Family Division of the High Court · Decided 16 September 2026
YIR v YIS
Feedback & support[2026] SGHCF 31 · Case no. Divorce (Transferred) No 1100 of 2024
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] HCF/DT 1100/2024 (“DT 1100”) was commenced by YIR (“Wife”) on 8 March 2024. She is 38 years old this year. The defendant is YIS (“Husband”). He is 42 years old this year.
- [2]
[2] Parties were married on 11 June 2016 in Singapore. There is one child to the marriage, born in 2016 (“Child”). The Child, now 10 years old, is a Primary 4 student. Pursuant to a consent order, joint custody of the Child was granted to parties, while sole care and control was granted to the Wife with liberal access to the Husband.
- [3]
[3] Interim judgment was granted on an uncontested basis, by reason of the Husband’s unreasonable behaviour, on 29 April 2024 (“IJ”). The marriage thus lasted nearly eight years. The matrimonial home was a condominium at [address redacted] (“Matrimonial Home”). The Wife and the Child moved out of the Matrimonial Home in February 2024. The Matrimonial Home, which was purchased and held in the Husband’s sole name, has since been sold by the Husband.
- [4]
[4] The Wife earns approximately $11,000 a month before tax and Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) deductions. The Husband claims that he is unemployed and that he last earned approximately $6,000 a month, though this is disputed by the Wife.
- [5]
[5] Parties filed a joint summary on 6 February 2026 (“Joint Summary”) setting out their respective positions as at 21 January 2026 on the contested issues in this case. For consistency, I adopt the abbreviations set out in the Joint Summary for the affidavits filed. The following table sets out the affidavits filed by parties and the respective abbreviations:
- [6]
[6] It should be noted that a discovery order was made against the Husband on 9 May 2025 (FC/ORC 1947/2025, the “Discovery Order”), directing him to disclose inter alia “all financial statements (including but not limited to balance sheets and profit and loss statements) for all companies which he is or was a director and/or shareholder of in the past 3 financial years, in Singapore or worldwide” and “full monthly bank account statements” of the same companies.
- [7]
[7] In response to the Discovery Order, the Husband filed an affidavit, DA-2. He did disclose some financial statements and bank statements, but for the most part, he has simply asserted that the documents are “not in his possession, custody or power”. The summary of his responses to the Discovery Order can be found in DA-2 at para 7. His various assertions that the documents are not in his possession, custody or power are disputed by the Wife.
- [8]
[8] The contested issues in DT 1100 concern the division of matrimonial assets and maintenance for the Child. I address first the division of matrimonial assets.
Division of matrimonial assets
The applicable law
- [9]
[9] The starting point is s 112(1) of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“WC”), which empowers the court to divide matrimonial assets in a “just and equitable” fashion, in light of all the relevant circumstances including the non-exhaustive factors set out in s 112(2) WC.
- [10]
[10] Matrimonial assets are identified as at the date of the IJ and valued on the date closest to the Ancillary Matters (“AM”) hearing, except for monies in bank accounts and CPF accounts which are identified and valued as at the date of the IJ: CVC v CVB [2023] SGHC(A) 28 at [55].
Summary of parties’ position
- [11]
[11] I summarise in the table below the parties’ respective positions on the value of the matrimonial assets.
- [12]
[12] It is not disputed that this was a dual-income marriage. As such, the structured approach in ANJ v ANK [2015] 4 SLR 1043 (“ANJ v ANK”) should apply. The Husband contends that the matrimonial assets should be divided in the ratio of 90:10 in his favour. The Wife contends that the division should be in the ratio of 48:52 in the Husband’s favour.
Identification and valuation
- [13]
[13] In this section, I deal only with those assets which are shown in the Joint Summary to be disputed. Most of the assets in this case are in fact disputed. For those assets that appear from the Joint Summary to be undisputed, I adopt the position shown in the Joint Summary. I also omit discussing assets which are agreed between parties to be valued at $0.
- [14]
[14] Where it is disputed whether an asset should be included in the matrimonial pool, the burden of proof is that set out by the Court of Appeal in USB v USA [2020] 2 SLR 588, at [31]:
Where the very existence of the asset is disputed, it is for the asserting spouse to prove the existence and ownership of the asset.
S/N 1 – Mercedes Benz G350D AMG Line 4Matic
- [15]
[15] The Husband takes the position that this vehicle should not be included in the matrimonial pool because according to him, it is registered in the name of a company (which I will refer to as “ADS VG”) and does not belong to him. He also claims that as the vehicle is subject to a hire-purchase agreement with a substantial outstanding redemption sum that outstrips the market value of the vehicle, there is no “equity capable of division”.
- [16]
[16] The Wife acknowledges that this vehicle is currently registered to ADS VG, but submits that the value of this vehicle – which she puts at $428,888 – should be added back to the matrimonial pool. The Wife highlights that the vehicle was transferred by the Husband to ADS VG on 24 April 2023 – ie after the marriage started to break down (according to the Wife).
- [17]
[17] I accept the Wife’s submission that notwithstanding the transfer of the vehicle to ADS VG, the value of this vehicle should be added back to the matrimonial pool. As the Wife has pointed out, there is no evidence of ADS VG having given any consideration for the transfer of this vehicle; nor is the vehicle listed as one of the company’s assets in its financial statements. In the meantime, the Husband continues to pay personally for expenses related to the vehicle.
- [18]
[18] As for the value to be ascribed to the vehicle, the Wife has not addressed the Husband’s submission on the outstanding vehicle loan liability. The Wife’s valuation of this vehicle is based on its resale value, without taking into account the outstanding vehicle loan. In my view, it is not correct to ignore the outstanding loan liability when valuing the vehicle. The Husband has tendered evidence that the original loan amount was $264,000. The latest evidence he provides shows that there is an outstanding liability of $189,004.99. Deducting the outstanding loan liability of $189,004.99 from $428,888, I find that the net value of this vehicle should be $239,883.01; and I add this figure to the matrimonial pool.
S/N 2 – 100% shareholding in NPL
- [19]
[19] Generally, in respect of the companies in which he holds shares, the Husband accepts that these companies exist but claims that they have no value and that they should be accounted for as a liability instead. This is premised on his assertion that these companies are (a) dormant; or (b) subject to court enforcement proceedings; or (c) exposed to “liabilities” rather than holding positive net value.
- [20]
[20] In respect of his shareholding in this company (which I will refer to as “NPL”), the Husband has previously deposed that his 10,000 shares are worth $10,000 (as at September 2024) in his affidavit (DAM-1). In the Joint Summary, however, the Husband now claims that NPL is facing a claim in HC/OC 479/2022 for $1,285,486.61, and that given the ongoing proceedings, “it would be speculative and unsafe to ascribe any positive value to the company at this stage”. In DLA-1, the Husband appears to take a different position again: he has adduced a settlement agreement between the claimant in HC/OC 479/2022 and NPL, in which it was agreed that NPL is to pay $400,000 to the claimant. Critically, though, this settlement agreement is dated 7 June 2023, which is more than one year before the Husband filed DAM-1 with the assertion that his 10,000 shares are worth $10,000. Furthermore, the Husband’s assertion in the Joint Summary that NPL is presently still facing a claim is patently false, since the claim was settled on 7 June 2023, according to the settlement agreement which he himself adduced.
- [21]
[21] The Wife, for her part, has not disputed the Husband’s previous bare assertion in his affidavit (DAM-1) that his shares in NPL are worth $10,000, but argues that an adverse inference should be drawn against him for his failure to comply with the Discovery Order which required him to disclose various documents such as the bank account statements and financial statements of his companies (see [6]–[7] above).
