Court of Appeal · Decided 21 September 2023
The “Navigator Aries”
Feedback & support[2023] SGCA 26 · Case no. Court of Appeal / Civil Appeal No 45 of 2022 · 25 paragraphs
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Introduction
Procedural history
- [4]
[4] The background facts for this dispute are set out in The “Navigator Aries” [2023] SGCA 20 at [8]–[38] (the “Judgment”).
- [5]
[5] In brief, on 28 June 2015, a collision occurred in the Surabaya Strait between the appellant’s vessel, the Navigator Aries (the “NA”), and the respondent’s vessel, the Leo Perdana (the “LP”).
- [6]
[6] On 18 August 2016 and 9 September 2016, the appellant and the respondent commenced their respective admiralty actions in the High Court for the apportionment of liability for the collision. The actions were consolidated on 11 November 2016.
- [8]
[8] On 13 September 2021, the High Court judge (the “Judge”) delivered an oral judgment and apportioned liability at 70:30 in the respondent’s favour. This meant that the respondent obtained a judgment that was more favourable than its offer to settle. The offer to settle had not been withdrawn at that point.
- [10]
[10] In ORC 5829, the Judge gave effect to O 22A r 9(3) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC (2014 Rev Ed)”), which was the applicable version of the rules at the time, concerning an offer to settle made by a defendant:
(a) This first issue is the respondent’s pleaded defence of inevitable accident. In its costs submissions below, the appellant had submitted that such an argument was superfluous, because the respondent was already mounting a primary case that the NA was solely to blame for the collision. In any case, the respondent could not avail itself of this defence. The parties did not dispute that the defence of inevitable accident requires the accident to have taken place without any negligence on the defendant’s part. The Judge accordingly rejected the defence on its merits, having found that the LP’s excessive speed contributed to the bow cushion effect (and, in turn, the collision).
(b) The second issue relates to an evidential objection raised in the respondent’s reply submissions below. The objection was that the appellant’s navigation expert had no factual basis with respect to certain matters (such as the existence of the anchored crane barge) on which to render an opinion premised on those matters. In its costs submissions below, the appellant submitted that this objection was unfounded, as objective evidence of these facts had clearly been adduced over the course of the trial.
- [14]
[14] On 28 September 2022, the appellant applied to transfer the appeal from the AD to the CA, vide OA 13.
- [16]
[16] On 29 March 2023, the respondent withdrew its offer to settle.
- [17]
[17] On 3 April 2023, CA 45 was heard. The appellant’s Calderbank offer had not been accepted by this point in time. On 13 April 2023, it was revoked.
- [18]
[18] On 7 July 2023, CA 45 was decided. Liability was apportioned at 50:50. The appellant thus obtained a better result in the appeal than the trial, as its share of liability was reduced from 70% to 50%. It also obtained a judgment not less favourable than its Calderbank offer, since both were for a 50:50 apportionment.
- [19]
[19] In summary, the following figures for the apportionment of liability were proposed or decided (as applicable) in these proceedings:
Stage
Appellant’s
% liability
Respondent’s
% liability
The respondent’s offer to settle
60
40
Decision at the trial
70
30
The appellant’s Calderbank offer
50
50
Decision on appeal
50
50
The parties’ positions on costs
Costs of the trial
- [23]
[23] The respondent has not challenged the Judge’s decision on the Excluded Issues (see [9] and [11] above).
Costs of the appeal
(a) Its primary position is for costs to be assessed, if not agreed. The standard basis should apply from the date the appeal was filed to the date its Calderbank offer was served. This is the period of 12 October 2021 to 10 August 2022. The indemnity basis should apply from a day after the Calderbank offer was served to the date the appeal was heard. This is 11 August 2022 to 3 April 2023.
(c) In the further alternative, should we be minded only to award costs on the standard basis, it proposes the figure of $75,000 (inclusive of disbursements).
Costs of the transfer application
Our decision
Costs of the trial
Costs of the appeal
- [38]
[38] Some cases may be read to suggest that a Calderbank offer should only be shown to the court and taken into consideration if the judgment obtained is more favourable for the offeror (or less favourable for the offeree) than the offer made: see SBS Transit at [24]; Ong & Ong Pte Ltd v Fairview Developments Pte Ltd [2014] 2 SLR 1285 (“Ong & Ong”) at [34]; and Zhang Jinwei v Tradsurance Agency Pte Ltd and another [2022] SGMC 58 (“Zhang Jinwei”) at [1]. This excludes cases where the judgment is only as favourable as the offer.
- [40]
[40] This view is consistent with how the offer to settle regime has been structured under O 22A r 9 of the ROC (2014 Rev Ed), which centres on whether the judgment is “not less favourable” or “not more favourable” than the offer made:
- [43]
[43] For the following reasons, we attach moderate weight to the respondent’s failure to accept the Calderbank offer in this case.
