General Division of the High Court · Decided 14 July 2026
A winning party's poor evidence as a witness did not justify a special costs order
Chong Jorina v Ritz Property Investimentos Imobiliarios Ltda and another
Feedback & support[2026] SGHC 148 · Case no. Originating Claim No 727 of 2023 · 20 paragraphs
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A winning party's poor evidence as a witness did not justify a special costs order
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [80], [87]
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Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
The underlying action
- [5]
[5] The background to this action can be stated briefly.
- [6]
[6] The claimant’s case was that she advanced loans totalling over $1.6m to the first defendant between 12 June 2018 and 12 November 2019 in reliance on false representations for which the second defendant was liable in either fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation. In addition, and on the same facts, she advanced an alternative claim against the second defendant in conspiracy.
- [7]
[7] I dismissed the claimant’s claims. I dismissed the claim in fraudulent misrepresentation for three principal reasons: (a) the representations were not made or, even if made, were not attributable to the second defendant; (b) the claimant failed to prove the dishonest state of mind that fraudulent misrepresentation requires; and (c) in any event, the claimant was not induced by, and did not rely on, the alleged representations. I dismissed the claimant’s claim in negligence for the same reasons, and for the additional reason that no duty of care arose. I did not have to deal with the claimant’s claim in conspiracy because she withdrew it in her written closing submissions.
- [8]
[8] In reaching those conclusions, I relied largely on the contemporaneous documents rather than on the oral evidence of the parties, because I found significant aspects of both parties’ evidence to be unsatisfactory. The claimant shifted her position when she perceived it to be inconsistent with the documents and, at points, gave evidence that she knew to be untrue. The second defendant, for her part, was in certain respects an evasive witness who deflected the questions put to her. The unsatisfactory aspects of both parties’ evidence did not affect the outcome, which turned largely on the documents.
- [9]
[9] As in the principal judgment in this action, and for the same reason, I shall refer henceforth to the second defendant simply as “the defendant”.
The parties’ submissions
- [16]
[16] I take these three issues in turn.
The claimant’s preliminary argument
General principles on the assessment of costs
Pre-trial costs
The parties’ submissions
Volume of documentary material
- [29]
[29] I do not accept the claimant’s submission that the documents were voluminous only in form and not in substance. It is true that the agreed bundles and supplementary agreed bundles held fewer than 280 distinct documents, that the text of the affidavits of evidence in chief came to only a little over 150 pages and that the pleadings were relatively brief, especially when compared to a complex commercial dispute. In my view, the volume of documents was high in substance, not just form. The events in issue spanned a decade. The WhatsApp messages in issue spanned several years. Answering the case pleaded against her required the defendant to trace the flow of funds through the documents relating to several bank accounts.
Two specific legal complexities
Novel question of law
- [33]
[33] The novel question of law that the defendant had to address was whether a statement purely as to the future is actionable in negligence. I directed the parties to address this question at a judge’s case conference.
- [34]
[34] In my view, it was reasonable for the defendant to consider that the court would have to deal with the question in determining the issues arising from the claims and the defences. It was therefore reasonable for the defendant to have undertaken research to deal with the question, not least because the court directed her to do so.
- [35]
[35] I do not accept the claimant’s submission that the law on this question is settled or covered by a single authority. Addressing this question reasonably required substantial research.
The claim in conspiracy
Quantum
The defendant’s case on quantum
The claimant’s case on quantum
Decision on quantum
Trial costs
Post-trial costs
Whether to deprive the defendant of part of her costs
- [62]
[62] I take these two reasons in turn.
The settlement overtures
- [64]
[64] I give these overtures no weight. The content of the discussions at the mediation and of the settlement terms exchanged are not before me. I cannot therefore make any finding as to whether the defendant acted reasonably or unreasonably in not responding to these overtures and in not settling this action.
The defendant’s conduct
- [68]
[68] For the reasons that follow, I decline to make a Type I order on grounds of either aspect of the defendant’s conduct.
Type I orders under Comfort Management
- [70]
[70] Comfort Management concerned the discretion to make a Type I order on the grounds that the successful party had raised and then failed on a discrete claim or issue. But the conceptual distinction between a Type I order and a Type II order turns on the conceptual nature of the order and not on the feature that triggers the order of either type.
- [71]
[71] Comfort Management was decided under the Rules of Court 2014 (“the 2014 Rules”). The power to make a Type I order was then found in O 59 r 6A of the 2014 Rules (Comfort Management at [42]). Under the current Rules, the power to make a Type I order is found in O 21 r 4 of the Rules:
The principles applicable to the power to make a Type I order
- [72]
[72] I begin with the principles applicable to the power to make a Type I order.
The quality of the defendant’s evidence
- [80]
[80] I take the complaint about the defendant’s evidence first. The complaint brings this complaint under O 21 r 4(b) of the Rules. That limb addresses a party who has done or omitted to do anything unreasonably. In my view this complaint does not engage O 21 r 4(b) at all. The unreasonable conduct to which r 4(b) is directed is a successful party’s unreasonable conduct of the litigation. That much is clear from the three other limbs of O 21 r 4. They are all concerned with the way a party conducts the litigation: raising and losing on discrete issues, failing to consider amicable resolution and failing to comply with orders of the court.
- [83]
[83] I do not exclude the possibility that a successful party’s conduct as a witness might, in another case, form part of her unreasonable conduct of the litigation overall. For example, a party may deliberately and dishonestly advance and persist in maintaining a case that she knows to be false. As part of that, she may give evidence at trial that is unsatisfactory (see Denis Matthew Harte v Tan Hun Hoe and another [2001] SGHC 19 at [41(o)]). But that is not the claimant’s complaint. Her complaint is about the unsatisfactory quality of the defendant’s evidence alone, not that that conduct is merely one dimension of dishonestly advancing a false case.
Non-compliance with disclosure orders
- [85]
[85] The complaint about the defendant’s alleged non-compliance with the disclosure orders falls within the express terms of O 21 r 4(d) of the Rules.
- [87]
[87] In my view, any breaches by the defendant of the disclosure orders did not have that effect. The cross-examination directed to the non-compliance with the orders, and to the defendant’s WhatsApp communications with Mr Lessa, went primarily to credibility. It did not assist in resolving the issues that I had to decide on the merits. I decided those issues largely on the contemporaneous documents.
Conclusion
(a) the costs of the action fixed on the standard basis at $215,000;
(b) the disbursements of the action fixed by agreement at $20,494.90; and
(c) the costs of the interlocutory applications ordered to be in the cause fixed by agreement in the sum of $8,670.60.