Court of Appeal · Decided 21 December 2023
QBE Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd and another v Relax Beach Co Ltd
Feedback & support[2023] SGCA 45 · Case no. Court of Appeal / Civil Appeal No 3 of 2023 · 23 paragraphs
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Introduction
- [3]
[3] With this broad overview and context in mind, we first outline the relevant factual matrix.
Factual background
Parties to the appeal and the insurance contract
- [4]
[4] The respondent, Relax Beach Co Ltd, is a company incorporated in Thailand which owns and operates a luxury hotel in Phuket known as Le Meridien Phuket Beach Resort (“the Insured Premises”). The respondent is a named insured under the Insurance Policy No 8-F0005135-ISR-R004 (“the Policy”) which provides coverage for the Insured Premises.
- [5]
[5] The first appellant, QBE Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd, and the second appellant, MS First Capital Insurance Limited, are co-insurers under the Policy and they agreed to indemnify the respondent in respect of business interruption losses suffered at, among other places, the Insured Premises. The period of insurance coverage under the Policy was between 1 January 2020 and 1 January 2021.
- [6]
[6] In particular, under s 2 of the Policy, the appellants agreed to provide the following indemnity:
It is not disputed between the parties that the Notification Clause is a condition precedent to any liability under the Policy. For convenience, we refer to the second paragraph of the Notification Clause as the “Second Condition”.
Closure of the Insured Premises and notification of the insurance claim
- [9]
[9] On 26 February 2020, COVID-19 was first declared a dangerous communicable disease by the Thailand Government under the Communicable Diseases Act 2015. Following this declaration, businesses were required to notify the health authorities of any cases of COVID-19 at their respective premises.
- [10]
[10] Thereafter, there was an increase in the number of COVID-19 infections in Thailand (including Phuket). As a result of the outbreak of COVID-19, the Thailand Government and the Governor of Phuket Province (“Governor”) (collectively, “the Public Authority”) implemented a series of escalating measures in Phuket to control the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. These measures were implemented between 18 March 2020 and 9 April 2020.
- [12]
[12] On 26 May 2020, the respondent submitted a claim notification to the first appellant and sought to be indemnified in respect of its business interruption losses under the Policy (“the Claim”). On the same day, the first appellant replied and sought further information from the respondent relating to the Claim (such as whether there was any outbreak of COVID-19 at the Insured Premises):
- [13]
[13] On 27 May 2020, the respondent replied to the first appellant stating, among other things, that there had not been any outbreak of COVID-19 at the Insured Premises. Regarding the other queries, the respondent explained that it would need time to reply. Nevertheless, no further information was provided to the appellants on the queries relating to risk management procedures and the extent of hotel operations that were still running.
- [15]
[15] It transpired that the appellants never received any further information from the respondent after the 29 May 2020 Letter was sent.
Initiation of court proceedings below
- [16]
[16] On 5 February 2021, after a period of more than eight months had passed following the 29 May 2020 Letter, the first appellant received a letter from the respondent’s lawyers, requesting that the first appellant retract the rejection of the Claim. The respondent’s lawyers stated that the rejection of the Claim was without basis as it was not a prerequisite for there to be an outbreak of COVID-19 at the Insured Premises for the coverage under the Policy to apply. In response, on 8 February 2021, the first appellant confirmed by email that it would not be retracting the 29 May 2020 Letter rejecting the Claim.
- [17]
[17] On 31 March 2021, the respondent commenced HC/OS 299/2021 (“OS 299”) in the General Division of the High Court, seeking the following primary reliefs, among others:
(a) a declaration that the respondent has a valid claim under the Policy for business interruption suffered in respect of the Insured Premises; and
(b) a declaration that the appellants are liable to indemnify the respondent in respect of such business interruption losses in accordance with the terms of the Policy.
The Judge’s key findings in the decision below
- [21]
[21] Regarding the provision of additional particulars of business interruption losses, the Judge opined that it was difficult to see how the appellants could insist on the respondent providing these particulars after summarily rejecting the respondent’s Claim on 29 May 2020. The appellants’ reliance on the statement in its 29 May 2020 Letter requesting further information to support the Claim rung hollow because, read in context, that was a request for the respondent to further justify the validity of the Claim (in light of the reasons the appellants gave for rejecting it) and not a request for details of the loss suffered.
- [22]
[22] On the substance of the Claim, the Judge agreed with the appellants that Limb (i) of the IDE referred to the outbreak of a notifiable human infectious or contagious disease at the premises. Reading all four limbs of the IDE together and considering the overall context, it was more consistent with a plain and grammatical reading to construe the phrase “at the premises” as applying to both defects in drainage and/or sanitary arrangements (meaning the Defects Limb) and also to the outbreak of infectious disease (meaning the Disease Limb).
