Court of Appeal · Decided 27 November 2014

Yan Jun v Attorney-General

Feedback & support

[2014] SGCA 60Case no. Civil Appeal No 142 of 2013

What happened, in plain English

There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.

Ask about this judgment

Laws this judgment relies on

Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA (delivering the judgment of the court):
Introduction
[1] This is an appeal by the appellant, Yan Jun (“the Appellant”), against the decision of the High Court judge (“the Judge”) in Registrar’s Appeal No 227 of 2013 (“RA 227/2013”). The Judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the decision of an assistant registrar (“the AR”) in Summons No 2310 of 2013 (“SUM 2310/2013”) to strike out parts of his statement of claim in Suit No 257 of 2013 (“S 257/2013”) under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) (“the Rules”).
The background facts
[2] The facts pleaded by the Appellant are as follows. On the morning of 19 July 2009, the Appellant was in his flat in Simei when he had an argument with his mother-in-law, Mdm Yu Xinlan (“Mdm Yu”). Given previous instances of violence between himself and Mdm Yu, the Appellant called the police. He then carried his child into the master bedroom of the flat and waited for the police to arrive.
[3] During the time he was in the bedroom, the Appellant heard Mdm Yu shouting to his wife, Mdm Liu Tian (“Mdm Liu”), that certain stove accessories had been removed from the kitchen. Upon hearing this, Mdm Liu rushed into the bedroom and hit the Appellant repeatedly and violently. The Appellant held his child tightly and raised his arm to protect himself, but did not fight back. He then ran out of the bedroom with the child and stood in the dining room while Mdm Liu remained in the bedroom.
[4] Shortly after this, two police officers arrived at the flat. The Appellant pointed to the master bedroom and stated in Mandarin, “she beat me”, but he was ignored by the police officers. Instead, they went directly into the bedroom to speak to Mdm Liu. After some time, they came out of the master bedroom and continued their conversation with Mdm Liu in the kitchen.
[5] The Appellant overheard Mdm Liu informing the police officers that the Appellant had hit her deliberately because he knew that an Expedited Order (“the EO”), which Mdm Liu had obtained against him on 25 June 2009, was about to expire. The Appellant also overheard one of the police officers talking to someone on the phone about whether the EO was valid on that day.
[6] After Mdm Liu had spoken to the police officers, the Appellant told one of the police officers that it was his turn to speak but was told that he was under arrest for breach of the EO. The Appellant protested on the ground that the police officers had only heard one side of the story but this was to no avail. The Appellant was handcuffed and later escorted to Changi General Hospital (“CGH”) for a medical examination.
[7] In the treatment room at CGH, the Appellant was asked by a doctor about how he had gotten injured, to which the Appellant replied that he was beaten by his wife. The doctor then asked about the Appellant’s wrongdoing to which one of the police officers answered “breach of PPO [personal protection order]”. The Appellant alleges that the doctor deliberately insulted him by replying “small injury” in a loud voice. The Appellant’s medical report stated that he had superficial nail excoriations on his face, neck and left hand.
[8] Mdm Liu also proceeded to CGH for a medical examination. Her medical report stated that she had superficial abrasions and tenderness on the left side of her neck.
[9] After his medical examination, the Appellant was taken to Bedok Police Division (“BPD”) for further investigations. In the course of these investigations, the Appellant informed the Investigating Officer (“the IO”) that he had gone to the Family Court on 6 July 2009, which was the return date of the EO, but that Mdm Liu had not attended court on that day. The Appellant was released on bail from BPD the next day, 20 July 2009, at about 6.30am. Approximately 21 hours had elapsed from the time of the Appellant’s arrest to his release.
[10] After the Appellant was released, he went again to the Family Court to check whether his wife had attended court on the return date of the EO, and was informed that she had not. This suggested that the EO was not valid when the Appellant was arrested on 19 July 2009. Therefore, on the next day, the Appellant sent an SMS to the IO about Mdm Liu’s non-attendance in court. He also later wrote to BPD for an explanation and was told that the case had been passed on to one Staff Sergeant Lim Shao Liang (“SSG Lim”). On 14 September 2009, SSG Lim informed the Appellant that his case had been referred to the Attorney-General’s Chambers (“AGC”). Around this time, the Appellant consulted a number of lawyers.
[11] On 5 October 2009, SSG Lim informed the Appellant that, having consulted with the AGC, it had been decided that no further action was to be taken against him. On 16 and 29 October 2009 the Appellant sent emails to SSG Lim to question the validity of the EO and to inquire about the outcome of the investigations. However, he did not receive a reply.
[12] Thereafter, the Appellant again consulted with lawyers but took no further steps until 16 March 2012. On that day, he sent an email to the AGC to ask about the outcome of the investigations. The AGC replied on 4 and 5 June 2012, taking the position that, in the circumstances of the case, there was a reasonable suspicion of the Appellant being concerned with an offence of a breach of the EO, even though it was subsequently discovered that the EO had been revoked by 19 July 2009. A series of emails between the Appellant and the AGC then followed before the Appellant filed S 257/2013 against the Attorney-General (“the Respondent”) on 1 April 2013.
The Appellant’s claim
[13] In S 257/2013, the Appellant claims damages against the Respondent for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, assault and battery, excessive use of force, malicious prosecution, abuse of process and defamation. These causes of action arise generally from the circumstances surrounding the Appellant’s arrest on 19 July 2009, and his subsequent detention before he was released.
[14] The cause of action in defamation, on the other hand, is based on the statements allegedly made by the doctor and the police officer at CGH during the Appellant’s medical examination (see above at [7]). The Appellant states that he was defamed by the police officer when the police officer had answered “breach of PPO” when asked by the doctor about the Appellant’s wrongdoing. The Appellant also states that the doctor had intentionally humiliated, and therefore defamed, him by loudly announcing that the Appellant had suffered a “small injury”.
[15] The Appellant claims the following as damages:
The claim for “economic loss” comprises the following items:
The proceedings below
[16] On 2 May 2013, the Respondent applied to strike out the Appellant’s statement of claim on the ground that the entire suit was time-barred. In the alternative, the Respondent submitted that the statement of claim did not disclose reasonable causes of action. On 3 July 2013, the AR struck out all the Appellant’s claims except the claim for general and aggravated damages for loss of liberty arising from false imprisonment and the claim for punitive damages for false imprisonment. On 16 July 2013, the Appellant filed an appeal against the AR’s decision in RA 227/2013.
[17] The appeal was heard, and dismissed, by the Judge on 21 August 2013, with written grounds reported in Yan Jun v Attorney-General [2014] 1 SLR 793 (“the GD”). The Judge held (at [46]) that the Appellant’s entire suit was time-barred under ss 24A(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act (Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed) (“the Act”). Despite this, the Judge appeared to be of the view that the AR’s decision not to strike out the Appellant’s false imprisonment claim should stand (at [54]). The Judge proceeded, by way of obiter dicta, to hold that there were other grounds for striking out the Appellant’s causes of action in wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process and defamation.
Issues before this court
[18] The two broad issues before this court are as follows:
