Court of Appeal · Decided 24 May 2021
Crest Capital Asia Pte Ltd and others v OUE Lippo Healthcare Ltd (formerly known as International Healthway Corp Ltd) and another
Feedback & support[2021] SGCA 57 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 113 of 2020 · 18 paragraphs
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] This judgment deals with two issues occasioned by this court’s decision in allowing the appeal by the fourth and fifth appellants in CA/CA 113/2020 (“VMF3” and “VMIII”, respectively), while dismissing the appeal by the first to third appellants (“Crest Capital”, “Crest Catalyst” and “EFIII”, respectively) (collectively, the “Crest Entities”): see Crest Capital Asia Pte Ltd and others v OUE Lippo Healthcare Ltd (formerly known as International Healthway Corp Ltd) and another and other appeals [2021] SGCA 25 (“the Appeal Judgment”).
- [5]
[5] After due consideration of the parties’ respective submissions on the two issues, our decision, in brief, is as follows:
Consequential Order Issue
Background
- [6]
[6] At first instance, the Crest Entities were found to be jointly and severally liable (along with others) to the respondents to the tune of some $12.6m. Thereafter, the respondents’ solicitors, Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP (“R&T”) wrote to the Crest Entities’ solicitors at the time, WongPartnership LLP (“WongP”) demanding that the Crest Entities pay the judgment sum by late July 2020. In the same month, the Crest Entities filed a notice of appeal, and applied for a stay of execution. However, the stay application was eventually withdrawn.
- [7]
[7] In early August 2020, the respondents commenced various enforcement proceedings against the Crest Entities. On 18 August 2020, Tham Lijing LLC took over from WongP as solicitor for VMF3 and VMIII. On 28 August 2020, after Tham Lijing LLC had taken over as solicitor for VMF3 and VMIII, WongP proposed to R&T for the judgment sum to be paid over three instalments in return for a stay of the enforcement proceedings. It is not disputed that this proposal by WongP was agreed to by all the Crest Entities on 29 August 2020. VMIII thereafter paid the sum of about $10.3m to the respondents for the judgment debt and the interest accruing thereon.
- [8]
[8] After VMF3’s and VMIII’s appeals were allowed, Tham Lijing LLC wrote to R&T, demanding repayment of the sums referred to in the preceding paragraph with interest. R&T declined to do so.
The parties’ positions
VMF3 and VMIII
The respondents
(a) First, the $10.3m was neither paid only by VMIII, nor paid to discharge only VMIII’s liability. There was no suggestion that (i) the $10.3m was paid only on behalf of VMIII and VMF3; or that (ii) the $10.3m was paid in exchange for a stay of the enforcement proceedings only as against VMF3 and VMIII. On the contrary, the $10.3m was paid by VMIII on behalf of all the Crest Entities, and received by the respondents on that basis. That the money was paid by VMIII does not mean that the money was paid on behalf of VMIII alone.
(b) Second, the correspondence between R&T and WongP resulted in a binding contract between the respondents and the Crest Entities, where the Crest Entities undertook to make payments to the respondent and in exchange, the respondents agreed to withdraw the enforcement proceedings. There is no provision in this alleged contract that the sums paid by VMIII are to be refunded to VMIII in the event that VMIII’s appeal succeeds.
(c) Third, the respondents were not unjustly enriched. There remains the alleged contract between the Crest Entities and the respondents (see [(b)] above) which bar any claims in unjust enrichment. Further, there is no total failure of consideration since the $10.3m payment discharged Crest Capital, Crest Catalyst and EFIII’s liability, which was upheld on appeal. For the same reasons, the respondents have detrimentally changed their position.
(d) Fourth, it would be unfair for the respondents to repay the $10.3m and to revert to having an unsatisfied judgment debt against Crest Capital, Crest Catalyst and EFIII. The respondents have proceeded on the basis of the judgment sum being satisfied in full and have therefore not taken any further enforcement steps against Crest Capital, Crest Catalyst and EFIII.
(e) Fifth, the respondents submit that it is for a judgment debtor who is jointly and severally liable with others, and who pays the judgment debt on behalf of all the judgment debtors, to seek contribution from the other judgment debtors. VMIII should therefore look to the other judgment debtors, ie, Crest Capital, Crest Catalyst and EFIII, and not the respondents for reimbursement of the $10.3 million or any part thereof.
In fact, the post-judgment correspondence suggested otherwise, in that the Crest Entities requested the respondents to inform the banks that they wished to apply the funds in VMIII’s and EFIII’s bank accounts (which were subject to garnishee orders) towards the satisfaction of the judgment sum.