- [22]
[22] At the hearing before me, when asked whether there was any objective documentary evidence to support his claim that NPL is no longer operating as a company, the Husband could only point me to a “Declaration Statement” dated 16 May 2025. This is an unsigned document, albeit purportedly bearing NPL’s company stamp, which simply states that NPL “has never commenced any business operations since its incorporation”. Given that the Husband’s own case in DLA-1 is that NPL faced a claim in HC/OC 479/2022 which was settled by way of NPL paying the claimant $400,000, I do not consider this declaration statement to be credible evidence.
- [23]
[23] In the circumstances, I accept the Wife’s proposed approach in respect of the NPL shares: namely, that minimally, $10,000 should be added to the matrimonial pool to reflect the value which the Husband has admitted in his affidavit, subject to further adverse inferences to be drawn on account of his failure to comply with the order for disclosure of the company’s bank statements and financial statements. I address the Wife’s submission for adverse inference at [141]–[147] below.
S/N 3 – 100% shareholding in AVGMPL
- [24]
[24] In respect of his shareholding in this company (which I will refer to as “AVGMPL”), the Husband has previously deposed in his affidavit (DAM-1) that his 100 shares are worth $100. In the Joint Summary, however, the Husband purports to value the AVGMPL shares at $345.12, while claiming that this company – like all the other companies in which he holds shares – is “dormant, loss-making, or subject to liabilities and enforcement exposure”; that there is “[n]o positive realisable value”; and that it is “[n]ot admitted as matrimonial asset”. The Wife, for her part, adopts the same approach which she proposed for the NPL shares (at [21] above).
- [25]
[25] As with the NPL shares, the Husband has again failed to produce any objective evidence to support his assertion about the lack of any positive value to be attributed to his AVGMPL shares. Subject to adverse inferences being drawn, I accept the Wife’s proposed approach: namely, that minimally, $345.12 should be added to the matrimonial pool to reflect the value which the Husband is now admitting to in the Joint Summary. I address the Wife’s submission for adverse inference at [141]–[147] below.
S/N 4 – 100% shareholding in FPL
- [26]
[26] Pursuant to the Discovery Order, the Husband disclosed the financial statement of this company (which I will refer to as “FPL”) for the year ending 31 December 2022. The Husband claims that the company became “dormant” thereafter and that he does not have the other financial statements in his possession, custody or power. In the Joint Summary, the Husband maintains that the company has been “dormant since 2022”.
- [27]
[27] Relying on the financial statement for the year ending 31 December 2022 of the company (which was disclosed by the Husband), the Wife takes the company’s net assets of $970,085 as the value of the Husband’s 100% shareholding. Additionally, the Wife submits that an adverse inference should be drawn in respect of the Husband’s non-compliance with the Discovery Order.
- [28]
[28] I address the Wife’s submission for an adverse inference at [141]–[147] below. For now, I note that the Husband has provided no credible evidence to support his allegation that the company has been “dormant since 2022”. In DLA-1, the Husband adduced a “Declaration Statement” which, like the NPL declaration statement, is an unsigned document (albeit purportedly affixed with FPL’s company stamp). The Husband also adduced a letter from the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (“IRAS”) approving an application for waiver of filing of FPL’s Income Tax Return with effect from Year of Assessment (“YA”) 2026. Notably, however, the approval letter from IRAS stated that “[b]ased on the declaration that [FPL] has not carried out any business activities since 31 Dec 2024, … [IRAS] have approved the application for waiver”. In other words, the Husband declared to IRAS that FPL has been dormant from 31 December 2024, which is inconsistent with his own case that FPL has been dormant from 31 December 2022. The Husband thus has no evidence to support his allegation that FPL has been “dormant since 2022”.
- [29]
[29] Further, and in any event, even if the company has become “dormant” (in the sense that it no longer operates actively), that does not explain why a $0 value should be ascribed to the company. In the circumstances, I agree with the Wife that FPL (and in turn the Husband’s 100% shareholding in the company) should be valued using the 2022 financial statements. The Husband’s shares are thus valued at $970,085.
S/N 5 – 100% shareholding in ADS VG
- [30]
[30] As explained at [15] above, the Husband’s case is that ADS VG owns the Mercedes Benz G350D; and to this end, he has included the value of the Mercedes Benz G350D as the company’s asset in the Joint Summary. However, he then claims that a negative value should be attributed to his shareholding in ADS VG because according to him, the company faces multiple lawsuits, such that its liabilities outstrip its assets. In this connection, the Husband has mentioned HC/OC 810/2023 and DC/OC 1547/2025, but provided no evidence otherwise to assist the court. From his affidavits adduced, I can see that, in relation to DC/OC 1547/2025, there is an enforcement order obtained by the claimant on 23 October 2025. However, the Husband has not provided any further evidence on the status of the case, despite his DLA-1 having been filed six months after the enforcement order was obtained. There is no evidence, for example, of whether ADS VG filed a notice of objection, and similarly no documentary evidence of the attachment of ADS VG’s Maybank account. Likewise, in relation to HC/OC 810/2023, the Husband produced a default judgment which was entered against ADS VG for failing to file a notice of intention to contest. This default judgment was dated 11 December 2023. Further, even leaving aside the sore lack of details of the status of this suit and even if the Husband’s case were to be accepted, the liability in question was incurred well before the preparation of the company’s statement of financial position as at 31 December 2024. However, the company’s statement of financial position did not include any provision for the alleged liability arising from HC/OC 810/2023, and instead showed the net current assets of the company to be $18,369.
- [31]
[31] In the circumstances, I find that the Husband has not proven the alleged liabilities he attributes to ADS VG.
- [32]
[32] The Wife relies on the company’s statement of financial position as at 31 December 2024 to value the Husband’s 100% shareholding at $18,369. The Husband has argued that to simultaneously include the value of ADS VG and the Mercedes Benz in the matrimonial pool would amount to double counting, because – according to him – the value of the vehicle has already been accounted for in his valuation of his ADS VG shareholding. I reject the Husband’s argument, as there is simply no factual basis for it: there is no evidence that the value of the Mercedes Benz was included in the ADS VG financial statement disclosed by him. In the circumstances, I accept the Wife’s valuation of the Husband’s ADS VG shareholding at $18,369.
S/N 7 – Bank of China multi CCY (account no. ending -9941)
- [33]
[33] The Husband values this bank account at $238.29 based on his account balance on 25 November 2025, while the Wife values it at $227.82 as at 29 April 2024. I accept the Wife’s valuation, as there is no reason shown for departing from the default position that monies in bank accounts are valued as at the date of IJ (ie, 29 April 2024).
S/N 8 – CIMB Fastsaver (account no. ending -4265)
- [34]
[34] In the Joint Summary, the Husband has given no input for this item. The Wife values this at $1,028.83 as at 29 April 2024, based on the bank account statement. I accept the Wife’s valuation.
S/N 11 – Citibank Citi Wealth First (account no. ending -8824)
- [35]
[35] The Husband values this bank account ("Citi 8824") at $193.47 as at 25 November 2025, but gives no reason to justify departing from the default position that monies in bank accounts are valued as at the date of IJ. I therefore accept the Wife’s valuation of $314,599.39 as at 29 April 2024 (ie, the date of IJ), which is based on the bank account statement.
S/N 15 – Standard Chartered Bonus$aver (account no. ending -3884)
- [36]
[36] The Husband values this bank account at $10.20 as at 25 November 2025, but again gives no reason to justify departing from the default position that monies in bank accounts are valued as at the date of IJ. Based on the bank account statement, I accept the Wife’s valuation of $113.86 as at 29 April 2024.