(a) Whether the Appellant’s suit is time-barred under s 24A of the Act (“Issue 1”).
(b) Whether there are other grounds for striking out the Appellant’s statement of claim (“Issue 2”).
Issue 1
The relevant statutory provisions
[19] Turning first to the issue of whether the Appellant’s suit is time-barred, the statutory provisions which are germane to the present appeal are ss 6 and 24A of the Act. Section 6 of the Act (“s 6”) prescribes a general limitation period of six years for actions based on contract or tort. It reads as follows:
[20] It should be noted that the six year limitation period under s 6 is subject to provision(s) to the contrary in the Act. In the context of the present appeal, an example of this is to be found in s 24A of the Act which reads as follows:
[21] The Respondent takes the position that all the causes of action pleaded by the Appellant are actions for “breach of duty” under s 24A(1) of the Act (“s 24A(1)”). It also contends that because the damages claimed by the Appellant include damages in respect of personal injury, a limitation period of three years applies to the entire suit under s 24A(2) of the Act, with the effect that it is time-barred. Conversely, the Appellant contends that s 24A(1) has no application because his pleaded causes of action fall outside the meaning of “breach of duty”. He therefore states that a limitation period of six years under s 6(1)(a) of the Act applies instead. Before considering these arguments in greater detail, let us first consider the legislative history of s 24A(1) itself.
The legislative history of s 24A(1) in Singapore
[22] Section 24A(1), in its present incarnation, was the product of amendments to the Act in 1966 and 1992, respectively. Prior to 1966, the Limitation Ordinance 1959 (Ordinance 57 of 1959) provided for a general six year limitation period for all torts, notwithstanding the nature of the cause of action pleaded or the damages sought. This state of affairs was altered by the Limitation (Amendment) Act (Act 7 of 1966) (“the 1966 amendments”) which introduced a new s 6(3A) in the following terms:
[23] The 1966 amendments therefore had the effect of reducing the limitation period from six to three years where damages were claimed in respect of personal injury in actions for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty. The rationale for these amendments was explained by the then Minister for Law and National Development, Mr Yong Nyuk Lin (“Mr Yong”), in the Second Reading Speech (see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (21 April 1966) vol 25 at col 79), as follows:
[24] The Act was amended again in 1992, by way of the Limitation (Amendment) Act (Act 22 of 1992) (“the 1992 amendments”). The 1992 amendments introduced, inter alia, the present s 24A. In 1992, Parliament had intended to address the perceived injustice created by the then existing limitation periods where the damage suffered by the plaintiff was latent and not readily discoverable. As the then Minister for Law, Prof S Jayakumar (“Prof Jayakumar”) explained during the Second Reading of the bill (see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (29 May 1992) vol 60 at cols 31–32)
[25] It will be evident that the parliamentary material, when read alone, sheds little light on what is meant by the phrase “breach of duty” under s 24A(1). In particular, it is unclear whether the phrase ought to be read widely, as including all torts and breaches of contract. This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that there has been a dearth of authority where the phrase has received judicial interpretation by the Singapore courts. It should be noted, however, that there is, and has been, considerable identification between the Singapore limitation statutes and the English ones. In this regard, both the 1966 and 1992 amendments were intended by Parliament to update the Singapore position in the light of common law and statutory developments in England. Let us therefore now consider what these developments were.
Developments in the English law
[26] Prior to 1954, s 2 of the Limitation Act 1939 (c 21) (UK) (“the 1939 UK Act”) provided for a general limitation period of six years for actions founded on contract and tort. If, however, the defendant was a public authority, then s 21 of the 1939 UK Act, read with s 1 of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893 (c 61) (UK) (“PAPA”), applied and the limitation period was one year instead.
[27] In 1944, a committee chaired by Sir Walter Monckton (“the Monckton Committee”) recommended that the limitation period should be three years for actions for personal injuries, whether the defendant was a public authority or not (see The Final Report of the Departmental Committee on Alternative Remedies (Cmd 6860) at paras 107–108). In the Monckton Committee’s view, the general limitation period of six years was too long a period of delay before commencing an action while the limitation period of one year for public authorities was too short.
[28] In January 1948, a committee chaired by Lord Justice Tucker (“the Tucker Committee”) was constituted to further consider reforming the said Acts. Their terms of reference included the following:
[29] The findings and recommendations of the Tucker Committee were published on 30 July 1949 in the Report of the Committee on the Limitation of Actions (Cmd 7740) (“the Tucker Report”). Three of the Tucker Committee’s recommendations are of note. First, it recommended the repeal of the PAPA, so that the limitation period which applied to private litigants would similarly apply to the Crown. Secondly, it recommended that the general limitation for actions in contract and tort remain at six years. Thirdly, and most pertinently for the purpose of the present proceedings, it recommended that the limitation period for actions for personal injuries be reduced to two years. In this regard, the Tucker Committee opined as follows (see the Tucker Report at paras 22–23):
The Tucker Committee, however, did not elaborate as to why these torts should not be subject to the shorter limitation period it had recommended for actions for personal injuries more generally.
[30] On the basis of the recommendations of the Tucker Committee, the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions, etc) Act 1954 (c 36) (UK) (“the 1954 UK Act”) was enacted. The material portions of the new s 2(1) read as follows:
[31] At the second reading of the amendment Bill, the proposer of the Bill, Mr John Peyton explained the nature of the amendments in the following terms (see Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) – House of Commons (4 December 1953) vol 521 at cols 1544 and 1546):
This “minor point” was to substitute a limitation period of three years – which was recommended by the Monckton Committee – for the two recommended by the Tucker Report in actions for personal injuries.
[32] Yet, none of the speeches in the House of Commons and the House of Lords expressly referred to the Tucker Committee’s recommendation that the shorter limitation period for personal injury claims should not apply to actions for trespass to the person, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and defamation. Rather, some speeches appeared to assume that the shorter limitation period was to apply to all actions for personal injuries, notwithstanding the precise cause of action that was pleaded. For example, Mr Graham Page, member for Crosby, observed in the House of Commons as follows (see Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) – House of Commons (4 December 1953) vol 521 at col 1558) :
In introducing the amending bill in the House of Lords, Viscount Hailsham similarly stated as follows (see Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) – House of Lords (20 May 1954) vol 187 at col 812):
[33] Section 2(1) of the 1954 UK Act arose for interpretation by the English Court of Appeal in Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232 (“Letang”). The plaintiff there was injured when the defendant drove over her legs while she was sunbathing in a carpark. She sued in negligence and trespass to the person but only issued the writ four years after the accident. The trial judge held that the defendant was negligent on the basis of an unintentional trespass to the plaintiff’s person. He also interpreted the phrase “breach of duty” under s 2(1) of the 1954 UK Act as not including an action for trespass to the person. In the event, the relevant limitation period was held to be six years and the plaintiff’s action was therefore not time-barred.
