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Grounds publishedDecided 27 Jul 2022

Court of Appeal

Roslan bin Bakar and others v Public Prosecutor and another appeal

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[2022] SGCA 57Case no. Criminal Motion No 6 of 202215 paragraphs

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  1. Introduction

  2. [2] CM 6 was a criminal motion filed under s 394H of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (“the CPC”). CM 6 was filed on 14 February 2022. It was heard and dismissed by this Court on 15 February 2022. That very evening, the firm of L F Violet Netto (“LFVN”) filed HC/OS 139/2022 (“OS 139”) on behalf of the first and second applicants in CM 6. OS 139 was an application for leave to commence judicial review proceedings. It was heard before a judge of the General Division of the High Court (“the Judge”) on the morning of 16 February 2022. Dissatisfied with the Judge’s dismissal of OS 139, the appellants immediately filed CA 6 which this Court then heard.

  3. [3] CM 6 was brought by three persons, namely, Roslan bin Bakar (“the first applicant”), Pausi bin Jefridin (“the second applicant”) and Lawyers for Liberty (“LFL”), the third applicant. They sought leave to file an application asking this Court to review its earlier decisions in CA/CCA 59/2017 (“CCA 59”) and CA/CCA 26/2018 (“CCA 26”) which were given in relation to the criminal cases against, respectively, the first and second applicants. The Public Prosecutor was the respondent in CM 6.

  4. [4] At the hearing on 15 February 2022 (“the CM 6 hearing), all the applicants were represented by the same counsel, Mr Charles Yeo Yao Hui (“Mr Yeo”). Mr Yeo was then, as he informed us, a salaried partner of the firm of LFVN, the solicitors for the applicants, having just been admitted as such. Mr Yeo had also filed an affidavit in support of the application. It should be noted that Ms L F Violet Netto (“Ms Netto”) was the sole proprietor of LFVN.

  5. [5] CM 6 was the first step in an attempt to set aside the death sentences that had been passed on the first and second applicants after their respective convictions for drug trafficking. As mentioned, we dismissed the application. In respect of the first and second applicants, we were of the view that they were not able to meet the threshold requirements for a review set down by s 394H of the CPC and had no material with which to do so. In respect of LFL, our judgment was that it had no standing to be a party to CM 6 and we therefore dismissed the application in respect of LFL as a preliminary matter. Our full grounds of decision can be found in Roslan bin Bakar & anor v Public Prosecutor [2022] SGCA 18 (“the CM 6 Judgment”).

  6. [6] OS 139 and CA 6 constituted the second step in the first and second applicants’ attempts to set aside the death sentences passed upon them. The Attorney-General, the respondent in the proceedings, opposed both the application and the appeal. Mr Yeo had filed an affidavit in support of OS 139 and represented the applicants at the hearing on 16 February 2022 (“the OS 139 hearing”). He also acted for them in respect of CA 6, their appeal against the decision in OS 139. CA 6 was dismissed because there was no merit in the arguments raised in support of the appeal before us or in the originating application before the Judge. Our full grounds for that decision can be found in Roslan bin Bakar and another v Attorney-General [2022] SGCA 20 (“the CA 6 Judgment”).

  7. Should LFL be ordered to pay costs

  8. Preliminary issue

  9. [13] The CPC does set out the relevant procedural rules in relation to the representation of a body corporate that is charged with an offence under s 117:

  10. The parties’ submissions

  11. Our decision

  12. [23] We find LFL’s arguments for this Court to strike down ss 356, 357 and 409 of the CPC under Art 4 of the Constitution unconvincing and devoid of any legal basis. LFL’s submissions are premised on the fundamental assumption that these provisions are impediments to an accused person’s access to justice or otherwise infringe upon such person’s right to a fair trial. This is not so, both in general and in the particular cases of the first and second applicants. Both the first and second applicants have had ample access to the courts and were assisted by defence counsel. Their cases have been given exhaustive consideration and all points raised by them have been argued on their behalf in court. CM 6 and CA 6 are but the last in a long line of cases in the Singapore courts concerning the first and second applicants. Given the gravity of the right to a fair trial and the importance of access to justice, allegations of breaches of the same which could impugn the criminal justice system ought not to be made lightly.

  13. [25] In any case, on the facts before us, we are satisfied that both the first and second applicants in CM 6 had been accorded every opportunity to defend their innocence, challenge their convictions (and sentences), and even review their sentences following amendments to the sentencing framework of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) under which they had been charged and convicted (see the CM 6 Judgment at [14]–[15]).

  14. [28] Thirdly, it was not open to LFL to make this argument as it was not acting for the first or second applicant in the first place.

  15. Should Mr Yeo be ordered to pay costs

  16. (b) If so, did such conduct cause the other party to incur unnecessary costs?

  17. The submissions

  18. [35] Secondly, there were serious substantive deficiencies in CM 6. This was because it sought reliefs which the court had no power to grant and a lawyer who had studied the history of the cases would have known that a review application in respect of CCA 59 and CCA 26, the appeals in question, was a legal non-starter. In addition, Mr Yeo admitted that he had no new evidence to ground the application and that he would have to rely on new evidence “which might possibly arise if time was given” to have the first and second applicants’ mental states re-assessed. He offered no legal arguments or authorities to support the application for review of the appeals. Furthermore, at the hearing, oral submissions traversed a wide range of issues including Arts 9 and 12 of the Constitution, international conventions and customary international law but the submissions lacked merit.

