Family Division of the High Court · Decided 27 July 2026
YFW v YFX
Feedback & support[2026] SGHCF 22 · Case no. Divorce (Transferred) No 4921 of 2020
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Hoo Sheau Peng J:
Introduction
- [1]
[1] The parties were married on 21 December 2011. The plaintiff wife (“Wife”) commenced divorce proceedings against the defendant husband (“Husband”) on 30 October 2020. Interim Judgment for the divorce was granted on 7 May 2021 (“IJ”), ending the marriage of around nine years and five months.
- [2]
[2] The outstanding ancillary matters (“AM”) comprise the division of matrimonial assets and maintenance for the Wife. In the midst of the AM proceedings, the Husband filed HCF/SUM 319/2025 (“SUM 319”), seeking to suspend or reduce the monthly maintenance payments to the Wife. Having heard the parties’ submissions, this is my decision on the AM and SUM 319.
Background
The parties
- [3]
[3] The Wife is 55 years old and the Husband is 52 years old. They have no children together. The parties were in a relationship since 2004. They purchased the matrimonial home at Pinnacle @ Duxton, (“Pinnacle Unit”) in 2005 before getting married in 2011.
- [4]
[4] During the marriage, the Husband was the sole income-earner. He was employed as a partner at EY before his employment was terminated on 31 December 2020. At EY, his last drawn monthly income was S$73,809.83. He was employed at ST from 1 October 2022 to 31 October 2025, drawing a monthly income of S$21,000. He is currently unemployed.
- [5]
[5] The Wife was unemployed throughout the marriage and continues to be so. She incorporated two businesses in 2010, the SGFA and the FASG, to carry out retail of antiques and art pieces. She maintains that she derived no income or returns from these businesses. The Wife was diagnosed with endometrial cancer in early July 2017 and underwent a total hysterectomy on 24 July 2017. She contends that the businesses have been dormant since 2017 as a result of her health issues. Throughout the marriage and up until the Wife moved out of the matrimonial home in May 2019, the Husband paid the Wife a monthly allowance of S$3,000. The Wife also used credit cards supplied by the Husband to pay for household and personal expenses.
Related proceedings
- [6]
[6] There are three sets of related proceedings to note.
- [7]
[7] First, HC/S 141/20xx (“Suit 141”) was the Wife’s action against the Husband and his father (“Dr C”) in relation to the beneficial ownership of the property to be referred to at 11 M Road, Singapore (“11M”). 11M is registered in Dr C’s name. On 14 September 2023, I ruled that Dr C holds 85.71% of the beneficial interest in 11M on behalf of the Husband under a resulting trust (see the judgment published, to be referred to as the “11M Judgment”, at [114]). Whether the Husband’s beneficial interest in 11M forms a matrimonial asset is an issue in the AM proceedings.
- [8]
[8] Second, FC/SUM 2965/2021 was the Wife’s application seeking interim maintenance from the Husband pursuant to s 112 of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“Women’s Charter”). Pending the final determination of the AM, the Husband was ordered to pay a sum of S$6,000 each month to the Wife with effect from 31 August 2021 (“Interim Maintenance Order”). The Husband’s appeal against the Interim Maintenance Order in HCF/RAS 24/2021 (“RA 24”) was dismissed on 3 February 2022.
- [9]
[9] The Husband complied with the Interim Maintenance Order up until October 2025, around the time he left ST. On 28 November 2025, the Husband commenced SUM 319. As alluded to at [2] above, he sought to suspend or reduce the monthly maintenance payments pending his securing of alternative employment and subject to the final determination of the AM. SUM 319 was heard on 11 March 2026. I adjourned the application to be decided together with the other outstanding matters.
Division of matrimonial assets
- [10]
[10] With that background in mind, I turn to the division of the matrimonial assets. As set out in the parties’ joint summary of positions dated 31 October 2025 (updated by the Wife) (“PJSP”) and the joint summary of positions dated 26 January 2026 (updated by the Husband) (“DJSP”) , there are 126 items for consideration by the court. Before addressing them, I deal with three preliminary issues which the parties disagree on, which affect the identification and valuation of the matrimonial assets.
Preliminary issues
Cut-off date for identifying the matrimonial assets
- [11]
[11] As a general rule, the operative date to determine the pool of matrimonial assets is the date of interim judgment (ARY v ARX [2016] 2 SLR 686 (“ARY v ARX”) at [31]---). The interim judgment “puts an end to the marriage contract and indicates that the parties no longer intend to participate in the joint accumulation of matrimonial assets” (see AJR v AJS [2010] 4 SLR 617 at [4], cited with approval in ARY v ARX at [32]). The court may depart from this default position where the particular circumstances or justice of the case warrant it (ARY v ARX at [31]). For convenience, I shall refer to the operative date as the “cut-off date”.
- [12]
[12] For the cut-off date, the Wife is content to rely on the default position, ie, the IJ date of 7 May 2021. However, the Husband seeks to apply an earlier date of 31 May 2019 (“move-out date”). The parties agree that the relevant considerations in deciding whether to depart from the default position include: (a) whether there is still a matrimonial home; (b) whether there is consortium vitae; and (c) whether there is any right on either side to conjugal rights (ARY v ARX at [32]). The crux of the assessment is when the marriage can be treated as “practically at an end” (ARY v ARX at [34]; CLD v CLE [2021] SGHCF 12 at [23]).
- [13]
[13] For context, in or around May 2019, the Wife moved out of the matrimonial home. At the time, the Wife informed the Husband that she would be overseas for a work trip for around three weeks. However, she did not return to the matrimonial home after this period. The Husband ceased all allowance and maintenance for the Wife from around May 2019. Between May 2019 and October 2020, there was little communication between the parties. In October 2020, the Wife returned to the home to retrieve her belongings but could not enter as the Husband had changed the keys.
- [14]
[14] The Wife’s position is that none of the indicia required to depart from the default position is present in this case. She left the matrimonial home with the initial intention of “getting the needed space to find a new breath and revive the marriage”. Indeed, she did not move out most of her personal belongings when she went overseas in May 2019 and only packed a carry-on luggage. The Wife points to other evidence suggesting that as of May 2019, the parties did not intend to have a clean break both financially and non-financially (see WJZ v WJY [2024] SGHCF 2 (“WJZ v WJY”) at [125]). Even after May 2019, the Wife continued to pay for expenses related to the matrimonial home such as utility bills and property tax. She continued holding the credit cards supplied to her by the Husband. Also, the parties maintained their two joint bank accounts, with the Wife’s insurance premiums amounting to S$6,091.38 per year being paid for out of OCBC Easisave Account No. 501750434001 (“OCBC Joint Account”) up until around May 2021. It is also undisputed that the Husband made multiple attempts to contact the Wife between June 2019 and October 2020 to express concern for her when she was ill and to wish her well on occasions such as Christmas and her birthday. While the marriage had deteriorated, it had not practically ended as of May 2019.
- [15]
[15] The Husband submits that the marriage can be treated as practically at an end from May 2019 as the parties did not even see each other again until October 2020 when the Wife returned to the matrimonial home to collect her belongings. They barely communicated after separating. In UWL v UWM [2021] 5 SLR 1012 (“UWL v UWM”), the childless marriage was treated as practically at an end when the wife moved to China shortly after the husband moved out of the matrimonial home as they had “led their own lives” since their separation (see UWL v UWM at [3] and [13]–[18]). The Husband emphasises that he ceased paying the Wife maintenance from May 2019. The Wife also terminated three insurance policies which listed the Husband as a beneficiary in June 2019. Further, the Husband submits that it would be just and equitable for the cut-off date to be around May 2019. By “surreptitiously” leaving the matrimonial home, the Wife was able to “arrange her finances” before divorce. Her bank balances fell by a total of S$755,076.22 between June 2019 and May 2021, which cannot be explained by the Wife’s expenditure alone. Essentially, the Husband alleges that the Wife wrongfully dissipated funds before IJ was granted. Applying the move-out date as the cut-off date would more accurately reflect the material gains of the marriage and account for any dissipation by the Wife.
