The regional crisis is far from over. While its impact on us in 1997 was minimal, the same cannot be said for 1998. Being at the heart of South East Asia, we are not isolated from regional conditions. We have comprehensive economic linkages with the region and a strong stake in our neighbours' prosperity. In particular, our tradable services sectors like finance and tourism have a strong regional orientation and will be directly affected. It is useful to review how the regional crisis started and spread, assess its impact on the Singapore economy and businesses, and identify the measures which the Government, companies and Singaporeans can take to tide over this difficult period. What Caused the Crisis The roots of the crisis can be traced back to the huge influx of cheap foreign capital to the region in the early 1990s. With inadequate prudential supervision, regional financial institutions over-extended themselves and lent excessively, often to unproductive sectors and projects. This rapid build up of foreign debt was not sustainable. It created asset bubbles in the property and stock markets. For a time, strong regional economic growth enabled the countries to service their debt obligations through buoyant export revenues. Confidence in the region's export potential began to waver towards the mid-1990s, with various exchange rate realignments. In 1994, China devalued the Yuan. In 1995 the Japanese Yen started depreciating against the greenback. In countries whose currencies were tightly pegged to the US dollar, exports began to lose competitiveness. Economies such as China and Latin America emerged as keen competitors. These developments coincided with a cyclical downturn in the global electronics industry and precipitated a regional export slowdown in 1996. With the export engines stalled, investors and creditors grew nervous of the regional countries' continued ability to service the growing foreign debt burden. Eventually, the market lost faith in the sustainability of the linked exchange rate systems adopted by regional economies. Thailand was the first to suffer this loss of investor confidence. Speculative attacks against the Baht mounted as concerns about the Thai economy grew. The breaking point came when Thailand's foreign reserves dipped below its short-term foreign debt obligations in the middle of 1997. Without sufficient reserves to defend its currency, the Thai Government was forced to allow the Baht to float on 2nd July 1997. The contagion effect of this de-facto devaluation of the Thai Baht quickly spread to Malaysia and Indonesia as the market switched its attention to other Southeast Asian economies with similar structural weaknesses in their financial and banking systems. By September, the financial crisis extended to North East Asia. Hong Kong's US dollar peg came under severe pressure, but managed to hold. Long standing structural weaknesses in Japan's financial and banking system caused some major institutions to fail. South Korea, with weaker fundamentals and large private sector debt, took the biggest hit. A massive US$57 billion IMF-led bail-out package was necessary to stabilise the Won, and to keep the Korean economy on its feet. Depending on how successfully Governments manage economic recovery, maintain political and social stability, and restore investor confidence, the regional situation could either gradually stabilise and start to recuperate, or continue to deteriorate before it gets better. Even if regional countries take all the right steps and see through painful but necessary political and economic reform policies, the recovery process cannot be immediate. Overall, we can therefore expect slower regional growth over the short to medium term. Outlook for the Singapore Economy Looking ahead, it is difficult to predict precisely the immediate economic outlook for Singapore. The regional context is too volatile and fraught with uncertainties. Further, political, social and economic changes can trigger off new discontinuities, and render past trends irrelevant. What we can do is to assess the economic outlook based on the current situation, assuming there are no drastic developments. The Singapore economy is expected to feel the full impact of the regional economic crisis this year. The latest business expectations survey results indicate that nearly all major sectors expect weaker business conditions for the next 6 months. The Composite Leading Index, which leads economic activity by about 9 months, has been slowing down since September. Growth in the financial services sector is likely to moderate significantly. The Asian Dollar Market, one of the key financial growth engines, will slow considerably. With the risk premium for the region having risen significantly, financial institutions are adopting a wait-and-see stance before committing any new loans to the region. Activity in the foreign exchange and stock markets is also expected to moderate from the high levels in the second half of 1997. The commerce sector has already registered early impacts from the regional crisis. Entrepot trade will moderate as import demand from regional countries for consumption and capital goods slows. The other domestic segments within commerce will also not be spared. The tourism and retail trades are already seeing slower tourist arrivals and consumer spending, with no immediate prospects of a pickup. The transportation sector, especially our air and sea ports, will also be adversely affected by the fall in tourist arrivals and regional transhipment activities. However, the telecommunications sub-sector should continue to expand, albeit at a more moderated pace. In manufacturing, the continuing robustness of our major export markets in US and EU will help to sustain growth. The US is enjoying an unprecedented stretch of strong growth accompanied by low unemployment and low inflation. The uptrend in US demand for electronics components since the second half of 1996 is continuing. Growth in the EU is also expected to remain firm. The healthy pipeline of investment commitments over the last few years will also contribute to additional industrial capacity in 1998. These positive factors will help our manufacturing sector, although we will still see some consolidation in industries where there is global over-capacity and keen competition. Construction should see