S/N 20–25
- [37]
[37] In relation to the items listed at S/N 20 to 25 of the Joint Summary, the Husband denies, in the Joint Summary, owning these items and the Carousell account (@l[redacted]) listing these items, claiming that the only Carousell account he has is (@a[redacted]) with $6,020 all-time earnings. However, these items and the Carousell account (@l[redacted]) were disclosed by the Husband himself in his DAM-1. Therefore, I accept the Wife’s valuation of the following items, which is based on the Husband’s own admission, and I add them to the matrimonial pool:
(a) S/N 20 – Goyard L'Alpin leather backpack: $6,500;
(b) S/N 21 – Bottega Veneta brown medium classic intrecciato briefcase: $1,500;
(c) S/N 22 – Goyard brown pouch: $2,000;
(d) S/N 23 – Christian Louboutin leather clutch bag: $800;
(e) S/N 24 – Fendi monster leather clutch bag: $600; and
(f) S/N 25 – Bottega Veneta wallet: $400.
S/N 26–30
- [38]
[38] S/N 26 to 30 of the Joint Summary are distinguished from S/N 20 to 25, in that S/N 20 to 25 were disclosed by the Husband himself in his affidavit DAM-1, whereas the items listed at S/N 26 to 30 have not been disclosed by the Husband in any of his affidavits. Instead, it is the Wife who brought up the items listed at S/N 26 to 30 of the Joint Summary and who submits that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Husband for his failure to disclose these assets. The Wife further submits that pursuant to such an adverse inference, the “quantification approach” in UZN v UZM [2021] 1 SLR 426 (“UZN v UZM”) should be adopted so as to add the values of these assets back into the matrimonial pool.
- [39]
[39] For an adverse inference to be drawn, there must first be a substratum of evidence that establishes a prima facie case against the person against whom the adverse inference is to be drawn; and that person must moreover have had some particular access to the information he is said to be hiding: UZN v UZM at [18]–[21]. The Court of Appeal explained that the first element relates to a “prima facie case of concealment” (at [19]). The Court of Appeal also explained that where the value of the concealed asset is known or its likely value can be assessed, the quantification approach should be adopted such that the known value of the asset is added back into the matrimonial pool (at [28]–[30]).
S/N 26 – Patek Philippe 5764R
- [40]
[40] In her affidavit PA-1, the Wife asserts that the Husband owns this Patek Philippe 5764R. The Husband’s response is not that he does not own this watch but that he has disposed of the documents relating to the purchase or sale of this watch. The Husband’s evidence is thus left unsatisfactorily vague – and in my view, deliberately so. Given that this watch is indisputably an expensive luxury item, I find it inconceivable that the Husband has retained no documents at all in relation to his possession and disposal of this watch. I therefore accept the Wife’s submission that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Husband and that the value of the watch should be added to the matrimonial pool.
- [41]
[41] The Wife relies on the listing on Carousell account (@j[redacted]) to submit that the watch should be valued at $218,800. The Husband denies owning this Carousell account, again claiming that the only Carousell account he has is (@a[redacted]) with $6,020 all-time earnings. I do not find his claim believable. As seen from my findings at [37] above, despite alleging that the only Carousell account he has is (@a[redacted]), items of value which he has disclosed in his own affidavit DAM-1 have been found listed on another Carousell account (@l[redacted]).
- [42]
[42] In the circumstances, I find that the Wife has discharged her burden of showing that an adverse inference should be drawn in respect of S/N 26. I also accept her submission that pursuant to the drawing of this adverse inference, the quantification approach should be adopted so as to add the value of this item to the matrimonial pool. I add that even if it were assumed that the Carousell account (@j[redacted]) does not belong to the Husband, the Carousell listing is still relevant and useful evidence of the value of the watch. I therefore accept the Wife’s valuation of $218,800 for the Patek Philippe 5764R and add this figure to the matrimonial pool.
S/N 27 – Richard Mille 010
- [43]
[43] As with S/N 26 above, the Wife has asserted in PA-1 that the Husband owns the Richard Mille 010 watch listed at S/N 27. The Husband’s response is the same – ie, he does not state positively that he does not own this watch but claims instead that he has disposed of the documents relating to the purchase or sale of this watch. I repeat the observations I made at [40] above in respect of the Patek Philippe watch. For the same reasons, I find that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Husband and that the value of this Richard Mille 010 watch should be added to the matrimonial pool.
- [44]
[44] The Wife relies on the listing on Carousell account (@j[redacted]) to submit that the watch should be valued at $215,000. The Husband again denies owning the Carousell account listing this item, claiming that the only Carousell account he has is (@a[redacted]) with $6,020 all-time earnings. In this connection, I repeat my observation at [41] above; and for the same reasons explained above, I add the value of $215,000 to the matrimonial pool.
S/N 28 – Rolex GMT Master
- [45]
[45] The Wife asserts in her affidavits (PA-1 and PAM-2) that the Husband owns the Rolex GMT Master watch listed at S/N 28, based on a photograph she has adduced, showing him wearing this watch. In reliance on the listing of this item on Carousell account (@j[redacted]), she submits that the value of $49,000 (as per the listing) should be added to the matrimonial pool. Again, the Husband’s response is that he does not have documents relating to the purchase or sale of this watch. He also denies owning the Carousell account listing this item, claiming that the only Carousell account he has is (@a[redacted]) with $6,020 all-time earnings.
- [46]
[46] Given the photographic evidence adduced by the Wife (which does appear to show the Husband wearing a Rolex GMT Master watch) and in light of the Husband’s unsatisfactorily vague response, I find that the Wife has discharged her burden of showing that an adverse inference should be drawn in respect of this item as well. I also accept her submission that pursuant to the drawing of this adverse inference, the quantification approach should be adopted so as to add the value of this item to the matrimonial pool. I add that even if it were assumed that the Carousell account (@j[redacted]) does not belong to the Husband, the Carousell listing is still relevant and useful evidence of the value of the watch. The value of $49,000 is accordingly added to the matrimonial pool.
S/N 29 – Richard Mille x Rafael Nadal 2015 RM 035
- [47]
[47] As with S/N 28, the Wife asserts in her affidavits (PA-1 and PAM-2) that the Husband owns the Richard Mille x Rafael Nadal 2015 RM 035 watch listed at S/N 29, based on photographs she has adduced of the Husband displaying this watch in his car. As with the previous items, the Husband’s response is that he has lost the documentary evidence. The Wife submits that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Husband in relation to this item, and that pursuant to such adverse inference, the value of the item should be added to the matrimonial pool. She relies on the price listed by a second-hand retailer for the same model of the watch to submit that the value of this item should be $619,378.
- [48]
[48] Per the same reasoning as that applied to S/N 28, I find that the Wife has discharged her burden of establishing that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Husband in respect of the watch listed at S/N 29. The value of $619,378 is accordingly added to the matrimonial pool.
S/N 30 – LV sling bag
- [49]
[49] Similarly, for the LV sling bag listed at S/N 30, the Wife asserts in her affidavits (PA-1 and PAM-2) that this is owned by the Husband. She relies on an Instagram post by the Husband to prove his ownership of the item. Per her submission that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Husband in respect of this item and that the value of the item should be added to the matrimonial pool pursuant to such an adverse inference, she relies on the price listed by a second-hand retailer for the same model of the bag to submit that the value of this item should be $1,371.
- [50]
[50] The Husband repeats his bare assertion that he has lost the documentary evidence. Per the same reasoning applied in [40] and [41] above, I find that the Wife has discharged her burden of establishing that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Husband in respect of the LV bag listed at S/N 30. The value of $1,371 is accordingly added to the matrimonial pool.