[34] The Court of Appeal allowed the defendant’s appeal. Lord Denning MR held (at 240) that as the injury was not inflicted by the defendant intentionally, the plaintiff’s only cause of action lay in negligence and not trespass to the person. This cause of action was clearly time-barred under s 2(1) of the 1954 UK Act. Pertinently, however, Lord Denning went on to observe that, even if the plaintiff did have a cause of action in trespass to the person, it too would have been time-barred as it was an action for “breach of duty”.
[35] Lord Denning gave several reasons for construing the phrase “breach of duty” in this manner. He noted at the outset that the Tucker Report had recommended excluding the torts of trespass to the person, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and defamation from the ambit of the shorter limitation period. However, he was of the view that this did not militate in favour of reading the phrase “breach of duty” as not including these torts. Lord Denning explained thus (at 240–241):
[36] In Lord Denning’s view, the phrase “breach of duty” was wide enough to encompass all torts. He reasoned, in this regard, that (at 241):
[37] Finally, Lord Denning noted (at 241) that the phrase “breach of duty” had been given a similarly wide construction by Lord Greene MR in the English Court of Appeal decision of Billings v Reed [1945] KB 11 (“Billings”) and by Adam J in the Victoria decision of Kruber v Grzesiak [1963] 2 VR 621. The latter of the cases just mentioned concerned the interpretation of the Victorian limitation legislation which was in identical terms to s 2(1) of the English Act.
[38] Between the time the 1954 UK Act was passed and Letang was decided, the English legislation was amended again by way of the Limitation Act 1963 (c 47) (UK) (“the 1963 UK Act”). These amendments were intended to ameliorate the harshness of the effect of the House of Lords decision in Cartledge v E Jopling & Sons Ltd [1963] AC 758 (“Cartledge”). In Cartledge, the plaintiff steel workers had been exposed to silica dust for periods between 1939 to 1950. By 1950, at the latest, each of the plaintiffs had contracted pneumoconiosis but this was not diagnosed until sometime between 1950 and 1955. The plaintiffs commenced their action in 1956.
[39] The court in Cartledge held that the plaintiffs’ causes of action accrued when more than negligible damage occurred, even though the injury was unknown to, and could not be discovered by, the plaintiffs. Hence, the plaintiffs’ actions were time-barred, the six year limitation period having expired in 1950 by the latest. At the same time, all the judgments delivered by the court expressed concern about the harshness of the decision which they felt compelled to arrive at under the 1939 UK Act and called for legislative reform in that regard. Further, as Lord Pearce noted (at 777), the situation was exacerbated by the 1954 UK Act which (it will be recalled) had reduced the limitation period in personal injury cases to three years.
[40] The 1963 UK Act was enacted shortly after the decision in Cartledge. Section 1 of the Act permitted the extension of the limitation period in cases of latent damage, provided the following requirements set out in the section were met:
The 1963 UK Act therefore provided for an alternative limitation period of one year that ran from the date the plaintiff came to know of the facts giving rise to his cause of action for personal injury, in cases where the injury he suffered was latent.
[41] The 1963 UK Act was further amended in 1971 and 1975 vide the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1971 (c 43) (UK) and the Limitation Act 1975 (c 54) (UK) (“the 1975 UK Act”), respectively. In summary, these amendments had the effect of, respectively, extending the alternative limitation period from one year to three in cases of latent damage and clarifying the concept of the knowledge required by the plaintiff to commence his action.
[42] In 1980, the English Parliament sought to consolidate all the interim legislation passed since 1939 by enacting the Limitation Act 1980 (c 58) (UK) (“the 1980 UK Act”). Section 11 of the 1980 UK Act is the most germane in the context of the present proceedings and it reads as follows:
[43] It is also pertinent to note that s 33 of the 1980 UK Act confers upon the court discretion to extend the limitation period in cases where s 11 applies. It reads as follows:
[44] The new s 11 arose for interpretation by the House of Lords in Stubbings v Webb [1993] AC 498 (“Stubbings”). The plaintiff in Stubbings was the victim of sexual abuse by her stepfather and stepbrother during her childhood. She suffered psychological disorders and mental illness as a result. Although the plaintiff had attained the age of the majority in 1975, her writ was only issued in 1987. She attributed this delay to the fact that she had only come to realise that the abuse was causative of her injuries after consulting with a psychiatrist in September 1984. The issue, therefore, was whether the plaintiff’s action for deliberate assault was an action for “breach of duty”. If it was, then the limitation period would have been three years from the date she realised that her injuries were significant and attributable to the defendants’ acts.
[45] In Stubbings, the House unanimously declined to follow the interpretation of the words “breach of duty” advanced in Letang and held that the plaintiff’s claim based on assault did not fall within the meaning of “breach of duty”. Rather, the phrase was construed to mean breach of a duty of care. It followed that a non-extendable limitation period of six years from the date the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued applied and her claims were accordingly time-barred.
[46] In arriving at this conclusion, Lord Griffiths, with whom the other members of the court agreed, placed much reliance on the recommendations made by the Tucker Committee, noting (at 507) that:
In so far as Lord Griffith purported to rely on the UK Hansard, he referred to that part of Mr John Peyton’s speech in the House of Commons, which we set out above at [31].
[47] Lord Griffiths went on to express doubt as to whether the phrase “breach of duty” could properly bear the meaning attributed to it by the Court of Appeal in Letang. He stated as follows (at 508):
[48] Lord Griffiths also did not think that by passing the 1975 UK Act and the 1980 UK Act in the same language, Parliament had endorsed the interpretation accorded to the phrase “breach of duty” in Letang. He noted that the 1963 UK Act, which had preceded Letang, was intended to address the problem posed by the insidious onset of industrial disease, which arose in Cartledge. The 1975 UK Act was passed to cure the imperfections of the 1963 UK Act and the 1980 UK Act merely re-enacted that part of the 1975 UK Act. In the final analysis, Lord Griffiths held that as the language of the 1954 UK Act was carried without alteration into the 1975 UK Act, and then into s 11(1) of the 1980 UK Act, it should bear the same meaning as it had under the 1954 UK Act.
[49] In A v Hoare [2008] 1 AC 844 (“Hoare”), the House of Lords had the opportunity to revisit its decision in Stubbings. Having done so, the House unanimously decided to depart from it. The plaintiff in Hoare was the victim of an attempted rape by the defendant in 1998. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The plaintiff, however, did not commence an action until December of 2004. In fact, she had only done so after the defendant had won £7,000,000 in a lottery, thus making him a party worth suing.
[50] In Hoare, Lord Hoffmann, who delivered the leading judgment, cautioned against placing undue reliance on the recommendations of the Tucker Committee in construing the phrase “breach of duty”. He first noted (at [4] and [6]) that:
In this regard, Lord Hoffmann observed that the language used by the UK Parliament was not new (at [7]). Rather, it had previously been judicially interpreted in Billings as having a wide meaning which included the tort of trespass to the person (at [8]–[9]).
