a respondent to rely on the plain and obvious standard as set out in Lutfi Salim bin Talib and another v British and Malayan Trustees Ltd [2024] SGHC 85 (“Lutfi”) to avoid its production obligations. Indeed, the notion of fair play and preventing an abuse of process should be the relevant touchstone for determining whether a respondent has provided a satisfactory explanation for its assertion of privilege. What would be considered satisfactory in a production application would depend, among other things, on how broadly the category is framed and the nature of the documents sought. If a category of documents sought is too broad and would include a significant volume of immaterial documents, the applicant should be invited to narrow its request to provide the respondent a fair opportunity of providing a complete response to the applicant’s request. Furthermore, where it is obvious from the context of the request and the undisputed facts that the requested documents would be privileged, it would be easier for a respondent to discharge its onus.
- [62]
[62] This contextual approach is illustrated in the Court of Appeal’s decision in ARX v Comptroller of Income Tax [2016] 5 SLR 590. The appellant had restructured its Singapore operations and incorporated a new subsidiary. The respondent, who was the Comptroller of Income Tax, had paid approximately $9.6m in tax refunds to the subsidiary, but subsequently took the view that the restructuring arrangement was a tax avoidance agreement. After unsuccessful attempts to recover the tax refund through the assessment of additional sums in tax, the respondent commenced a suit against the appellant and its subsidiary to recover the tax refunds. In a supporting affidavit to an application to serve the writ of summons on the appellant out of jurisdiction, the respondent’s employee deposed that the suit was not time-barred as the respondent had only concluded that the restructuring arrangement was a tax avoidance arrangement on a certain date. The deponent referred to the fact that the respondent had sought and obtained advice from lawyers from his in-house legal department.
- [63]
[63] The appellant entered an appearance in the suit and applied for production of the legal advice, arguing that it was not privileged. It advanced three broad arguments, namely, that (a) communications with in-house legal counsel were not protected by legal professional privilege before the passage of the Evidence (Amendment) Act 2012 (Act 4 of 2012); (b) the prerequisites necessary for privilege to be asserted under the common law had not been satisfied; (c) even if the advice was privileged, privilege had been waived. The High Court did not order the production of the legal advice but ordered that the respondent was to elect whether he was relying merely on the fact that the advice had been given or was seeking to rely upon the contents of the advice. If it was the former, the respondent would have to file a supplemental affidavit to confirm that it was not relying on the “substance or contents” of the advice. If it was the latter, the respondent would have to produce the advice. The appellant appealed, reprising the same arguments it had presented in the High Court and also arguing that the High Court had erred in law by failing to render a decision on the application for production and had, instead, left it to the respondent to “decide for himself” what the outcome of the application should be.
- [64]
[64] On the second issue of whether the prerequisites necessary for privilege at common law had been satisfied, the appellant submitted that that burden had not been discharged because the respondent had not adduced any positive evidence either of the confidential nature of the communications or of the independence of the lawyers who rendered the advice. The Court of Appeal disagreed with that submission (at [43]) and endorsed (at [44]) the approach of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Australian Hospital Care (Pindari) Pty Ltd v Duggan (No 2) [1999] VSC 131, where Gillard J opined that “once the client swears the affidavit of documents claiming legal professional privilege in a way which leads the court to the conclusion that the claim is properly made, then the prima facie position is that the legal adviser was acting independently at the relevant time”; further, “if any other party to the litigation disputes the claim for legal professional privilege then it has the evidentiary burden of establishing facts which prima facie rebut the presumption” (at [67]–[68]). Additionally, the Court of Appeal in ARX opined that if the court was still not satisfied, it would be open to the court to look behind the affidavit to the documents themselves to ascertain if privilege was rightly asserted and the court would reach a decision after examining the evidence (at [46], citing the Supreme Court of Queensland in Aquila Coal Pty Ltd v Bowen Central Coal Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 82).