robust growth. Private residential developments are sluggish. But growth will be supported by the continued healthy pipeline of public sector infrastructure projects, including the North-East MRT line and public housing projects. Under present conditions, the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) expects the Singapore economy to slow down significantly, but not to the extent of going into a recession. MTI's economic growth forecast for 1998 is 2.5 to 4.5%. MTI will continue to monitor future developments closely, and review its forecast where necessary. Lessons from the financial crisis The rapid development of the regional crisis and the regional outlook for 1998 contains two important lessons for Singapore. First, even while the external environment appears favourable, things can deteriorate rapidly. We cannot assume that the external environment will remain benign forever. We should never be complacent. Policy vigilance is necessary. We must save and invest wisely in good times, to build up a deep and firm economic foundation. Second, the regional crisis has reaffirmed the importance of preserving and instilling confidence internationally and domestically for continued stability and economic growth. International and domestic investors determine demand, invest ment and hence the level of business activity. The Government must therefore build up the confidence and trust of investors through credible, consistent and pro-growth policies. During crises, we must be responsive and ready to effect rational measures judiciously and promptly to restore market confidence. Policy Stance/Adjustments We should use this period as an opportunity to build on our considerable strengths, review our longer term strategies and position ourselves for future growth. Fortunately, our economy is now much stronger and more resilient than it was in 1985. Our economic structure is more mature, our costs more aligned with productivity and economic growth, and our people better trained and skilled than a decade ago. Our current account surpluses and reserves are healthy, our export markets are well diversified, and our industrial and services base is broad. Overall, our fundamentals remain sound. The Government is watching closely the impact of the regional crisis on our economy. The Committee On Singapore's Competitiveness has gathered private sector feedback and recommendations. We must make some adjustments to keep our business environment competitive, but drastic policy changes are not appropriate or necessary at this juncture. In formulating our policies, the Government's key objective is to maintain the framework for economic activity. Market forces will compel industries to consolidate and restructure. Some industries will feel the fall in business demand more than others. Weak and over-extended companies may have to merge or fold. We must accept this. It is the normal process of adjustment to new economic conditions. The Government cannot prevent it from happening, or intervene to support companies which are in difficulty, without paying a high price in terms of misallocated resources and moral hazard. At the same time, we will push ahead with plans to restructure our economy towards higher value-added activities, and enhance our economic capabilities and competitiveness to support future growth. (A) Fiscal Policy During this period of uncertainty, we have emphasised fiscal prudence in planning the Government Budget. We have decided to adopt a conservative fiscal stance, and target for a modest budget surplus, smaller than in recent years. Government revenues will be stagnant. We are keeping a tight lid on operational expenditures. But we are increasing capital expenditures, particularly in the key areas of education, economic infrastructure and defence, in order to invest for the long-term. Education Human talent has always been our most precious resource, and will become increasingly critical as we develop into a knowledge-based economy. The quality of our education system will determine whether young Singaporeans will be able to access, process and apply knowledge creatively. The Ministry of Education (MOE) has embarked on a comprehensive plan to upgrade both the hard and soft aspects of our school infrastructure. For example, the Master Plan for Information Technology in Education seeks to impart thinking, learning and communication skills through the use of information technology (IT) in our schools. At the same time, the Master Plan aims to continually anticipate the needs of society in future and cater courses to meet these needs. Economic infrastructure Our world-class infrastructure has helped to keep us in front in a highly competitive environment by keeping our total business cost relatively low. We must continue to invest in building our longer-term productive capacity. Key economic infrastructure projects we will push on with include reclamation at Changi East, Jurong Island Phase 3 and the upgrading of industrial facilities at Tuas. This counter-cyclical spending will boost the economy, and enable us to take advantage of lower construction costs during the regional slowdown. Defence Economic prosperity depends on a framework of stability and security. A strong, credible SAF deterrent has been a key element of this framework. A professional and effective defence force with cutting-edge capabilities is not built up overnight, but through prudent and consistent investment over many years. Defence spending must be seen as a long-term investment, not dependent on the ups and downs of the economy from year to year. A credible defence capability is the pre-condition for Singapore's continued peace and prosperity. (B) Wage Restraint & Skills Upgrading Our overall cost structure is not significantly out of line. Singapore is internationally competitive, unlike in 1985. But we should be careful to do nothing to weaken our competitiveness during this period of slower economic growth. Cost containment will be a major concern for all businesses. Wages form the largest component of business costs. We need to watch wage costs very carefully. Our priority this year should be to protect jobs. Companies are already trimming back wage increases, and in some cases freezing wages. The Government has announced that salaries of ministers and civil servants will effectively be frozen this year. Wage