Withdrawal of the appeal against the decision below
- [25]
[25] The present appeal in CA/CA 3/2023 (“CA 3”) was initially begun by way of AD/CA 35/2022 in the Appellate Division of the High Court. The appeal was then transferred to the Court of Appeal in CA/OA 18/2022 (“OA 18”) upon the application of the appellants (filed with the consent of the respondent) as the Court of Appeal found that the issues in the appeal would raise points of law of public importance and the consideration of a landmark decision of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in the FCA Test Case concerning the interpretation of insurance contracts with business interruption clauses in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The parties’ submissions on costs
(a) First, the appellants unilaterally decided to withdraw CA 3 on the last working day before the actual hearing and must be taken to have acknowledged that the appeal lacked any merit. The appeal should thus never have been filed.
(b) Second, the appellants made no effort whatsoever to amicably resolve the dispute even when invited by the Court to attempt alternative dispute resolution. This is despite the appellants having lost in the proceedings below.
(c) Third, CA 3 raised novel and complex issues of law relating to coverage and causation in the context of COVID-19 related business interruption insurance claims. CA 3 would have important industry-wide implications for both insurers and insured. Also, the respondent’s conduct in procuring the KC Opinion was reasonable given that the parties’ written submissions had relied on English case law pertaining to these legal issues.
(d) Fourth, the appellants have allegedly taken every opportunity to delay the payment of the Claim (summarily rejecting the Claim initially, contesting proceedings below in OS 299 and initiating the appeal in CA 3, and so on). The withdrawal of CA 3 at the very last-minute is to be taken as a sign that the appeal was unmeritorious and was simply the appellants’ latest ploy to delay and frustrate a valid claim under the Policy.
(a) It appears that the respondent is seeking costs on an indemnity basis given the significant quantum sought in excess of what is contemplated under the costs guidelines. However, there is no basis for the respondent to seek costs on an indemnity basis because such costs are appropriately granted only in exceptional circumstances. The discontinuance of CA 3 does not necessarily connote an acceptance that the case was, is or has become hopeless. Nor does the fact that the withdrawal occurred shortly before the hearing itself justify indemnity costs.
(b) The costs claimed by the respondent are wholly excessive compared to taxed costs and costs awards in other insurance-related appeals, which often range between S$40,000 and S$80,000 only.
(c) The present appeal arose out of an Originating Summons and, unlike many other insurance-related appeals, did not involve substantial disputes of facts but only narrow issues of law. Thus, the record of appeal was less voluminous when compared to other such appeals. There were also no full grounds of decision issued below, and the appeal in CA 3 did not proceed to an oral hearing.
(d) In these circumstances, the costs of CA 3 should be on the lower end of the range of costs awarded based on Appendix G of the SCPD 2021 and previous cases, and hence S$40,000 would be appropriate (being double the costs awarded below for OS 299).
(e) The sum of S$40,000 also more than covers the costs of OA 18 (which should be no more than S$500) as it was uncontested, and the respondent did not file affidavits or make any submissions.
(f) The respondent is not entitled to recover the sum it paid for the KC Opinion this being S$15,722.85. This sum was not reasonably incurred because the Policy was governed by Singapore law and the respondent is already represented by Senior Counsel with notable experience in insurance disputes.
The issues raised before this court
- [34]
[34] We proceed then to consider the two main issues before us:
Issue 1: Whether granting indemnity costs is appropriate
Applicable law on indemnity costs
Relevance of the merits of the case even where the case is discontinued
It is not clear to us what material by way of submissions the court had received from the parties, and we have reservations as to the appropriateness of such a course if there had been an absence of any such submissions. But it may be noted that the need to clarify a legal point of significance was again cited as a factor that may drive a court to set out its views even in the face of a settlement of a pending matter.
Preliminary views on whether there was no merit in the appeal
- [47]
[47] Our preliminary view on the merits is that the Judge is likely to have erred in at least two material aspects.
- [48]
[48] First, there is the anterior issue of whether the respondent had complied with the Notification Clause by providing proper notification of the Claim. The parties do not dispute that this obligation in the Notification Clause is a condition precedent to liability that must be satisfied, failing which no claim under the Policy shall be payable. If the obligation under the Notification Clause is not fulfilled, then this provides a complete defence to liability under the Policy such that an insurer is not liable to indemnify the insured (see PT Adidaya Energy Mandiri v MS First Capital Insurance Ltd [2022] 4 SLR 371 at [169]; see also, George Hunt Cranes Ltd v Scottish Boiler & General Insurance Co Ltd [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 366). The appellants argued that the respondent breached the Notification Clause when it failed to inform the appellants of Mr K’s case at the Insured Premises. On a preliminary basis, and assuming the loss in this was case was within the scope of the IDE, we are inclined to agree with the appellants’ view. In particular, the Second Condition in the Notification Clause did not seem to be satisfied because it required the provision of all other information, explanations and other evidence “as may reasonably be required for investigation and verification of the claim” (see above at [8]).