- [65]
[65] Applying these principles to the facts, the Court of Appeal in ARX held that the respondent’s assertion of privilege was sufficient in the context of that case, and explained as follows (at [47]–[50]):
- [66]
[66] The passage above underscores the importance of undertaking a fact-sensitive exercise to determine the sufficiency of a respondent’s assertion of privilege. In ARX, it was evident – at least on a prima facie basis – that the advice in question was privileged because: (a) the deponent of the affidavit that referred to the advice was trying to explain how the respondent came to the view that the appellant was involved in a tax avoidance arrangement after seeking advice from the respondent’s Law Division; (b) there was no suggestion that the Law Division provided anything other than legal advice; (c) there was an assertion on affidavit that privileged subsisted and had not been waived. The Court of Appeal opined that these points alone would have sufficed to present a prima facie case that the advice was privileged. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal observed that “more could perhaps have been done”, and the respondent had realised this and had further clarified on affidavit that the Law Division comprised in-house legal officers whose work was concerned with providing independent legal input and advice and dealing with legal issues on a confidential basis (at [49]). However, the initial lack of clarification, and the mere fact that more could have been said in that particular context, were not fatal, and did not detract from the core principle that where “the preconditions for privilege to subsist are present, the bar (at least to make out a prima facie case) is not high” (at [50]).
- [67]
[67] I further observe that while ARX was decided under the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed), I do not think that the position under the ROC 2021 necessarily imposes a more onerous standard for respondents in production applications. I reiterate that whether satisfactory particulars pertaining to an assertion of privilege have been provided is a fact-sensitive question. Further, while more particulars should be required if it is not obvious on a prima facie standard why certain documents are privileged, the plain and obvious test should not be turned on its head by requiring respondents to go beyond a prima facie standard to establish privilege. This would denude the plain and obvious test by shifting from applicants the primary burden of disproving privilege on a plain and obvious standard. Moreover, to require a respondent asserting privilege to go into too much detail may be self-defeating, as excessive particularity may disclose the substance of what privilege is meant to protect, as the other parties to the litigation may be able to infer the advice given, the respondent’s concerns, and the potential weaknesses in the respondent’s case.
Implied waiver of privilege
- [68]
[68] I turn to discuss the principles on implied waiver of privilege, which the Claimants raise in respect of many categories of documents in this application.
- [69]
[69] The starting point is that privilege is a right to resist the compulsory disclosure of information, and like all rights, it can be waived. In ARX, the Court of Appeal held (at [64]) that fairness is the theme that runs through the doctrine of implied waiver. However, it is not “fairness at large” that drives the operation of the doctrine of implied waiver. The Court of Appeal observed in ARX that “[m]ere unfairness, in the sense of a disadvantage accruing to one side due to the withholding of information on the ground of privilege, can never be the touchstone by which the court determines whether there has been an implied waiver of privilege” (at [64], citing the English Court of Appeal decision of Paragon Finance plc (formerly National Home Loans Corporation plc) and others v Freshfields (a firm) [1999] 1 WLR 1183 at 1194 (“Paragon Finance”) per Lord Bingham CJ (as he then was)). This is because while there is always some unfairness in allowing information to be withheld on the ground of privilege, the balance between disclosure and privilege has long been struck in favour of preserving privilege (ARX at [64]).
- [70]
[70] Instead, implied waiver is concerned with a certain scenario where it would be unfair and inconsistent for a party to only disclose aspects of privileged documents that are advantageous to it and seek haven under the cloak of privilege in respect of evidence that is disadvantageous. The Court of Appeal described the guiding principle as follows (ARX at [65]):
- [71]
[71] The inquiry should not be approached simplistically. It is “not every case of inconsistent conduct that will warrant a finding of implied waiver” (ARX at [67]). Indeed, not all references to the fact of the receipt of legal advice will need to a finding of implied waiver. Much would depend on the precise facts and context of the case, and non-exhaustive factors include: (a) what has been disclosed and the materiality of the information in the context of the present proceedings; (b) the circumstances under which the disclosure took place; (c) whether it may be said (albeit only as a relevant factor as opposed to a single test) that the party had “relied” or “deployed” the advice to advance his case; and (d) whether it can be said that there is a risk that an incomplete and misleading impression had been given (ARX at [69]).