[51] Lord Hoffmann also found support for a wide interpretation of the phrase “breach of duty” from the legislative amendments in 1975 and 1980. He explained thus (at [14] and [16]):
To this end, Lord Hoffmann criticised Stubbings as having been decided as if the 1954 UK Act had just been enacted (at [17]). Lord Hoffmann disagreed with Lord Griffiths’s characterisation of the 1963 and 1975 amendments as being to “meet the problem of the insidious onset of industrial disease” (see Stubbings at 506). He opined, instead, that the amendments were intended to apply to cases of personal injuries more generally (at [18]–[19]).
Meaning of “breach of duty” under s 24A of the Act
[52] With the foregoing as background, let us turn to consider the meaning of the phrase “breach of duty” under s 24A(1). In this regard, the Judge followed Letang and held that the phrase was wide enough to encompass all torts, and, therefore, all the causes of action pleaded by the Appellant. The Judge also noted that Letang had been approved by the House of Lords in Hoare.
[53] Before this court, the Appellant first contends that the Judge’s interpretation of the phrase was incorrect because the Tucker Committee had excluded the torts of trespass to the person, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment and defamation from the shorter limitation period they had recommended for personal injury actions. Presumably, what the Appellant means is that this would entail this court reading the phrase “breach of duty” under s 24A(1) as not including these torts.
[54] In this regard, the Appellant’s contention is a superficially attractive one. On a broad level at least, the 1954 UK Act, which introduced the phrase “breach of duty”, was passed on the back of the Tucker Report which had recommended excluding these torts from the shorter limitation period they had recommended for personal injury actions. Furthermore, by specifically including the words “negligence” and “nuisance” before the phrase, it is at least arguable that the UK Parliament, and a fortiori the Singapore Parliament, could not have intended “breach of duty” to refer to all torts. Otherwise, the words “negligence” and “nuisance” would be rendered superfluous.
[55] On the other hand, there are considerable difficulties with the foregoing view, which suggest that the Appellant’s reliance on the Tucker Report is misplaced. For a start, as Lord Hoffmann pointed out in Hoare, the UK Parliament’s use of the phrase “breach of duty” was not traceable to anything that was stated in the Tucker Report. Rather, as noted above at [32], the speeches in the English parliamentary debates seem to suggest that the three year limitation period was intended to apply to actions for damages for personal injuries more generally, without stating the causes of action to which this was, or was not, to apply.
[56] More pertinently, perhaps, the issue before this court is not the interpretation of the English limitation legislation in 1954, but the interpretation of s 24A(1) as enacted by the Singapore Parliament in 1966 and as subsequently amended in 1992. Counsel for the Respondent, Mr Khoo Boo Jin (“Mr Khoo”), submits that, when the Singapore Parliament passed the 1966 amendments, it did so against the backdrop of the interpretation given to the phrase “breach of duty” in Letang. By retaining the phrase, Mr Khoo argues that the Singapore Parliament must have intended to endorse that interpretation.
[57] In our judgment, there is force in Mr Khoo’s submission. In this regard, it is a canon of statutory interpretation that where the legislature re-enacts a statute in words that have received interpretation by a superior court, it intends those words to bear the meaning which the court has given to them (see, for example, the English Court of Appeal in Chancery decision of Ex Parte Campbell. In re Cathcart (1870) LR 5 Ch 703 at 706). This canon also applies where the provisions under consideration have been construed by a competent court in a foreign jurisdiction (see, for example, the High Court of Australia decision of National Phonograph Co of Australia Ltd v Menck (1908) 7 CLR 481 at 529).
[58] Yet, to the extent that this canon is premised on the legal fiction that the legislature is presumed to scrutinise all judicial decisions, it must be applied with the requisite circumspection. Moreover, it must yield to actual legislative intent to the contrary under the purposive approach that is mandated by s 9A(1) of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed). As V K Rajah JA observed in the Singapore High Court decision of Public Prosecutor v Low Kok Heng [2007] 4 SLR(R) 183 at [41]:
[59] Bearing Rajah JA’s observations in mind, we are of the view that the canon referred to above at [57] can be properly applied in the case before us. As we have already noted above at [23], it was Parliament’s intention in passing the 1966 amendments to align the law in Singapore with that in England. Furthermore, the then Minister for Law and National Development, Mr Yong, explained that the thrust of the amendments was to shorten the limitation period to three years in “general actions for personal injuries”, without drawing a distinction between different causes of action. Although the Minister referred to motor-accident cases, it is evident that he did so by way of illustration only. The foregoing analysis coheres with the wide interpretation given to the phrase “breach of duty” in Letang. However, it is acknowledged that an argument could be made to the effect that the Singapore Parliament might not possibly have been aware of Letang. That having been said, this is unlikely to have been the case. The decision itself was handed down on 15 June 1964, and was reported in [1964] 3 WLR 573 (later in the Official Law Reports (Queen’s Bench Series) as noted above (at [33])). It was also noted contemporaneously in at least two leading journals by two very distinguished authors (see J A Jolowicz, “Forms of Action – Causes of Action – Trespass and Negligence” [1964] CLJ 200 and Gerald Dworkin, “Trespass and Negligence – A Further Attempt to Bury the Forms of Action” (1965) 28 MLR 92). Be that as it may, it could not have been the case that, by the time the 1992 amendments were enacted, the Singapore Parliament was not aware of the decision in (as well as legal implications of) Letang. And it is to these last-mentioned amendments that our attention must now turn.
[60] As just mentioned, the 1992 amendments in the Singapore context are also apposite in this regard. As noted earlier, the 1992 amendments were directed at the problem of latent damage and they followed a line of legislative and common law developments in England. At the Second Reading stage, Prof Jayakumar made express reference to these common law developments. By 1992, therefore, it is inconceivable that Parliament was unaware of the interpretation accorded to the phrase “breach of duty” by Letang. Moreover, in cases of latent damage, we do not, as a matter of policy, see why a different limitation period should apply based on whether or not the damage was caused by an intentional or unintentional tort, or, for that matter, a breach of contract. Cases such as Stubbings and Hoare demonstrate that latent damage is just as much an issue in the case of intentional torts. Indeed, in explaining the effect of the 1992 amendments, Prof Jayakumar did not distinguish between different causes of action. Instead, he spoke in general terms and distinguished between personal injury and non-personal injury cases.
[61] In our judgment, a purposive interpretation of s 24A(1) would entail reading the phrase “breach of duty” as encompassing all torts.
[62] The Appellant’s second argument was that the tort of false imprisonment is a strict liability tort and therefore not based on any “breach of duty”. In our judgment, this argument is untenable. We agree with the Judge’s observation (see the GD at [40]) that there is no dichotomy between torts of strict and fault-based liability under s 24A. It is, first and foremost, plain from the language of s 24A(1) that it applies to breaches of contractual duties, in which case liability would be strict. There is also nothing in the both the English and local legislative history which suggests that Parliament had intended for such a dichotomy to exist. Instead, as we have already explained, it is more likely that Parliament had intended that the phrase “breach of duty” to be read widely, and therefore encompassing all torts and breaches of contract.
