Court of Appeal · Decided 29 November 2023
How Weng Fan and others v Sengkang Town Council and other appeals
Feedback & support[2023] SGCA 42 · Case no. In the matter of Suit Nos 668 and 716 of 2017 · 27 paragraphs
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] We previously dealt with the substantive merits of the present appeals (the “Appeals”) in How Weng Fan and others v Sengkang Town Council and other appeals [2023] 1 SLR 707 (the “Judgment”), which concerned the liability of members and senior employees of Aljunied-Hougang Town Council (“AHTC”) to AHTC and to Sengkang Town Council (“STC”) (collectively, the “Town Councils”). The members comprise Ms Sylvia Lim Swee Lian (“Ms Lim”), Mr Low Thia Khiang (“Mr Low”), Mr Pritam Singh (“Mr Singh”), Mr Chua Zhi Hon (“Mr Chua”) and Mr Kenneth Foo Seck Guan (“Mr Foo”) (collectively, the “Town Councillors”). The senior employees are Ms How Weng Fan (“Ms How”) and Mr Danny Loh Chong Meng (“Mr Loh”) (collectively, the “Employees”), with Ms How acting as the personal representative of Mr Loh’s estate. There is also FM Solutions & Services Pte Ltd (“FMSS”), which too is a party to the Appeals, and of which, at the material time, Ms How and Mr Loh were directors and shareholders (see the Judgment at [14(g)]).
- [2]
[2] Subsequent to the Judgment, we clarified the orders to be made in respect of the Appeals in How Weng Fan and others v Sengkang Town Council and other appeals [2023] 2 SLR 235 (the “Supplementary Judgment”) in light of what appeared to be inadequacies in AHTC’s pleadings on a number of issues.
This court’s decision in the Appeals
- [4]
[4] The Town Councillors, the Employees and FMSS were co-defendants in the Suits below. The Town Councillors were represented by Tan Rajah & Cheah in the Appeals, while the Employees and FMSS were represented by Netto & Magin LLC. AHTC and STC were represented by Shook Lin & Bok LLP and Tan Kok Quan Partnership in the Appeals, respectively.
- [5]
[5] The Appeals consist of the following five appeals arising out of the Suits below: (a) CA/CA 196/2019 (“CA 196”); (b) CA/CA 197/2019 (“CA 197”); (c) CA/CA 198/2019 (“CA 198”); (d) CA/CA 199/2019 (“CA 199”); and (e) CA/CA 200/2019 (“CA 200”). The nature of the Appeals are as follows (see also the Judgment at [17] and the accompanying Annex in the Judgment):
(a) CA 196 is the appeal brought by the Employees and FMSS against STC in respect of the Judge’s findings on their respective liabilities.
(b) CA 197 is the appeal brought by the Employees and FMSS against AHTC in respect of the Judge’s findings on their respective liabilities.
(c) CA 198 is the appeal brought by Town Councillors against STC in respect of the Judge’s findings on their respective liabilities.
(d) CA 199 is the appeal brought by the Town Councillors against AHTC in respect of the Judge’s findings on their respective liabilities.
(e) CA 200 is the appeal brought by STC against Ms Lim, Mr Low and the Employees, in respect of the Judge’s findings that limited the remedies available to it, specifically, that (i) STC was not entitled to equitable compensation in the form of substitutive compensation; and (ii) that STC bore the burden to demonstrate causation in the ‘but for’ sense to ascertain the loss recoverable in the form of equitable compensation arising from the Town Councillors’ and Employees’ breaches of fiduciary duties (see the Judgment at [109]). Just prior to the hearing of the Appeals, STC withdrew CA 200 in part and the parties to CA 200 agreed that the “hybrid approach” as set out in Sim Poh Ping v Winsta Holding Pte Ltd and another and other appeals [2020] 1 SLR 1199, under which the Town Councillors and the Employees bore the legal burden of showing that the loss would have been sustained by the Town Councils even if the Town Councillors and the Employees had not breached their duties, would apply. Ms Lim, Mr Low and the Employees reserved their rights to seek costs from STC in respect of CA 200 (see the Judgment at [115]).
- [6]
[6] In the Judgment and Supplementary Judgment, we reversed many of the Judge’s factual findings and legal conclusions (see the Judgment at [498] and [499] and the Supplementary Judgment at [66(a)]–[66(c)]). We held, in relation to AHTC, that Mr Low, Ms Lim and the Employees were negligent in permitting the control failures in the System to exist. In respect of STC, we held that the Town Councillors and the Employees were negligent in permitting the control failures in the System to exist, and in addition, Ms Lim was negligent in causing AHTC to award a fresh contract to Red-Power instead of renewing contracts with Digo and Terminal 9 at significantly cheaper rates. We further held that the degree of negligence involved in this context amounted to gross negligence so that the relevant parties could not rely on s 52 of the TCA to avoid personal liability (see the Judgment at [451]–[454]).
