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Grounds publishedDecided 21 Jun 2021

General Division of the High Court

Parti Liyani v Public Prosecutor

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[2021] SGHC 146Case no. Magistrate’s Appeal No 9068 of 2019/01

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The facts surrounding the conviction and subsequent acquittal of the appellant, Parti Liyani (“Parti”), have been comprehensively set out in my decision in Parti Liyani v Public Prosecutor [2020] SGHC 187 (the “Main Judgment”) at [4]–[21]. For the sake of brevity, I do not propose to repeat them here save to briefly summarise the facts relevant to this judgment. Unless otherwise indicated, I will adopt the abbreviations used in the Main Judgment.

  3. [2] Following a trial in the lower court, Parti was convicted of one charge of theft as a servant under s 381 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (“Penal Code”) and three charges of theft in dwelling under s 380 of the Penal Code. She was sentenced to a total of 26 months’ imprisonment (see Public Prosecutor v Parti Liyani [2019] SGDC 57).

  4. [3] After hearing Parti’s appeal against conviction and sentence, I found that the Prosecution failed to prove its case against Parti beyond a reasonable doubt in relation to all four charges that were brought against her. As such, I allowed Parti’s appeal and acquitted her of those charges.

  5. [5] To the extent that the inquiry under s 359(3) of the CPC may constitute any circumscribing of prosecutorial power, I find the observations made by the Court of Three Judges in Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 (at [146]) to be applicable:

  6. To the extent that prosecutorial power is circumscribed in any way, the court’s inquiry pursuant to ss 355(2) and 359(3) of the CPC is wholly within the limits of its judicial power as set out by the CPC. It is also a corollary of its power to control the proceedings before it.

  7. [7] For reasons which I will explain in this judgment, I find that the prosecution of Parti was not frivolous or vexatious and dismiss Parti’s application for compensation.

  8. Factual background

  9. [8] Parti was employed as a foreign domestic worker in the Liew household for approximately nine years from March 2007 to 27 October 2016. The Liew household residing at 49 Chancery Lane (“49 CL”) comprised Mr Liew Mun Leong (“Mr Liew”), his wife, Mdm Ng Lai Peng (“Mdm Ng”), their daughter Ms Liew Cheng May (“May”), their son Mr Karl Liew (“Karl”) and Karl’s wife, Ms Heather Lim (“Heather”). Karl, Heather and their children lived in 49 CL until they moved to 39 Chancery Lane (“39 CL”) on 1 March 2016.

  10. [9] In October 2016, Mr Liew, while overseas, decided to terminate Parti’s employment because he suspected that Parti had stolen several missing items over the years. On the morning of 28 October 2016, Karl served the termination notice and informed Parti that her employment was terminated at 49 CL in the presence of two representatives from the employment agency and Mdm Ng. She was given only two hours to pack all her belongings. Besides packing her items into three jumbo boxes, Parti also brought out a black bag (the “Black Bag”) containing clothes which had been given by Karl to Jane, the Liew household’s previous domestic worker. She looked at the contents of the Black Bag and decided that she did not want any of the clothes either. The Black Bag was left there. After packing, Parti left the house with the representatives from the employment agency and returned to Indonesia.

  11. [10] After Parti left, Mdm Ng, Karl and Heather checked the contents of the boxes at 49 CL on 29 October 2016 and discovered items in the boxes that allegedly belonged to members of the Liew household. In the process, a 21-second video clip was recorded of the items that they had taken out (the “Video”). After Mr Liew’s return to Singapore, Karl and Mr Liew filed a police report on 30 October 2016.

  12. [11] On 2 December 2016, Parti returned to Singapore and was arrested upon her arrival at the airport. Parti was charged with the following charges which she contested at trial (see Main Judgment at [6]):

  13. [12] Parti’s defence to the charges was a denial that any of the listed items were stolen. Her explanation for each of the items could be grouped broadly as follows:

  14. [13] The evidence and testimony given by the factual witnesses of both parties were hotly contested at trial and on appeal.

  15. [14] In the lower court, the trial judge (“Judge”) convicted Parti of one charge of theft as a servant under s 381 of the Penal Code and three charges of theft in dwelling under s 380 of the Penal Code. The Judge also amended the 2nd charge by removing several items. Parti was sentenced to a total of 26 months’ imprisonment.

  16. [15] On appeal, I considered the undue emphasis on Parti’s failure to inquire about the three jumbo boxes she was accused of stealing, the break in the chain of custody of some of the items, the existence of an improper motive by members of the Liew family for mounting the allegations against Parti, the potential inaccuracies of the statements (ie P31, P32 and P33) due to various reasons and the lack of credibility of several Prosecution witnesses. In the light of these considerations, I accepted parts of Parti’s defence that some of the items were purchased and belonged to her, some were given to her, some were not packed by her and some were discarded items and retrieved by her. As such, I acquitted Parti of all the charges and allowed her appeal.