- [16]
[16] Having considered the parties’ submissions, I find that there is insufficient reason to depart from the default position, ie, the IJ date of 7 May 2021. First, the parties’ marriage cannot be said to have been practically at an end as of May 2019. Certainly, it cannot be said that there was no longer a matrimonial home (ARY v ARX at [32]). For some time after May 2019, each of them contributed to expenses related to the matrimonial home. Several payment accounts relating to the matrimonial home such as the utilities, gas, Housing Development Board (“HDB”) conservancy charges, town council charges, and the parties’ StarHub account were in the Wife’s name even up until May 2021. The Husband’s own position was that he paid for their StarHub and HDB conservancy bills. Furthermore, the Husband continued living in the matrimonial home even after the Wife moved out and most of the Wife’s belongings remained there. This sets the present case apart from UWL v UWM where both parties left the matrimonial home (see UWL v UWM at [3]).
- [17]
[17] Second, as of May 2019, there was no clean break between the parties, be it financially or non-financially (see WJZ v WJY at [125]). As mentioned above, both parties continued contributing towards expenses of the matrimonial home. In addition, their joint bank accounts also continued to subsist. GIRO instructions for payment of the Wife’s insurance policies from the OCBC Joint Account were only cancelled sometime after the IJ date. While the Husband submits that the “continuation of certain monetary arrangements alone does not show that the marriage subsisted meaningfully”, they point away from any finding of a clean break between the parties. Indeed, my view is fortified by the Husband’s position that he was unaware at the material time that the Wife had “abandoned the home and marriage for good”. The Husband’s attempts to contact the Wife thereafter showed that there was no clean break when the Wife moved out.
- [18]
[18] Third, it appears to me that the Husband’s main concern is that before the IJ date, the Wife unreasonably cashed out three insurance policies and dissipated a large amount of funds from her bank accounts. Out of these insurance policies, AIA Smart Growth 24 Policy No. xxxxxxx133 (“AIA Policy 133”) is a disputed asset which the Husband addresses separately in his submissions. He also makes a specific allegation of dissipation against the Wife regarding the sum of S$500,937.80. The Husband’s concerns are not good reasons to depart from the default position. If these concerns are founded, these assets can be added back to the matrimonial pool. I shall return to these concerns later.
- [19]
[19] In sum, I adopt the IJ date, instead of the move-out date, as the cut-off date for determining whether assets are to be accounted for within the matrimonial pool.
Valuation dates for valuation of the matrimonial assets
- [20]
[20] In general, matrimonial assets are valued at or as close to the date of the ancillary matters hearing (see UYP v UYQ [2020] 3 SLR 683 (“UYP v UYQ”) at [4]). In this connection, the parties broadly agree that the valuation date should be at or as close to the AM hearing date, ie, 25 September 2025.
- [21]
[21] For bank accounts and Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) account balances, the default position is that they should be valued as at the interim judgment date. It is the moneys, and not the accounts themselves, which are the matrimonial assets (UYP v UYQ at [4]). For convenience, I refer to this as the “valuation date for account balances”. The Wife is content to apply the default position. The Husband, however, presses for the move-out date to apply in line with his position on the cut-off date.
- [22]
[22] Given my decision above on the cut-off date, I similarly reject the Husband’s position on the valuation date for account balances. The valuation date for account balances shall be at or close to the IJ date.
Applicable exchange rates
- [23]
[23] The parties have assets denominated in various foreign currencies. In the PJSP and DJSP, they propose different exchange rates to derive the S$ values, without clearly explaining why this is so. They also propose only one set of exchange rates each, without specifying whether these are to be applied for assets to be valued at the IJ date or the AM hearing date. For some of the assets in foreign currencies, the values submitted in S$ are not in line with the parties’ own proposed exchange rates. Given these difficulties, I adopt the relevant exchange rates based on historical data provided by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (“MAS exchange rates”). For clarity, I set out the parties’ proposed rates and the MAS exchange rates which I apply:
Identification and valuation of the matrimonial assets
- [24]
[24] Originally, the parties’ submissions were solely based on their primary positions on the cut-off date and the valuation date for account balances. For completeness, I directed both parties to submit on the alternative positions should I rule against their primary positions. They did so in the PJSP and the DJSP. Specifically, in the DJSP, the Husband provides his alternative positions on the assets to be included should the cut-off date be the IJ date (instead of the move-out date), and the valuation date for account balances be at or close to the IJ date (instead of at or close to the move-out date). With that, I turn to the 126 items, and categorise them into four groups.
Group 1: Agreed Assets, and assets with disputes concerning the cut-off date and/or valuation date
- [25]
[25] First, I deal with the agreed assets, together with the assets where the parties’ disputes centre only on the cut-off date and/or the valuation date for account balances. I refer to these as the “Group 1 Assets”.
- [26]
[26] Having determined the issues against the Husband in relation to the assets he sought to exclude solely on account of the cut-off date, I include these in the matrimonial pool. As for account balances, I accept the Husband’s alternative position set out in the DJSP, of the values at or close to the IJ date. The Wife is largely in agreement with this alternative set of figures. Where necessary, I also apply the MAS exchange rates set out above.
- [27]
[27] Proceeding as explained above, I set out the assets, as well as their respective values in the table below (“Table of Group 1 Assets”).
- [28]
[28] Having explained the general basis for arriving at my findings set out in the table, I make a few comments in relation to specific items. In relation to S/N 19, the Husband owns 28 Singapore Savings Bonds in total. In the PJSP and DJSP, these are itemised individually. The Husband sought to exclude most of them from the matrimonial pool on the basis that they were acquired after the move-out date. Having rejected the Husband’s position on the cut-off date, I include 26 of the Singapore Savings Bonds acquired well before the IJ date within the matrimonial pool, with a total agreed value of S$132,500. As for the remaining two savings bonds, these are dealt with below under the disputed assets at [89], to address the Husband’s other objections to their inclusion in the matrimonial pool.
- [29]
[29] For S/N 20 and S/N 23, the Husband sought to exclude these Stashaway Accounts as they were opened in August and November of 2019 respectively (ie, after the move-out date). Should the cut-off date be the IJ date, the Husband values them at S$32,814.36 and S$124,148.96 as at 7 May 2021 respectively. Following from my reasoning above, I accept this alternative position.
- [30]
[30] For S/N 21 and S/N 22, the Husband values them at S$16,819.21 and S$2,104.09 as at 1 June 2019. As I reject the Husband’s primary position regarding the valuation date for account balances, I adopt his alternative position that these accounts stood at S$12,963.05 and S$5.08 as at 7 May 2021 respectively.
- [31]
[31] For S/N 26–30, the Husband values these Citibank accounts at S$19,811.03 in total as at 31 May 2019. Based on the bank documents relied on by the Husband for his alternative position in the DJSP, I find that the accounts should be valued at S$21,951.12. Some of these Citibank accounts contain foreign currencies. Initially, the Husband converted the foreign currency amounts into S$ using his proposed exchange rates. However, he later produced documentation from Citibank valuing the total amount at S$21,951.12 as at 31 May 2021. The Wife agrees to the moneys in these accounts being added to the pool, although she relies on the earlier values provided by the Husband. Here, I do not find it necessary to apply the MAS exchange rates. I accept the values based on the documentation from Citibank.
- [32]
[32] Similar to the items above, for S/N 34–35, S/N 38–40 and S/N 57–59, which are all bank accounts, the figures set out in the table are drawn from the Husband’s alternative position on these account balances as at May 2021. These figures align with what the Wife submits on her primary position for valuation of these accounts.