- [72]
[72] Further, privilege may only be waived by the client, not the solicitors. This was a point that arises in SUM 1526, as the Claimants argue that the “Defendants” – comprising Linklaters LLP, Linklaters Singapore, Linklaters HK and Thai Oil – had waived legal advice privilege. Given the reference to all Defendants, it is unclear which of the Defendants had waived privilege. If the argument is that Linklaters had waived privilege, this would clearly not get off the ground. At the hearing, the Claimants’ counsel argued that one cannot avoid waiver simply by having Linklaters LLP, Linklaters Singapore, Linklaters HK disclose privileged documents on affidavit, and further, all Defendants are represented by the same set of counsel in OA 9. With respect, it is still important to be clear on who holds the right against disclosure, and consequently who can waive that right. The court cannot conclude that privilege has been waived by a person who does not even possess the right.
Judicial inspection and Hollander orders
- [73]
[73] As mentioned above (at [64]), if there is uncertainty as to whether a document is privileged, judicial inspection remains an option in appropriate circumstances.
- [75]
[75] The Court of Appeal observed that there were authorities to suggest that judicial inspection should only be ordered where there is “real doubt” over whether a document is privileged (Skandinaviska at [104]), citing the English Court of Appeal decision of Westminster Airways Ltd v Kuwait Oil Co Ltd [1951] 1 KB 134 (“Westminster Airways”), where Jenkins LJ observed (at 146):
The emphasised portions of this passage indicate that the starting point is that affidavits should generally be conclusive of the matter and the court will generally not look behind the affidavits. Nevertheless, it may be helpful for the court to order for judicial inspection where there is “real doubt” about whether the documents requested are privileged.
- [76]
[76] Skandinaviska was a decision that pre-dated the ROC 2021 that affirmed the court’s power to inspect documents, although it should be exercised conservatively and in cases of real doubt. In Wesley Widjaja, which was decided under the ROC 2021, the court opined that there were several reasons why a court faced with a disputed claim of legal professional privilege should decline to inspect the documents over which privilege is asserted, even where inspection is requested by either or both parties, and especially in proceedings governed by the ROC 2021 (at [97]):
- [77]
[77] To the extent that the quoted passage suggests that judicial inspection is no longer remain available under the ROC 2021, I respectfully disagree for the following reasons:
(a) First, it is not clear how the introduction of the ROC 2021 derogated from or removed a power that was previously available to the court. While the ROC 2021 did not expressly mention judicial inspection, there is no indication in either the Civil Justice Commission Report (29 December 2017) (Chairperson: Justice Tay Yong Kwang) or the Report of the Civil Justice Review Committee (2018) (Chairperson: Indranee Rajah SC) that suggested that the court’s power to order judicial inspection is abrogated.
(b) Secondly, the court’s power to order judicial inspection originated from its inherent powers (see Grant v Downs (1976) 11 ALR 577 and 588–589), and there is no indication that s 2(1) of the EA intended to derogate from that. Even assuming arguendo that s 164 of the EA does not apply to interlocutory applications, it does not follow that the court does not have the power at common law to order judicial inspection in production applications. On the contrary, if the court’s power to order judicial inspection in production applications is not addressed by the EA, it is even more arguable that it is not inconsistent with the EA and is not repealed by s 2(2) of the EA, which provides that “[a]ll rules of evidence not contained in any written law, so far as such rules are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act, are repealed” [emphasis added]. In any event, it is doubtful if the power to order judicial inspection can be regarded as a rule of evidence that would fall within the ambit of s 2(2) of the EA, as opposed to being a rule of procedure.
(c) Thirdly, the concern about the party seeking production not being able to argue the matter fully if the court were to inspect the document without hearing from that party may be considerably better than the court deciding to simply order production where issues of privilege are not clearly resolved, which may cause substantial prejudice to the party asserting privilege or to a party who holds the privilege. In any event, the concern may be ameliorated by a “Hollander order” in appropriate cases, which is discussed subsequently in this judgment.