  17. The parties’ cases

  18. [17] Regarding the scope of s 359(3) of the CPC, Parti makes the following submissions:

  19. (a) The legislative purpose of s 359(3) of the CPC is not to serve a punitive function but to grant the acquitted party a convenient and less burdensome path to receive recompense where it is rightfully deserved. It is a statutory innovation that provides a check and balance that ensures the maintenance of public trust in the Prosecution’s exercise of its function.

  20. (b) The test for “frivolous or vexatious” prosecution should be less onerous than the torts of malicious prosecution or false imprisonment and “extravagant and unnecessary” conduct by the Defence under s 355(1) of the CPC. Where the Prosecution’s conduct is purposeless or lacking in seriousness as considered by the court in the context of the Prosecution’s duties as ministers of justice, it is “frivolous or vexatious”. Where the Prosecution undertakes a prosecution “without reasonable and probable cause”, this is a possible indication that the prosecution is “frivolous or vexatious”. Malice or dishonesty on the part of the Prosecution is not required. Parti also aligns her position with Prof Ong’s submissions on the meaning of “frivolous or vexatious” (see below at [26(d)] below). Alternatively, the test for “frivolous or vexatious” prosecution is akin to “dishonest or malicious” conduct.

  21. (c) Section 359(3) of the CPC does not limit the meaning of “the prosecution” to just commencement and continuation of a case but includes the conduct of the Prosecution in advancing the case at trial.

  22. (d) The factors to be considered are the circumstances as a whole, the facts of the case, the strength of the prosecution, and the course of conduct of the Prosecution.

  23. (e) The standard of proof would require the Defence to show prima facie evidence of “frivolous or vexatious” prosecution which will then require the Prosecution to justify its conduct to the court. If the Prosecution fails to do so, the prosecution will be found to have been “frivolous or vexatious”. Alternatively, the standard of the balance of probabilities should apply.

  24. (f) The Prosecution’s conduct of trial does not fall within the purview of constitutionally protected prosecutorial discretion.

  25. [18] Parti argues that the following conduct of the Prosecution in the trial below amounts to “frivolous or vexatious” prosecution and entitles her to compensation:

  26. (a) taking issue with the post-offence conduct of Parti and her representatives which were merely intended to annoy or embarrass the Defence;

  27. (b) proceeding against Parti on an unsustainable charge (ie, 1st charge);

  28. (c) relying on unreliable and improperly procured statements;

  29. (d) proceeding despite the break in the chain of custody of the alleged stolen items;

  30. (e) failing to objectively value the items;

  31. (f) impeding Parti’s preparation for trial;

  32. (g) nit-picking at Parti’s inability to recall the exact price of kitchenware;

  33. (h) making purposeless attacks in respect of the use of supermarket shopping points in cross-examination;

  34. (i) withholding evidence on the functionality of the Pioneer DVD Player;

  35. (j) repeatedly objecting to the introduction of evidence of illegal deployment;

  36. (k) admitting statements (ie, exhibits P31, P32 and P33) after the investigative officers (ie, IO Amir and ASP Lim) had taken the stand, and failing to recall them as rebuttal witnesses;

  37. (l) continuing with charges relating to Karl despite his lack of credibility;

  38. (m) continuing with the 2nd charge in relation to 115 pieces of clothing, despite the serious risk of contamination of evidence owing to the Black Bag; and

  39. (n) including the Phillips DVD player in the 2nd charge (relating to Karl Liew’s items), when evidence from witnesses indicated it was Heather’s.

  40. [19] For the quantum of compensation, Parti submits that she incurred losses of $73,100.00 but seeks the statutory maximum amount of $10,000.00.

  41. [20] On the other hand, the Prosecution submits that the decision to prosecute was not frivolous or vexatious by any account and Parti’s application for compensation should be dismissed.

  42. [21] Regarding the scope of s 359(3) of the CPC, the Prosecution makes the following submissions:

  43. (a) Section 359(3) of the CPC is meant to provide a convenient and rapid route to obtaining compensation which should ordinarily be pursued through a civil claim for malicious prosecution. It is not a sui generis cause of action but an alternative route to the torts of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment.

  44. (b) To prove that a prosecution was “frivolous or vexatious”, it is necessary to prove that there was “dishonesty or malice” on the Prosecution’s part. An applicant must prove that the Prosecution did not honestly and reasonably believe that there was sufficient evidence against the accused person to make a case fit to be tried to begin with. A prosecution will be “frivolous or vexatious” if it was not motivated by a desire to achieve justice but by improper and indirect considerations, including a desire to harass or annoy the accused and thus lacked a bona fide or legitimate purpose.