- [33]
[33] For S/N 36, the Husband’s OCBC SRS Account, the Wife submits a value of S$17,850.36. This is the balance as at 30 April 2021. In the DJSP, the Husband submits a value of S$15,850.36. This is the account’s balance as at 5 May 2021 based on a bank statement for May 2021 adduced later in these proceedings. I adopt the value of S$15,850.36, as the value which is closer to the IJ date.
- [34]
[34] Finally, for S/N 67, I only include a loan of €12,000 made by the Wife to her friend, one Salehi, on 10 January 2019. There were two other loans that the Wife made to Salehi on 3 August and 9 December 2019 (ie, after the move-out date). In her written submissions, the Wife submits that all three loans are assets, agreed by parties to be added to the matrimonial pool. However, the Husband’s position is that the two other loans should be excluded. I shall thus discuss these two loans as disputed assets below at [208].
Group 2: Disputed Joint Asset
- [35]
[35] Turning to the second group, this concerns the Pinnacle Unit, jointly owned by the parties.
- [36]
[36] The Pinnacle Unit was purchased in the parties’ joint names on 21 February 2005 at S$305,600. It was used as the matrimonial home during the marriage. It is fully paid for. The parties agree that it is a matrimonial asset but disagree on its valuation.
- [37]
[37] The Wife submits that it is worth S$1,240,000 as of 29 July 2025. This is based on a Singapore Real Estate Exchange (“SRX”) X-Value home valuation report (“X-Value Report”). The Husband, however, submits that the property should be valued at S$920,888. This is based on a transaction of a similar flat in May 2021, as found on the HDB website. He argues that his valuation should be preferred as the X-Value Report itself states that it is “not guaranteed to be reliable” and “not independently verified”.
- [38]
[38] I adopt the Wife’s valuation. Not only is the Husband’s position based on a single transaction, but that transaction took place around four years before the AM hearing date. In contrast, the Wife’s valuation is based on information much closer to the AM hearing date. Further, the X-Value Report is based on “publicly available information” and “proprietary data of SRX”. I see no reason to doubt the reliability of the report. Thus, I value the Pinnacle Unit at S$1,240,000.
Group 3: Disputed Assets of the Husband
- [39]
[39] I now turn to the Husband’s assets which are disputed. Out of the 15 items, there are fierce fights over many of them.
(1) S/N 1: 11M
- [40]
[40] As explained above at [7], 11M is registered in Dr C’s sole name. It was purchased in 2009 for S$2,100,000, prior to the parties’ marriage in 2011. To purchase the property, the Husband contributed S$520,000 towards its downpayment and took up a mortgage loan of S$1,280,000 in his sole name. Dr C paid S$300,000 towards the downpayment. After its purchase, it was rented out.
- [41]
[41] In Suit 141, I determined that based on their financial contributions towards its purchase, Dr C and the Husband are beneficial owners of 14.29% (S$300,000 out of S$2,100,000) and 85.71% (S$1,800,000 out of S$2,100,000) of the property respectively. Under a resulting trust, Dr C holds the Husband’s 85.71% beneficial interest on behalf of the Husband (11M Judgment at [114]). The parties now dispute whether the Husband’s share, which is a pre-marriage asset, should form part of the matrimonial pool.
- [42]
[42] Pursuant to s 112(10)(a)(ii) of the Women’s Charter, an asset acquired prior to a marriage can be included in the matrimonial pool if it has been substantially improved during the marriage. Where an asset is acquired by one spouse before the marriage, the entire asset may be considered a “transformed matrimonial asset” if it is substantially improved during the marriage by the other spouse or by both spouses (see USB v USA [2020] 2 SLR 588 (“USB v USA”) at [19(b)] and [25]). The improvement must arise from some “expenditure or application of effort” towards improving the asset in an economic sense (USB v USA at [22]).
- [43]
[43] Where a pre-marriage asset is not transformed into a matrimonial asset, it is to be excluded from the matrimonial pool unless it is “partially paid for during the marriage by the owning spouse with income that would have been a quintessential matrimonial asset had it been saved up rather than expended on the pre-marriage asset”. The proportion of the value of the asset that was acquired during the marriage may be added to the matrimonial pool on this basis (USB v USA at [19(c)]). Specifically, through repayments of the mortgage loan of a pre-marriage asset during the marriage, what is acquired is the “equivalent proportion of the equitable or beneficial interest of the mortgagee” (USB v USA at [29]).
- [44]
[44] With the law in mind, and based on the parties’ cases, two issues arise for determination:
(a) Whether the Husband’s 85.71% share of 11M should be considered a “transformed matrimonial asset” and added in its entirety to the matrimonial pool.
(b) Alternatively, whether and/or what proportion of the value of 11M that was acquired by the Husband during the marriage may be added to the matrimonial pool.
- [45]
[45] On the first issue, the Wife contends that the Husband’s entire share in 11M should be included. She submits that she first identified the property as an investment for the couple. Further, by her contributions, the profitability of 11M increased. Specifically, she ensured that 11M was in good condition to be rented out to tenants. She points to certain findings in the 11M Judgment that she was involved in the management of 11M. Based on e-mails and WhatsApp messages, she was involved in managing tenants and amending a tenancy agreement. Also, she solely held the keys to the property (see 11M Judgment at [93]–[97]). The Wife further asserts on affidavit that she was “responsible for engaging contractors to repair any defects or issues” so that 11M could be rented out. By all of the above, she argues that there was “substantial improvement” of the property.
- [46]
[46] The Husband’s position is that the Wife’s contributions were de minimis; they do not rise to the level of substantial improvement of the property. In Suit 141, the court’s findings on the Wife’s involvement with managing the property were “not geared at establishing if the Wife had substantially improved the property”, but at assessing the beneficial ownership of the property. In fact, the court found that while “[the Wife] had at least some involvement in relation to [11M]”, “she was not as involved as [the Husband]” (11M Judgment at [92]). In this regard, the Husband adduced his e-mail and WhatsApp correspondence with the real estate agents, evidencing his heavy involvement with managing the rental of the property.
- [47]
[47] To consider this question, I turn to cases which shed some light on what constitutes substantial contributions to a rental property. In TQU v TQT [2020] SGCA 8 (“TQU v TQT”) at [55], the Court of Appeal considered that finding tenants and supervising maintenance works were possible relevant contributions, but ultimately dismissed the wife’s claims due to a lack of evidence. While this was in the context of a property acquired as a gift by the husband during marriage, drawing guidance from this, the type of contributions relied on by the Wife appears relevant. Similarly, in Ryan Neil John v Berger Rosaline [2000] 3 SLR(R) 647, the High Court affirmed the trial judge’s findings that “some correspondence to show that the estate agent had communicated with both [the husband and wife]”, an “insurance policy for certain items in the property taken out in the wife’s name” and the wife’s “bare assertion that the property had been renovated with her supervision” were insufficient to constitute substantial improvement to a property purchased by the husband pre-marriage (at [60]). Based on these cases, the Husband contends that, likewise, the Wife has not produced credible evidence of her substantial involvement with 11M.
- [48]
[48] Having reviewed the evidence, I find that the Wife’s contributions appear to be rather piecemeal, and do not amount to substantial improvement of the property. In Suit 141, and in the context of determining the beneficial ownership of the property, I discussed the Wife’s involvement with the property. There, the analysis included assessing the efforts of the couple against “Dr C’s limited role”. In that context, I remarked that the Husband was “intimately involved in the management of [11M]”, and that “[the Wife] was not as involved as [the Husband]” (11M Judgment at [92]–[97]).