  19. Our decision

  20. [42] The first question we have to consider is whether Mr Yeo acted improperly. In this connection, as we pointed out in [19]–[21] of the CM 6 Judgment, the requirement under s 394H of the CPC to apply for leave for criminal review under s 394J was instituted to weed out unmeritorious applications for review of appellate decisions at an early stage. The review application itself which is made under s 394J of the CPC requires “sufficient material”, being evidence or legal arguments, on which the appellate court may conclude that there has been a miscarriage of justice in the criminal matter in respect of which the earlier decision was made. The material, whether legal or evidential, must not have been previously canvassed and must be compelling in that it is capable of showing almost conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, in a leave application under s 394H the applicant must be able to show the court that “the material it will be relying on in the review proper is almost certain to satisfy the s 394J requirements”. In CM 6, after hearing Mr Yeo and considering the affidavit he had filed, we found at ([25] of the CM 6 Judgment) that there was no evidential material at all which could found a criminal review of either CCA 59 or CCA 26. Further, at [26] we were satisfied that there was no material in the form of legal arguments reflecting a change in the law after the decisions in CCA 59 and CCA 26 that could support a review. Accordingly, CM 6 was dismissed. We observed at [30]:

  21. [43] As counsel for the applicants, it was incumbent on Mr Yeo to determine whether there existed any material, legal or evidential, that could support a criminal review of the sentences that had been imposed on the first and second applicants. What he did in this regard could be gleaned from the affidavit he filed in support of the application. In para 4 of the affidavit, he gave the “reasons” why a review was required. These “reasons” centred first, on the assertion that the first and second applicants had an abnormality of mind in that their IQs were low, and secondly, the assertion that no one should be sentenced to death or executed subsequently if that person had a mental disorder at the time of the offence or at the time of execution. Mr Yeo’s affidavit did not deal with the findings of the court in CCA 59 and CCA 26 that the applicants were not suffering from such abnormalities of mind that impaired their responsibility for their offences or the fact that such findings were made after consideration of all the psychiatric and other expert evidence provided to the court. Nor did his affidavit contain any new evidence on the mental states of his clients. As for new legal material, Mr Yeo only cited two cases from other jurisdictions in the Commonwealth, which, based as they were on different legal provisions and different facts, were only marginally relevant, if at all. As we found in the CM 6 Judgment, there was a dearth of any material that could support a s 394H application much less a review under s 394J of the CPC.

  22. [44] The foregoing criticisms apply equally to Mr Yeo’s conduct in relation to CA 6. As we pointed out at [8] of the CA 6 Judgment, all of the reasons in purported support of the application for leave to commence judicial review proceedings had to do with the assertion that by reason of an alleged mental disorder or substantial mental impairment on the part of each of the appellants, it would not be lawful or constitutional to carry out the death sentences that had been imposed. We commented that the four “reasons” for judicial review were almost identical to the four grounds that had been stated in CM 6 (at [9]) and, again, found that the affidavit did not contain any factual material whatsoever (at [11]). Simply put, there was no factual basis for any of the arguments Mr Yeo raised in CA 6 (see the CA 6 Judgment at [19]). It was incumbent on Mr Yeo to determine whether there existed any material, legal or evidential, that could support an application for judicial review. Given the earlier courts’ findings that the appellants did not suffer from an abnormality of the mind that impaired their responsibility for the offences that they committed in CCA 59 and CCA 26, and a further reiteration of the same at the hearing in respect of CM 6, it would have been obvious to Mr Yeo that there could be no factual basis whatsoever for CA 6.

  23. [45] We are satisfied that Mr Yeo acted improperly in filing and presenting both CM 6 and CA 6 when he had no material to justify it. Lawyers owe a duty both to their clients and to the court not to invoke the court’s jurisdiction without a proper basis. It is notable that in his CM 6 affidavit, Mr Yeo stated he would make reference at the hearing of CM 6 to the affidavits filed by experts about the mental state of one Nagaenthran a/l Dharmalingam (“Mr Nagaenthran”), another convicted drug-trafficker, who was at that time involved in judicial review proceedings that sought to challenge his own death sentence. At the hearing of CM 6 it turned out that Mr Yeo was hoping that his clients could be examined by Mr Nagaenthran’s experts and that such examination would then provide evidence to support his arguments against the carrying out of their sentences. Before any application is filed, material arguably capable of justifying it must exist – it is improper to file an application especially of this nature in the hope of obtaining evidence at a later date. By the end of September 2018, both CCA 59 and CCA 26 had been dismissed. More than three years elapsed before CM 6 was filed and this lapse of time made the paucity of material on which it was based even more egregious. Likewise, in CA 6, Mr Yeo argued that the appellants’ execution be stayed pending the outcome of the court proceedings in Mr Nagaenthran’s case. We held that such an argument was totally unacceptable as Mr Yeo was effectively speculating on the outcome of a case entirely distinct from that in CA 6 (see CA 6 Judgment at [24]).

  24. [46] On the terms of each of the applications, there was nothing to anchor CM 6 or CA 6 at all when they were filed. At the hearing, as the respondent submitted, Mr Yeo made no attempt to show how s 394H of the CPC or the requirements for leave for judicial review could be satisfied. Instead, he brought up questions of international law and customary international law but was not able to substantiate his arguments on these bases (see the CM 6 Judgment at [28]–[29] and the CA 6 Judgment at [22]). We also accept the submissions of the respondent in relation to the procedural and substantive inadequacies of CM 6 and CA 6 which we have recited earlier. We agree with the points made in this regard.

  25. Conclusion