  45. (c) The threshold should be higher than that of O 18 r 19(1)(b) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“Rules of Court”) where an objective standard prevails and not less onerous than the tort of malicious prosecution. This is because the Prosecution exists to perform a public function and their decisions must be adequately protected from excessive scrutiny. The constitutional role of the Prosecution is relevant to interpreting the threshold and scope of s 359(3) of the CPC. The lower the threshold for proving that a prosecution was “frivolous or vexatious”, the greater the risk that this will erode the independent exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

  46. (d) The subject of the inquiry under s 359(3) of the CPC is the decision to prosecute itself, and not the Prosecution’s conduct at trial. Disciplinary proceedings exist to provide redress for breaches of professional responsibilities.

  47. (e) The appropriate standard of proof is a “high degree of confidence” where the criminal court must not be entangled in complex issues of liability but must be satisfied that the evidence is so overwhelmingly strong that malicious prosecution can be proved.

  48. (f) The statutory limit of $10,000.00 applies whenever a person is acquitted, whether of one or multiple charges.

  49. [22] The Prosecution maintains that it had sufficient basis to prosecute Parti because of the following:

  50. (a) the testimony of the Liew family clearly identifying the respective items within the charges as belonging to them;

  51. (b) Parti’s admission during investigations that she had taken some of the items listed in the charges without their owners’ consent;

  52. (c) there was no apparent reason for the Liew family to frame Parti at the time of making the decision to prosecute; and

  53. (d) this is supported by the fact that Parti did not make any submission that there was no case to answer at the close of the Prosecution’s case.

  54. [23] The Prosecution argues that none of Parti’s arguments relating to the Prosecution’s conduct at trial shows basis to conclude that the decision to prosecute was “frivolous or vexatious”:

  55. (a) While the Prosecution overlooked the fact that Parti’s employment terminated on 27 October 2016 for the 1st charge, this does not reflect a lack of seriousness, dishonesty or malice. In any case, the upshot is that any conviction recorded ought to be for an offence under s 380 of the Penal Code rather than s 381 of the Penal Code.

  56. (b) Any issues with the statement recording process ought to affect the admissibility or weight of the statements but are not grounds for compensation. It was reasonable for the Prosecution to rely on the statements given the Liew’s corroborative statements and the statement recorder’s testimony that Parti had no difficulty understanding him.

  57. (c) The break in the chain of custody only affected the items that were not seized from Parti personally and which she claimed that she did not intend to take with her to Indonesia. Further, the Prosecution’s decision to prosecute was supported by other evidence such as the statements of the Liew family.

  58. (d) The valuation of the stolen items is a factor primarily relevant to sentencing and does not undermine the integrity of the decision to prosecute.

  59. (e) The Prosecution’s submissions and questions about Parti’s post-offence conduct is relevant under s 8 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (“Evidence Act”) as to the court’s determination of Parti’s guilt or innocence.

  60. (f) The tendering of additional exhibits during trial is part and parcel of the criminal litigation process. Parti could have sought an adjournment had it been required and there was no prejudice arising out of the exhibits disclosed.

  61. (g) The Prosecution’s cross-examination of Parti regarding the purported discrepancy on the price of kitchenware and her purported use of supermarket shopping points to purchase a ceramic pot were clearly permitted under s 148 of the Evidence Act.

  62. (h) Regarding the functionality of the Pioneer DVD player, there was no prejudice to Parti because Parti’s counsel had sufficient access to the DVD player to pursue her case and had ample opportunity to re-examine Parti.

  63. (i) The Prosecution’s objections to the introduction of evidence of illegal deployment cannot amount to “frivolous or vexatious” conduct since the court can decide on whether to sustain or overrule such objections and the objections must be seen in light of the Prosecution’s understanding of Parti’s case at that juncture (as disclosed in the Case for the Defence) which did not include any allegation of false accusations by the Liew family.

  64. [24] For the quantum of compensation, the Prosecution submits that Parti’s quantification of $73,100.00 as the compensation she is entitled to is grossly overstated, but the discussion is “somewhat academic” since Parti limits her application to the statutory limitation of $10,000.00.

  65. The young amicus curiae’s submissions

  66. [25] Prof Ong was asked to address me on the following issues:

  67. (b) What is the meaning of a prosecution that is “frivolous or vexatious” in the context of s 359(3) of the CPC?

  68. (c) What is the relevant test for proving “to the satisfaction of the court that the prosecution was frivolous or vexatious”? Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, to consider:

  69. (i) Whether this involves a subjective standard, an objective standard, or a combination of both?

  70. (ii) What factors should the court consider when determining whether a prosecution was frivolous or vexatious?

  71. (iii) What is the standard of proof for the test and who bears the burden of that proof?

  72. (d) In determining whether there has been a “frivolous or vexatious” prosecution, are the parties allowed to furnish further or fresh evidence (ie, other than those which has been admitted into evidence at the trial) in support of their respective positions?

  73. (e) Assuming it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the prosecution was “frivolous or vexatious”, how should the court assess the quantum of compensation payable under s 359(3) of the CPC? Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, to consider:

  74. (i) What factors should the court consider in assessing the quantum of compensation payable?

