SH Design & Build Pte Ltd v Jurong Port Pte Ltd and another

Lee Seiu Kin SJ:

[43] The applicant filed OA 1204 on 24 October 2025 in which the substantial prayers were as follows:

(a) In respect of a performance bond dated 1 August 2020 issued by the second respondent (“R2”) in favour of the first respondent (“R1”) for the sum of $12,569,800 (the “PB”), an injunction be granted to restrain the R1 (whether by itself, its officers, agents, employees and/or in any way) from directing the payment or transfer of and/or receiving the sum of $12,569,800, or any part thereof from the R2, until the determination or outcome of an arbitration hereto or further order;

(b) In the event that the R1 (by itself, its officers, agents, employees and/or in any way) receives the sum of $12,569,800 or any part thereof under the PB, an injunction be granted to restrain the R1 (by itself, its officers, agents, employees and/or in any way) from using, depleting and/or disposing of such sums received until the determination or outcome of an arbitration hereto or further order, and/or to pay to the applicant the sum of $12,569,800 within seven days of the date of this order;

(c) An injunction be granted to restrain the R2 (by itself, its officers, agents, employees and/or in any way) from paying, transferring and/or directing the payment or transfer of the sum of $12,569,800 or any part thereof, to the R1 pursuant to the R1’s written demand dated 3 July 2025 in respect of the PB (“Demand Letter”) and/or for the R2 to cease the processing of any payment to the R1 pursuant to the demand until the determination or outcome of an arbitration hereto or further order.

[45] An oral hearing was conducted on 20 April 2026, at the end of which I reserved judgment. On 30 July 2026, I issued the Judgment in which I found that the basis upon which the R1 had made the call on the PB was invalid and therefore the call was also invalid. I declared that the R2 was not obliged under the terms of the PB to make any payment pursuant to the Demand Letter.

[48] Secondly, OA 1204 was not legally complex and did not involve novel issues of the law on injunctions restraining calls on performance bonds. The R1 took issue with substantive submissions by the applicant on issues that the court did not ultimately deal with.

[49] Thirdly, there were no complex issues of fact which justified the long affidavits filed by the applicant.

[57] On the first point raised by the R1, I agree that the extent of the prayers of the applicant was wider than what it had succeeded on. However, the applicant’s written submissions were limited to the circumstances surrounding the Demand Letter and no submissions were made on a general injunction against all subsequent calls. I should also point out that the R1’s submissions were similarly constrained.

[58] Indeed, in the area of performance bonds, injunctions are normally based on a specific call made, or where there is an imminent call based on letters of demand. While one can imagine a scenario where a party is entitled to a general prohibition against a call under a performance bond, the reality is that the injunction must pertain to a specific call. This is because the court can only make a determination of the validity of a call based on actual claims made by the beneficiary.

[59] My conclusion from this is that, while the R1 is correct to point out that the applicant had obtained less than it prayed for, the actual submissions of both sides referred only to the call made under the Demand Letter. I am, however, not without sympathy to the R1’s point that the width of the relief prayed for meant that its solicitors had to consider the entire scope of relief. But as the R1’s submissions (filed on the same day as the applicant’s) did not address the entire scope of relief, and addressed the same issues as that of the applicant’s, I am of the view that any discount for this would be de minimis in quantum. I would like to caveat that, if the wide scope of relief sought did cause unnecessary work to be done by a respondent, there may well be a substantive discount.

[60] The R1’s second and third points are to be contrasted against points (a), (b) and (c) of the applicant (at [53] above). In my view, the legal issues are not out of the ordinary, save that the issue of Clause 35 of the PSSCOC is new. I would point out that it is justifiable for the applicant to canvass the issues that it has done in its submissions as there is no certainty which one of them will succeed.

(a) To the applicant, the sum of $50,000 plus reasonable disbursements to be taxed unless agreed, being the costs for OA 1204 and SUM 3457; and

(b) To the R2, the sum of $4,000 all-in, being the costs for OA 1204 and SUM 3457.

Chuah Chee Kian Christopher, Lee Hwai Bin, Koh Huini Valerie, Leong Wen Wei Michael, Yang Yuanhong Bernard (Christopher Chuah Law Chambers LLC) for the claimant;

Thio Shen Yi S.C., Loh Eu Tse Derek, Ow Guan Jie Daniel, Chen Sixue, Terence Yeo (TSMP Law Corporation) for the first defendant;

Wee Anthony (Titanium Law Chambers LLC) for the second defendant.