S/N 31 – Goods purchased at luxury shops
- [51]
[51] For S/N 31, the Wife relies on the Husband’s credit card statements to make a submission similar to the submissions made for S/N 26 to 30. In gist, I understand the Wife to be saying that the Husband has failed to disclose the goods purchased at the various luxury stores shown in the credit card statements, that the credit card expenditure amounts represent the value of these luxury goods, and that these amounts should accordingly be added back to the matrimonial pool. The amounts in question are as follows:
(a) $810 spent at Hermes on 3 September 2023;
(b) $585.74 spent at Ginza Six Tokyo on 15 October 2023;
(c) $1,597.98 spent at b.space KL on 20 October 2023;
(d) $219 spent at Chanel on 4 November 2023;
(e) $1,190 spent at Burberry on 4 November 2023;
(f) $4,125 spent at Louis Vuitton on 28 January 2024;
(g) $825 spent at Louis Vuitton on 28 January 2024;
(h) $480 spent at Takashimaya on 29 January 2024;
(i) $2,086.53 spent at Balenciaga on 1 February 2024;
(j) $2,520.52 spent at Prada Malaysia on 24 February 2024;
(i) For this item of expenditure, the Husband claims that he only bought a jacket (currently worth $295) from Prada Malaysia. The Wife disagrees that this was the only item bought and points out that the Husband has failed to adduce any evidence of his alleged purchase (eg, receipt/invoice). In any case, she does not accept his purported valuation of the jacket, since it would translate into an unexplained and substantial drop of 88% in value.
(k) $363.68 spent at Balmain on 14 March 2024; and
(l) $1,003.35 spent at Marni on 11 May 2024.
- [52]
[52] In the Joint Summary, the Husband appears to be claiming that all these items were purchased as “holiday gifts” for his mother (“Mdm Chen”). Once again, however, this is a bare assertion by the Husband; he has not identified any affidavit evidence which substantiates this assertion.
- [53]
[53] In the circumstances, I agree with the Wife that based on the credit card statements, it would appear the Husband has more luxury goods than those he has disclosed in his affidavits; ie, there is a prima facie case of concealment by the Husband. I accept the Wife’s submission that a sum of $15,806.80 – being the aggregate of the expenditure items listed at [51(a)-(l)] above – should be added back to the matrimonial pool.
S/N 32 – Laguna Country Club membership
- [54]
[54] For S/N 32, the Wife has highlighted that the Laguna Country Club Membership was not disclosed by the Husband as a matrimonial asset, but was instead included in his list of expenses in DAM-1 . The Wife relies on an email sent to the Husband by the Country Club to value the membership at $120,000. This email was sent by a membership executive of Laguna Country Club, apparently in response to a query from the Husband as to the “indicative market price” for “re-sales” of club memberships.
- [55]
[55] For his part, the Husband claims in the Joint Summary that this club membership has been cancelled due to his non-payment of the membership fees. However, this is again a bare assertion: he has not adduced any objective evidence (eg, correspondence from the club) of the cancellation of this club membership. On the contrary, as the Wife has noted, the Laguna Country Club Membership was included by him in his list of expenses in DAM-1 – which inclusion implies that the membership was still active, at least as at the date when DAM-1 was filed on 2 October 2024. In other words, as at the date of the IJ, the club membership was still part of the Husband’s assets.
- [56]
[56] In addition, I note that the Wife followed up on the Husband’s disclosure of this club membership (albeit in his list of expenses) by requesting more details. In his reply affidavit DA-1 (filed on 25 February 2025), the Husband does not actually depose that the club membership has been cancelled, nor does he deny owning (or having owned) the club membership: he simply states that it is “open to the [Wife] to attempt to obtain the latest transacted prices and/or reach out to any brokers to retrieve the value of these country club memberships”.
- [57]
[57] Given the position adopted by the Husband on affidavit, I accept the Wife’s submission that the Laguna Country Club Membership formed part of the Husband’s assets as at the date of the IJ, and that it should be included in the matrimonial pool. I also accept that the email from the Country Club’s membership executive supports the Wife’s valuation of the membership at $120,000.
S/N 33 – Husband’s cryptocurrency
- [58]
[58] On the Wife’s case, S/N 33 accounts for almost 50% of the total value of the Husband’s assets, which in turn account for more than 98% of the entire matrimonial pool. In other words, S/N 33 makes up approximately 47% of the entire matrimonial pool.
- [59]
[59] The Wife’s case is that the Husband derives his main source of income from trading in cryptocurrency and Non-Fungible Tokens (“NFT”). The Wife hired an expert, one Mr Lin Yun Heng (“Mr Lin”), to trace the Husband’s NFTs and cryptocurrency transactions. In gist, Mr Lin’s finding was that there was cumulative inflow of US$3,801,681 from the wallets he investigated (which allegedly belonged to the Husband) into a single Binance account. The Wife submits that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Husband in respect of his non-disclosure of this asset, and that pursuant to such adverse inference, the sum of US$3,801,681 – less the sum of US$805,386.40 used to purchase the NFTs – should be added to the matrimonial pool.
- [60]
[60] For the purposes of the hearing before me, the Husband has denied that he presently has any cryptocurrency capable of realisation. He has reiterated the claims he made in the Joint Summary about his cryptocurrency wallet having been hacked. To support his narrative, the Husband points to evidence of his having sought police assistance and legal advice to recover the (allegedly) stolen NFTs.
- [61]
[61] As the Wife has observed, however, the Husband’s response does not address the case she puts forward vis-à-vis S/N 33. From the evidence that the Husband himself has pointed to, his story of “an unauthorised transfer” in fact relates to an incident which allegedly occurred in December 2020. So far as I can glean from the letters from his solicitors and the police report he has cited, his case is that he and one Cheng Haijiang had transferred cryptocurrency into a wallet for investment purposes. One Huang Yilong, who had access to the wallet and who was tasked to manage the investment, had – without consent from the Husband and/or Cheng Haijiang – transferred the cryptocurrency out of the wallet (ending with -EFB02). Per the Wife’s case, however, S/N 33 relates to the Husband’s Binance account (ending with -5997F) and his three wallets (viz, the “Purchase Wallet”, “HODL/Hardware Wallet” and “Sale Wallet” referred to in LYH-1 ), which he used to trade NFTs and other cryptocurrencies from August 2021 to November 2024. In other words, the Wife’s case is that the Husband failed to disclose his cryptocurrency and NFT holdings in the Binance account and the three wallets. The alleged hacking incident in December 2020 is of no relevance to the present proceedings.
- [62]
[62] As I alluded to earlier, the Wife’s case on the Husband’s ownership of the Binance account and the three wallets is premised on the evidence of her expert witness Mr Lin. In gist:
(a) The Wife first referred five distinct NFTs to Mr Lin. The Wife’s evidence is that the Husband had posted these NFTs on his social media and that these NFTs must therefore belong to the Husband. This is borne out by the evidence of Mr Lin, who has stated that NFTs are unique digital assets which represent ownership of a specific item or content: as NFTs are unique (eg, one of the NFTs alleged to belong to the Husband has a unique code of “MAYC #5016”), the Husband’s social media posts show that he owns these NFTs.
(b) Tracing these five NFTs, Mr Lin found that they interacted with three primary wallets. Mr Lin further found two other NFTs that interacted with these three wallets. These wallets are:
(i) The Purchase Wallet: Used to acquire NFTs or tokens (usually funds are deposited into this wallet).
(ii) HODL/Hardware Wallet: A secure cold-storage wallet used to store assets long-term. "HODL" is slang for "Hold On for Dear Life".
(iii) Sale Wallet: Wallet used to list and sell NFTs, typically on platforms like Blur or OpenSea.
(c) Because the Husband owns the NFTs (as evidenced from his social media posts), and because these NFTs interacted with the three wallets, Mr Lin inferred that these three wallets belong to the Husband.
(d) That the three wallets belong to the Husband is also borne out by the fact that these wallets used the same unique Binance Deposit address: ie, cryptocurrencies or NFTs from these three wallets were all transferred to the same Binance account, presumably for sale for cash. Mr Lin thus inferred that the Husband also owns the said Binance account (ending with -5997F).