  75. (ii) Do the words “[i]f an accused is acquitted of any charge for any offence …” in s 359(3) of the CPC mean that the $10,000.00 limit for compensation under that subsection is to apply per charge?

  76. (iii) What should the court’s approach be in cases where the court is satisfied that the prosecution is “frivolous or vexatious” in relation to some charges but not in relation to others?

  77. (iv) Whether there is a difference and if so, what is the difference in assessing the quantum of compensation payable if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the prosecution was:

  78. (A) both frivolous and vexatious;

  79. (B) frivolous but not vexatious; and

  80. (C) vexatious but not frivolous?

  81. [26] Following an extensive review of the genealogy of s 359(3) of the CPC, Prof Ong helpfully makes the following submissions:

  82. (a) The object and purpose of s 359(3) of the CPC is to create and define a new type of legal wrong captured by the phrase “frivolous or vexatious” which is not coterminous with, and cannot be subsumed within, an existing legal wrong (such as the torts of false imprisonment or malicious prosecution); its purpose is also to create an expedient procedure to obtain redress in the form of monetary compensation (“Possibility A”). Alternatively, the object and purpose of s 359(3) of the CPC is to create a new procedure to obtain a monetary remedy for a type of wrong that was already recognised by the law (eg, the torts of malicious prosecution or false imprisonment) (“Possibility B”). Possibility A is to be preferred.

  83. (b) The phrase “the prosecution” in s 359(3) of the CPC prima facie refers to the commencement, continuation, and the conduct of the prosecution. Compensation is available if the fact of prosecution (including both the initiation and the continuation of the prosecution) or the manner of prosecution was “frivolous or vexatious”.

  84. (c) The meaning of “frivolous or vexatious” cannot depend on characteristics specific to the Prosecution because s 359(3) of the CPC applies to private prosecutors as well. Therefore, the constitutional role of the Prosecution should have no impact on the meaning of “frivolous or vexatious”.

  85. (d) If Possibility A is correct, a prosecution is “frivolous or vexatious” if one or more of the following applies:

  86. (i) The prosecution is or becomes legally or factually unsustainable, in that:

  87. (A) the initiation of the prosecution was legally or factually unsustainable in the light of the known evidence and applicable law; or

  88. (B) at any point during the prosecution, the prosecution becomes legally or factually unsustainable in the light of the known evidence and applicable law.

  89. (ii) The prosecutor lacks an honest belief that there is a reasonable and probable cause of action, in that:

  90. (A) when initiating the prosecution, the prosecutor did not honestly believe that “there is a case fit to be tried” or “a proper case to lay before the court”; or

  91. (B) at any point during the prosecution, the prosecutor ceased to honestly believe that “there is a case fit to be tried” or “a proper case to lay before the court”.

  92. (iii) The prosecutor’s motive is improper, in that:

  93. (A) the prosecution was initiated with an improper motive, such as to annoy, embarrass or harass; or

  94. (B) at any point during the prosecution, the prosecutor formed such a motive.

  95. (iv) The prosecution is not conducted seriously, in that:

  96. (A) the prosecution was initiated with a lack of seriousness; or

  97. (B) the prosecution was initiated with a sense of seriousness, but this sense of seriousness disappeared at any point during the prosecution.

  98. (v) As to the prosecutor’s conduct:

  99. (A) the prosecutor’s conduct evinces any of (ii), (iii), or (iv) above; or

  100. (B) the prosecutor engages in conduct that does not advance its case or serves no purpose but to protract the trial, or is otherwise unnecessary and extravagant.

  101. (e) If Possibility B is correct, a prosecution is “frivolous or vexatious” if:

  102. (i) the Prosecution has committed the tort of frivolous imprisonment by unlawfully charging the defendant with an offence to which s 95(1) of the CPC applies; or

  103. (ii) the Prosecution has committed the tort of malicious prosecution.

  104. (f) The applicant for compensation bears the legal burden of proving that the prosecution was “frivolous or vexatious”. As to the standard of proof:

  105. (i) the appropriate standard is the “balance of probabilities”;

  106. (ii) the acquitted person will fail if he/she fails to adduce evidence which, if unrebutted, will warrant a conclusion that the prosecution was “frivolous or vexatious”; and

  107. (g) Even after the trial, parties may adduce fresh evidence as to whether the prosecution was “frivolous or vexatious”, and, if it was, what quantum of compensation should be paid. This may be adduced by way of witness testimony or the production of documents through a relatively straightforward procedure to which the criminal process (as opposed to the civil litigation process) is suited.

  108. (h) The quantum of compensation is to be that which will put the accused in a position as though the accused had not been frivolously or vexatiously prosecuted by compensating for proven injuries to legally protected interests, subject to causation, mitigation, and remoteness.

  109. (i) The methodology just described applies regardless of whether the prosecution is frivolous, vexatious, or both, subject to a rule against double recovery.