- [7]
[7] Accordingly, we made the following orders (see the Supplementary Judgment at [66(c)]):
(a) CA 196 was allowed in part in that the Employees succeeded in reversing some of the heads on which they had been found liable by the Judge but were held liable to STC in negligence for permitting the control failures in the System to exist.
(b) CA 197 was allowed in part in that the Employees succeeded in reversing some of the heads on which they had been found liable by the Judge but were held liable to AHTC in negligence for permitting the control failures in the System to exist.
(c) CA 198 was allowed in part in that the Town Councillors succeeded in reversing some of the heads on which they had been found liable by the Judge but were held liable to STC in negligence for permitting the control failures in the System to exist and Ms Lim was held liable to STC for causing AHTC to award a contract to Red-Power.
(d) CA 199 was allowed in part in that the Town Councillors succeeded in reversing some of the heads on which they had been found liable by the Judge but Mr Low and Ms Lim were held liable to AHTC in negligence for permitting the control failures in the System to exist.
(e) CA 200 was dismissed, because neither the Town Councillors nor the Employees owed any fiduciary duties to AHTC, and the issue of reparative compensation therefore fell away.
The parties’ submissions
The Town Councillors
- [10]
[10] The Town Councillors are the appellants in CA 198 and CA 199, and Ms Lim and Mr Low are also two of four of the respondents in CA 200.
(a) for CA 198, STC to pay costs of $139,612.50 and disbursements of $20,043.87;
(b) for CA 199, AHTC to pay costs of $93,075 and disbursements of $13,362.58; and
(c) for CA 200, STC to pay costs of $52,500 and disbursements of $3,725.30.
The Employees and FMSS
- [14]
[14] The Employees and FMSS are the appellants in CA 196 and CA 197 and also the two other respondents in CA 200.
AHTC
- [18]
[18] AHTC is the respondent in CA 197 and CA 199.
STC
- [22]
[22] STC is the respondent in CA 196 and CA 198 and the appellant in CA 200.
Issues to be determined
- [27]
[27] We will deal with the following issues:
(a) First, should a Certificate of Three Counsel be awarded to the Town Councillors for the purposes of CA 198, CA 199 and CA 200?
(c) Third, and contingent on our decision on the issues listed above in (a) and (b), what is the appropriate quantum of costs to be awarded in respect of the Appeals?
- [28]
[28] We shall deal with each in turn.
Our decision
A preliminary point on the entitlement to costs
- [31]
[31] It will often not be controversial who the successful party is in a given litigation. But the position becomes less clear where neither party can be said to have achieved a complete victory. In such circumstances, how should a court go about determining the successful party to the litigation? This will usually turn on the outcome of the litigation as a whole and how the outcome reflects the respective and relative success of each party in the context of the dispute as a whole. This will necessarily be a fact-sensitive exercise, and “[a]scertaining in whose favour the event went in litigation therefore requires asking which party in substance and reality won the litigation, looking at its outcome in a realistic and commercially sensible way” (Comfort Management at [28]). In Roache v News Group Newspapers Limited and others [1998] EMLR 161, Sir Thomas Bingham MR described the exercise that the court ought to undertake in these terms (at 168–169):
(a) Do the Town Councillors and the Employees owe fiduciary duties, equitable duties of skill and care, and/or a tortious duty of care at common law to AHTC?
(b) What is the proper interpretation and scope of s 52 of the TCA?
(c) Did the Town Councillors and Employees act in good faith in respect of the waiver of tender for the First MA Contract and First EMSU Contract and the subsequent award of those contracts to FMSS?
(d) Were the award of contracts by AHTC to LST Architects, Red-Power, Titan and J Keart done in good faith?
(e) Were the control measures associated with the “control failures” instituted by the Town Councillors and the Employees effected in good faith, even if such measures were ultimately found to be inadequate, and if so, whether this constituted a breach of duties owed to AHTC?