- [45]
[45] There has been no suggestion that the offer’s terms are unreasonable. On the contrary, whereas the appellant’s position at first instance was that the respondent ought to bear 80% of the liability, the offer moderated this down substantially to 50%. This suggests that the appellant realistically reassessed the strength of its case, after the Judge found that it ought to bear 70% of the blame. This element of compromise reflects a genuine and reasonable attempt to settle by the appellant: see, in the context of offers to settle, Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd v Goel Adesh Kumar and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 1070 at [20]–[22]; Man B&W Diesel S E Asia Pte Ltd and another v PT Bumi International Tankers and another appeal [2004] 3 SLR(R) 267 at [8].
- [46]
[46] There has also been no suggestion that the timeframe for accepting the offer was unreasonably short, such that the respondent lacked a fair opportunity to properly consider and deal with the offer. The offer was made even before the appellant filed its case in CA 45. It remained open for acceptance for over a week after the appeal was heard.
- [48]
[48] For these reasons, the Calderbank offer should be given due weight. However, this must be balanced against two countervailing considerations. First, we appreciate that predicting how a court might apportion liability for a collision is not a straightforward exercise even for the most seasoned of litigators. Apportionment is fundamentally based on a “broad, commonsensical and qualitative assessment” of the circumstances: Judgment at [55]. Furthermore, the court is not confronted with a binary choice, but may entertain a range of possible percentages, and this inherently complicates the prediction exercise. A second, related consideration is that the appellant did not obtain a considerably more favourable judgment, only one as favourable as its offer. This colours the assessment, at least in this case, of how reasonable the offer’s terms were.
- [49]
[49] Therefore, considered holistically, the Calderbank offer ought to be given moderate weight.
- [50]
[50] Leaving the Calderbank offer aside, we consider a more significant factor to be the nature of CA 45. It was an evidentially voluminous and technically demanding case. The length of the Judgment and the range of issues canvassed is most telling in this regard. Detailed consideration had to be given to a host of technical evidence concerning navigation practice in narrow channels, the nature and effect of hydrodynamic phenomena, and various dimensions of each vessel’s speed, course and steerage.
- [52]
[52] More fundamentally, the appellant’s case was never that the respondent should bear full liability, only 50% thereof. Some of the points that it failed on had also been mounted as alternative submissions. Evidently, the appellant was cognisant that it might not succeed on all the points it raised. Crucially, it did not need to succeed on all points to obtain the 50:50 apportionment it sought.
Costs of the transfer application
- [55]
[55] In evaluating this submission, it is pertinent to consider the following developments:
(a) On 13 September 2022, the court sent a letter to both parties indicating that the appeal (which had then been placed before the AD) had been identified for a possible transfer on the court’s own motion, as it would raise a point of law of public importance. Parties were directed to indicate by 20 September 2022 if they objected to the transfer, and if so, their reasons for objecting.
(b) On 14 September 2022, the appellant stated that it had no objections.
(c) On 19 September 2022, the respondent objected to the transfer as the appeal did not raise a point of law of public importance. Instead, the appeal’s focus was on the causative potency of the conduct of both parties’ vessels, and the law on causative potency was not in dispute.
(d) On 28 September 2022, the appellant filed OA 13. It decided to file OA 13 because of the respondent’s expressed objection to a transfer, and because the prescribed 14-day period for filing a transfer application was expiring that day.
(e) On 3 October 2022, the Supreme Court Registry convened a case management conference (“CMC”) to clarify whether the filing of OA 13 ought to be accepted, given the court’s earlier indication to the parties that a transfer on the court’s own motion was being explored. The appellant clarified that it wished for the application to be accepted. The respondent was given until 5 October to state its position.
(f) On 5 October 2022, the respondent stated that it would not object to OA 13. On the one hand, it maintained the view that there was no point of law of public importance, and that the appeal’s result would not be significant. On the other hand, in the light of the appellant’s filing of a transfer application, and in the interest of saving judicial time and costs, the respondent decided not to object to OA 13.
- [56]
[56] In its submissions, the appellant acknowledged that the respondent ultimately did not object to the application. However, it added that the application would not have been necessary if the respondent had not first informed the court on 19 September 2022 that it was objecting to the proposed transfer.
- [58]
[58] First, the respondent only decided not to contest the transfer after OA 13 was filed. When the transfer was being considered on the court’s own motion, it was unequivocally against the transfer. Even after OA 13 was filed, it reiterated its view that a transfer would be inappropriate in principle. As such, the filing of OA 13 was not objectively unnecessary. From the appellant’s perspective, the filing of OA 13 was also reasonable at the time of filing. It would have been unclear to the appellant whether the court would have gone ahead to transfer the appeal on its own motion notwithstanding the respondent’s objections.
- [60]
[60] Third, substantial work was in fact done for OA 13. The appellant filed comprehensive submissions. Legal research was undertaken to confirm that various questions of law were indeed novel and unaddressed in the jurisprudence, such as how Rule 9(a) of the COLREGS ought to be interpreted and applied in narrow channels with recommended navigation tracks.
Quantum of costs of the appeal and the transfer application
Conclusion
- [63]
[63] In summary:
(b) the costs of the appeal and the transfer application are fixed at a total of $100,000 (inclusive of disbursements) to be paid by the respondent to the appellant; and
(c) the usual consequential orders shall apply.