  110. (j) The costs of the accused’s defence (which, for the avoidance of doubt, Parti is not claiming) is not recoverable as compensation.

  111. (k) The maximum amount of compensation which the court may award is $10,000.00 per charge.

  112. (l) If the prosecution was “frivolous or vexatious”, it is nonetheless open to the court, in its discretion, to award no compensation or to award a smaller sum than the proposed method of computing the quantum would yield.

  113. Issues to be determined

  114. [27] Based on the parties’ submissions, the main issues to be determined before me are as follows:

  115. (a) what is the meaning of “the prosecution was frivolous or vexatious” in s 359(3) of the CPC; and

  116. (b) whether the prosecution was frivolous or vexatious in this case and, if so, what quantum of compensation should be awarded.

  117. Legislative history

  118. The law

  119. [37] The CPC Commentary (at para 18.015–18.016) explained the adaptations to s 355(2) of the CPC from its predecessor as follows:

  120. Issue 1: The meaning of “the prosecution was frivolous or vexatious” in s 359(3) CPC

  121. [41] The proper interpretation of the scope and meaning of s 359(3) of the CPC has not hitherto been considered by the Singapore courts. Since the interpretation of s 359(3) of the CPC is a novel one, I turn first to the principles of statutory interpretation applicable in Singapore.

  122. [42] It is trite that the court adopts a purposive approach in interpreting statutory provisions (see s 9A of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed) (“IA”)). The Court of Appeal in Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General [2017] 2 SLR 850 (“Tan Cheng Bock”) (at [37] and [54]) set out a three-stage framework as follows:

  123. (a) First, the court will ascertain the possible interpretations of the provision, having regard not just to the text of the provision but also to the context of that provision within the written law as a whole.

  124. (b) Second, the court will ascertain the legislative purpose or object of the statutory provision in question.

  125. (c) Third, the court will compare the possible interpretations of the text against the purposes or objects of the statute. The interpretation which furthers the purpose of the written text should be preferred to the interpretation which does not.

  126. [43] As the Court of Appeal in Tan Cheng Bock cautioned (at [50]), the proper function of the court when applying s 9A of the IA is to interpret a given statutory provision. While purposive interpretation is an important and powerful tool, it is not an excuse for the court to rewrite a statute. The authority to alter the text of a statute lies with Parliament, and judicial interpretation is generally confined to giving the text a meaning that its language can bear. Hence, purposive interpretation must be done with a view toward determining a provision’s or statute’s purpose and object “as reflected by and in harmony with the express wording of the legislation”.

  127. [44] Applying the Tan Cheng Bock framework in the context of determining the meaning of “the prosecution was frivolous or vexatious” in s 359(3) of the CPC, the analysis proceeds as follows:

  128. (a) First, this court will consider the various possible meanings of the phrase “the prosecution was frivolous or vexatious” in s 359(3) of the CPC, having regard to the text of s 359(3) of the CPC and the context of that provision within the CPC as a whole.

  129. (b) Second, this court will ascertain the legislative purpose of s 359(3) of the CPC. In so doing, this court ought to give primacy to the text of the provision. Where appropriate, this court may also consider extraneous material for this purpose.

  130. (c) Third, this court will compare the possible meanings of the phrase “the prosecution was frivolous or vexatious” in s 359(3) of the CPC against the legislative purpose and ascertain which of these possible meanings best furthers the legislative purpose of s 359(3) of the CPC.

  131. [45] For ease of reference, I set out s 359(3) of the CPC again:

  132. [46] With this, I turn to the first stage of the Tan Cheng Bock framework, namely, to determine the various possible meanings of “the prosecution was frivolous or vexatious” as used in s 359(3) of the CPC.

  133. The first stage of the Tan Cheng Bock framework

  134. The various possible meanings of “the prosecution”

  135. [47] I begin with the various possible meanings of “the prosecution” in s 359(3) of the CPC. I note that the provision uses the term “the prosecution” three times, though not necessarily in the same way. In the first use of the term, the provision describes a situation where “the prosecution” was frivolous or vexatious (“the First Use”). In the second use of the term, the provision describes the court ordering “the prosecution or the complainant” to pay compensation (“the Second Use”). In the third use of the term, the provision describes an informant as “the person on whose information the prosecution was instituted” (“the Third Use”). It is the First Use which is material to the dispute before me.

  136. [49] The Prosecution submits that the First Use “plainly denotes the decision to commence and continue prosecution, and cannot encompass the minutiae of how each prosecutor conducts himself or herself at every stage of the proceedings”. This interpretation is supported by the following:

  137. (b) If the provision were intended to address improper conduct by the Prosecution, there would be no reason for compensation under s 359(3) of the CPC to be limited to cases where the accused was acquitted.

  138. (c) Section 359(5) of the CPC refers to “civil damages for malicious prosecution”, which likewise target wrongful prosecution (and not the prosecutor’s conduct of the proceedings).