[63] The Appellant’s final argument was that his causes of actions in tort do not concern a “breach of duty” as the police officers did not owe him any duty when arresting him. With respect, this argument is flawed for the simple reason that if the police officers did not owe the Appellant any duty at all, the Appellant would not have had a cause of action against the Respondent in tort in the first place. As Lord Denning observed in Letang (at 241), “[o]ur whole law of tort today proceeds on the footing that there is a duty owed by every man not to injure his neighbour in a way forbidden by law”. The fact that the police officers had committed the alleged torts in the proper discharge of a public duty would only be relevant to the issue of whether they had breached the duties which they owed to the Appellant and not to the issue of whether the action is one for a “breach of duty”.
[64] In the circumstances, we find that each of the causes of action pleaded by the Appellant were in respect of a “breach of duty” under s 24A(1).
Do the damages claimed by the Appellant consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries?
[65] Having found that each of the causes of action pleaded by the Appellant were in respect of a breach of duty, the Judge held that because the Appellant’s suit included a claim for damages for personal injuries, a limitation period of three years applied to the entire suit under s 24A(2) of the Act (“s 24A(2)”) (see the GD at [43]–[46]). To recapitulate, s 24A(2) reads as follows:
[66] In this regard, the Judge cited the English Court of Appeal decision of Bennett v Greenland Houchen & Co (A Firm) [1998] PNLR 458 (“Bennett”) as authority for his interpretation of s 24A(2). In Bennett, the plaintiff sued his previous solicitors for breach of contract and negligence for mishandling earlier litigation. He claimed damages for clinical depression, as well as for financial loss, because his employability had become impaired as a result of his depression. Pertinently, however, the suit was commenced after the three year limitation period for personal injuries actions under s 11 of the 1980 UK Act had expired. To avoid the problem of limitation posed in this last-mentioned regard, the plaintiff argued that his claim was really one for economic loss and that the claim for damages for clinical depression was peripheral to this.
[67] This argument was not accepted by the court which held that, because the plaintiff’s action included a claim for damages for personal injury, a limitation period of three years applied and the entire action was time-barred. Both Otton and Peter Gibson LJJ reasoned that the width of the language used under s 11 of the 1980 UK Act meant that the section applied not only when the damages claimed consisted of damages for personal injury, but also when they included such damages.
[69] The English Court of Appeal held that the partnership’s claim was for damages in respect of personal injury and was therefore also time-barred. In coming to this conclusion, Stuart-Smith LJ reasoned thus (at 36):
[70] Nicholls LJ, who agreed that the partnership’s claim was for damages resulting from the personal injuries, further observed that (at 40-41):
[74] Bennett and the line of cases preceding it were considered by Singer J in the English High Court decision of Oates v Harte Reade & Co [1999] PNLR 763 (“Oates”). The plaintiff in that case sued solicitors who had previously acted for her in matrimonial proceedings. The plaintiff alleged she had lost her home and had suffered from stress and anxiety as a result of the defendant’s negligence. The defendant applied to strike out the claim on the ground that it included damages in respect of personal injury and that it was commenced after the three year limitation period had expired. The plaintiff then applied to amend her statement of claim so as to abandon the portion claiming damages for stress and anxiety. A Master allowed the plaintiff’s amendment at first instance and the defendant appealed.
[75] On appeal, Singer J followed Bennett and held that as the plaintiff’s claim, in its original form, included a prayer for damages for personal injuries, the entire claim was subject to a three year limitation period under s 11 of the 1980 UK Act. Singer J proceeded to consider whether the plaintiff should be allowed to amend her statement of claim to abandon the prayer for damages for stress and anxiety under O 20 r 5(1) and (2) of the UK Rules of the Supreme Court (“the UK RSC”) which read as follows:
[76] Singer J accepted that the amendments sought did not amount to adding or substituting a new cause of action. The learned judge also accepted, that under O 20 r 5(1) of the UK RSC, he had a wide discretion to allow the amendment sought by the plaintiff. Yet, he declined to exercise his discretion on the ground that it would deprive the defendant of a “cast-iron” limitation defence. Singer J elaborated thus (at 774–775):
[77] Singer J’s reasoning was criticised by the English Court of Appeal in Shade v The Compton Partnership [2000] PNLR 218 (“Shade”). In Shade, the plaintiff had instructed the defendant solicitors to sue his former solicitors for negligently carrying out a conveyancing transaction. However, a writ was not issued in time and the plaintiff’s claim against his conveyancing solicitors was time-barred as a result. The plaintiff then commenced proceedings against the defendant. Apart from claiming damages for financial loss, the plaintiff claimed that that the defendant’s professional negligence had caused him to suffer physical and psychiatric damage. The plaintiff, however, served his writ after the three year limitation period for personal injuries claims and the defendant applied to strike out the claim on the ground that it was time-barred.
[78] At first instance, the plaintiff’s action was struck out. On appeal, the court accepted (at 219) that, as the damages claimed by the plaintiff included damages in respect of personal injuries, a limitation period of three years applied to the action. However, instead of striking out the plaintiff’s action, the court granted leave to the plaintiff to amend his statement of claim to sever the personal injury claims. Walker LJ, who delivered the leading judgment, noted at the outset that (at 223):
In so far as the decision in Oates was concerned, Walker LJ described (at 224) the reasoning in that case as being “less than fully satisfactory”. He continued thus (ibid):
[79] Walker LJ went on to disagree with the view expressed in Oates that an amendment should be refused if it would have deprived the defendant of a limitation defence that he would have had at the time of service of the writ. He observed as follows (at 224–225):
[80] Finally, Walker LJ (at 225–226) sought to distinguish the earlier Court of Appeal decision in Walkin in the following way:
In such cases, the learned judge was of the view that common sense should dictate whether an amendment should be allowed to sever the personal injuries claim.
[81] For completeness, we also note that the leading textbooks on the subject of limitation periods have endorsed the approach taken by Walker LJ in Shade. Andrew McGee, for example, in his book titled Limitation Periods (Sweet & Maxwell, 6th ed, 2010) has opined (at p 159) that:
Rodney Nelson-Jones, Frank Burton QC and Andrew Roy, the learned authors of Personal Injury Limitation Law (Tottel Publishing, 2nd ed, 2007), similarly take the view (at p 24) that:
[82] Returning, then, to the case before this court, for the reasons set out below, we would respectfully differ from the Judge’s conclusion that, because the Appellant has claimed damages for personal injuries in relation to some of his pleaded causes of action, a limitation period of three years applies to his entire suit. Citing the cases of Walkin, Bennett and Oates, however, Mr Khoo submits that the Judge was correct in reaching the conclusion which he did. Mr Khoo states that s 24A(2) applies to any “action” where the damages claimed “consist of or include” damages in respect of personal injuries. He further points out that “action” is defined by s 2(1) of the Act to include “a suit or any proceedings in court”.