Our decision
- [11]
[11] In our view, it will be helpful to first explain the basis of the rule for the restitution of benefits conferred pursuant to a judgment that is subsequently reversed (which, for convenience, shall be referred to as the “restitutionary rule”). Tham Lijing LLC did not explicitly state that this restitutionary rule is based on unjust enrichment, and we think for good reason. Even the treatise cited by Tham Lijing LLC does not rationalise the restitutionary rule on the basis of unjust enrichment. Instead, the restitutionary rule is justified as part of the court’s “procedural mechanisms whose function is to reduce the risk of judicial error”: Goff & Jones at 26-05. Put differently, the restitutionary rule is rationalised as a practical instrument through which the court can undo the judgment below and results thereof, ie, as a rule of judicial policy. As explained by Lord Nicholls in Nykredit Mortgage Bank PLC v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (formerly Edward Erdman (an unlimited company)) [1997] 1 WLR 1627 at 1637: “when ordering repayment the [court] is unravelling the practical consequences of orders made by the courts below and duly carried out by the unsuccessful party”.
Policy rationalisation
- [14]
[14] Having examined the correspondence between R&T and WongP at the material time, we agree with the respondents that the $10.3m was intended to discharge the joint and several liability of all the Crest Entities.
- [15]
[15] There is no dispute that the $10.3m was paid by VMIII following negotiations between WongP and R&T (for the avoidance of doubt, this is not to say that this payment was entirely funded by VMIII). The letter from WongP, which initiated the negotiations, referred to a proposal from “our clients”. Although by this time, Tham Lijing LLC had already taken over the conduct of the appeals on behalf of VMF3 and VMIII, there was no indication from WongP’s letter that the negotiations were done only for the remaining three Crest Entities ie, Crest Capital, Crest Catalyst and EFIII. In fact, in early September 2020 before the $10.3m was paid, WongP wrote to R&T to state that their “clients” (without specifying that it was a reference only to Crest Capital, Crest Catalyst and EFIII) would pay the $10.3m using the funds from the bank accounts of EFIII and VMIII. It would not make commercial sense to interpret the reference to “clients”, to refer only to the clients of WongP as that would mean that the $10.3m was paid by VMIII to discharge the liability of Crest Capital, Crest Catalyst and EFIII only.
- [16]
[16] In our view, as the $10.3m was paid by VMIII, this payment would naturally have been intended to also discharge the liability of at least VMIII and possibly VMF3 as well, as VMF3 was closely aligned with VMIII. At the same time, the $10.3m must also have been paid to discharge the liability of the remaining three Crest Entities, since they were the clients of WongP, which kickstarted the negotiations (see [15] above). Accordingly, the $10.3m was clearly paid to discharge the liability of all five Crest Entities. This is reinforced by the fact that all the Crest Entities were found to be jointly and severally liable for the same indivisible judgment debt.
- [17]
[17] Our view is further fortified by a letter from Tham Lijing LLC to this court dated 14 April 2021, which stated that:
Tham Lijing LLC thus accepted that WongP was negotiating on behalf of the “Appellants”. The reference to “Appellants”, without qualification, must refer to all of the Crest Entities, and not just VMF3 and VMIII. This is because in other parts of its letter, Tham Lijing LLC referred to VMF3 and VMIII as the “4th and 5th Appellants”, and to the remaining three Crest Entities as the “1st to 3rd Appellants”. Given that Tham Lijing LLC accepted that WongP had negotiated on behalf of all the Crest Entities, it must follow that Tham Lijing LLC must have also accepted that the $10.3m paid pursuant to the negotiations was likewise meant to discharge the joint and several liability of all the Crest Entities.
- [18]
[18] Since the $10.3m was made to discharge the liability of all five Crest Entities, a successful appeal by some but not all the Crest Entities would give rise to the question as to who should bear the risk of non-payment of the judgment debt. The full reimbursement of the $10.3m to VMIII would mean that the risk of non-payment would necessarily be borne by the respondents. This would be plainly unsatisfactory because the respondents did succeed in resisting the appeals by Crest Capital, Crest Catalyst and EFIII, whose liability has been discharged by the $10.3m payment. Should the $10.3m be fully reimbursed to VMIII, the respondents would be compelled to retake steps to enforce the judgment against Crest Capital, Crest Catalyst and EFIII. Balanced against this is VMIII’s case that it would be wrong for VMIII to bear the risk of non-payment as it had succeeded in its appeal together with VMF3.
- [19]
[19] On the specific facts of this appeal, we are of the view that VMIII should bear the risk of non-payment. VMIII paid the $10.3m to the respondents after the Crest Entities had lodged the notice of appeal. Significantly, at the time of the payment, VMIII and VMF3 were already represented by Tham Lijing LLC. By then, it would have been apparent that VMIII’s and VMF3’s appeals were no longer completely aligned with those of the remaining three Crest Entities, and therefore the possibility of VMIII and VMF3 succeeding in their appeals but that the appeals of the other three Crest Entities would fail could not have been ruled out. In the circumstances, the onus was on VMIII to protect itself from the risk of non-payment by requesting contributions from the remaining Crest Entities before it decided to make the $10.3m payment. It is not even clear to us whether this was done by VMIII in relation to the remaining Crest Entities. Instead, VMIII on its face elected to pay the judgment debt on behalf of all the Crest Entities. If VMIII did not intend to discharge the liability of Crest Capital, Crest Catalyst and EFIII, then it was incumbent upon VMIII to state its position clearly, which it did not. In fact, for the reasons set out in [15]–[17] above, the evidence is to the contrary.
