Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time." This may be a suitable occasion to give Members a brief review of the changes to the international monetary system in the last 15 years. These changes have made necessary this Amending Bill. This has been a period of great turbulence in the world's financial markets. The economies of the major industrial countries, except for Japan and West Germany, began to experience increasing difficulty in maintaining full employment without running into inflation and balance of payments problems. At first, the matter was dismissed as purely technical, something which Finance Ministers and Central Bankers could handle. By the early 1970s, governments began to recognize that their troubles had deep-rooted causes, but the experts were not agreed on what these were. In fact, till today the problems remain unresolved, as the present sorry state of the world economy testifies. Yet despite the troubled state of the world economy, Singapore and certain countries in Asia - the ASEAN states, South Korea, Taiwan and Hongkong - registered good economic growth rates throughout the period. Until the Currency Act of 1967 set up the Republic's own currency, we shared a common currency with Malaya (later Malaysia) and Brunei. The common currency was managed by an entity called the Board of Commissioners of Currency, Malaya and British Borneo, a colonial relic which strangely survived the independence of Malaya in 1957 and the establishment of Malaysia in 1963 with Singapore as a constituent part. However, when we left Malaysia in 1965, it became clear that the days of this colonial relic were numbered. With the break-up of the common currency system, Singapore introduced its own currency. But the essentials of the system remained. There was automatic conversion of the Singapore dollar into sterling. If you had dollars you could get any amount of British pounds at a fixed rate of exchange - $8.57 per £. If you had British pounds you could buy any amount of Singapore dollars. To ensure this free convertibility, at all times, the Currency Board was obliged by law to maintain at least 100% sterling reserves against its currency issue. In practice, the cover was 110%. The Board earned income through commissions on buying and selling as well as on its sterling investments in London, which was then managed by the Crown Agents. Early in 1967, it became apparent that Britain was running into balance of payments troubles and that a devaluation of the pound was on the cards. The Board began its first moves to diversify its reserves into other currencies and into gold. On 18th November 1967, the pound was devalued. Singapore decided to retain its old parity in relation to other currencies, and the dollar rate was fixed at $7.35 to the pound. After 1967 it was becoming increasingly evident that the whole international financial system was running into serious trouble. The linchpin of the system was the US dollar, which was the world's major reserve currency. The pound sterling was the reserve currency only of some Commonwealth countries. Most of the world's Central Banks kept their reserves in the US dollar and their currency parities were fixed in relation to the US dollar. This system of fixed exchange rate parities, underpinned by the US dollar, was one of the great financial innovations in the world's financial history. It was introduced in 1944 under the Bretton Woods Agreement. For two decades, world trade flourished under fixed exchange rates and a period of continuous inflation-free growth produced increasing affluence in the industrial countries. It is no exaggeration to say that many experts believed that the rich countries had found the secret of everlasting prosperity. There was then genuine concern for poor countries of the Third World and a willingness to help them through generous amounts of aid. Alas, this no longer holds true today. Unfortunately events after 1967 were to confound the optimists. The reasons are complex and I will not deal with them here. I will only trace the major events. The linchpin of the world's monetary system was, as I have said, the US dollar, the major reserve currency. In the early postwar years, the world was starved of dollars. When the US ran balance of payments deficits - this happened when Americans spent more on foreign goods and services than they sold to foreigners - American dollars would then accumulate in foreign countries as welcome Central Bank reserves. The same thing happened when the Americans lent or invested more overseas than they borrowed from foreigners. In those years, these surplus dollars were eagerly sought after. However, one can have too much of a good thing. When foreign Central Banks accumulated US dollars, they were entitled to convert these into gold at the rate of US$35 per ounce. American gold reserves at the end of World War 11 were enormous, US$28 billion at US$35 per ounce. By 1968, half this amount had found their way into the vaults of foreign Central Banks. Then there arose doubts on two points. First, whether the Us balance of payments deficit would cease; second, if it did not, whether the dollar would continue to be convertible into gold. On 15th August 1971, these doubts were removed. The US Government suspended dollar convertibility into gold. The American Government took the position that if foreign Central Banks accumulated US dollars it was their business. If they did not like it, they could remedy the situation by revaluing their own currencies upwards. To add insult to injury, President Nixon called this "a policy of benign neglect". This enraged Central Bankers of the world. Before long, a meeting of major industrial countries, Finance Ministers and Central Bankers, was convened at the Smithsonian Institute in Washington and in December of that year, participants reached agreement on new parity exchange rates. This allowed the over-valued US dollar to be fixed at a more realistic level. Another major change was that exchange rates were allowed to fluctuate within wider limits, plus and minus 2 1/4% of the parity value, compared with 1% under the Bretton Woods Agreement. The Smithsonian agreement with its wider intervention limits, gave more leeway to Central Banks in regard to their intervention operations to support the exchange rate parity. But it solved nothing because the problems confronting the world were not those which would yield to a technical solution, which the Smith-sonian arrangement was. Within six months, the pound floated, i.e., the British Government decided not to tie its value to the Smithsonian parity. Other governments followed the British example and gave up the struggle. By February 1973, the Smithsonian fixed parity exchange rate was largely abandoned. The yen was the first to go. It floated upwards. In March, six members of the European Economic Community linked their exchange rates against each other and floated jointly against the US dollar. Exchange rates were allowed to float, i.e. their values were determined by day-to-day foreign exchange market operations with Central Banks intervening from time to time as they saw fit. The world had reached this position not by deliberate choice. It was because Finance Ministers, Central Bankers and their experts had run out of choices. When the pound lost its moorings on 26th June 1972, Singapore used the US dollar for intervention purposes, the parity rate being taken at one US dollar to $2.82, compared with $3.03 in 1967. In February 1973, the US dollar was further devalued and the Singapore parity was fixed at $2.