[84] At the hearing of the appeal, we raised the possibility of the Appellant being allowed to amend his statement of claim in order to abandon his claims for damages for personal injury. Mr Khoo conceded that, based on the decision in Shade, this court did have the discretion to allow such an amendment. In our view, Mr Khoo’s concession was properly made. In this regard, we fully agree with the reasoning of Walker LJ in Shade (see above at [77]–[80]) and would gratefully apply it here. As was the case in Shade, even if the Appellant’s causes of action which claim damages in respect of personal injuries are struck out, the Appellant will be within the six year limitation period and can commence fresh proceedings if such damages are not claimed. Therefore, we do not see how the Respondent would be prejudiced if the aforementioned amendment is allowed. In fairness to Mr Khoo, he did not in any event adopt such a position.
[85] We should, however, point out that it is unclear from Shade whether such an amendment should similarly be allowed if, at the time of the proposed amendment, the plaintiff is also out of time to commence fresh proceedings in which damages for personal injuries are not claimed. Although this point was, not taken before us, we would, parenthetically, observe that there appears to be no reason to disallow such an amendment in every case. As a matter of principle, any amendments made to the writ would date back to the date the writ was originally filed (see, for example, the English Court of Appeal decision of Warner v Sampson [1959] QB 297 at 321). Hence, if the limitation period is current at the date the writ was filed, then the action, as amended, will be deemed to have been commenced within time. As a matter of policy, we do not think that the question of prejudice to the defendant should turn, purely, on whether the proposed amendment would deprive the defendant of a technical limitation defence which it could avail itself of now were a fresh writ to be filed but which would not have been available at the time the original writ was filed. Although limitation periods exist to protect defendants from stale claims being instituted against them, this must be balanced against the need to ensure that meritorious claims are not unduly stifled by procedural requirements. In our view, therefore, the issue of prejudice is one that depends, in the final analysis, on the facts and circumstances of each case, and, in particular, whether under the original pleading, the defendant was given fair notice of the claim being brought against him.
[86] Applying what we have stated above to the case before us, we are of the view that the following of the Appellant’s claims are for damages in respect of personal injuries: (a) general damages for assault and battery; (b) general damages for assault and battery (humiliation); (c) general damages for excessive use of force; (d) general damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (e) damages for economic loss. In so far as item (e) is concerned, although the Appellant attaches the label of “economic loss” to his claim, it is, in substance, a claim for damages in respect of personal injuries. Conversely, the following heads of damages claimed by the Appellant are not damages in respect of personal injuries and can be properly severed from the claims which are: (a) general damages for loss of liberty arising from false imprisonment; (b) aggravated damages for loss of liberty arising from false imprisonment; (c) general damages for defamation; and (d) punitive damages for malicious prosecution, wrongful arrest and abuse of process. It should be pointed out that the Respondent takes the position that there are other grounds for striking out the Appellant’s causes of action in malicious prosecution, abuse of process and defamation. We will come to these grounds later in our judgment. It suffices however, at this juncture, to state that, subject to our decision on those particular matters, we would be minded to allow the Appellant to amend his statement of claim to abandon his claims for damages for personal injuries.
[87] Unfortunately, given how the parties chose to argue their respective cases, neither party took the point as to whether, as a matter of law, if a cause of action pleaded by the Appellant includes a claim for damages for personal injury, the three year limitation period under s 24A(2) would apply to bar the entire cause of action, or whether, the three year limitation period would only apply in so far as damages were claimed in respect of personal injury. As alluded to earlier, an argument was made by the plaintiff in Walkin that the unwanted pregnancy gave rise to two causes of action, one for damages for pre-natal pain and suffering and the other for post-natal economic loss incurred in raising the child. This argument did not find favour with the English Court of Appeal, which held that both claims for damages arose from a single cause of action. Without intending to cast any doubt on the correctness of the decision in Walkin, we do not, with respect, think that Walkin settles the position in so far as the point raised at the beginning of this paragraph is concerned. In this regard, we agree with Walker LJ’s observation in Shade that Walkin was a case where the claim for economic loss was closely related to, and therefore could not be severed from, the personal injury suffered by the plaintiff (ie, the unwanted pregnancy). It is therefore not difficult to see why the court in Walkin rejected the argument which the plaintiff had sought to advance. In our view, the position is less clear in cases such as Shade where the claim for damages for personal injuries can be properly severed from the rest of the claim. It seems to us that, in these cases, it is at least arguable that the various heads of damages claimed give rise to separate causes of action, with the effect that the limitation period under s 24A(2) would only apply in so far as damages are claimed for personal injuries. In any event, as the point was not taken before us and since what we have stated above at [84]–[85] makes it unnecessary to deal with this point, we say nothing further on it and leave it for decision if a suitable case arises in the future.
Issue 2
[88] Given our conclusion that the Appellant’s suit is not absolutely time-barred, it becomes necessary to consider the Respondent’s arguments that there are other grounds for striking out the Appellant’s claims in malicious prosecution, abuse of process and defamation.
The Appellant’s constitutional argument
[89] To buttress his causes of action in malicious prosecution and abuse of process, the Appellant raises a preliminary argument concerning the interpretation of Art 9(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Rev Ed) (“the Constitution”). This Article reads as follows:
[90] The rationale underlying Art 9(4) of the Constitution is explained by Prof Thio Li-Ann as follows (see A Treatise on Singapore Constitutional Law (Academy Publishing. 2012) at para 12.076):
[91] It will be evident from the language of Art 9(4) that it requires an arrested person, if not released earlier, to be brought before a Magistrate without “unreasonable delay”. This means that Art 9(4) may be violated even where an arrested person is brought before a Magistrate within the 48 hour period, if the time taken to do so amounted to “unreasonable delay” in all the circumstances of the case. Likewise, the fact that a person is released, whether on police bail or otherwise, within the 48 hour period, does not necessarily preclude the possibility of Art 9(4) being contravened.
[92] It is, however, also plainly the case that Art 9(4) does not confer an arrested person with an unqualified right to be brought before a Magistrate immediately upon his arrest. Rather, it recognises the need to afford the police a reasonable time in which to carry out their investigations. This point is further accentuated by the 1984 amendments to the Constitution which extended the maximum period for which a person could be detained from 24 to the present 48 hours. At the second reading, the then Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, explained the rationale for the longer time period to be as follows (see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (24 July 1984) vol 44 at col 1723)
In our view, therefore, Art 9(4) requires the right of the individual against arbitrary detention upon arrest to be balanced against the need to afford the police reasonable time in which to carry out their investigations.