- [49]
[49] I am mindful that the question before me is a different one. Even then, the Wife’s evidence of her involvement in dealing with 11M as a rental property remains sparse, and pales in comparison to the Husband’s voluminous evidence of his role. Apart from the management of 11M as a rental property, there is a lack of evidence to show any other “expenditure or application of effort”, by either party, towards improving the asset in an economic sense. While there must have been maintenance works, there is no evidence of any major works requiring substantial expenditure during the marriage. As for the Wife’s claim of her efforts in identifying 11M as an investment property, these were matters before the marriage. I am unable to take these into account. In my view, the pre-marriage asset has not been transformed into a matrimonial asset. Accordingly, I cannot add the entirety of the Husband’s 85.71% share in 11M to the pool.
- [50]
[50] Turning to the second issue, as stated at [40] above, to purchase the property, the mortgage loan taken in the Husband’s name was S$1,280,000. The monthly mortgage payment is S$3,871.02. As at 7 May 2021, there is an outstanding mortgage amount of S$923,323.05. Out of the mortgage loan of S$1,280,000, it appears to me that thus far, the loan principal of $356,676.95 has been repaid.
- [51]
[51] According to the Husband, the rental proceeds were used to finance the mortgage repayments for the property up until around three years before 25 June 2021. By then, 11M could no longer be rented out due to its poor condition. For three years thereafter, the Husband paid the monthly mortgage payments totalling S$139,356.72 in cash. Only this sum should be added to the pool and taken as his sole direct contributions. The rental proceeds are attributable to the legal owner of 11M, being Dr C, and thus cannot be included.
- [52]
[52] Before me, the Wife’s alternative position is that all contributions made during the marriage to pay down the mortgage loan should be added back into the matrimonial pool, as against the net value of the property.
- [53]
[53] Having considered the matter, I do not accept the Husband’s position. First, there is no basis to attribute all the rental proceeds to Dr C simply because he is the legal owner. As the beneficial owner of 85.71% of the property, prima facie, the Husband is beneficially entitled to 85.71% of the rental proceeds. In Ong Chai Soon v Ong Chai Koon [2022] 2 SLR 457, sub-tenancy rental proceeds and earnings from a business beneficially owned by the respondents used to pay the mortgage loan for a property in dispute were taken as the respondents’ direct financial contributions to the purchase of that property. This was in the context of determining the parties’ interests in HDB property under a common intention constructive trust. Indeed, the court observed that ownership of the rental proceeds was “inextricably linked to the question of who beneficially owned the [p]roperty” (at [33]). In my view, nothing points against such a position in the context of matrimonial proceedings. More importantly, such rental proceeds obtained during the marriage by a spouse can prima facie be considered “income that would have been a quintessential matrimonial asset had it been saved up rather than expended on the pre-marriage asset” (USB v USA at [19(c)]).
- [54]
[54] Second, as explained above, through repayment of a mortgage loan, what is “acquired” is the equivalent proportion of the beneficial interest of the mortgagee (USB v USA at [29]). Although the Husband is not the legal owner of 11M, the same principle is applicable. The application of the Husband’s 85.71% share of the rental proceeds during the marriage to repay the loan went towards “acquiring” the Husband’s equivalent beneficial interest in the property.
- [55]
[55] Consequently, I find that 85.71% of the rental proceeds going towards repayment of the mortgage from the time the parties were married (ie, around December 2011) to the time 11M could not be rented out (ie, around June 2018) should be attributed to the Husband. I do not have clear information on the rental amounts for that period. However, the Husband claims that the entire monthly mortgage payment was paid out of the rental proceeds. Thus, I multiply the monthly mortgage payment amount (being S$3,871.02) by the number of months during this period (being around 78 months), to arrive at a figure of S$301,939.56. I thus attribute 85.71% of this figure, being S$258,792.40, to the Husband. As for the remaining S$43,147.16, prima facie, this should be treated as Dr C’s share of the rental proceeds.
- [56]
[56] Third, the Husband’s cash contributions to repaying the mortgage loan for the three-year period thereafter totalling S$139,356.72 also went towards “acquiring” the equivalent proportion of his beneficial interest. He does not dispute adding this amount to the pool. Therefore, I find that the total sum contributed by the Husband to the property during the marriage is S$398,149.12 (being S$258,792.40 plus S$139,356.72). It should be noted that out of the loan principal, only the amount of $356,676.95 has been repaid as at 7 May 2021 (at [50] above). While there is a discrepancy of S$41,472.17 between these values, this likely arises from the interests of the loan.
- [57]
[57] With that, I turn to consider how to quantify the proportion of the asset to be added into the pool. One option is to simply return to the pool the sum of S$398,149.12 – as the “quintessential matrimonial assets” expended on the property during the marriage by the Husband. This approach is endorsed in USB v USA (at [34]). However, the Wife urges the court to adopt the approach of applying a formula to determine the proportion of the current net value of the asset that should be credited to the pool (USB v USA at [34]). This ensures that any capital gains on the property would be factored in.
- [58]
[58] In this connection, the Wife submits that 11M is worth SS$4,480,000 as at 18 August 2022, based on a SRX X-Value home valuation report which had been provided by the Wife for the purposes of Suit 141. Given his case, the Husband provides no alternative valuation. Indeed, his evidence is that the property is in such poor condition that it could not be rented out. Although there is no recent valuation, there is nothing to suggest that the market price of 11M, a shophouse, would have materially decreased in the period up to the AM date. While it might not have been fit for rental, there is also nothing to suggest any material impact on its market price. If necessary, the Husband should have obtained a valuation. The Wife, on the other hand, is not contending for any increase in the market price since 18 August 2022. Based on the available evidence, I accept the Wife’s valuation. There is a profit made on 11M. Its net value is S$3,556,677, and the Husband’s beneficial share amounts to S$3,048,427.86.
- [59]
[59] From the outset when 11M was acquired before the marriage, it was meant to be an investment property. The Wife participated in the process. Since a profit has been made during the marriage, I agree with the Wife that the appropriate approach is to determine the proportion of the current net value of the asset that should be credited to the pool. Although the Husband contributed the sum of S$398,149.12 towards the mortgage loan payments, only the sum of $356,676.95 of the loan principal of S$1,280,000 has been paid down (see [56] above). Treating $356,676.95 of the loan principal as being paid off during the marriage by the Husband solely out of his contributions of S$398,149.12, the appropriate proportion of 11M that was acquired by the Husband during the marriage is 16.98% (S$356,676.95 out of the purchase price of S$2,100,000). This translates into the Husband gaining S$603,923.75 of the property’s net value, ie, 16.98% of S$3,556,677 during the marriage. I add this sum to the pool.
- [60]
[60] For completeness, by the above, I have treated Dr C’s prima facie share of the rental proceeds, ie, the sum of S$43,147.16, as going towards paying interests of the mortgage loan only, and not towards any part of the loan principal (see [55] above). By his downpayment of S$300,000 towards its purchase price, Dr C fully acquired his 14.29% beneficial interest in 11M. Whatever the arrangement between the parties, the use of the balance rental proceeds by the Husband should not result in Dr C gaining any further beneficial interest in the property.
(2) S/N 2: Marlex 2
- [61]
[61] Flat 2, Marlex Lodge (“Marlex 2”) is a property in the United Kingdom (“UK”) purchased by the Husband’s parents in 1981.
- [62]
[62] Dr C filed an affidavit stating that in 2015, he and the Husband’s mother (“Mrs C”) sought advice on inheritance tax planning in relation to their UK properties. For tax structuring purposes, they registered the following transactions with respect to Marlex 2 on 28 March 2016:
(a) Dr C and Mrs C each to sell 18% of Marlex 2 (totalling 36%) to the Husband for £124,000.
(b) Dr C and Mrs C each to gift 27% of Marlex 2 (totalling 54%) to the Husband.
