MAIN AND DEVELOPMENT ESTIMATES OF SINGAPORE - FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1ST APRIL, 19 TO 31ST MARCH, 1985
Sir, first, let me separate the substance from the form. I wish to recapitulate the points raised by my colleagues and information sought by them. They have raised eight points altogether: 1. Total defence. 2. Rationale for the extension of the Reserve cycle from 10 to 13 years. Would it not inconvenience the employers? 3. Criteria for enlistment into National Service. 4. What has been done by the SAF to improve the quality of its officers so that they could cope with the demands of a modern, technically sophisticated and professionally competent force, and questions on upgrading of permanent staff and the welfare schemes for regular officers. 5. What is the status of the drug problem in SAF? 6. Requirement to submit medical certificates within 24 hours. 7. Search and rescue. 8. SAF Boys' School. Let me deal with the first item, which is total defence. Why total defence, the question was asked. When Singapore became independent in 1965, the primary problem was getting a credible military defence capability quickly. The problem became most urgent when the British announced their pull-out East of Suez in 1967. So National Service was introduced in 1967 and the SAF was formed. It took many years for Singaporeans to accept National Service as a way of life. Three to four years ago the public education effort on Defence moved away from full-time National Service to concentrate on the role of reservists, particularly the fact that these are front-line fighting troops and that the better of them would have to be put to higher level of appointments in the Reserve. So we moved from National Service to concentrate on the reservists. But we all know that a military attack on Singapore is not the only means by which Singapore can fall to an aggressor. Public morale and confidence have to be boosted with the knowledge that a civilian population is organized to cope with emergencies even when the younger and physically more capable men are mobilized for SAF service. Hence, civil defence. Also, due to a lack of natural resources and a small population, our economy must be organized to withstand external pressures as well as internal pressures that can be brought about by the mobilization of men and equipment from the private sector. Hence, economic defence. As a multi-racial society, Singapore can be a fertile ground for mischievous elements to stir up problems on account of race, religion or culture. Hence, the need for social defence, the need to organize communities within housing estates, like RCs, CCCs, community centres and so on. But undergirding it all is the need for Singaporeans to be willing to stand up for themselves, Hence, psychological defence. Having spent many years to educate the general public concerning military defence, first, concerning fulltime national servicemen and then reservists, we feel that it is now time to cover the other potential weak spots in Singapore's security. Hence, the mass effort on civil defence starting last year, and greater effort this year to educate the public on total defence. Otherwise we, the Singaporeans, can be caught unawares and Singapore can go down without an aggressor even having to mount a military campaign against Singapore because we are not prepared psychologically, socially, and in the fields of economics and civil defence. I will now move on to explain briefly the rationale for extending the Reserve cycle from 10 to 13 years. Simultaneously as we try to educate the public on the necessity of total defence, we have to also impart to them the concept that defence is a life-long commitment. It is not service in the SAF for two years or 21/2 years in National Service and 10 years in the Reserve and then you are free of any responsibility whatsoever to defend this place. So we have also to preach this concept of defence is everybody's business. Defence is a life-long commitment. In fact, the SAF Enlistment Act clearly stipulates that Reserve liability is up to the age of 50 for officers and 40 for other ranks. Although the ideal is to require all reservists in the SAF Reserve service to serve till the maximum age limit, there are many practical limitations which preclude this ideal, factors such as lack of training area, cost of training, shortage of regular staff, administration and logistic constraints. All these limitations require us to decide on a fixed cycle for reservist training. In the past it was 10 years. So why 13 years now? We have been projecting future intakes into the National Service based on current and projected birth rate which has come down drastically after we started family planning. Our falling birth rate has led to dwindling National Service resources which will be insufficient for us to generate the force required for our Reserve force. If we extend this by three more years, it gives us additional men and not just additional men but also trained men for three more years. Hence the need for us to extend the training cycle from 10 to 13 years. As soon as a decision to increase the 10-year training cycle to 13 years was made, briefings and discussions were held by Mindef and the SAF to keep Reservist officers informed of the new Reserve policy. The respective Reserve Formation Headquarters also conducted briefings for their Reserve personnel. Mindef is happy to note that reservists have no problem accepting the logic for the extension from a 10-year Reserve cycle to 13 years. 