54. By June of 1973, this parity could no longer be maintained and the Singapore dollar followed other world currencies and floated. Like the yen, it floated upwards. By this time, the Currency Board had become something of an anachronism, By law its duty was to exchange Singapore dollars for sterling, and later the US dollar, at fixed rates of exchange. It cannot operate under floating rates. Even before the regime of freely floating rates emerged, the function of mana in the external value of the Singapore dollar had been taken over by the Monetary Authority of Singapore, established by an Act of Parliament on 1st January 1971. It was the MAS that provided banks with Singapore dollars against US dollars and US dollars against Singapore dollars when the market was short of one or the other currency. The function of the Currency Board was to issue coins and currency notes to banks and other customers against payment in Singapore dollars. For instance, it issued new currency notes against old ones and coins against currency notes. Even the assets of the Board were managed by the MAS. While the world's monetary system was shaken to its roots by the tumultuous events I described, the Currency Board continued to operate in an environment of complete serenity. It even found time to issue gold and silver coins. In May 1977, it moved from its dilapidated premises in Empress Place to the CPF building where, for the first time, it possessed secure vaults for the storage of currency. The old vaults at Empress Place were a constant source of worry. An enterprising burglar could burrow underground and break into the vaults. Some Members will recall that the renowned detective Sherlock Holmes foiled one such attempt on a bank vault. This exploit is recounted in "The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes: The Red-headed League". As a precaution, a security alarm system was installed in the vaults which responded to seismic shocks which tunnelling operations must set off. However, the system was so sensitive that the alarm went off whenever a heavy truck passed by Empress Place. After some time the only response to the alarm signal when it went off at the Police Control Room was to switch it off. Fortunately no enterprising burglar, assuming he existed, discovered this weakness in the security system at the old vaults. This Bill aims to bring legislation in line with reality. The sections of the old Act, 16 and 17, which obliged the Board to issue Singapore dollars against gold and foreign currencies are repealed in Clause 5. The parity rate of exchange is abolished in Clause 6. Clause 10 will regularise the existing practice whereby the assets of the Board are managed by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. Clause 10 also provides for a revision of the method of valuation of assets. At present the gold reserves of the Board are valued at US$42.22 per ounce which is unrealistic. Notwithstanding these changes, the principle that assets of the Currency Fund shall provide at least 100% cover for the currency issue is retained. This is provided for in Clause 11 of the Bill. There are other minor changes which experience over the years has indicated as necessary. For instance, the Board used to provide free service in exchanging new notes and coins for old ones. Banks are large customers. Unfortunately, some banks abuse this free service, dumping huge amounts of usable and unusable notes for brand new ones. The Board has incurred substantial costs as a result. First, valuable storage space in the vaults is occupied by such notes while waiting to be re-sorted into unusable notes assigned for destruction and usable notes which can be re-circulated. Second, the cost of resorting is substantial. As manual resorting could not cope, the Board had to buy machines. A small charge will encourage banks to do preliminary processing as well as help to defray these costs. There are also provisions relating to tampering, counterfeiting and the production of replicas of notes and coins and a redefinition of limits of the legal tender of coins of various denominations. Sir, I beg to move.