- [63]
[63] At present, the Husband owns 90%, while his parents own 5% each, of Marlex 2. They are tenants-in-common. While the transfer document seemingly states that the Husband transferred £62,000 each to Dr C and Mrs C, Dr C explains that these payments were not actually requested for or received by the Husband’s parents. Thus, the Husband’s position is that the 90% share in Marlex 2 was a gift to the Husband. The Wife did not substantially improve Marlex 2 for it to be considered a “transformed matrimonial asset” (see USB v USA at [19(d)]). She does not provide any evidence of her efforts in managing the property.
- [64]
[64] The Wife argues that the Husband’s assertion that his share in Marlex 2 was a gift should be disbelieved. On the face of the Marlex 2 transfer document, the Husband transferred £62,000 each to Dr C and Mrs C; the transfer document states that they “received” the sums. The transfer document dated 28 March 2016 for another related property in dispute in the AM – Flat 3, Marlex Lodge (“Marlex 3”) – suggests that the Husband paid sums to acquire Marlex 3. This only shows that these sums had in reality been paid to acquire Marlex 2 as the Husband had already fully paid for Marlex 3’s purchase in 2013. Therefore, the Husband’s 90% share of Marlex 2 was not a gift and should be included in the pool.
- [65]
[65] Having considered the evidence, I find that the 90% share in Marlex 2 was a gift to the Husband. I accept the evidence of the Husband and Dr C that the transactions recorded in the transfer document were for tax structuring purposes, and there were no actual transfers of funds to the Husband’s parents. The Wife’s own evidence is that around 2015 or 2016, the Husband told her his name would be “added into Marlex 2” for inheritance tax purposes after he and his parents received tax and legal advice. In line with this, the fact that the transfer document for Marlex 3 suggests the Husband paid his parents to acquire an interest in Marlex 3 although he had earlier paid the entire purchase price for the property only supports my finding that both transfer documents cannot be taken at face value. On the totality of the evidence, there is basis to support the Husband’s position.
- [66]
[66] As Marlex 2 was gifted to the Husband, the question becomes whether it has been substantially improved during the marriage so as to be treated as a matrimonial asset pursuant to s 112(10) of the Women’s Charter (USB v USA at [19(d)]). I find that Marlex 2 is not a “transformed matrimonial asset”. The Wife only provides scant evidence regarding her efforts in managing Marlex 2. These are certainly not efforts that substantially improved the property in an economic sense. Thus, the Husband’s share in Marlex 2 is excluded from the matrimonial pool.
(3) S/N 3: Marlex 3
- [67]
[67] Marlex 3 is the neighbouring property to Marlex 2. On 28 May 2013, Marlex 3 was purchased in Dr C’s sole name. It is undisputed that at that time, the full purchase price of S$557,492.35 was paid by the Husband. Again for tax restructuring purposes, the following transactions with respect to Marlex 3 were registered on 28 March 2016:
(a) Dr C to gift 50% of Marlex 3 to Mrs C.
(b) Dr C and Mrs C to sell 16% of Marlex 3 (totalling 32%) to the Husband for £124,000.
(c) Dr C and Mrs C to gift 29% of Marlex 3 (totalling 58%) to the Husband.
Like Marlex 2, the Husband presently owns a 90% share in Marlex 3, as a tenant-in-common with his parents who each hold 5%.
- [68]
[68] The Husband’s case is that while he paid the full purchase price of S$557,492.35 in 2013, he used S$500,000 which he received from his parents as an early payout of his inheritance in 2011. Only the remaining S$57,492.35 was paid using his own funds. Relying on a valuation of Marlex 3 of £345,000 as at 7 June 2021, the Husband argues that only 10.3% of this value (being the proportion of the purchase price contributed using his own funds) should be included in the pool. Although the Husband only holds 90% of the legal title, I note that he is willing to add 10.3% of the entire value of Marlex 3 as at June 2021 to the pool. I surmise that the Husband accepts that he is the 100% beneficial owner of the property.
- [69]
[69] The Wife values Marlex 3 at £448,000 as at January 2024, and argues that this entire value should be added to the matrimonial pool as it is undisputed that the Husband paid the entire purchase price of the property. The Wife relies on CLC v CLB [2023] 1 SLR 1260 (“CLC v CLB”) at [62], where the Court of Appeal noted that in deciding whether an asset retains the character as one acquired by gift or inheritance, the court must consider: (a) the evidential issue of whether the new asset is traceable to the assets which constituted the original gift; and (b) if the spouse who received the original gift intends that the new asset retains the nature of the original gift, or if there is a real and unambiguous intention that the new asset forms part of the matrimonial pool. She submits that the Husband fails at the evidential inquiry as he has not produced documentary evidence that his interest in Marlex 3 is traceable to the S$500,000 received as an early payout of his inheritance.
- [70]
[70] On the matter of tracing, I find that the original gift of S$500,000 to the Husband is traceable into Marlex 3. Dr C’s affidavit corroborates the Husband’s position. He explains that in or around 2011, he and his wife sold a property at Robin Road. Thereafter, they gave S$500,000 to each of their four sons, as well as S$50,000 to each of their four daughters-in-law. These were meant as an early payout of their inheritance. In an affidavit filed by the Wife before Dr C’s affidavit, the Wife confirmed that when the property at Robin Road was sold, the Husband received a cheque of S$500,000, while she received a cheque of S$50,000. Not long after that, Marlex 3 was bought. As the original gift was a sum of money, it is unrealistic to expect evidence from the Husband showing the flow of that specific amount of funds going towards the purchase.
- [71]
[71] More importantly, I am satisfied that the Husband has no intention for Marlex 3 to form part of the matrimonial pool. In ascertaining the intention of the donee spouse, the court may consider relevant circumstances like the parties’ conduct and correspondence, and acts such as registering the other spouse as a joint tenant of the property (CLC v CLB at [63]). The Wife’s evidence accords with the evidence of the Husband and Dr C that Marlex 3 was acquired soon after the Husband learned from his parents that Marlex 3 was available on the market. While the Wife alluded to Marlex 3 being acquired by both of them as an investment property, I am not satisfied that there was any “voluntary intention” on the part of the Husband for Marlex 3 to be integrated into the matrimonial pool. Importantly, it was initially registered in Dr C’s name (see CLC v CLB at [63]; AAE v AAF [2009] 3 SLR(R) 827 at [10]).
- [72]
[72] Thus, I adopt the Husband’s position that only 10.3% of Marlex 3 should be added to the pool. In submitting that the property is worth £448,000, the Wife relies on the highest end of an estimated range of £367,000 to £448,000 as at January 2024. I do not think that is reasonable. Instead, I adopt the middle of the range ie £407,000. I prefer this to the Husband’s valuation of the property at £345,000 as at 7 June 2021, as the Wife’s valuation is far closer to the AM date. With that, I arrive at a figure of S$72,277.59 (being 10.3% of £407,000 and applying the relevant MAS exchange rate), to be added to the matrimonial pool.
(4) S/N 4: Cobalt Point
- [73]
[73] I move on to Flat 518, Cobalt Point (“Cobalt Point”). This is a UK property purchased for £415,000 in March 2016. Ms C T (“Ms T”), the Husband’s friend and ex-colleague at EY, is the legal owner and mortgagor of Cobalt Point. It is not disputed that the Husband has a beneficial interest in the property, and that this should form part of the matrimonial pool. The parties also agree to adopt the value of Cobalt Point as £461,000 as at 3 January 2024. With the outstanding mortgage of £314,504.90 as at 1 June 2021, the parties agree that the net value is £146,495.10. The parties’ disagreement, therefore, centres on the extent of the Husband’s beneficial interest in Cobalt Point, and what should be added to the pool.
