YGP v YGQ [2026] SGFC 109

MSS 2606 of 2025 (“MSS 2606”) was the Wife’s application against the Husband. She sought to vary a maintenance order, MO 58 of 202X (“MO 58”). Under that order, the Husband was ordered to, amongst other things, pay $3250 as spousal maintenance and $3250 as maintenance for the son (“[T]”).

I heard the trial of the matter on 7 May 2026 and reserved judgment after hearing oral arguments from parties. Judgment was handed down on 26 June 2026. These are the reasons for my decision.

There are two parts to the Wife’s application. First, she sought to vary the orders providing for her maintenance. Second, she sought to vary the orders providing for maintenance for [T].

To succeed in her application, the Wife had to prove either: a) that there was a change in circumstances on her part or that of the son, or b) that there was good cause for the order to be varied: s 72 of the Women’s Charter 1961.

I shall deal with both parts of the Wife’s application in turn, beginning with reasons the Wife had set out explaining why the orders for her maintenance should be varied.

First, the Wife sought the re-instatement of a credit card. She said this credit card was active at the time of the initial draft consent order (“DCO”), but the Husband had since cancelled the card without her knowledge or consent. She told me that the credit card facility was necessary to enable her to manage urgent essential household and medical expenses, and to meet financial obligations.

It bears noting that provision for this credit card was something which was discussed at the time parties settled on their consent order (which was recorded as MO 58). I am told that it was not included in the DCO as the credit card was active at the time. Regardless of the reasons why it was not included, the point remains that no provision was made for this particular expense at the time. The courts have taken a strict view when it comes to applications to vary orders for maintenance entered into by consent. It is not for parties to return to court to vary the order to reflect a particular expense which they had, at the time, decided to leave out of the consent order: see YAC v YAD [2026] SGFC 34 at [8] citing TGZ v THA [2019] SGFC 97 at [46] and WYH v WYG [2024] SGHCF 34 at [5].

That being said, the more fundamental problem with the Wife’s request was that she was seeking an order that the Husband reinstate her supplementary credit card. The court’s power to order maintenance and to vary any order in relation to maintenance is found in ss 69(1) and 72(1) of the Women’s Charter 1961 respectively:

The plain words of these provisions make clear that the court’s power to order maintenance extends to ordering that a spouse pay monthly sums, or a lump sum. It thus follows that the court’s power to vary any order for maintenance can only relate to monetary sums and does not extend to ordering that a spouse open, as was sought in the present case, a credit card or some other credit facility for use by the other spouse.

Second, the Wife explained that she needed an upwards variation of her maintenance as she needed to pay off her legal fees from her previous application for maintenance. She also explained that she needed the money “for future legal proceedings which [she] would need to be divorced from” the Husband.

I did not consider that the circumstances which the Wife had described amounted to either a material change in circumstances, or a good cause to vary the original maintenance order. These sums provided for in maintenance reflect a Husband’s obligation to his Wife, to ensure that her immediate needs are provided for: XHG v XHH [2025] 2 SLR 501 at [66]. Such legal fees incurred do not, in my judgment, fall within this category.

Further, insofar as the Wife had told me that she needed money for future divorce proceedings, that was an event that has yet to come to pass, and so as a matter of logic, cannot amount to a material change in circumstances. In any event, that was certainly not, in my judgment, a good reason to vary the maintenance owed to her. After all, the provision of such maintenance is meant to cover sums for the Wife’s immediate needs which include, amongst other things, daily expenses or medical bills. It is certainly not meant to be a tool for parties to put together a fund in preparation for divorce.

The third and final reason the Wife offered as to why she should receive more in maintenance was that she needed the extra money to attend upskilling courses so that she could re-enter the workforce.

The Wife had exhibited an invoice from [XYZ] School. It was for an advanced diploma course. The total course fees came up to $10,155.00 which were payable in three tranches.

The Wife had told me that at the time MO 58 was made, she had already been paying the money for this upskilling course. I had asked her if it was the case that she was spending money out of her own pocket to go for the course and felt that she needed extra support from the Husband, why was it that such expenditure on upskilling was not reflected in MO 58.

The Wife told me that it was a “point that was brought into the maintenance order, but it wasn’t broadly discussed”. She explained that it was very difficult to discuss such matters with the Husband.

In conclusion, I thus found that there was no basis on which to grant the upwards variation that the Wife sought in respect of her maintenance.

I turn now to the reasons the Wife had given as to why the maintenance for [T] should be varied upwards.

The Wife explained that she needed the extra $1,500 per month as child maintenance to ensure that [T] could go to university. She told me that she had struggled financially to get her firstborn son through university and did not want to repeat that experience. She told me that [T] would, if all went well, be admitted to university in 2027.

This was not a good basis to grant the upwards variation of child maintenance that the Wife sought. These university fees have not yet actually been incurred. The plain wording of s 72 of the Women’s Charter 1961 explicitly provides that there must be a “change in circumstances” – this phrase speaks to a set of events that have actually occurred. It does not cover future events. In other words, variation of maintenance orders are only meant to account for events which have already transpired. The court cannot and will not grant variation of maintenance orders in anticipation of future events: see YAC v YAD [2026] SGFC 34 at [6].

Apart from this, the Wife had also sought to justify the increase in maintenance for [T] on the basis that he had to go for therapy and his language lessons which were part of his course requirements.

These expenses were incurred after the consent order was entered into. It appears that this expenditure was not contemplated by either party at the time the consent order was recorded.

The court does have the power to vary any agreement relating to the maintenance of a child provided that it is reasonable and for the welfare of the child to do so: s 73 of the Women’s Charter 1961.

In the present case, I found that it was indeed reasonable and for the welfare of [T] that the Father pay these sums for his therapy and language classes.

For one, the Father was the only parent drawing an income, and thus, the only one with the means to pay for these sums. Further to this, he has (and this very much to his credit) demonstrated his ability, and commitment as he has already paid for these expenses.

Finally, I was satisfied that it was indeed in [T]’s welfare to attend therapy and go for the language classes. I had seen the doctor’s report which showed why therapy for [T] was necessary, and the letter from the school showing that the language classes were part of the curriculum.

I thus ordered that the Father was to pay these sums for the therapy and language lessons.

To sum up, I dismissed the Wife’s application to vary her maintenance. I allowed the Wife’s application to vary maintenance for [T] to the extent which I have set out above, specifically, that the Husband shall pay for [T]’s therapy sessions and language classes.