3.00 pm What about the employers? Would this not inconvenience the employers even though most of the reservists understand the need for an extended reserve cycle? Mindef has also held meetings with employers to explain the rationale for increasing the Reserve cycle from 10 to 13 years. Mindef is also pleased to note that more and more employers are coming forward to express their support for their employees' involvement in Reserve in-camp training and for the need for total defence. In fact, if employers have been accustomed to the reservists going for in-camp training for the last 10 years, an additional three years will not pose any great inconvenience to the companies. A question was asked as to the criteria for enlistment into National Service. The Enlistment Act provides for all able-bodied citizens to render National Service. The contribution or the role he will play in the defence of Singapore will, however, to a larger extent, depend on the physical standard and educational attainment as well as the vocational requirements of National Service appointments. Those who satisfy the criteria for enlistment into full National Service, which I have touched on above, would serve in any one of the organizations which require full-time National Service, like the Singapore Armed Forces, Police National Service and so on. If the Member for Kaki Bukit knows of any particular able-bodied citizens who have not served National Service and who would like to do so, we would be pleased to get the names from him. Moving on to the question raised by the Member for Nee Soon on the quality of SAF officers and how we intend to upgrade the quality to meet new needs, this question was also touched on by the Member for Pasir Panjang when he spoke on the Regular officers. I will take both questions together. We need to do two things. The first thing is to recruit better and better qualified individuals who can become officers or NCOs. That is the first approach, to work out a scheme to attract better qualified people to join the SAF. Secondly, for those who are in the Regular service, we have to work out schemes to upgrade the quality of these officers and NCOs. Fundamental to the upgrading of the SAF officer cadre is our ability to identify those who have good potential and to groom them for key appointments. First, we have to identify them before we can groom them. The SAF has a Wrangler scheme which was started in February 1974 to achieve this. This scheme was revised in July 1981 to incorporate elements of the Shell appraisal scheme. The scheme is part of a wider personnel management system for assessing and developing SAF officers. Basic to the system is the SAF personnel management philosophy of developing human resources to the fullest of the individual's potential. That is the fundamental assumption in the management philosophy. Fitting the right man to the right job at the right time is not only good for the man, but it is also good for the SAF. Apart from the Wrangler development scheme, the SAF also runs advanced and specialized military courses to keep all its officers and NCOs updated and trained in modern weaponry and tactics. In FY 1983, a total of 1,083 regulars, 465 national servicemen and 589 reservists attended advanced level courses conducted by the SAF. Sixty-three regular officers and 28 regular NCOs were also sent overseas to attend specialized courses conducted by other armed forces so that they could learn from their experience and to ensure that in-breeding does not occur. To improve the quality of the officer cadre, the SAF revised the minimum educational requirement for its Regular recruits in 1981. Officers are required to have a minimum of two 'A' levels and two 'O' levels. To ensure that the SAF has its fair share of top talent, the SAF has scholarship schemes to sponsor good 'A' level students to the best universities overseas as well as to the NUS. Ten candidates were awarded the SAF Overseas Scholarship in 1982 and 12 in 1983 to study in Oxbridge and other good universities in the United Kingdom. Fourteen candidates were awarded scholarships to pursue both academic and military training in military academies in UK, Japan, West Germany and Australia. Another 20 National Service officers took up local scholarships to study in the NUS in 1983. There are several other management courses which we put our SAF officers and NCOs through. To ensure that the SAF is able to attract and retain a fair share of the requisite skills and talents, the terms and conditions of service are continually being reviewed to keep them competitive with those prevailing in the public sector as well as in the private sector. We have set up a Pay Research Unit recently to better organize research into salaries and service conditions. The salaries of SAF officers are presently being pegged at 20% above those in the Civil Service for candidates with similar abilities and capabilities. This is also in recognition of military life being more onerous and demanding. As for welfare schemes, there are several such schemes which are available to the Regular officers, like housing loans, car loans, and so on. I do not think I need go into details of these schemes which are sufficiently attractive to the Regular officers and NCOs. What is the status of the drug problem in the SAF? This was asked by the Member for Nee Soon. The problem of drug abuse in the SAF has been well contained. That explains our silence, not the other way round. Evidence? The number of servicemen arrested for drug offences decreased from 631 cases in 1977 to only 109 cases last year, hard evidence that the problem is under control. The relapse rate for drug abuses has also dropped steadily over the last five years. In 1977, there were 90 cases of relapse. In 1983, only 34 cases. How have we done this? Again, we adopt a two-prong approach, soft and hard approaches. The soft approach comprises various educational an d publicity measures carried out from the very beginning when the servicemen are enlisted. The purpose of the programme is to educate them on the dangers of drug abuse. Counsellors from the SAF Counselling Centre assist unit officers in this educational effort. Servicemen who have taken drugs prior to their enlistment are encouraged to admit this fact to their superiors or medical officers. Disciplinary action will not be taken against self-confessed drug abusers. In addition to education and publicity, more direct preventive and containment measures are taken to discourage abuse in the SAF. Mass urine screening exercises are regularly conducted on a spot-check basis at unit level. Where abusers persist in their drug taking habit, punitive punishment follows. Even then the emphasis is on counselling and prevention. Every effort is made by the SAF to rehabilitate drug abusers. Even where punitive punishment has been meted out against persistent drug abusers, they are accorded individual attention and treatment from counsellors from the SAF Counselling Centre which has a good record in tackling the drug problem in the SAF. 3.15 pm The Member for Nee Soon also touched on the peculiar procedure in SAF of requiring national servicemen who have fallen sick and seen private doctors to personally submit their medical certificates to the SAF units within 24 hours. This is, in fact, the directive but I have been told that officers exercise this