- [33]
[33] The issues listed at (a), (b) and (c) above formed the bulk of the analysis in the Judgment (see the Judgment at [125]–[413]) and indeed, this also occupied much of the parties’ Cases in the Appeals as well as their written submissions (including the parties’ response to the court’s list of questions, see [8] above). At the hearing of the Appeals, substantial time was also spent on the issue of the propriety of the award of the Contracts. Having regard to the substance of the matter, we are satisfied that the Town Councillors and the Employees (along with FMSS) did succeed substantially in the Appeals given that the result of the Appeals is that it is primarily the claims relating to (e) above and a small part of (d) that were ultimately allowed to proceed to assessment. We found that the Town Councillors and the Employees did not owe fiduciary duties to AHTC, and that they had acted in good faith in the award of the Contracts, thereby entitling them to personal immunity under s 52 of the TCA (see the Judgment at [212] and [498]). Further, in so far as the award of the contract to Red-Power is concerned, this was a claim that was only pleaded by STC (see the Supplementary Judgment at [9]). While it is of course true, as AHTC submits, that we did conclude that liability had been established in relation to AHTC for the control failures, we first note that this conclusion was limited to Ms Lim and Mr Low, because we also found that AHTC had failed to adequately plead and run a case against Mr Singh, Mr Chua and Mr Foo in respect of the control failures (see [7] above and the Supplementary Judgment at [54]). More importantly, however, the question is not whether AHTC did enjoy some success against the Town Councillors and the Employees. They did, because even after the Appeals, liability for some serious breaches was found to have been established. But the real question is in relation to the outcome of the Appeals. On this, it is clear that the Town Councillors, the Employees and FMSS were successful in overturning the outcome reached in the court below on the majority of the issues.
Should a Certificate of Three Counsel be awarded to the Town Councillors?
- [36]
[36] The Town Councillors seek an award of a Certificate of Three Counsel pursuant to O 59 r 19 of the Rules.
- [38]
[38] Paragraph 1(2) of Appendix 1 to O 59 of the Rules sets out the following factors that are to be considered by the court when determining whether the use of more than two solicitors is reasonable (see also Ng Eng Ghee and others v Mamata Kapildev Dave and others (Horizon Partners Pte Ltd, intervener) and another appeal [2009] 4 SLR(R) 155 (“Ng Eng Ghee”) at [36]):
(a) the complexity of the item or of the cause or matter in which it arises and the difficulty or novelty of the questions involved;
(b) the skill, specialised knowledge and responsibility required of, and the time and labour expended by, the solicitor;
(c) the number and importance of the documents (however brief) prepared or perused;
(d) the place and circumstances in which the business involved is transacted;
(e) the urgency and importance of the cause or matter to the client; and
(f) where money or property is involved, its amount or value.
- [39]
[39] As an illustration, in Raffles Town Club Pte Ltd v Lim Eng Hock Peter and others (Tung Yu-Lien Margaret and others, third parties) [2011] 1 SLR 582, Chan Seng Onn J granted a Certificate of Three Counsel, considering that the litigation resulted in what was, at the time, the longest civil trial in Singapore’s history, a wide range of issues had been raised at trial, numerous witnesses had been called, and the documents were voluminous. He concluded that the “use of more than two solicitors was reasonably necessary for the adequate preparation and presentation of the case” (at [41]). In contrast, in Colliers International (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Senkee Logistics Pte Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 230, Lai Siu Chiu J rejected the defendant’s request to be awarded a Certificate of Three Counsel in unequivocal terms, observing that one counsel would have been more than sufficient for the defendant’s case, given that there was only one issue in dispute, namely, whether the plaintiff was the effective cause of the sale of the defendant’s property (at [126]).
- [40]
[40] Save for CA 200, in our judgment, this is an exceptional case that warrants the award of a Certificate of Three Counsel to the Town Councillors in CA 198 and CA 199, for three reasons.
- [41]
[41] First, they involved complex issues of both law and fact:
(a) As we observed in the Judgment, the Appeals “raise the important question of whether a public servant exercising statutory duties under public law is also subject to duties under private law (specifically, fiduciary and equitable duties)” (see the Judgment at [1]). This required a consideration of the distinction between public law duties and private law duties, which had only been touched upon briefly in our earlier decision in Attorney-General v Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council [2016] 1 SLR 915. This was a sufficiently important issue that we directed the parties on 14 September 2020, prior to the hearing of the appeals (see [8] above), to provide further submissions on whether public law statutory duties should be overlayed with fiduciary duties. It may be noted also that a five-judge Bench was empanelled to hear the Appeals and this in turn reflected the need for the assistance of counsel with the requisite knowledge and experience. The Judgment that we issued did consider in detail the distinction between private law duties and public law duties, and drew on authorities from a number of different jurisdictions (see the Judgment at [137]–[212]).