  139. [50] On this point, Prof Ong submits that the First Use means the entire process of prosecution, from its initiation, to its continuance and the manner in which it was conducted, all the way until the end of the proceedings. Prof Ong relies on the change of wording from “the complaint was frivolous or vexatious” in s 179 of the 1900 CPC (see [29] above) to “the prosecution was frivolous or vexatious” to submit that the Legislature must be taken to have intended a change in the scope of the provision. Unlike the word “complaint”, the word “prosecution”, as used in the 1900 CPC and the CPC, describes not just the initiation of a process, but an entire process, from the bringing of the charges to the conclusion of the court proceedings.

  140. [51] While parties agree that the First Use includes the initiation and continuation of the proceedings, they dispute as to whether the First Use also includes the conduct of the prosecutors during the proceedings per se.

  141. [52] Prima facie, the ordinary meaning of “the prosecution” is broad and capable of encompassing the conduct of the prosecutors during the proceedings. As such, I accept that there are two possible interpretations of the First Use having regard to the text of s 359(3) of the CPC and the context of that provision within the CPC:

  142. (a) “the prosecution” means only the decision to prosecute and continue prosecuting (“Interpretation 1”); and

  143. (b) “the prosecution” means the entire process of prosecution including the decision to prosecute and continue prosecuting as well as the conduct of the prosecutors during the proceedings (“Interpretation 2”).

  144. [53] However, the correct interpretation must depend on the “particular statutory context in which it is used, in particular, the legislative intention underlying the relevant statutory provision, which in turn is primarily embodied in the text of the statutory provision itself or, failing which, in extraneous material” (see Skyventure VWT Singapore Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor and another and another matter [2021] SGCA 40 at [32]).

  145. The various possible meanings of “frivolous or vexatious”

  146. [54] The phrase “frivolous or vexatious” is not new. Apart from s 359(3) of the CPC, the word “frivolous” appears eight other times in the CPC and the word “vexatious” appears seven other times in the CPC albeit in various formulations. The same phrase is also utilised in other legislation (see O 18 r 19 (1)(b) of the Rules of Court and ss 85(8)(a), 85(19), 93(2A) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (“LPA”)). Before turning to the possible meanings of “frivolous or vexatious” in the context of s 359(3) of the CPC, I examine the ordinary meaning of “frivolous or vexatious” as set out in local and foreign case law.

  147. (1) The meaning of “frivolous or vexatious” in local cases dealing with costs orders against the Prosecution under the CPC

  148. [61] In Huang Liping, the Court of Appeal (at [17]–[19]) discussed Arun Kaliamurthy and made the following observations:

  149. [62] While the Court of Appeal did not go further to explain the meaning of “frivolous or vexatious” in the context of ss 356(2) and 409 of the CPC, it emphasised the factually intensive nature of the inquiry inherent within legal terms of art like “frivolous or vexatious”, “extravagant or unnecessary” or “abuse of process of the Court”. The Court of Appeal also made the following observations as regards s 356(2) of the CPC (at [24]):

  150. (2) The meaning of “frivolous or vexatious” in the Rules of Court

  151. [66] With regard to “plainly or obviously unsustainable” actions, the Court of Appeal, in The “Bunga Melati 5” [2012] 4 SLR 546 (at [39]), explained that this would refer to:

  152. (a) legally unsustainable actions: if “it may be clear as a matter of law at the outset that even if a party were to succeed in proving all the facts that he offers to prove he will not be entitled to the remedy that he seeks”; or

  153. (b) factually unsustainable actions: if it is “possible to say with confidence before trial that the factual basis for the claim is fanciful because it is entirely without substance, [for example, if it is] clear beyond question that the statement of facts is contradicted by all the documents or other material on which it is based”.

  154. (3) The meaning of “frivolous or vexatious” in foreign cases dealing with costs or compensation

  155. [69] Next, in Musammat Jaina v Santukdas and another [1919] 54 Indian Cases 249 at 250, the court affirmed Beni Madhab’s observations and similarly described “frivolous” as trifling, silly, or without due foundation. It observed that “[i]f the charge was found to be a false one, it was to my mind patently both a vexatious and frivolous one”. Finally, in Bakaji v Mukundsingh and others [1920] 55 Indian Cases 98 at 100, the court observed that “there seems to be no room for doubt that an accusation may be frivolous or vexatious without being wholly false”. It also stated that a “vexatious” charge may be partly true and the idea conveyed by the word is that the object of the person making the accusation should be primarily to harass the persons accused.

  156. (4) The tort of malicious prosecution

  157. [72] Section 359(5) of the CPC (see [35] above) provides that any compensation paid out under s 359(3) of the CPC shall be counted towards the satisfaction of any claim for civil damages for malicious prosecution. The tort of malicious prosecution is similar to “frivolous or vexatious” prosecution in s 359(3) of the CPC in that they both deal with proceedings which ought not to have been brought in the first place and are contingent on the acquittal of the accused person. Therefore, the elements of the tort of malicious prosecution may potentially have some relevance to the meaning of “frivolous or vexatious” in s 359(3) of the CPC.