- [20]
[20] Since VMIII should bear the risk of non-payment, the $10.3m should not be refunded to it. The proper course of action for VMIII to take, assuming that it had funded the entire payment of the $10.3m, would be to look to Crest Capital, Crest Catalyst and EFIII for their contributions to the $10.3m instead of to the respondents. Just to be clear, in our view, it would make no difference even if the entire $10.3m was indeed funded by VMIII. The undeniable fact remains that the $10.3m was intended to discharge the joint and several liability of all the Crest Entities.
Unjust enrichment rationalisation
- [21]
[21] It is clear to us that that the respondents had been enriched to the tune of $10.3m, at VMIII’s expense. However, the key question is whether such enrichment is unjust.
- [23]
[23] For completeness, we make some brief observations in relation to each of the three unjust factors. As regards the first unjust factor of failure of basis, as the respondents have correctly pointed out, if the $10.3m payment was meant to discharge the liability of all the Crest Entities, it would follow that there was no total failure of basis since Crest Capital, Crest Catalyst and EFIII remained liable. Partial failure of basis does not suffice as an unjust factor to support a claim in unjust enrichment.
- [24]
[24] In relation to the second unjust factor of mistake, we do not think that there was any operative mistake on the evidence before us. A mistake is defined by Lord Walker JSC (as he then was) in Pitt v Holt [2013] UKSC 26 at [108] as either a “mistaken conscious belief” or an “incorrect tacit assumption” about a state of affairs. However, in the context of VMIII’s payment of the judgment that was subsequently appealed against, the very fact of VMIII’s appeal (along with the other Crest Entities) against the judgment revealed that none of them including VMIII, harboured any mistaken belief or incorrect assumption about the correctness of the decision below (see also Papamatheos at 279).
- [25]
[25] In relation to the third unjust factor of compulsion, we similarly do not think that it applies here. The compulsion that was exerted on VMIII to pay the judgment debt was entirely legitimate, since such compulsion emanated from the judgment of the High Court, even though the judgment was subsequently established to have been erroneously decided. While legal compulsion is a recognised unjust factor, its relevance is typically limited to a three-party situation: for instance, where a claimant is forced to pay a third-party to discharge a joint and several liability shared with the defendant, or where a claimant is forced to pay a debt owed by the defendant to the defendant’s creditor (see Graham Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (OUP, 3rd Ed, 2015) at p 234). Put differently, the unjust factor of legal compulsion would support a claim by VMIII against the three unsuccessful Crest Entities in unjust enrichment, but not against the respondents. As between the VMIII and the respondents, it cannot be said that the payment of the $10.3 was unjust, since the compulsion to effect the payment was to prevent further recourse to legal process which is a normal incident post-judgment (see Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford, 1989) at p 185).
Costs Issue
Background
The parties’ positions
VMF3 and VMIII
The respondents
(ii) Further, the Crest Entities, including VMF3 and VMIII, ran a very wide defence in the trial below, the large part of which failed.
(i) It was reasonable for the respondents to have pursued against VMF3 and VMIII, since they were parties to the Disputed Facilities.
(ii) Further, this court found that VMF3 and VMIII were misled by the investment memorandums for which the remaining Crest Entities were responsible.
Our decision
Costs of the trial below
(i) Refund of the $350,000
(ii) Adjustments to the costs order below
(a) The Crest Entities relied on the same set of pleadings, the same Affidavit of Evidence-In-Chief and the same set of submissions for the trial below.
(b) In the Crest Entities’ written opening statement for the trial below, there was in fact no reference to the attribution point. The first mention of the attribution point appears to have been only in the oral opening statement.
(c) In the Crest Entities’ closing submissions for the trial below, only six paragraphs (out of 490) dealt with the attribution point; in the reply closing submissions, only eight paragraphs (out of 178) were devoted to the attribution point.
Costs of the appeal
- [43]
[43] We agree with the respondents that VMF3 and VMIII should not be awarded the full sum of $100,000, or the alternative amount of $80,000. As the respondents have pointed out, VMF3 and VMIII succeeded in their appeals only on a narrow point of proof of attribution, while their remaining arguments were rejected. While we did engage Mr Toby Landau QC, counsel for VMF3 and VMIII, primarily on the attribution issue during the oral hearing, the remaining arguments which we did not accept were nonetheless prominently featured in VMF3’s and VMIII’s written case on appeal. Further, the questions posed to Mr Landau on the attribution issue also concerned the sub-issue of pleadings, on which VMF3 and VMIII did not succeed.
Conclusion
(b) In relation to the appeal, the respondents are to pay VMF3 and VMIII costs fixed at $30,000 inclusive of disbursements.