(d) Finally, the concern about judicial inspection undermining the conclusiveness of affidavits may be ameliorated by exercising the discretion to order judicial inspection conservatively and only where there is a real doubt as to whether a document is privileged but ordering the production of that potentially privileged document may cause irreparable prejudice to a party if privileged information is revealed to the requesting party.
- [78]
[78] Nevertheless, I am of the view that judicial inspection is a discretion that should be exercised cautiously, having regard to the Ideals set out in the ROC 2021. In this regard, the Claimants submit that academic commentary has observed that the Singapore cases adopted the “serious doubt” [the term used in the Claimants’ submissions] standard from the prevailing English standard, and that English law has overruled the standard of “serious doubt” (Colin Liew, Legal Professional Privilege (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2023) at paras 3.116–3.118). The Claimants submit that the English Court of Appeal has held in WH Holding Ltd and another company v E20 Stadium LLP [2018] EWCA Civ 2652 (“WH Holding”) (at [39]–[40]) that inspection is a “matter of general discretion”, and that relevant factors would include: (a) the nature of the privilege claimed; (b) the number of documents involved and (c) their potential relevance to the issues.
- [79]
[79] In WH Holding, the English Court of Appeal considered the issues of whether internal corporate emails discussing a commercial settlement proposal were protected by litigation privilege, and when a court may inspect documents to test a disputed claim of privilege. The appellants and the respondent were in dispute over the number of seats the respondent was entitled to use at the London Olympic Stadium. During disclosure, the respondent redacted six internal emails exchanged among its board members and shareholders. The emails discussed a proposed commercial settlement of the dispute.
- [80]
[80] The respondent claimed litigation privilege in respect of those six documents and the appellants applied for the court to inspect the documents. The English High Court rejected that application, holding that documents created for the dominant purpose of formulating and proposing a settlement could attract litigation privilege. On appeal, the English Court of Appeal held that the documents concerned only commercial settlement discussions and did not obtain or reveal relevant advice or information. Accordingly, the claim to litigation privilege failed (at [18]).
- [81]
[81] While not necessary, the English Court of Appeal went further to address the correct approach to judicial inspection. The court considered the decision of Beatson J in West London Pipeline and Storage Ltd v Total UK [2008] 2 CLC 258 (“West London”), where he opined that the court should not go behind the affidavits unless it was “reasonably certain” that the claim to privilege is erroneous, the evidence of the person or entity which directed the creation of the communications or documents over which privilege is claimed is incorrect, or the other evidence before the court shows that the affidavit is incorrect or incomplete on the material points (at [86(3)]). Beatson J further opined that where the court is not satisfied on the basis of the affidavit and the other evidence before it that the right to withhold inspection is established, it may among other things order a further affidavit to deal with matters which the earlier affidavit does not cover or on which it is unsatisfactory; order cross-examination of the makers of the affidavits; or it may inspect the documents. Beatson J opined that inspection should be a solution of “last resort” because of the danger of looking at documents out of context at the interlocutory stage, which should not be undertaken unless “there is credible evidence that those claiming privilege have either misunderstood their duty, or are not to be trusted with the decision making, or there is no reasonably practical alternative” (at [86(4)(c)]).
- [83]
[83] In my view, the approach in WH Holding is not inconsistent with that taken in Skandinaviska. First, it is not suggested in either decision that judicial inspection should be the norm whenever the issue of privilege is contested. Secondly, both cases indicate that the discretion should be exercised carefully and conservatively (Skandinaviska at [104]; WH Holding at [39]). Thirdly, neither case espoused a rigid test but emphasised that each case must depend on its specific facts (Skandinaviska at [104]; WH Holding at [39]). There is nothing in Skandinaviska that suggests that the discretion will only be exercised in cases where the court is “reasonably certain” that the claim to privilege is erroneous. Indeed, if the court can already reach that conclusion on the evidence before it, it should generally order the production of that document instead of ordering judicial inspection.
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