[93] The need to balance an individual’s constitutional rights against other public interest considerations was also alluded to in this court’s recent decision in James Raj s/o Ariokasamy v Public Prosecutor [2014] 3 SLR 750 (“James Raj”). James Raj concerned an application for leave to refer a question of law of public interest to this court under s 397(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) as to the interpretation of Art 9(3) of the Constitution (“Art 9(3)”). Art 9(3) reads as follows:
In dismissing the application for leave, this court regarded its earlier decision in Jasbir Singh and another v Public Prosecutor [1994] 1 SLR(R) 782 (“Jasbir Singh”) as settling the position that the right to counsel under Art 9(3) was not exercisable immediately, but, rather, only after a reasonable time, observing as follows (at [31]):
[94] Returning then to the present case, the Appellant contended that under Art 9(4), the police were obliged to bring him before a Magistrate for a determination of whether there were reasonable grounds for this arrest, or in the Appellant’s words, a “probable cause hearing”. As he was not produced before a Magistrate but instead released on police bail, the Appellant submitted that his constitutional right under Art 9(4) had been violated.
[95] We do not agree with the Appellant’s contention. In accordance with what we have stated above, it will be evident that Art 9(4) does not confer a right upon an arrested person to be brought before a Magistrate upon his arrest in every case. Rather, the right of the arrested person is more accurately characterised as one to not be detained for a period that is unreasonable in the circumstances, and which in any event does not exceed 48 hours, unless he is brought before a Magistrate. If the arrested person is released within a reasonable time after his arrest, he does not have to be brought before a Magistrate.
[96] The Appellant is therefore incorrect in arguing that Art 9(4) was contravened merely because he was not taken before a Magistrate upon his arrest.
Malicious prosecution
[97] In Zainal bin Kuning and ors v Chan Sin Mian Michael and anor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 858 (“Zainal”), this court held (at [54]) that in order to establish a cause of action in malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show: (a) he was prosecuted by the defendant, that is, the law must be set in motion against him on a criminal charge; (b) the prosecution was determined in his favour; (c) the prosecution was without reasonable and probable cause; and (d) the prosecution was malicious.
[98] Mr Khoo contends that the first requirement in Zainal is not satisfied in the case before us because the Appellant was not charged, and therefore, not “prosecuted”. We agree. As the Privy Council observed in Amin v Bannerjee [1947] AC 322 at 330:
The learned authors of Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (Michael A Jones gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 20th ed, 2010) likewise define a “prosecution” to mean (at para 16-11):
A prosecution therefore requires that the criminal law is set in motion against the plaintiff either on a criminal charge or under a private prosecution.
[99] We should state that the Appellant accepts that a prosecution requires the criminal law to be set in motion against him. However, he argues that a prosecution commenced at the time of his arrest as the criminal law ought to have been set in motion by the “probable cause hearing” that he was entitled to, but did not receive, under Art 9(4) of the Constitution. As we have explained above at [89]–[96], Art 9(4) did not provide the Appellant with the right that he contends for. His arguments in this regard must therefore fail.
[100] It follows that the claim for malicious prosecution plainly does not disclose a reasonable cause of action and should be struck out. We are not minded, and it is indeed not necessary for us, to make any finding on the issue of malice.
Abuse of process
[101] In relation to the Appellant’s claim for an abuse of process, it should be noted at the outset that it is unclear whether this is a recognised free standing cause of action at law and further, whether this is a cause of action capable of giving rise to a claim for damages. In Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 (“Phyllis Tan”), the High Court noted (at [130]) that:
[102] Similar sentiments were expressed by the English Court of Appeal in Land Securities Plc & Ors v Fladgate Fielder (A Firm) [2010] Ch 467, where Moore-Bick LJ observed as follows (at [77]):
[103] It will also be evident from this that courts have generally regarded the concept of an abuse of process as referring to an abuse of the judicial process. On this note, Mr Khoo submits that, as no judicial proceedings were commenced against the Appellant, there could be no abuse of process. Conversely, the Appellant contends that there could be an abuse of process because the judicial process ought to have been invoked by bringing him before a Magistrate for a probable cause hearing, in accordance with Art 9(4) of the Constitution. He further contends that the abuse of process lies in the Attorney-General’s direction to the police not to take him before a Magistrate in contravention of the same article of the Constitution. In this regard, the Appellant cites Phyllis Tan where the court held (at [148]):
[104] In our view, the Appellant’s contentions are untenable. We find that there was no abuse of the judicial process for the simple reason that judicial proceedings were never commenced against the Appellant in the first place as he was not charged. Further, for the reasons which we stated above at [89]–[96], we disagree with the Appellant’s suggestion that judicial proceedings ought to been commenced against him by bringing him before a Magistrate. For the same reasons, under the principles enunciated in Phyllis Tan (see above at [103]), the Attorney-General did not act in excess of his prosecutorial powers.
[105] In the event, the claim for abuse of process discloses no reasonable cause of action and should be struck out.
Defamation
[106] To establish a prima facie case of defamation, a plaintiff must prove the following three elements: (a) the statement must be defamatory in nature; (b) the statement must refer to the plaintiff; and (c) the statement must be published (see Gary Chan Kok Yew, The Law of Torts in Singapore (Academy Publishing, 2011) (“Law of Torts in Singapore”) at para 12.009).
[107] As already mentioned, the Appellant relies on two statements to make out his claim in defamation. The first is the police officer’s statement “breach of PPO” when asked by the doctor at CGH about the Appellant’s wrongdoing. The second is the doctor’s comment that the Appellant had only suffered a “small injury”.
[108] As a preliminary point, we note that the Appellant’s claim in defamation is deficient as matter of pleading. In this regard, O 78 r 3 of the Rules is germane and it sets out the particulars which must be provided when pleading a claim in defamation:
[109] Applying O 78 r 3 of the Rules to the present case, it was incumbent upon the Appellant to: (a) identify whether the offending words were defamatory in their ordinary meaning or in terms of innuendo; and (b) set out all the facts and particulars which he intended to rely upon to support his claim for damages. In the context of point (b), we note that the Appellant had failed to plead particulars of the extent of publication of the allegedly defamatory statements. Besides the doctor and the police officer, the Appellant’s statement of claim did not identify anyone else who was present in the examination room at the time the alleged statements were made. Moreover the defamation here is a slander, as opposed to a libel, and the common law rule is that a slander requires proof of special damage (see Law of Torts in Singapore at para 12.005), unless one of the statutory exceptions under ss 4, 5 and 6 of the Defamation Act (Cap 75, 2014 Rev Ed) applies, which was not the case here. This court is unable to infer any special damage occasioned by the slander from the Appellant’s pleaded case without which there is no cause of action. In other words, the Appellant’s complaint of slander bears no discernible cause of action, and is susceptible to being struck out under O 18 r 19(1)(a) or under the court’s inherent jurisdiction.