  158. [73] In Zainal bin Kuning and others v Chan Sin Mian Michael and another [1996] 2 SLR(R) 858 (“Zainal Kuning”) (at [54]), the elements of the tort of malicious prosecution were set out by the Court of Appeal as follows:

  159. [74] The Court of Appeal (at [56]) accepted Hawkins J’s definition in Hicks v Faulkner (1878) 8 QBD 167 at 171 that reasonable and probable cause was “an honest belief in the guilt of the accused based upon a full conviction, founded upon reasonable grounds, of the existence of a state of circumstances, which, assuming them to be true, would reasonably lead any ordinarily prudent and cautious man, placed in the position of the accuser, to the conclusion that the person charged was probably guilty of the crime imputed”. This is both subjective and objective: not only must there be reasonable and probable cause, the prosecutor must have subjectively believed that it existed (see Challenger Technologies Pte Ltd v Dennison Transoceanic Corp [1997] 2 SLR(R) 618 at [44]).

  160. [75] The degree of guilt believed by the prosecutor need not extend to a belief that the accused would be convicted but simply whether there is a case fit to be tried. This was persuasively observed by Lord Denning in Glinski v McIver [1962] AC 726 at 758:

  161. Similarly, Lord Devlin expressed, at 766, that:

  162. [76] The requirement of malice, in the context of prosecutions, means being motivated by improper and indirect considerations. It must be shown that the prosecution was motivated not by a desire to achieve justice but for some other reason (see Zainal Kuning at [84]).

  163. (5) The possible meanings of “frivolous or vexatious” for s 359(3) of the CPC

  164. [77] Since each statutory context may target different mischief and Parliament may well use the same phrase to mean different things (see Attorney-General v Ting Choon Meng and another appeal [2017] 1 SLR 373 (“Ting Choon Meng”) at [61]), the case law above may only offer guidance on the ordinary meaning of “frivolous or vexatious” across several contexts. I emphasise that it is still ultimately a matter of interpretation as to what “frivolous or vexatious” means in the context of s 359(3) of the CPC.

  165. [78] Parti (see [17(b)] above) and Prof Ong (see [26(d)] above) agree that “frivolous or vexatious” prosecution would not require proof of malice or dishonesty but could include any of the following:

  166. (a) where the prosecution is or becomes legally or factually unsustainable in the light of the known evidence and the applicable law;

  167. (b) where the prosecutor lacks an honest belief that there is a reasonable and probable cause of action;

  168. (c) where the prosecutor’s motive is improper in that it was initiated with an improper motive (such as to annoy, embarrass or harass);

  169. (d) where the prosecution is not conducted seriously in that the prosecution was initiated with a lack of seriousness or that sense of seriousness disappeared at any point during the prosecution; and

  170. (e) where the prosecutor’s conduct (i) evinces a lack of an honest belief, an improper motive or a lack of seriousness; or (ii) evinces conduct that does not advance its case, is purposeless and only protracts the trial, or is unnecessary or extravagant.

  171. [79] In contrast, the Prosecution (see [21(a)] and [21(b)] above) submits that “frivolous or vexatious” has the same meaning as malicious prosecution. It is necessary to prove dishonesty or malice on the Prosecution’s part and that the Prosecution did not honestly and reasonably believe that there was sufficient evidence against the accused to make a case fit to be tried to begin with. This could be the case where the prosecution was not motivated by a desire to achieve justice but by improper and indirect considerations, including a desire to harass or annoy the accused and thus lacked a bona fide or legitimate purpose.

  172. [80] Parties do not dispute that the meaning of “frivolous or vexatious” in s 359(3) of the CPC will include a situation where the prosecution was instituted or continued dishonestly, maliciously, for an improper motive (such as a desire to harass or annoy an accused person without a bona fide or legitimate purpose). The central dispute is whether there is a requirement to prove malice or dishonesty before “frivolous or vexatious” prosecution under s 359(3) of the CPC is made out. I am of the view that both interpretations proffered by the parties are possible when considering the text of the CPC and the context of that provision within the CPC as a whole.

  173. The second stage of the Tan Cheng Bock framework

  174. [81] I turn next to ascertain the legislative purpose or object as per the second stage of the Tan Cheng Bock framework. As observed in Ting Choon Meng (at [61]), the more general object of the statute may cast little light on the purpose of a particular provision within that statute. As such, it is sensible to focus on ascertaining the more specific purpose behind s 359(3) of the CPC. The starting point of ascertaining legislative purpose should be giving primacy to the internal sources (ie, the text of the relevant legislative provision itself and the statutory context) (see Tan Cheng Bock at [43]). This is because the law enacted by Parliament is the text which Parliament has chosen to embody and give effect to its purposes and objects. Where appropriate, extraneous material may be referred to under ss 9A(2) and 9A(3) of the IA to assist the court in ascertaining the legislative purpose.