moderation and flexibility are an important part of our response to the regional crisis. Up to the 1985 recession, our wage system was too rigid. This made it difficult for companies to trim wage costs when the economy slowed, and contributed to deepening the recession. To trim costs, we had no alternative but to cut the employers' CPF contribution rate. So after the recession, we set up the flexible wage system. As the economy grew, year by year we built up a variable component of wages, instead of locking in all the wage increases of good years in the fixed wage. This variable component would be a buffer that could be reduced not too painfully when business conditions changed. In 1987, when the flexible wage system was introduced, the variable component was, on average, 11% of total annual wages. Today, in the civil service the variable component has increased to at least 20% of annual wages, while in the private sector, the variable component is about 16%. We built up the variable component of salaries precisely to meet a situation like this year. If we need to trim wage costs this year, these variable components will be the first line of defence. This will depend on the NWC recommendations. Slower economic growth also makes it more urgent for workers to re-skill, re-train and upgrade themselves. There will be retrenchments as industries and companies consolidate. Workers who add significant value to companies are those who will keep their jobs. The key challenge for workers is to remain relevant and employable. The Government's policy has always been to create the right conditions for companies to create good jobs, and to provide ample training and upgrading opportunities for workers. We have not opted for unemployment insurance, but instead have kept our labour market flexible. This approach has served workers well and produced full employment for many years. However, despite this, nobody can expect lifetime job security. From time to time workers will be retrenched, even in a full employment economy. When this happens, those who have been retrenched must be willing to be flexible in their expectations, and if necessary accept a little less pay to secure a new job. The longer a worker stays unemployed, the more difficult it will be for him or her to rejoin the workforce. Even now the number of foreign professionals and workers is still increasing in Singa pore. There are more jobs to be filled than Singaporeans available to do them. Companies too need to tighten their belts during this period. They should look at streamlining and consolidating their operations to cut costs. They should also take the opportunity to upgrade their capabilities, and enhance their existing products and services to prepare for the upturn. At the same time, they should make more efforts to upgrade their workers. While MNCs and larger companies have made significant progress in worker training, reaching roughly 4-6% of investment payroll, smaller companies still lag behind, spending an average of only about 2%. Just as the Government is not letting up on our investments in education, companies too should not neglect to improve the quality of their workforce. (C) Local Enterprise Financing Scheme Another key concern of businessmen during this period of slower growth is the availability and cost of capital to support their business activities. Some businesses have reported that they are facing higher interest rates and that their credit lines are being pulled back. Some tightening of bank credit and increase in interest rates is inevitable at a time of regional uncertainty. The Government has explained that it cannot intervene to ask banks to extend loans or to lower interest rates. These are commercial lending decisions, which the banks themselves have to take. However, the Government will enhance its Local Enterprise Financing Scheme (LEFS) to help local businesses to obtain working capital. First, we will expand the scope of LEFS to cover more local enterprises. For factoring and working loan facilities, we will raise the eligibility threshold for manufacturing companies from a maximum of $15 million in fixed productive assets, to $30 million. For services companies, the cap on maximum employment size will be raised from 200 to 300 employees. Second, the Government will share a greater part of the risk in LEFS. Currently, for factoring loans, the risk is borne fully by the financial institution administering the LEFS loan, while for working capital loans, the Government and the financial institution share the risk 40:60. The Government will now co-share the risk for both factoring and working capital loans on a 50:50 basis with the financial institution. However, the financial institution must still undertake the necessary credit analysis, and satisfy itself that the company is a good risk. Third, the maximum loan quantum per company for factoring and working capital loan facilities will be increased from $5 million to $8 million. To cater for the expected increase in the volume of LEFS loans, the Government will increase its provision in LEFS loan lines from $760 million to $1.1 billion. We will review these enhancements to LEFS in 2 years' time. The Productivity and Standards Board and the Economic Development Board will be releasing more details of the enhanced LEFS shortly. (D) JTC/HDB Rentals Besides wages and the cost of capital, rentals form another significant component of business costs. In July last year, the Jurong Town Corporation (JTC) implemented several measures to moderate or defer rental increases for its lessees. These measures are up for review on 1st July 1998. Similarly, in December 1997, the Housing and Development Board (HDB) implemented a package of rental concessions for its industrial and commercial tenants. The HDB package included moderating rental adjustments at 3rd renewal of tenancies and staggering increases in rent for sub-letting and assignment cases. These steps were part of the Government's continuing efforts to review and moderate cost pressures on businesses. JTC and HDB will now extend additional rental concessions to their tenants and lessees. (a) JTC and HDB will freeze their posted land rentals for an additional 12 months, till end June 1999. They will moderate rental adjustments for their industrial land lessees who are paying less than the posted rates.