(e) Mr Lin found that there was a cumulative inflow of US$3,801,681 from the three wallets into the Binance account. Mr Lin explained that “a cumulative inflow can be understood as the total sum of funds or assets that have been transferred into a specific account or wallet over a given period, derived from multiple transactions”.
(f) Mr Lin further explained the significance of this cumulative inflow of funds from the three wallets into the Binance account:
- [63]
[63] It should be noted that in the affidavit (PA-1) which she filed in support of her application against the Husband for discovery and interrogatories, the Wife requested the Husband to provide inter alia information relating to the said five NFTs. In responding to the request specifically relating to the NFTs in his reply affidavit (DA-1), the Husband appeared to admit ownership of these NFTs, stating that “these digital assets were sold at a loss”, that he had “no documentary evidence of [his] selling them”, and that “any attempt to try and retrieve such evidence would be futile”. Regrettably, having implicitly admitted his ownership of the NFTs, the Husband then attempted to prevaricate by adding that the Wife had no proof either of his purchase of these NFTs or of his username being “J[redacted]” (the username allegedly used by him on platforms such as OpenSea, which is a “major NFT marketplace”). In my view, this attempt at prevarication did not detract from the implicit admission of ownership contained in his statement about having sold the NFTs at a loss. In this connection, it should be pointed out that his statement about having sold the NFTs at a loss was actually corroborated by the evidence of the purchase price and sale price of these NFTs in Mr Lin’s report: these appeared to show that the NFTs were generally sold at a loss.
- [64]
[64] In light of the above evidence, I am satisfied that the Wife has established at least a substratum of evidence showing that the Husband has – by virtue of the cumulative inflows noted by Mr Lin – an amount of US$3,801,681 in his Binance account which he has failed to disclose. The Husband’s argument about the Wife having no “proof” either of his purchase of these NFTs or of his username being “J[redacted]” does not assist him, since the Wife only needs to show a prima facie case for an adverse inference to be drawn (UZN v UZM at [18(a)]). Nor does the Husband’s present argument about his accounts having been “hacked” assist him, since (as I noted above) the evidence shows that the “hacking” incident occurred in December 2020, whereas S/N 33 relates to cryptocurrency and NFT transactions in the Husband’s three wallets and his Binance account in the period between April 2021 and November 2024. As for his remarks at the hearing about the alleged inadequacy of Mr Lin’s qualifications, these were entirely unsupported by any evidence: he did not, for example, seek to adduce any expert evidence of his own.
- [65]
[65] In so far as the Wife has proposed that the value to be attributed to S/N 33 should be the sum of US$3,801,681 less the US$805,386.40 used to purchase the NFTs, I note that Mr Lin’s evidence was that no definitive conclusions could be drawn as to what must have happened to the cumulative inflow into the Binance account. Mr Lin also very fairly pointed out that in deriving the figure of US$3,801,681, he had used the values of those cryptocurrencies at the time of the transfer into the Binance account; ie, there was a possibility that this figure might not accurately reflect the values at which the assets were eventually liquidated. These caveats notwithstanding, the relevant threshold is whether the value assessed is “unreasonable” and it is for the Husband to convince the court that it is: UZN v UZM at [28(a)]. He has made no attempt to do so. I therefore accept the Wife’s submissions and add the sum of S$3,865,220.03 into the matrimonial pool. Per the Wife’s case, the sum of S$3,865,220.03 is obtained by deducting US$805,386.40 from the cumulative inflow figure of US$3,801,681 and then applying an exchange rate of US$1:S$1.29.
S/N 34 – Debts owed to Husband from FPL
- [66]
[66] Next, in respect of S/N 34, it is trite that debts owing to a spouse as at the date of interim judgment constitute matrimonial assets. As Woo Bih Li JC (as he then was) observed in Leong Mei Chuan v David Chan Teck Hock [2001] SGHC 80 (at [123]), if debts owed to a spouse are not included in the matrimonial pool, “a spouse will be encouraged to lend monies to various persons when the marriage is floundering, and then claim that such debts should not be treated as part of matrimonial assets”.
- [67]
[67] The loan documents between FPL and the Husband show that $41,000 was lent by the Husband to FPL. The Wife contends that the entire sum should be added back into the matrimonial pool. In response, the Husband’s position appears to be that this amount should be excluded from the matrimonial pool because FPL has (according to him) been dormant since November 2022 and there is no realistic likelihood of getting back this loan. In support of his allegation that FPL has been “dormant” since November 2022, the Husband has adduced IRAS’ letter approving an application for waiver of filing of FPL’s Income Tax Return with effect from YA 2026. As explained at [28] above, this document does not support the Husband’s allegation that FPL was already “dormant” as at November 2022. A fortiori, the document does not support his allegation that there was no realistic chance of the debt being repaid as at the date of the IJ.
- [68]
[68] In the circumstances, I agree with the Wife that the entire debt amount of $41,000 should be added back into the matrimonial pool. For the avoidance of doubt, it appears to me that the Wife made an error in the Joint Summary in that the sums for S/N 34 and 35 were swapped around. This is inconsequential, though, as the documentary evidence puts it beyond doubt that the debt owed from FPL was $41,000.
S/N 35 – Debts owed to Husband from ADS VG
- [69]
[69] For S/N 35, the loan documents between the Husband and ADS VG show that $183,000 was lent by the Husband to ADS VG. The Wife contends that the entire sum should be added back into the matrimonial pool.
- [70]
[70] Again, as with S/N 34, the Husband appears to be suggesting that there is no realistic likelihood of this debt being repaid because ADS VG has “ceased operation due to several law suit”. First, I repeat my findings at [30] above in relation to the lawsuits referred to by the Husband. In gist, I do not find that the Husband has proven these liabilities. Second, the document he purports to rely on to prove that ADS VG is currently dormant is the IRAS’ letter approving waiver of filing of Income Tax Returns for ADS VG which expressly states that it is “based on the declaration that the company has not carried out any business activities since 1 January 2025”; ie, after the date of the IJ. In other words, as with S/N 34, so too for S/N 35 there is no evidence to substantiate the Husband’s allegation that there was no realistic chance of the debt being repaid by ADS VG as at the date of the IJ. As such, I do not accept the Husband’s bare assertion; and I agree with the Wife that the entire debt amount of $183,000 should be added back into the matrimonial pool.
S/N 36 – Debts owed to Husband from MLPL
- [71]
[71] For S/N 36, the Wife submits that two withdrawals (on 9 and 31 January 2024) totalling $18,000 were made from the Husband’s account Citi 8824 to a company which I shall refer to as “MLPL”; and that this amount should be added back into the matrimonial pool.
- [72]
[72] The Husband has no real explanation for the transfer of $18,000 to MLPL. His response in the Joint Summary – that “Company reimburse the funds as salary to husband in order to transfer back the share to the Duhui. And Husband stopped working for company from 1st Nov 2025” – is incoherent, entirely irrelevant to the withdrawals made in January 2024, and in any event unsupported by any objective documentary evidence.
- [73]
[73] In the circumstances, I find that regardless of whether the transfer of $18,000 to MLPL is to be treated as a debt owing from MLPL to the Husband or as a sum dissipated by him, the amount should be added back to the matrimonial pool.
S/N 37 – Debts owed to Husband from Kelvin
- [74]
[74] The Wife notes that in his compliance affidavit of 13 June 2025 (DA-2), the Husband himself listed Kelvin as one of his debtors and deposed that Kelvin owed him a sum of $80,000. As such, she submits that this sum should be added to the matrimonial pool.
- [75]
[75] In the Joint Summary, the Husband now claims – for the first time – that Kelvin has been unreachable since April 2024. However, he has not deposed to this on affidavit, nor has he adduced any evidence of any attempts to contact Kelvin. In the “remarks” column, the Husband also asserts that of this $80,000, only a sum of RM76,500 is outstanding. However, the Husband provides no documentary evidence for this. I therefore reject his claim and find that the debt of $80,000 should be included in the matrimonial pool.