- [42]
[42] Second, the Appeals involved voluminous materials, which in part accounts for the increase that we allowed in page limits for the parties’ respective Cases to 100 pages each. The Joint Record of Appeal comprised 206 bundles totalling 52,694 pages.
- [43]
[43] Third, the stakes in these Appeals were very high for all the parties. There was strong media interest and important questions of public interest were raised. More fundamentally, the claims raised against the Town Councillors and Employees were serious ones: allegations of breaches of fiduciary duties owing from the wrongful award of the Contracts, as well as the lack of oversight of public funds.
- [45]
[45] However, we do not consider the grant of a Certificate of Three Counsel to the Town Councillors to be warranted for CA 200. CA 200 was a relatively confined appeal (see [5(e)] above) as it turned largely on a question of law, which was whether STC would have to prove but for causation before it would be entitled to obtain recovery in the form of reparative compensation. That question of law ultimately depended upon certain anterior questions being answered, which were whether the Town Councillors and Employees owed fiduciary duties to AHTC and STC, and whether they acted in breach of their fiduciary duties in respect of the award of the Contracts. These questions were the subject of CA 196, CA 197, CA 198 and CA 199. We answered these anterior questions in the negative, as a result of which CA 200 fell away (see the Judgment at [413]). The numerous documents underpinning the factual circumstances leading to the award of the Contracts were, in essence, the very evidence that had already been considered in CA 196, CA 197, CA 198 and CA 199. Furthermore, CA 200 was, in a large part, withdrawn before the Appeals were heard (see the Judgment at [115]). In the circumstances, we are of the view the CA 200 neither involved issues of such complexity nor did it require such specialised knowledge of the solicitors that would justify the grant of a Certificate of Three Counsel.
Should a single or separate costs order be made against STC in CA 196, CA 198 and CA 200?
(a) the degree of the community of interests among the parties;
(b) the size of the sum or the importance of the interest that is the subject matter of the dispute; and
(c) the degree of overlap in the pre-hearing preparations and conduct of proceedings.
(a) In respect of the correct interpretation of s 52 of the TCA, the Town Councillors’ arguments and the Employees’ arguments differed, with the Town Councillors placing greater emphasis on the mischief behind s 52 of the TCA, while the Employees focused on the plain wording of the provision (see the Judgment at [251] and [252]). The Town Councillors’ submission was also that good faith in s 52 of the TCA could encompass elements of reasonableness, whereas the Employees wholly rejected the notion that it could encompass concepts such as reasonable care.
(b) As to the point concerning whether they had breached their duties by awarding the Contracts, the Town Councillors’ primary submission was that FMSS’s involvement was a contingency plan in the event that CPG decided not to continue providing its services and it was not a pre-ordained conclusion. Given the urgency and importance of MA and EMSU services, the waiver of tender was therefore justified in the circumstances (see the Judgment at [117]). On the other hand, the Employees’ submissions hinged mainly on the fact that they were not involved in the decisions to waive the calling of tenders for the First MA Contract and the First EMSU Contract (see the Judgment at [119]). In fact, Ms How’s position was that she was not even sure of the exact date on which the waiver of tender for the First MA Contract had taken place.
(c) Even in the context of the control failures in the System, the Employees’ arguments appeared to place greater weight on the Standing Instruction that had been instituted as being an adequate safeguard against the risks of overpayment (see the Judgment at [430] and [431]).
- [52]
[52] Moreover, and relatedly, the Town Councillors and Employees also stand in distinct positions (and therefore necessarily have quite distinct interests). In particular, Mr Low, Ms Lim and Mr Singh are elected MPs in addition to being key appointment holders in AHTC (see the Judgment at [9]), while the Employees, although likewise appointed to key positions in AHTC, are not public facing, in that they did not, on top of the legal consequences arising from the claims brought against them, also have to face potential political consequences arising from the breaches alleged. Further, the Town Councillors and Employees acted in rather distinct capacities in respect of AHTC’s affairs. The Town Councillors appeared to largely be responsible for the management of AHTC while the Employees were largely responsible for the operations of AHTC, and in particular, pursuant to their obligations under the Contracts. The nature of the claims against the Town Councillors, the Employees and FMSS were also somewhat distinct. For example, the claims against FMSS were based only on secondary liability for dishonest assistance and knowing receipt. And the improper award of contracts to third-party contractors were claims limited only to the Town Councillors (see the Judgment at [99]). It therefore cannot be said that there is a complete overlap of interests that would militate against the Town Councillors and the Employees engaging separate sets of counsel.