- [74]
[74] According to the Husband, he co-invested in the property with Ms T, and they entered into an oral agreement regarding the investment (“Cobalt Point Agreement”). Pursuant to the Cobalt Point Agreement, any net gain from the sale would be split equally between them, while any net loss would be borne by the Husband. Thereafter, the Husband made cash contributions to Cobalt Point totalling £149,501.57. He submits that assuming Cobalt Point was sold on 3 January 2024 (ie, the date at which the parties agree to value Cobalt Point), the capital gain would be £46,000. Under the Cobalt Point Agreement, the Husband would stand to receive half of this, ie, £23,000. The Husband values his beneficial interest in Cobalt Point at £172,501.57, being his cash contributions plus half the capital gain if the property was sold. Despite saying this, it is not clear if the Husband is content to add £172,501.57 (or any value) into the pool. Instead, the Husband also argues that based on the agreed net value of £146,495.10 (which falls below his cash contributions of £149,501.57), the Husband suffers a loss on the property.
- [75]
[75] The Wife’s position is that the agreed net value of Cobalt Point, ie, £146,495.10 should be added to the pool. She argues that the Husband has 100% beneficial interest in the property, and that the evidence on the Cobalt Point Agreement is to be disbelieved. The Husband “bore the full financial responsibility” towards the property, and there is no documentary evidence suggesting that Ms T contributed any of her own funds towards the property. On the purported term that the Husband only stands to gain half of any net profits upon a sale, this should also be disbelieved.
- [76]
[76] I should add that Ms T filed an affidavit confirming the Husband’s version of the arrangement between them. Ms T explains that when EY posted her to the London office for work, the Husband saw this as an opportunity for the co-investment. As Ms T was based in London, she was able to take up a mortgage with a local bank. While she was residing in the UK, she lived in Cobalt Point and in lieu of rental, she paid the mortgage payments, as well as utility bills and council taxes. After she left the UK sometime in 2016, Cobalt Point was rented out to other tenants. The rental proceeds were paid into her bank account and then used to repay the mortgage. Whenever rental proceeds were insufficient, the Husband would remit money to Ms T to top up the difference. However, the Husband is financially responsible for the property.
- [77]
[77] Based on the evidence before me, I agree with the Wife that Cobalt Point is 100% beneficially owned by the Husband. I accept that Ms T paid the mortgage payments, while she was residing in the property, albeit for a relatively short period. However, as Ms T candidly conceded, this was in lieu of rental payments. She does not suggest that these payments are referrable to her acquiring a beneficial interest in the property. In fact, Ms T is clear that although the mortgage is taken out in her name, the Husband bears the full financial responsibility for the property, including the mortgage payments. Her role is to be the registered legal owner and to assume the legal liability for the mortgage vis-à-vis the bank.
- [78]
[78] A presumption of resulting trust arises when a person makes a voluntary contribution (in whole or in part) to the purchase of a property, which is vested in another (Lau Siew Kim v Yeo Guan Chye Terence [2008] 2 SLR(R) 108 (“Lau Siew Kim”) at [34]). This presumption may be rebutted. However, what is telling is that despite having an opportunity to do so, in her affidavit, Ms T does not claim to have any beneficial interest in Cobalt Point. More importantly, the Husband does not clearly assert what Ms T’s beneficial interest is.
- [79]
[79] As for the term within the Cobalt Point Agreement on how to allocate the gains and losses upon a sale, I proceed on the basis that it exists. Even then, at its highest, I observe that the term confers upon Ms T the contractual right to claim half of any gains from the Husband, as well as a contractual indemnity from the Husband against any losses. Certainly, Ms T does not rely on the term to claim that while the Husband bears 100% of the financial burden, there is a common intention that she beneficially owns 50% in the property. In fact, as the term makes it clear that the Husband fully bears the full financial loss for the property, it is inconsistent with any finding of equal beneficial ownership, and fortifies a finding of the Husband’s sole beneficial ownership instead.
- [80]
[80] The remaining question is how to quantify the Husband’s 100% beneficial interest in Cobalt Point. It is, in my view, most appropriate to quantify this at the agreed net value of £146,495.10 (being S$252,577.76, applying the MAS exchange rate). Contrary to the Husband’s submission, I do not adopt the Husband’s computation of his beneficial interest, albeit at a higher value, of £172,501.57. I also see no reason why any consideration should be accorded to any hypothetical loss on the Husband’s part. That said, given that I proceed on the basis that the Cobalt Point Agreement exists, I treat the £23,000 due to Ms T as the Husband’s liability. I therefore add £123,495.10 (being S$212,922.59 applying the MAS exchange rate) into the matrimonial pool.
- [81]
[81] For completeness, I am mindful that there has not been any separate legal action to determine the property rights in Cobalt Point. In UDA v UDB [2018] 1 SLR 1015 (“UDA v UDB (CA)”) at [58], the Court of Appeal held that where there is a dispute over the beneficial ownership of property with third party interests at stake, the court may determine the property interests exercising its power under s 112 of the Women’s Charter but make no order that directly affects the disputed asset. It appears to me that parties (including Ms T) are content to proceed on this basis. This approach is appropriate where no order is sought against the third party. In order not to prejudice Ms T, I shall not make any specific order affecting the property.
(5) S/N 5: Taman Anggrek
- [82]
[82] The Taman Anggrek Residences Unit (“Taman Anggrek”) is a property in Indonesia purchased for IDR 2,900,000,000 in May 2015. The legal title and mortgage are in the name of the Husband’s friend and ex-colleague at EY, Ms N Y (“Ms Y”). However, the Husband agrees that his beneficial interest should be included in the pool. The property is estimated to be worth IDR2,400,000,000 as at 7 May 2021. After deducting the outstanding mortgage of IDR1,018,484,657 as at 2 May 2021, the net value is IDR1,381,515,343. This is agreed by the parties.
- [83]
[83] In relation to Taman Anggrek, the parties’ positions are similar to those for Cobalt Point. Again, the Husband explains that he entered into an oral agreement with Ms Y on the same terms as the agreement with Ms Yeo set out above (“Taman Anggrek Agreement”). Ms Y also filed an affidavit, recounting that because she lived in Indonesia, the Husband proposed co-investing in an Indonesian property, with Ms Y taking up a loan with a local bank. Ms Y confirms their agreement that upon a sale of the property, any net gain from the sale would be split equally between the Husband and Ms Y, and that any net loss would be borne by the Husband.
- [84]
[84] Further, Ms Y’s evidence is that Taman Anggrek was rented out. Rental proceeds went towards the mortgage repayments. Any shortfall and other miscellaneous expenses were to be covered by the Husband. However, occasionally, Ms Y paid for these first since she was based in Indonesia, and it was convenient for her to do so. Upon a sale of the property, Ms Y is to be reimbursed for these payments. Ms Y also provided a breakdown of the cash contributions made by the Husband, totalling IDR739,748,044.
- [85]
[85] As the property is valued at IDR2,400,000,000 as at 7 May 2021, ie, IDR500,000,000 less than the purchase price of IDR2,900,000,000, the Husband argues that this net loss should be deducted from his contribution to the property of IDR739,748,044. He thus values his beneficial interest in Taman Anggrek at only IDR239,748,044.
- [86]
[86] The Wife takes a similar position as that taken for Cobalt Point. She argues that the entire arrangement with Ms Y is to be disbelieved and that Taman Anggrek is 100% beneficially owned by the Husband. Accordingly, the net value of Taman Anggrek being IDR1,381,515,343 as at May 2021 should be added to the pool.
- [87]
[87] For the same reasons set out above in respect of Cobalt Point, I accept the Wife’s position. In particular, again, despite being afforded the opportunity to do so, Ms Y does not clearly stake a claim to the beneficial interest in the property. At its essence, the Taman Anggrek Agreement provides that upon a sale of the property, the Husband would bear the losses, while Ms Y would share in any gains. These aspects appear to be merely contractual rights and obligations between the co-investors. Meanwhile, the financial liability for the property rests solely on the Husband. Given the nature of the arrangement, the Husband owns 100% beneficial interest in the property. Therefore, I add the net value of IDR1,381,515,343 (amounting to S$106,293.80, applying the MAS exchange rate) into the matrimonial pool.