S/N 38 – Debts owed to Husband from Malaysian debtor
- [76]
[76] In his compliance affidavit of 13 June 2025 (DA-2), in response to the question of the nature of the debt which the Husband hired “ALBB Consultancy Sdn Bhd” to collect and the amount of debt outstanding, the Husband simply asserted that “balance amount is RM76,500 before deducting 40% of commission”. It should be highlighted that it was in this same paragraph in DA-2 that the Husband deposed to a sum of $80,000 having been lent to Kelvin. Notwithstanding that the same figure RM76,500 appears to be relied on for both Kelvin and the alleged Malaysian debtor, it appears to me that on the face of the Husband’s affidavit, there is – apart from Kelvin - an additional unknown Malaysian debtor. Unfortunately, to make matters even more confusing, the Husband now states in the Joint Summary that “ALBB” was used to collect debt from one “Kevin” and that “so far collected back $14,525.32”. The reference to “Kevin” appears to be a reference to S/N 37, but in his affidavit evidence, the Husband does not depose to any relationship between Kelvin and this unknown Malaysian debtor. I was therefore left with the Husband’s evidence in DA-2 which appears to allege two different debts; one of $80,000 owing from Kelvin and one of RM76,500 owing from an unknown Malaysian debtor.
- [77]
[77] I note, in addition, that the sum of $14,525.32 referenced by the Husband as the sum “collected back” is also the exact sum that the Wife seeks to add back into the matrimonial pool as the outstanding debt owed to the Husband. While parties have not explained how this sum was arrived at, I surmise that it was derived by converting RM76,500 to the Singapore dollar equivalent and then deducting from it the 40% commission alleged by the Husband to be due to the debt collector. The Husband’s concurrent reference to this sum of money being “collected back” and RM76,500 “not yet collect back” is therefore simply incoherent.
- [78]
[78] The Husband’s inconsistent and incoherent explanation aside, the bottom line is that the Husband does not dispute that a balance sum of RM76,500 is still owed to him which is to be collected by ALBB Consultancy Sdn Bhd. In the circumstances, I accept the Wife’s submission that a sum of S$14,525.32 should be added back to the matrimonial pool.
S/N 39 – Transfers to Emi
- [79]
[79] For S/N 39, the Wife has pointed out that the Husband made 16 transfers of funds totalling $17,388 to one “Emi” between 8 January 2024 and 11 April 2024. The Husband claims that these transfers were for various “expenses” such as “skin care”, “hair care”, “supplements”, “perfume”, and “tennis lesson”.
- [80]
[80] The Wife’s case is that these payments to “Emi” form part of an attempt by the Husband to dissipate his assets by transferring funds to a friend. She relies on the following reasoning and evidence for this submission. First, she notes that it is “extremely strange” that the payments to “Emi” for all these disparate “expenses” are always in round figures. Second, her evidence is that she has never met anyone called “Emi”, nor has the Husband previously mentioned this person to her. Third, she also asserts that the Husband has in any event never used the products listed in the invoices he purports to rely on.
- [81]
[81] In this connection, I note that the Husband has failed to give any coherent explanation as to who exactly “Emi” is and how “Emi” came to provide him with such a wide range of disparate products and services (“skin care”, “hair care”, “supplements”, “perfume”, “tennis lesson”, etc). Moreover, while the Husband alleged in his affidavit DA-2 that the payments to “Emi” were for various expenses (for which he purported to produce invoices), he has now claimed in the Joint Summary that these payments represented his repayments of a loan taken from Emi. The internal inconsistency in the Husband’s own narrative speaks volumes as to his lack of credibility.
- [82]
[82] In the circumstances, I accept the Wife’s submission that the transfers to “Emi” represented dissipation of assets by the Husband, and that the sum of $17,388 should be added back to the matrimonial pool.
S/N 40 – Transfers to Husband’s mother
- [83]
[83] For S/N 40, it is not disputed that the Husband made four transfers totalling $440,000 to his mother, Mdm Chen, in the period between 26 April 2024 and 29 April 2024. In the Joint Summary, the Husband claims that these transfers were made in repayment of loans totalling $759,650 which Mdm Chen had extended to both parties during the marriage.
- [84]
[84] For her part, the Wife contends that this was another attempt by the Husband to dissipate assets, as the fund transfers to Mdm Chen were made in the month after the commencement of divorce proceedings by the Wife, and the Husband has adduced no evidence of the actual loan amounts extended to either party. The Wife also submits that the alleged repayments to Mdm Chen exceed the alleged amount borrowed, noting that in his affidavit DAM-1, the Husband had previously alleged that Mdm Chen lent parties $314,304 while exhibiting loan documents which appeared to show a total loan amount of only $244,904.53.
- [85]
[85] I understand the Wife’s case on dissipation to be based on the dicta of the court in TNL v TNK [2017] 1 SLR 609 (“TNL v TNK”) at [24]:
- [86]
[86] The above dicta in TNL should be read in the light of the remarks by the Court of Appeal in UZN v UZM. In that case, the Court of Appeal elaborated on the TNL dicta (at [65]), explaining that –
Although the label of “dissipation” is commonly used to describe dispositions intended to put assets out of reach of the other spouse, a dissipation falling within the TNL dicta is not necessarily a culpable act. It may also not involve a non-disclosure. Instead, this category may be seen to encompass a disposition of matrimonial assets during the relevant period when one spouse has failed to obtain the other’s consent, even for “innocent” reasons. [emphasis added]
- [87]
[87] Giving the example of a mother who used a sum of $35,000 (which would have constituted part of the matrimonial pool) to pay for the child’s school fees in an overseas institution, the Court noted that the mother’s reason for such expenditure – if true – “would not be a ‘wrongful dissipation’ intended to put assets out of reach of the other party”, but that the sum should nevertheless be returned to the matrimonial pool if the payment was made without the father’s consent (at [64]). Another example may be seen in WNR v WNQ [2023] SGHCF 43: in that case, the court cited the TNL dicta in finding that the husband had not provided evidence of the wife’s consent to a substantial withdrawal from his CPF account and that the sum should accordingly be returned to the matrimonial pool (at [12]).
- [88]
[88] In the present case, the transfers to Mdm Chen were made after the commencement of divorce proceedings but before the grant of IJ. The TNL dicta apply. Save for a somewhat incoherent bare assertion (“it was agreed that if the Matrimonial Home was sold, my mother will recover all the monies she spent on the Matrimonial Home, my family (which includes the [Wife], my daughter and me) and our household expenses”), the Husband has not adduced any evidence of the Wife’s consent to the alleged loan repayments to Mdm Chen,. In the circumstances, and irrespective of the Husband’s alleged intention, I find that the sum of $440,000 should be returned to the matrimonial pool, per the TNL dicta.
S/N 41 – Transfers to Chia Hwee Kiat
- [89]
[89] S/N 41 concerns a transfer of $49,717 by the Husband to one Chia Hwee Kiat (“Chia”) on 29 April 2024. In the Joint Summary, the Husband claims that this transfer was in repayment of a debt which he owed Chia.
- [90]
[90] The Wife submits, on the other hand, that this transfer represents yet another dissipation of assets by the Husband. The transfer was made on the very day that IJ was granted. According to the Wife, she does not know who Chia is, nor has the Husband ever mentioned this loan to her during their marriage.
- [91]
[91] Given that the Husband has failed to adduce any evidence of the Wife’s consent to this alleged loan repayment to Chia, I find that the amount of $49,717 should be added back to the matrimonial pool, per the TNL dicta.