- [53]
[53] We also note that the subject matter of the Appeals involved a very substantial sum. While the ultimate amount of any liability has yet to be determined, the stakes were, as we have observed, very high. This goes to the importance of issues in the case to the parties and the different interests that they each had in the outcome of the case, which goes to the reasonableness of their desire to be separately represented.
- [54]
[54] Finally, as to the degree of overlap in the pre-hearing preparations and conduct of proceedings, there was some degree of overlap in so far as the parties had relied on the same broad arguments (see [51] above). However, in our view, this cannot be taken too far, in light of the differences in the nature of the claims brought against the Town Councillors and Employees (and FMSS), and in the nature of the defences they ran as we have outlined above. We note that the oral submissions made by counsel for the Town Councillors focused extensively on the parliamentary intention underpinning the TCA and why the imposition of a fiduciary duty over and above statutory duties would be inconsistent with such intention, particularly given the stringency of such a duty that mandates single-minded loyalty. Considerable emphasis was placed on the fact that Town Councils are inherently political in nature and that MPs are granted latitude to exercise autonomy on how best to achieve their agenda and to serve their residents’ interests. Much time was also devoted to the argument that FMSS’s appointment and the award of the Contracts was part of a contingency plan should CPG opt to no longer continue to provide MA and EMSU services. On the other hand, counsel for the Employees focused in his oral submissions on the issue of the control failures, and how there could not be any risk of unjustified payments.
The quantum of costs that should be awarded for the Appeals
- [56]
[56] We turn then to the final issue which is the appropriate quantum to be awarded to the Town Councillors, Employees and FMSS for the respective Appeals.
(b) Second, there should be some discount in the costs payable to the Employees and FMSS for CA 196 and CA 197, because there is a degree of overlap in the work prepared by Netto & Magin LLC for both these appeals given the overlap in the claims made by AHTC and STC. The same should apply to the costs payable to the Town Councillors for CA 198 and CA 199 for the degree of overlap in the work prepared by Tan Rajah & Cheah for both these appeals as well. The overlap in the work prepared by the respective solicitors for the appeals involving STC’s claims CA 196 and CA 198 (on the one hand) and the appeals involving AHTC’s claims in CA 197 and CA 199 (on the other) would not have been insignificant since these two sets of appeals canvassed essentially the same issues, and while AHTC’s pleadings were narrower than those of STC’s in certain aspects (see the Judgment at [65]), that would not have detracted too much from the overall complexion of the appeals that we have described. We therefore consider that it is appropriate for this discount to be fixed at 25%.
(c) Third, there should be some discount in the costs payable by AHTC and STC as the Town Councillors and the Employees ultimately did not succeed on some issues in the Appeals (see [7] above). Although the Town Councillors and the Employees did substantially succeed in the Appeals (see [33] above), there were nonetheless some issues found in AHTC and STC’s favour, as we found that the Town Councillors and Employees owed a common law duty of care and skill to the Town Councils and consequently found the Employees, the Town Councillors, as well as Mr Low and Ms Lim liable in respect of some of AHTC’s and STC’s claims. We therefore consider that it is appropriate for this discount to be fixed at 15%.
- [60]
[60] We now apply that methodology to the Appeals.
CA 196 and CA 197
CA 198 and CA 199
CA 200
Conclusion
(a) For CA 196: STC is to pay to the Employees and FMSS costs of and incidental to the appeal fixed at $51,637.50 and disbursements of $4,444.27, with the usual consequential orders to apply.
(b) For CA 197: AHTC is to pay to the Employees and FMSS costs of and incidental to the appeal fixed at $63,112.50 and disbursements of $5,431.88, with the usual consequential orders to apply.
(c) For CA 198: STC is to pay to the Town Councillors costs of and incidental to the appeal fixed at $78,532.03 and disbursements of $9,583.48, with the usual consequential orders to apply.
(d) For CA 199: AHTC is to pay to the Town Councillors costs of and incidental to the appeal fixed at $95,983.59 and disbursements of $11,713.14, with the usual consequential orders to apply.
(e) For CA 200: STC is to pay to Ms Lim and Mr Low costs of and incidental to the appeal fixed at $31,350 and disbursements of $3,539.04, and STC is to pay to the Employees costs of and incidental to the appeal fixed at $31,350 and disbursements of $2,105.20. The security furnished by STC for CA 200 is to be equally divided amongst Ms Lim and Mr Low on the one hand and the Employees on the other hand.