- [88]
[88] Contrary to the Husband’s position, I again see no reason why any account should be given to any hypothetical loss. As with Cobalt Point, to avoid any prejudice to Ms Y, no direct order shall be made in relation to the property.
(6) S/N 6: Disputed Singapore Savings Bonds
- [89]
[89] As mentioned at [28] above, the Husband objects to the inclusion of two Singapore Savings Bonds within the matrimonial pool. These are Singapore Savings Bond SBMAY21 XXXXX50V (“Bond 50V”), and an undisclosed Singapore Savings Bond (“Undisclosed Bond”). For Bond 50V, the Husband seeks to exclude it from the pool as it was purchased in May 2021. However, as the Husband’s Singapore Exchange account statement shows that Bond 50V was allotted on 3 May 2021, ie, before the IJ date. Thus, I add the value of Bond 50V at S$40,000 to the pool. Likewise, for the Undisclosed Bond, the Husband argues that it was applied for only on 4 May 2021. As a decently substantial sum of S$30,000 was expended in applying for the Undisclosed Bond near the IJ date, I include this in the pool. The total value of these assets is S$70,000.
(7) S/N 7: Inova Shares
- [90]
[90] I turn to the shares in Inova Medical Pty Ltd (“Inova Shares”). In October 2019, the Inova Shares were purchased in Dr C’s name for A$100,000. The Husband asserts that Dr C owns 75%, while he owns the remaining 25%. Only A$25,000 should be added to the matrimonial pool as this was what he paid to acquire his share of the asset. The Wife’s position, however, is that the entire amount used to purchase the shares should be added to the pool.
- [91]
[91] Having considered the evidence, I accept the Husband’s case. The Husband adduces proof of the wire transfer for the payment for the shares, showing that it was made in Dr C’s name and from Dr C’s bank account. If anything, the presumption would have been that the Husband has no interest whatsoever in the Inova Shares. The Husband’s ownership of the Inova Shares is thus valued at A$25,000 (being S$21,186.44 applying the MAS exchange rate at the AM date).
(8) S/N 8: DBS 468
- [92]
[92] DBS Bank Account No. [xxxxxxx468] (“DBS 468”) is held in the joint names of the Husband and his parents. The Husband’s case is that he merely manages this account on behalf of his elderly parents; the moneys should not form part of the matrimonial pool. The Wife argues that the Husband has not discharged the burden of proof that the moneys in the account do not belong to him. The Husband stated on affidavit that Dr C would affirm an affidavit confirming the Husband’s management of DBS 468 on Dr C’s behalf. However, Dr C did not do so. Therefore, the Wife asks that an adverse inference be drawn against the Husband. She seeks the addition of the entire balance in DBS 468 of S$50,000.64 as at 30 April 2021 to the pool.
- [93]
[93] There is a dearth of evidence as to the origin of funds flowing into DBS 468, which would be essential to determine the ownership of the moneys. Certainly, the Husband has not shown that the parents contributed all the moneys in the account, such that no part of the moneys should be considered his. At the same time, the Wife’s position is also untenable. Although Dr C failed to file an affidavit on the matter, I do not think there is sufficient basis to draw an adverse inference against the Husband, to the extent of adding the entire balance in the account into the matrimonial pool.
- [94]
[94] Instead, where there is a lack of evidence as to contributions towards moneys in a joint account, the court may divide the balance between the joint owners equally (see VQF v VQG [2024] SGHCF 4 at [11]). Unless proven otherwise, the presumption is that joint owners of a bank account are equally entitled to the moneys. I thus add one-third of the moneys in DBS 468, ie, S$16,666.88 to the matrimonial pool.
(9) S/N 9: DBS 590
- [95]
[95] Similar to the above, DBS Bank Account No. [xxxxxxx590] (“DBS 590”) is held in the joint names of the Husband and Dr C. Likewise, the Husband asserts that he manages the account on Dr C’s behalf. The balance in DBS 590 is substantial, standing at S$440,274.73 as at 7 May 2021. The Husband adduces a “bank statement” showing DBS 590 being named as “Parents Operating Account” and a few transactions showing that moneys in the account were used to pay Dr C’s income tax. He submits that it is clear that Dr C “has means” and that the moneys in DBS 590 should be recognised as Dr C’s and excluded from the matrimonial pool.
- [96]
[96] The Wife makes the same case for DBS 590 as for DBS 468, again seeking an adverse inference to be drawn and for all the moneys in the account to be considered the Husband’s.
- [97]
[97] In my view, the “bank statement” produced by the Husband does not appear to be an official document from the bank. Nevertheless, the Wife does not dispute the authenticity of the document. Other than the few transactions suggesting Dr C’s use of the moneys for his own purposes, all the other transactions are redacted. The unredacted transactions also all took place a few days before the IJ date. If the moneys in DBS 590 were solely Dr C’s, and used for Dr C’s behalf, the Husband could have adduced evidence of other transactions relating to Dr C.
- [98]
[98] There is again a lack of evidence on the origins of the funds in DBS 590. The evidence of the use of the funds by Dr C in a few instances only tangentially supports the Husband’s claim. I am not satisfied that the moneys in the account should be considered solely to belong to Dr C. However, even considering that entries have been redacted, there is insufficient basis for me to consider the moneys to be solely attributable to the Husband. I thus find that half the moneys in DBS 590, ie, S$220,137.37 should be added to the pool for division.
(10) S/N 10: SICC membership
- [99]
[99] Turning to the Husband’s membership in the Singapore Island Country Club (“SICC”), the Husband asserts that it is a gift from his parents before the marriage. He first received a junior membership, which his parents converted into an adult membership as a gift to him when he turned 21. Indeed, his SICC membership card shows that he has been a member since 1994, the year he turned 21. This asset should stay out of the matrimonial pool.
- [100]
[100] Relying on s 112(10)(a)(i) of the Women’s Charter, the Wife argues that the SICC membership should be considered a matrimonial asset. While acquired before the marriage, it was “ordinarily used or enjoyed by both parties” for recreational and social purposes (see Chen Siew Hwee at [46]). The Wife contends that as a spousal member, she enjoyed the facilities at SICC. She ate frequently at the restaurants in SICC with the Husband or her mother. She and the Husband also hosted friends and family for meals at SICC, and they would use the bowling facilities or take leisurely walks on the grounds.
- [101]
[101] In response, the Husband points to a lack of documentary evidence from the Wife, in the form of receipts, communications or photographs, to support her position. According to him, the parties rarely visited the SICC. The Wife should be disbelieved as her account is “entirely at odds” with her evidence that the marriage was strained by the Husband’s neglect of her.
- [102]
[102] Having reviewed the evidence, I agree that the Wife has not adduced sufficient evidence to show that the SICC membership was ordinarily or substantially used by the parties for recreational or social purposes. The Wife relies on VUF v VUG [2021] SGFC 86, where the court added the husband’s club membership into the matrimonial pool on the ground that it had been used by the family (at [41]). However, there, the wife was able to provide receipts and evidence of spending at the club during the marriage. As the Husband highlights, the Wife is unable to produce any documentary evidence of the sort. The burden of proof falls on the Wife to prove that the SICC membership, having been acquired before the marriage, should be considered a matrimonial asset. She has failed to do so, and I decline to include the SICC membership in the pool.
(11) S/N 11: RTC membership
- [103]
[103] Moving on to the Raffles Town Club (“RTC”) membership, it is undisputed that the Husband acquired the RTC membership during the marriage. The Husband avers that this was a gift from his uncle and should be excluded from the pool as it “should not be treated as having been transformed into a matrimonial asset by both parties’ ordinary use or enjoyment”. As with the SICC membership, he asserts that the Wife has provided no documentary evidence of the parties’ use of the RTC membership.