[110] That having been said, we should not lose sight of the fact that the Appellant’s claim in defamation is also legally unsustainable in other respects.
[111] In relation to the doctor’s comment, we agree with Mr Khoo’s submission that the proper defendant to such a claim is the doctor himself or his employers. The Respondent cannot be made liable for statements made by the employees of CGH, which is privately managed by Changi General Hospital Pte Ltd. We also note that the Appellant did not assert to the contrary in this regard.
[112] In relation to the police officer’s statement, the Respondent first contends that the statement was made on an occasion of qualified privilege. The law in this regard is settled. The defence of qualified privilege applies where the defendant to a defamation suit has an interest or duty, whether legal, social or moral, to communicate the information and the recipient has a corresponding interest or duty to receive the information: see Law of Torts in Singapore at para 13.063. It is also pertinent to note in this regard that the privilege attaches to the occasion on which the defamatory statement is made and not the statement itself: see this court’s decision in Lim Eng Hock Peter v Lin Jian Wei [2010] 4 SLR 331 at [34]. There is, therefore, no need to apply an objective test of relevance to every part of the defamatory matter as a pre-condition to the existence of the privilege: see ibid. However, it is equally important to note that the aforementioned is subject to the following caveat which is succinctly explained by the learned author of Law of Torts in Singapore in the following terms (at para 13.062):
[113] In the present case, the Appellant appeared to acknowledge (correctly, in our view) that, as he was under arrest at the time of the medical examination, the relationship between the police officer and the doctor was such that the police officer had a duty or an interest to answer the doctor’s questions. He nonetheless contended that qualified privilege did not apply on the facts of this case because the doctor was not under a duty to include details of the Appellant’s wrongdoing in his medical report, because it contributed nothing to the Appellant’s diagnosis and his treatment, and, therefore, the doctor could not be said to have a corresponding duty or interest to receive the information communicated by the police officer.
[114] With respect, we are unable to agree with the Appellant’s submission which, in our view, is overly pedantic. As stated above (at [112]), the test as to whether the police officer’s statement was made on an occasion of qualified privilege does not require an objective test of relevance to be applied to every statement made, but, rather, the issue is whether the statements made can be said to be plainly extraneous or irrelevant. It is therefore necessary to have regard to the full context of what – according to the Appellant – had transpired in the medical examination. Pertinently, on the Appellant’s own case, when he was brought to CGH for his medical examination, he was handcuffed and escorted by the two police officers. It was in this light that the doctor had first asked how the Appellant had gotten injured. Having been informed by the Appellant that his wife had beaten him, it was not only logical but within the scope of the doctor’s duty for him to inquire as to why the Appellant had been arrested, or in the Appellant’s own words, his “wrongdoing”. Moreover, the doctor had recorded in the Appellant’s medical report that he was “arrested for breach of PPO”. Even if the doctor was not under a strict duty – or in other words, an obligation – to include this information in the Appellant’s medical report, it could not be said that the information requested was plainly irrelevant or extraneous, such that the police officer’s statement was outside the ambit of the qualified privilege. We also note, for completeness, that the Appellant did not suggest that the statement was motivated by malice, such that the defence of qualified privilege would be defeated. It follows from this that the Appellant’s claim in defamation ought to be struck out.
[115] As a further basis for striking out the Appellant’s claim in defamation, the Respondent contended that given the extremely limited publication of the statements made by the doctor and the police officer, the Appellant’s claim in defamation ought to be struck out. In this regard, Mr Khoo cited the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Jameel (Yousef) v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2005] QB 946 (“Jameel”). In Jameel, the foreign claimant issued defamation proceedings in England against the publisher of an American newspaper in respect of an article posted on a website in the USA. The publisher adduced evidence showing that only five persons in the jurisdiction had accessed the website, of which three persons were from the claimant’s camp. The publisher subsequently applied to strike out the claim on the ground that it had no reasonable prospect of success. Arguments before the court proceeded on the basis that only five persons had viewed the allegedly defamatory material.
[116] In striking out the claim, the court held that there was no “real and substantial tort” allegedly committed within the jurisdiction and that it would be an abuse of process for the plaintiff to proceed with his claim, even though the publisher had not objected to the jurisdiction of the English courts on the ground of forum non conveniens earlier. The court observed (at [54], [69] and [70]) that:
[117] The decision of Jameel has been followed by the English High Court in Phillip Wallis and GHP Securities Limited v Justin Meredith [2011] EWHC 75 (QB) and the English Court of Appeal in Tamiz v Google Inc [2013] 1 WLR 2151. Locally, Jameel was applied by Sundaresh Menon JC (as he then was) in the Singapore High Court decision of Lee Hsien Loong v Review Publishing Co Ltd and another and another suit [2007] 2 SLR(R) 453, albeit in the different context of a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court by a defendant against whom the plaintiff had been granted leave to effect service of the writ out of jurisdiction. Jameel was also referred to (also in a different context) in the Singapore High Court decision of Ng Koo Kay Benedict and another v Zim Integrated Shipping Services Ltd [2010] 2 SLR 860 at [44]. However, there was a direct application of Jameel in the Singapore District Court decision of Kesavan Engineering & Construction Pte Ltd v S P Powerassets Limited [2011] SGDC 179.
[118] It is also pertinent to note that since Jameel was decided under a set of procedural rules which are fundamentally different from those in Singapore (see, for example, Gatley on Libel and Slander (Alastair Mullis & Richard Parkes QC joint eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 12th ed, 2013) (“Gatley”) at para 30.48), and because it entails – in part, at least – the (potentially far reaching) proposition that an action may be struck out on the basis that the publication of the defamatory material is limited, or the amount claimed as damages is de minimis, the principle enunciated in that case should be approached with the necessary circumspection by the Singapore courts. In this regard, we find the following observations of the learned authors of Gatley (at para 6.2) to be instructive:
We also note, however, that the same authors have also observed as follows (at para 30.48):
[119] In another leading work, Carter-Ruck on Libel and Privacy (Alastair Mullis & Cameron Doley gen eds) (LexisNexis, 6th ed, 2010), it is observed as follows (at para 28.44):

The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.

Yan Jun v Attorney-General

Laws this judgment relies on

Grounds of decision

Introduction

The background facts

The Appellant’s claim

The proceedings below

Issues before this court

Issue 1

The relevant statutory provisions

The legislative history of s 24A(1) in Singapore

Developments in the English law

Meaning of “breach of duty” under s 24A of the Act

Do the damages claimed by the Appellant consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries?

Issue 2

The Appellant’s constitutional argument

Malicious prosecution

Abuse of process

Defamation