S/N 42 – HSBC Credit Card liability
- [92]
[92] For S/N 42, the Husband argues for his HSBC credit card liability to be taken into account in the determination of the matrimonial pool (presumably as a deduction). According to him, this liability is “ordinary, unsecured debts incurred for living expenses and subsistence, not for asset accumulation”, and that this “genuine financial obligation” materially affects his ability to pay maintenance. At the same time, he has claimed that his HSBC credit card liability stands at $17,721.96 as at 21 December 2025.
- [93]
[93] There are two problems with this. First, the only affidavits filed by the Husband since 21 December 2025 are DLA-1 and DLA-2. There is no documentary evidence of the Husband’s HSBC credit card liability in either of these affidavits. Further and in any event, the Husband has failed to explain why liabilities arising after the IJ date ought to be considered when the default position is for assets (including liabilities) to be identified as at the IJ date.
- [94]
[94] In the circumstances, I agree with the Wife that this item should be disregarded in the determination of the matrimonial pool.
S/N 43 – Trust Bank liability
- [95]
[95] For S/N 43, the Husband repeats his argument that this liability is “ordinary, unsecured debts incurred for living expenses and subsistence, not for asset accumulation”, and that this “genuine financial obligation” materially affects his ability to pay maintenance. He claims that his personal liability vis-à-vis Trust Bank is $55,233.78 as at 25 December 2025. Again, as with S/N 42, he has produced no documentary evidence to substantiate this claim; and he has also not explained why liabilities arising after the IJ date ought to be considered when the default position is for assets (including liabilities) to be identified as at the IJ date. I therefore agree with the Wife that this item should be disregarded in the determination of the matrimonial pool.
S/N 44 – ADS VG’s liability
- [96]
[96] For S/N 44, the Husband claims that ADS VG has a liability of $363,905.38. As a preliminary point, as I explained at [30]–[32] above, ADS VG’s financial statements ending 31 December 2024 do not reflect this liability and instead show the net current assets of the company to be $18,369. The Husband exhibited in his affidavit DLA-1 a number of court documents, but these were for an enforcement order by the claimant in DC/OC 1547/2025 for a sum of $176,878.99 and for a default judgement in HC/OC 810/2023 for a sum of US$370,000 – which figures did not correspond to the amount of $363,905.38 stated in the Joint Summary. In any event, even if one assumes for the sake of argument that this liability of $363,905.38 exists, it would be the company’s liability: the Husband has not explained why it should be treated as his personal liability for the purposes of determining the matrimonial pool. I therefore disregard this alleged liability in determining the matrimonial pool.
S/N 45 – NPL’s liability
- [97]
[97] For the same reason given in the preceding paragraph, I reject the Husband’s argument that NPL’s liability should be accounted for in the determination of the matrimonial pool.
S/N 46 – The Husband’s alleged personal liabilities to third parties
- [98]
[98] For S/N 46, the Husband has listed in the Joint Summary a number of third parties whom he claims he took loans from. Oddly, although the Husband claims that the outstanding liability is $464,795, his own figures show an aggregate loan amount of $360,000, out of which (on his own case) he has repaid $85,205. No explanation has been provided for this discrepancy.
- [99]
[99] Further and in any event, I reject the Husband’s claim about his personal liabilities to third parties. The position he has taken in the Joint Summary is inconsistent with his own affidavit evidence, and no explanation has been provided for the inconsistencies. In his first affidavit of assets and means filed on 2 October 2024 (DAM-1), the Husband deposed that he had no liabilities. He then changed his position and deposed in his subsequent affidavit DAM-2 (filed on 28 July 2025) that he owed Mdm Chen substantial sums of money. Despite ostensibly having clarified his position on his liabilities in DAM-2, he made no mention of loans taken from other third parties. The first mention of these alleged loans was in the affidavit DLA-1, which was filed on 16 April 2026. No explanation was provided as to why these alleged loans were not disclosed earlier; and a good number of them appear to have been incurred after the date of IJ. In addition, although the Husband purported to exhibit certain “loan agreements” in DLA-1, the documentation was incomplete: there was no documentary evidence for several of the loans – including a substantial loan of $200,000 allegedly taken from one “Chen XingPing”; and the Husband did not point to his bank account statements to show when the alleged loan monies were actually paid to him.
- [100]
[100] For the reasons stated above, I decline to take the alleged personal liabilities listed in S/N 46 into account in determining the matrimonial pool.
S/N 47 – Matrimonial Home
- [101]
[101] S/N 47 relates to the Matrimonial Home. As I noted earlier at [3], the Matrimonial Home has been sold by the Husband. What he purports to do in S/N 47 is to account for an amount of $453,953 which he claims is owed to Mdm Chen for repayment of a “personal loan”.
- [102]
[102] The Husband has inserted some numbers and calculations at S/N 47 in the Joint Summary, but has not elaborated on how these numbers and calculations are to be understood. In any event, his evidence on the amount owed to Mdm Chen is riddled with inconsistencies. For S/N 47, he appears to be claiming that there is an outstanding loan of $453,953 – despite having allegedly paid Mdm Chen the “balance sale proceeds” of $755,083.07 following the sale of the Matrimonial Home. Elsewhere in the Joint Summary, he appears to claim that there is an outstanding liability of $759,650 owed to Mdm Chen. In his second affidavit of assets and means filed on 2 December 2025 (DAM-2), the Husband claimed that he owed Mdm Chen an amount of $529,650, and that he and the Wife also jointly owed Mdm Chen a separate amount of $314,303. In his affidavit DLA-1 filed on 16 April 2026, the Husband now appears to claim that he owes Mdm Chen a total amount of $459,650.
- [103]
[103] In light of the above inconsistencies and the absence of any explanation for them, I find that the Husband has failed to adduce any credible evidence of the amount allegedly owed to Mdm Chen. As such, I decline to deduct the alleged amount of $453,953 from the Husband’s assets.
S/N 54 – CIMB Fixed Deposit (account no. ending -0201)
- [104]
[104] For S/N 54, the Husband makes a bare assertion in the Joint Summary that this account should be valued at $100,000 because according to him, Mdm Chen had lent the Wife $100,000 to put into this fixed deposit account. There being no evidence at all to substantiate the Husband’s assertion, I reject his suggested valuation, and instead, adopt the Wife’s valuation of $10,363.54, which is based on the bank account statement as at 7 September 2024.
S/N 55 – The Wife’s CPF Ordinary Account
- [105]
[105] The Husband has left this item blank in the Joint Summary. For the avoidance of doubt, I accept the Wife’s figure of $154,919.74 which is based on her CPF account statements as at 29 April 2024, less the amounts already accrued in her CPF account before marriage.
S/N 59 – Purple Audemars Piguet watch (26319OR)
- [106]
[106] The Husband alleges that the Wife owns this Audemars Piguet watch, which the Wife denies. As the Husband has not adduced any evidence to show that this watch exists and is owned by the Wife, I decline to include this item as one of the Wife’s assets.
S/N 60 – Cartier watch
- [107]
[107] The Husband asserts that this Cartier watch was purchased by the Wife during the marriage. The Wife does not dispute that she owns this watch, but claims that it was gifted to her by her mother before the marriage.
- [108]
[108] As I noted earlier, parties’ assets are treated as matrimonial assets, unless otherwise proven (see [14] above). The burden is thus on the Wife to prove that this watch is not a matrimonial asset. She has not adduced any evidence to discharge this burden. As such, I agree with the Husband that the value of this watch should be added to the matrimonial pool. The Wife has also not adduced evidence to refute his valuation of the watch ($12,800). I therefore accept the valuation of $12,800.
S/N 61 – Chanel watch
- [109]
[109] The Husband alleges that the Wife owns this Chanel watch, which the Wife denies. As the Husband has not adduced any evidence to show that this watch exists and is owned by the Wife, I decline to include this item as one of the Wife’s assets.