- [104]
[104] The Wife’s case is that the Husband has failed to adduce evidence that the RTC membership was indeed a gift. She recalls the Husband buying the RTC membership from his uncle. She further submits that as the parties enjoyed the facilities and restaurants at RTC, the RTC membership has been “transformed into a matrimonial asset” as it was used and enjoyed by the parties for their benefit.
- [105]
[105] Prima facie, the RTC membership squarely falls within the definition of matrimonial assets being an asset acquired during the marriage by the Husband pursuant to s 112(10)(b) of the Women’s Charter. If, as the Husband contends, it was given to him during the marriage, the question then becomes whether the RTC membership has been transformed into a matrimonial asset, by being substantially improved during the marriage pursuant to s 112(10) of the Women’s Charter (USB v USA at [19(d)]).
- [106]
[106] Based on the evidence, I am not convinced that the RTC membership was a gift to the Husband. The Husband cannot remember when exactly the gift was made. There is nothing to support his account. I add the RTC membership, being an asset acquired during the marriage, into the pool.
- [107]
[107] As for the value of the RTC membership, the Wife submits that it should be S$8,500, this being the price of a RTC membership listed for sale on Carousell as at 28 August 2022. The Husband refers to two such Carousell listings, one at S$7,600 and the other at S$8,500 (this being the same listing relied on by the Wife as above) and suggests that the average of the two, ie, S$8,050, be taken. He also refers to a website from Tee Up Marketing Enterprises, which appears to be a club membership broker, indicating that the transfer fee for a Raffles Town Club membership is S$7,276. He suggests that the net value is thus the average value of S$8,050 less the transfer fee.
- [108]
[108] In UTS v UTT [2019] SGHCF 8, the court declined to deduct the transfer fee from the value of a club membership owned by the husband as there was no intention on his part to sell it (at [15]). By analogy to real property, the court observed that fees incurred on potential future sales are not typically deducted from property values (at [16]). As the Husband has not indicated any intention to sell the RTC membership, and the Wife has no objection to him retaining the asset, I see no reason to deduct the transfer fee from its value. As for the lower listed price of S$7,600 submitted by the Husband, the link to the listing he provides is no longer working at the present time and the value cannot be verified. Thus, I adopt the Wife’s valuation at S$8,500.
(12) S/N 12: EY Payouts
- [109]
[109] Upon the Husband’s departure from EY on 31 December 2020, he was entitled to certain sums. For clarity, I now explain these sums in detail.
- [110]
[110] In his first affidavit of assets and means, the Husband declared his “EY Capital Account” containing S$142,000 as at 7 May 2021 as his asset. In the course of proceedings, the Husband eventually disclosed that he received the following sums upon his departure from EY, totalling S$1,400,000 (“EY Payouts”):
(a) FY20 Final Allocation: S$354,000;
(b) FY21 Final Allocation: S$190,000;
(c) EY Capital Account: S$426,000; and
(d) Long Service Award: S$430,000.
- [111]
[111] The Husband produces bank statements showing that these sums have been paid into OCBC 550 (S/N 34 in the Table of Group 1 Assets). Based on the Husband’s position that the cut-off date should be 31 May 2019, he submits that only the balance in the EY Capital Account (as at 2019) should be added to the pool. The other three sums were acquired after 31 May 2019. The Husband further submits that as the EY Capital Account is maintained at 50% of a partner’s last declared distributable income, the EY Capital Account should only be valued at S$425,500 (and presumably not S$426,000) as his income in FY2019 was $851,000. That said, in the DJSP, the Husband’s alternative position taking the cut-off as the IJ date is that the “EY – Capital Account” is worth only S$142,000 as at 7 May 2021.
- [112]
[112] The Wife’s position is that the EY Payouts should be entirely included in the pool as the Husband has “deliberately withheld” the amount of S$974,000 (ie, the sums he received other than the EY Capital Account he first declared) in an attempt to reduce the matrimonial pool. Thus, in the PJSP, she values the asset reflected as “EY – Capital Account” at S$1,400,000.
- [113]
[113] I find that the entire sum of the EY Payouts is a matrimonial asset. It was acquired by the Husband during the marriage. The Husband does not suggest any reason to the contrary. For the avoidance of doubt, the bank statements show that the EY Payouts were paid in increments into the Husband’s bank account from 25 January 2021 to 29 June 2021. I decline to exclude the payments received after the IJ date (ie, 7 May 2021). On the Husband’s evidence, he was entitled to the entire sum upon his departure from EY, which was during the marriage. In any event, these payments were made shortly after the IJ date.
- [114]
[114] Next, I consider the issue of double counting. As a cash asset, this could have gone into acquiring other matrimonial assets separately added to the pool. In this connection, the Husband accounts for outflows from the EY Payouts for transactions worth S$30,000 and above as follows. A total sum of S$70,000 was used to acquire the Disputed Singapore Savings Bonds, which I have included in the matrimonial pool (at [89] above). This is to be deducted from the EY Payouts to avoid double counting. A sum of S$37,740 was applied as the Husband’s “CPF contributions” on 4 February 2021. While it is not entirely clear what this meant, the payment reference in the relevant bank statement for the transaction is “SELF-EMPLOYED PAYNOW TOP-UPS” which may indicate that it was a voluntary CPF contribution at the time. I deduct the sum of S$37,740, as the Husband’s CPF account balances standing at the IJ date are included in the pool. Another S$150,000 was applied towards repair works for 11M around February and March 2021. The Wife contends that the sum was expended shortly after divorce proceedings were filed, without the Wife’s knowledge and consent. In any event, there should be a claw-back back to the pool (TNL v TNK [2017] 1 SLR 609 (“TNL v TNK”) at [24]). I agree. Also, there is no issue of double counting here, as I did not consider this sum in determining the value of his beneficial interest in 11M to be added to the pool.
- [115]
[115] By the above, my final decision is to add the figure of S$1,292,260 to the pool. For completeness, I note that while the EY Payouts were paid into OCBC 550, the bank balance as at the IJ date (ie, 7 May 2021) was only S$34,500. By then, the Husband would have received S$646,664 as part of the EY Payouts. A sum of S$354,424 (being the S$646,664 paid into OCBC 550 by the IJ date less the balance of S$34,500 and the declared outflows of S$257,740) is not accounted for. Although he is in the position to do so, the Husband chooses not to explain these outflows. Thus, I leave aside any concern about including the unaccounted sum.
(13) S/N 13: M Trust
- [116]
[116] The M Trust is an irrevocable trust settled by the Husband on 21 September 2015. It is also a discretionary trust, and is managed by a professional trustee, Camelot Trustees Limited (“Trustees”). As between the Husband as settlor and the Trustees, the document titled “Discretionary Settlement (With Protector)” (“Trust Deed”) sets out the trust terms.
- [117]
[117] I should mention that A Limited is a company with one share, incorporated in the British Virgin Islands on 30 November 2018. The single share in A Limited is beneficially owned by M Trust. From [165] below, I shall specifically discuss A Limited, in determining whether the company and/or any of its assets may be included in the pool. That said, as the parties’ cases in respect of M Trust and A Limited are similar, much of the reasoning in respect of M Trust is applicable to A Limited.
- [118]
[118] I set out the salient features of M Trust, as captured in the Trust Deed:
(a) Beneficiaries: The Beneficiaries are the Husband, the Wife, the Husband’s descendants and their spouses (unidentified), the Husband’s parents, the Wife’s mother, the Husband’s three siblings and their descendants (unidentified), and “any person or class of persons added to the class of Beneficiaries by the Trustees by deed with the consent in writing of the Protector” (Clause 1.3).
(b) Trust income: The Trustees may pay or apply the income of the Trust Fund to or for the benefit of any Beneficiaries as the Trustees, with the Protector’s written consent, think fit (Clause 2.1).
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