  175. [82] Prof Ong suggests Possibility A and Possibility B (see [26(a)] above) as alternative versions of the legislative purpose of s 359(3) CPC and he takes the view that Possibility A is correct. In substance, Parti’s position (see [17(a)] and [17(b)] above) is aligned with Possibility A and the Prosecution’s position (see [21(a)] above) is aligned with Possibility B.

  176. Text of s 359(3) of the CPC and the statutory context

  177. [88] On this point, I take guidance from the following extract in Francis Bennion, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (LexisNexis, 5th ed, 2008) at p 1157:

  178. [90] Had the Legislature intended that compensation for an accused person who is acquitted is only available if the torts of malicious prosecution or false imprisonment had been made out, it would have simply used the phrase “the prosecution was malicious or the accused person was falsely imprisoned” instead of “the prosecution was frivolous or vexatious”. At most, it may be observed that the Legislature considered that a malicious prosecution would likely satisfy the test of “frivolous or vexatious” prosecution. This, as I explain below at [126], is correct.

  179. [92] I now consider the purpose behind the recognition of the legal wrong of “frivolous or vexatious” prosecution or the mischief that the provision seeks to address. This is material since the parties dispute over whether the legal wrong of “frivolous or vexatious” prosecution encompasses the conduct of the prosecutors at trial even if there was a case fit to be tried before the court. In my view, the language chosen suggests that the mischief that the Legislature intended to address in s 359(3) of the CPC is prosecutions that ought not to have been brought or continued but was frivolously or vexatiously done so and not how the prosecutions were conducted by the prosecutors. If the latter was the intention, the Legislature could have worded s 359(3) of the CPC as “the commencement, continuation or conduct of the prosecution was frivolous or vexatious” similar to s 356(3)(a) of the CPC as opposed to “the prosecution was frivolous or vexatious”. However, the Legislature chose to utilise “the prosecution” in s 359(3) of the CPC despite having used other phrases which clearly encompass the prosecutors’ or the accused’s conduct such as the “conduct of the matter … by the prosecution” (see s 356(2) of the CPC) and the “commencement, continuation or conduct of the matter … by the accused” (see s 356(3)(a) of the CPC) in other provisions of the CPC.

  180. [93] Nothing in the provision suggests that the mischief sought to be addressed includes the conduct of the prosecutors at trial even if there was a case fit to be tried before the courts. Conversely, the requirement of an acquittal in s 359(3) of the CPC suggests that the legislative intention behind the creation of the new legal wrong of “frivolous or vexatious” prosecution is not to regulate the conduct of prosecutors at trial. This is because it would not be logical to make the legal wrong contingent on an acquittal if the mischief targeted was the conduct of the prosecutors at trial. Frivolous or vexatious conduct by the prosecutors at trial would be unacceptable regardless of whether there is an acquittal or a conviction. I do not think that the legislative purpose is for the legal wrong of “frivolous or vexatious” prosecution to censure such conduct by the prosecutors when there is an acquittal but to have no application when there is a conviction. This fortifies my view that the legislative purpose of s 359(3) of the CPC, as discerned by the Legislature’s choice of words in the provision, is intended to primarily address the mischief of prosecutions that ought not to have instituted or continued but was frivolously or vexatiously done so, and not the conduct as such of the prosecutors at trial. As it stands, the latter ought to be left to the remit of the disciplinary procedures available under the LPA.

  181. Parliamentary debates

  182. [94] I turn next to consider whether there are any parliamentary debates that may help me ascertain the legislative purpose behind s 359(3) of the CPC. At the outset, I should point out that there is a dearth of any legislative material concerning the Legislature’s specific purpose in enacting s 359(3) of the CPC. The introduction of ss 355(2), 356(2) and 359(3) of the CPC was not debated in Parliament. The only written material available on s 359(3) of the CPC specifically is the Ministry of Law’s Consultation Paper dated 11 December 2008 to 5 February 2009 (“Consultation Paper”) which states:

  183. [96] The Prosecution also submits that the comments made by the Minister of Law, K Shanmugam (the “Minister for Law”), in August 2008, just a few months before the Consultation Paper was released, show that the genesis of s 359(3) of the CPC is the tort of malicious prosecution. I quote the relevant extract from the 2008 debates as follows (Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (25 August 2008), vol 84 at cols 2991 to 2992):

  184. [97] The Prosecution argues that the genesis of s 359(3) of the CPC is malicious prosecution because the Minister for Law used the terms “frivolous”, “vexatious” and “malicious prosecutions” interchangeably and declared that the bar would not be changed in August 2008 when the Consultation Paper was released in December 2008. This means that the law following s 359(3) of the CPC should be the same as the tort of malicious prosecution.

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