S/N 62 – Chanel bag
- [110]
[110] The Husband asserts that this bag was purchased by the Wife during the marriage. The Wife does not dispute owning this bag but claims that it should not be considered a matrimonial asset because she bought it before the marriage. However, she has not adduced any evidence to support her position. As such, I accept the Husband’s submission that this item should be included as a matrimonial asset. The Wife has also not adduced evidence to refute his valuation of the bag ($5,199). I therefore accept the figure of $5,199.
S/N 63 and 64 – Celine bags
- [111]
[111] For S/N 63 and 64, the Husband’s position per the Joint Summary is that these two Celine bags were purchased by him for the Wife during overseas trips. However, he has not deposed to this in his affidavit evidence, nor has he identified any evidence capable of supporting his assertion. The Wife denies owning these items. There is thus no factual basis for concluding that these two bags are matrimonial assets.
S/N 65 to 67 – Hermes bags
- [112]
[112] For S/N 65 to 67, the Husband has asserted in his affidavit DAM-2 that the Wife owns three Hermes handbags; and in support of his assertion, he has adduced photographs of the Wife carrying some of these bags while on overseas trips. The Wife admits the existence of these bags and the fact that she carried them on overseas trips, but claims that they belong to her younger sister and that she merely borrowed them for her trips. She has not, however, adduced any evidence to show that the bags were borrowed from her sister.
- [113]
[113] In the circumstances, I find that the Wife has not discharged her burden of proving that these three bags are not matrimonial assets. I therefore include the value of these bags in the matrimonial pool; and in the absence of any evidence from the Wife to refute the Husband’s valuation of these bags, I accept the figures he has put forward ($37,027; $24,820; $9,888).
S/N 68 – Hermes Picotin bag
- [114]
[114] S/N 68 refers to a Hermes Picotin bag which the Husband alleges to be owned by the Wife. The Wife, on the other hand, denies owning this bag. The Husband has not produced any evidence to support his allegation; and this allegation is, moreover, inconsistent with his own assertion in DAM-2 that the Wife owns three Hermes bags (as set out at S/N 65 to 67 of the Joint Summary). In the circumstances, there is no factual basis for me to conclude that such a bag exists or that it is a matrimonial asset.
S/N 69 – Property in Australia
- [115]
[115] While the Husband has not included this item as one of the Wife’s assets in the Joint Summary, he has submitted for an “adverse inference” to be drawn against the Wife in respect of this item and for a sum of A$160,000 to A$180,000 to be added to the matrimonial pool. Although the Husband has not used the specific terminology seen in cases such as UZN v UZM, I understand him to be contending that the Wife failed to disclose this property as one of her assets, that an adverse inference should be drawn against her for such (alleged) non-disclosure, and that pursuant to such adverse inference, the quantification approach should be adopted so as to add the (alleged) value of the property back to the matrimonial pool.
- [116]
[116] In support of his submission for an “adverse inference”, the Husband relies on text messages (including voice messages) which – according to him – show the Wife speaking about renting out a property in Australia. Regrettably, these texts and voice messages are in Mandarin; and he has not produced any certified translation by a qualified, independent translator. For her part, the Wife has explained that she was helping a friend to look for a managing agent who could help rent out apartment units in Melbourne, Australia. The Wife has also adduced evidence of property ownership searches conducted in Australia by her Australian lawyers to show that she does not own any property in any Australian state or territory. In this connection, I note that during the hearing before me, the Husband contended that the Wife could have acquired property in Australia under another name – but again, he has not adduced any evidence to support such a contention. In any event, the Wife did disclose that she had a previous name, and the Australian property ownership searches adduced by her include searches against this previous name.
- [117]
[117] Having regard to the state of the evidence, I do not see any basis for drawing an adverse inference against the Wife in respect of S/N 69.
S/N 70 – Wife’s property in Singapore
- [118]
[118] For S/N 70, the Husband has also not included this (alleged) property as one of the Wife’s assets in the Joint Summary, but he similarly argues for an “adverse inference” to be drawn against the Wife and for a sum of $950,000 to be added to the matrimonial pool. According to the Husband, his mother Mdm Chen lent $66,000 to the Wife for the latter to purchase her parents’ property at [address redacted] (“Bukit Batok HDB”). He claims that the Wife has a “share” in her parents’ Bukit Batok HDB flat and that she has not repaid the loan she got from Mdm Chen.
- [119]
[119] I reject the Husband’s submissions in respect of S/N 70. First, he has adduced no evidence of the alleged loan from Mdm Chen to the Wife. Second, even assuming for the sake of argument that there was such a loan, any failure by the Wife to repay Mdm Chen is a matter between the two women – and not a matter for these matrimonial proceedings between the Husband and the Wife.
- [120]
[120] As for the Husband’s assertion that the Wife has a “share” of her parents’ Bukit Batok HDB flat, the Wife has explained in her response to the Husband’s request for interrogatories that her name was added to the Bukit Batok HDB flat on 2 August 2010 – before the marriage – because her parents needed to refinance the property to obtain liquidity for her father’s business. The Wife’s evidence is that her name has since been removed on 7 March 2020 as she was named as an essential occupier of the Matrimonial Home (an executive condominium), and she was not allowed to own an HDB flat while also being named as an essential occupier of an executive condominium. In her response to the request for interrogatories, she has further explained that she made no financial contribution to the Bukit Batok HDB flat and received no monies when her name was removed.
- [121]
[121] In the circumstances, I find that the Husband has failed to show that an adverse inference ought to be drawn for S/N 70.
Conclusion on the identification and valuation of the matrimonial pool
- [122]
[122] Having regard to the findings I have set out above on the disputed items in the Joint Summary, I conclude that the matrimonial assets in this case have a total value of $8,065,790.21. The table annexed to this judgment as Annex 1 sets out my valuation in respect of each alleged matrimonial asset. To summarise, the total value of $8,065,790.21 comprises:
(a) $7,850,965.52 of the Husband’s assets; and
(b) $214,824.69 of the Wife’s assets.
Division ratio
- [123]
[123] I next address the appropriate ratio for the division of the matrimonial assets.
- [124]
[124] It is not disputed that the structured approach in ANJ v ANK should apply in the present case. The first step of the structured approach calls for the court to “ascribe a ratio that represents each party’s direct contributions relative to that of the other party, having regard to the amount of financial contribution each party has made towards the acquisition or improvement of the matrimonial assets”: ANJ v ANK at [22].
Direct financial contributions
- [125]
[125] In respect of parties’ direct financial contributions, although the Wife’s case is that the total value of the matrimonial pool is approximately $8.1m, she takes the position that parties’ direct financial contributions (“DFC”) should be assessed only in respect of an amount of approximately $800,000 of matrimonial assets. The Wife submits that the bulk of the matrimonial assets should be excluded from the DFC calculation because it is made up of sums included pursuant to an adverse inference against the Husband, and he should therefore not be entitled to credit for such sums in the computation of the contribution ratios. The Wife also submits that the assets in each party’s name should be credited solely as that party’s DFC. Based on the $800,000 worth of matrimonial assets, the Wife submits that the ratio of DFC should be 84:16 in favour of the Husband.
- [126]
[126] The Husband’s submissions are not helpful, as he has simply attributed 100% of the matrimonial assets to his DFC without explaining why this should be so.
- [127]
[127] As a matter of principle, it is true that in UZN v UZM, the Court of Appeal held that where an additional sum had been included in the matrimonial pool by virtue of an adverse inference against the Husband rather than by disclosure by him, the Husband was “not entitled to credit for it in the computation of the contribution ratio” (at [57]). It must be highlighted, however, that UZN v UZM makes it clear that this principle applies only to sums which are added to the matrimonial pool as a result of an adverse inference, and not to every single item in respect of which a party may have provided incomplete or inconsistent evidence or belated disclosure.
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