- [49]
[49] Our preliminary view is that the notification ought to have extended to the facts said to give rise to the underlying insured risk. If the risk encompassed an outbreak of an infectious or contagious disease at the premises, and if Mr K’s illness constituted an outbreak, then it was a necessary part of any notification of loss that is said to be covered by the Policy, that the existence of Mr K’s case occurring at the Insured Premises be notified to the appellants. However, this was not done by the respondent until after the proceedings in OS 299 were commenced about a year later (see above at [13] and [18]). The purpose of such a condition precedent is to enable the insurer to investigate and ascertain the bona fides of the claim within a reasonable time of the loss, take steps to mitigate the consequences and to preserve the evidence where necessary (Law Relating to Specific Contracts in Singapore (Steven Chong editor-in-chief & Cavinder Bull gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2nd Ed, 2016) at para 9.12.17). It would therefore have been vital for the respondent to promptly inform the appellants of Mr K’s case to enable the latter to properly investigate the validity of the Claim and decide whether the insured peril had occurred. As this was not done, it seems that the condition precedent was likely not to have been satisfied. If our eventual conclusion had remained the same following full arguments, this would have provided the appellants a complete defence to liability.
- [50]
[50] Further, contrary to the Judge’s finding (see above at [21]) that the appellants’ statement in its 29 May 2020 Letter rang hollow and amounted to a summary rejection of the Claim, we do not see it that way. Rather, it seems to us that the appellants were inviting further information on the Claim in the 29 May 2020 Letter, but no such further information was provided. We elaborate on this.
- [51]
[51] The Judge opined that the respondent could not be faulted for not providing further particulars after the appellants had already rejected the Claim in the 29 May 2020 Letter, and thus there was no further opportunity for the respondent to comply with the Notification Clause. We are inclined to disagree with this view. The material portion of the 29 May 2020 Letter concluded with the statement: “we request that you provide further information to support the above claim for our consideration within 21 days, failing which we shall close our file accordingly” (see above at [14]). A plain reading of the 29 May 2020 Letter suggests that this was not meant to be a summary rejection of the Claim, but rather a request for further information, failing which the Claim would subsequently be rejected (meaning that there was still the opportunity to provide further particulars). We do not see why the respondent could not have simply replied to the 29 May 2020 Letter to inform the appellants of the requested-for details such as risk management procedures, current hotel operations still running, and crucially, of Mr K’s case. Instead, nothing further was put forward as to the particulars of the loss or the accounts or other information that may be required for investigation and verification of the Claim (see above at [15]).
- [52]
[52] As the fulfilment of the obligation in the Notification Clause is a condition precedent to liability under the Policy, the absence of proper notification on the respondent’s part would have been fatal to the Claim based on our initial view on this issue.
- [54]
[54] As we intimated above (at [1]), the parties’ commercial risk allocation is encapsulated in the language used in the terms of the Policy which must be given careful consideration. Limb (i) of the IDE stipulates that there must be an “outbreak” of a notifiable human infectious or contagious disease at the premises (see above at [7]). It was not clear to us how a singular case occurring at the Insured Premises could be said to constitute an “outbreak”, which is a term that ordinarily contemplates the infection of more than one person on a plain and commonsensical meaning, and an increase from zero to one infected person might not readily be understood as an “outbreak” (see BSD-360, LLC d/b/a the Goddard School v Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company 580 F Supp 3d 92 (ED Pa, 2022) at 102). It therefore seems to us that Mr K’s solitary case would likely not have been sufficient to trigger coverage under Limb (i) of the IDE.
- [56]
[56] In this connection, the parties disagreed over whether the phrase “at the premises” applies only to the Defects Limb at the end of Limb (i) of the IDE, or whether it applies to both the Defects Limb and the Disease Limb (see above at [7]). On this, we are inclined to agree with the Judge that the qualifier applied to both limbs such that only the COVID-19 cases occurring at the Insured Premises could be considered in the analysis under the Disease Limb. This is based on a plain and grammatical reading of the IDE and is consistent with the internal context of the other sub-clauses of the IDE (each of which contemplates a set of incidents that must occur at the Insured Premises). Where several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language would suggest that the clause be read as applicable to all (Great Western Railway Co. v Swindon and Cheltenham Extension Railway Co (1884) 9 App Cas 787 at 808 (“Great Western Railway”); United States v Standard Brewery, Inc (1920) 251 US 210 at 218). For example, as the English House of Lords illustrated in Great Western Railway, in the expression “horses, oxen, pigs, and sheep, from whatever country they may come”, the latter qualifying phrase would apply to horses as much as to sheep.
Indemnity costs not appropriate
Issue 2: What the appropriate costs order should be
Conclusion