flexibly. In other words, the sick national servicemen can report over the telephone and send the medical certificate to the unit through somebody else if they like. There is no requirement now for them to personally appear before the SAF medical officers. This also applies to servicemen at the Infantry Training School at Pulau Tekong. So the problem is one of too rigid an implementation. But in some non-routine cases where it is felt that monitoring is necessary, the medical officer may ask the servicemen concerned to report back to camp for review of the ailment and arrangement of suitable medical attention and follow-up. This refers to non-routine cases. This is necessary where the medical leave given is of long duration, more than one day, two days. In such cases, it is necessary for the unit medical officer to liaise with the doctor who issued the medical certificate to discuss the serviceman's illness and, if necessary, to work out a more detailed or appropriate treatment programme. Where it is not possible for the serviceman to return to camp, for example, if he is too ill, the medical officer will visit him at his home. Search and rescue. The Member for Kebun Baru would like to know the number of occasions the Republic of Singapore Air Force was involved in search and rescue missions and whether such services benefited the RSAF. In the last two years, the RSAF has on 14 occasions launched search and rescue missions at the request of civilian agencies. These missions resulted in 26 people being successfully evacuated by rescue helicopters to the Singapore General Hospital. The heli-evacuation conducted during the cable car incident of January 1983 in which 13 lives were saved was one such mission. The experiences derived from search and rescue operations help to reinforce the operational proficiency and skills of our pilots to conduct exacting missions in difficult situations. The RSAF search and rescue capability was primarily developed to meet the Air Force's own needs, both in peace time as well as in war. However, the facilities and resources are also used by the Department of Civil Aviation to meet Singapore's obligations under the Convention of International Civil Aviation to provide search and rescue within the Singapore search and rescue region. Now I move on to the last point raised by the Member for Pasir Panjang on why did we decide to close down the SAF Boys' School. The SAF Boys' School was established in 1975 with the primary purpose of producing potential NCOs for the SAF. Premature school leavers between the ages of 14 and 16 were recruited and trained to become tradesmen or combat NCOs in the SAF. As a result of changes in our national education system, almost every child is now provided with an opportunity to continue its education after PSLE to GCE normal level or 'N' level. And for those who are less academically inclined, they are streamed to VITB for vocational training. So there are fewer and fewer premature school leavers available from the mainstream of our education system. So the SAF Boys' School has become a victim of the improvement in our national education system. For example, in 1982 and 1983, the intake was only about 140 boys compared to about 500 previously. There is an additional reason for closing down the SAF Boys' School, and that is, with our increasing emphasis on upgrading our NCOs' cadre to meet new challenges and higher responsibilities, including the necessity of training progressively better educated national servicemen, the SAF requires people who are better educated. I have covered the points of substance raised by my colleagues in Parliament. I shall now move on to the speech made by the Member for Anson. The Member raised three points. First, our Defence expenditure at 27.92% of our recurrent expenditure is too high. Second, the acquisition of E2C or Hawkeye at $1 billion is unnecessary, particularly as we do not see any immediate threats to our security. His third point is: reveal our enemies. Where are the threats? Who are the enemies? These are the three points which I will answer one at a time. He made one claim and, that is, he and the Workers' Party are totally committed to the defence of Singapore. I shall also examine this claim later on. But first, Mr Speaker, let me state briefly our Defence objective and philosophy. Our Defence objective is straight forward, and that is, national security and national survival. We are too small to be a threat to anyone but we must be able to stand up for ourselves should we be threatened. We see our security and prosperity as closely linked with that of Malaysia and our other ASEAN neighbours. All we want is to be left alone to progress and prosper in peace. But deterrence requires that we have and are known to have a good defence capability. Our defence doctrine is therefore to build up sufficient military, civil, social, economic and psychological strength to deter any threat against our vital interests. And should deterrence fail, to have the capacity to repel any aggression. We started off emphasizing military defence, first full-time national servicemen and then reservists, moved on last year to civil defence, and this year to total defence. Building up the Armed Forces is like a person learning martial arts, for example, karate. When that person acquires a black belt and people know that he has a black belt, he is unlikely to be bullied. And even if others take him on, he has got the wherewithal to defend himself. I know, Mr Speaker, Sir, that such a general answer would not satisfy the Member for Anson and I do not propose to duck the issue. I will come to his points one at a time. Looking at our Defence expenditure and relating it to just recurrent expenditure alone is not correct. He should relate this Defence expenditure to the total Government budget. For the coming year, the more correct figure is therefore 13.67% of our total budget. This appears to be high. But to view this percentage of 13.67% in isolation and to conclude that we should scale down our Defence expenditure is to betray an analytical perception that is as shallow as a saucepan. And I propose to give him more information, more data, and to circulate to Members of the House a Table (Cols. 1275 - 1276) on Defence expenditure for Singapore and several other countries plus two neutral countries, Sweden and Switzerland. Table - DEFENCE EXPENDITURES, 1982 (Cols. 1275 - 1276) [Copies of Table distributed to Members.]