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Grounds publishedDecided 23 Oct 2023

Court of Appeal

BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd and another v PT Bayan Resources TBK and another

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[2023] SGCA(I) 8Case no. Court of Appeal / Civil Appeal from the Singapore International Commercial Court No 4 of 202327 paragraphs

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  1. Introduction

  2. [2] We heard the appeal on 4 September 2023. Having considered the parties’ arguments, we now allow the appeal for the reasons which we will set out below.

  3. Background

  4. [3] The broad factual backdrop to this long-running dispute has been set out in our earlier judgment, BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd and another v PT Bayan Resources TBK and another [2023] SGCA(I) 1 (the “Third Tranche Appeal Judgment”). We do not propose to repeat this, save to the extent it is necessary and material to the issues raised in the appeal.

  5. [4] The matter was heard over three tranches. The appellants, BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd (“BCBCS”) and Binderless Coal Briquetting Company Pty Limited (“BCBC”), had succeeded on most of the issues concerning liability in S 1, which formed the focus of the first and second tranches. However, the respondents, PT Bayan Resources TBK (“BR”) and Bayan International Pte Ltd (“BI”), ultimately succeeded on issues relating to damages and quantum in the third tranche that were determinative of the appellants’ claim. As we held in the Third Tranche Appeal Judgment, this was chiefly because BR would have wound up the parties’ joint venture company, PT Kaltim Supacoal (“KSC”), as an unpaid creditor well before sufficient revenue would have been generated for BCBCS to realise any profits or even recover any of the wasted expenditure it had incurred in connection with the project (we refer to this aspect of BR’s case as the “Winding Up Defence”). In the third tranche appeal, the appellants were ultimately awarded $1,000 by way of nominal damages.

  6. [8] In identifying the successful party, the SICC considered that the outcome of the litigation had to be assessed in its entirety, in a realistic and commercially sensible manner, to determine which party could be said in substance and reality to have won the litigation. On this basis, the SICC ruled that the respondents were, in overall terms, the successful party in S 1. Although they had failed on significant aspects of their defence as well as in their counterclaim against the appellants, the identification of the successful party did not, in the SICC’s view, turn on the outcome of the individual tranches or the discrete issues that were dealt with in those tranches. Ultimately, the respondents were the successful party because the appellants failed in their pursuit of substantial damages against the respondents, and, indeed, obtained practically nothing from the litigation.

  7. Parties’ cases on appeal

  8. Appellants’ case

  9. Respondents’ case

  10. [21] Third, there is no basis for this court to interfere with the SICC’s exercise of discretion in ordering a 40% discount.

  11. Issues raised

  12. [23] There are, broadly speaking, two issues which arise for our consideration in this appeal:

  13. (a) Did the SICC err in its exercise of discretion to award a 40% discount as to costs, as opposed to adopting a different approach to awarding costs or applying a larger discount?

  14. [24] We turn to consider each of these issues.

  15. Our decision

  16. Did the SICC err in its exercise of discretion?

  17. [28] Counsel for the appellants, Mr Francis Xavier SC (“Mr Xavier”), submitted that the SICC erred in the exercise of its discretion because it found that the issue-based approach could not apply as long as an overall winner could be identified. Mr Xavier referred us to three cases where the court had applied an issue-based approach notwithstanding the fact that an overall winner could be identified. We think that it may be an overstatement to say that the SICC had erred in the exercise of its discretion because it declined to apply the issue-based approach once it identified a clear winner in this case.

  18. [30] In so far as the appellants are dissatisfied with the SICC’s adoption of the discounting approach, no cogent reason has been given to show where and how the SICC erred in adopting such an approach. In the context of an appeal, it does not suffice for the appellants to merely point to why an issue-based approach might, in their view, be preferable in this case, or why it could conceivably have been applied. The SICC was therefore, in our view, perfectly entitled to adopt a discounting approach.

  19. The Beoco approach and the appropriate discount on costs

  20. [34] The appellants contend that permission to raise a new point on appeal is no longer required because O 21 r 22(1)(b) of the Singapore International Commercial Court Rules 2021 (the “SICC Rules 2021”), which is applicable to the present appeal, only requires parties to “highlight” in their written cases any new points which were not raised before the SICC. We disagree. The purpose of requiring that parties highlight such new points is to afford the appellate court the opportunity to consider the arguments in advance and assess whether permission should be granted to the party to raise those points in the appeal. This also prevents the opposing party from being taken by surprise at the hearing of the appeal. The appellants’ argument not only runs contrary to well-established practice, but would allow a party to raise any new point, which had not been raised in the court below, just by highlighting those points in their cases on appeal. That can hardly be consistent with the court’s pursuit of the expeditious and efficient administration of justice according to law under O 1 r 3(1)(a) of the SICC Rules 2021.

  21. [35] In considering whether permission to appeal should be granted, the court will have regard to such factors as: (a) the nature of the parties’ arguments below; (b) whether the court had considered and provided any findings and reasoning in relation to the new point; (c) whether further submissions, evidence or findings would have been necessitated had the new points been raised below; and (d) any prejudice that might result to the counterparty in the appeal if permission were to be granted: Abhilash s/o Kunchian Krishnan v Yeo Hock Huat and another [2019] 1 SLR 873 at [41], citing Grace Electrical Engineering Pte Ltd v Te Deum Engineering Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 76 at [38].

  22. [37] Turning to the merits of the appellants’ argument, we agree with the appellants that the Winding Up Defence could and should have been pleaded earlier. In the Third Tranche Appeal Judgment at [33], we noted, in relation to the respondents’ Winding Up Defence, that:

  23. [38] It may be noted that this amendment, by the respondents to their Defence and Counterclaim (“D&CC”), appears to have been triggered by the appellants’ amendments to their Statement of Claim (“SOC”) pursuant to SIC/SUM 63/2019 (“SUM 63”). SUM 63 was filed on 13 September 2019, after the second tranche of S 1 was completed, and before the third tranche was due to commence in 2020.

  24. [39] We describe the D&CC amendment as appearing to have been “triggered” by the appellants’ amendments, because the appellants intimated their intention to pursue damages primarily on a reliance basis for the first time in SOC (Amendment No 6) dated 11 November 2019. Their claim was initially for loss of profits, and, in the alternative, wasted expenditure. In SOC (Amendment No 6), the claim for loss of profits was dropped. Instead, the claim became one for wasted expenditure (or what is also commonly labelled as reliance damages) and loss of chance.

  25. [40] On one view, the point is potentially significant because in a claim for expectation damages, it is the plaintiff who bears the burden of proving that the venture would have resulted in the expected gain, whereas in a claim for wasted expenditure, once the plaintiff proves that it has incurred certain expenditure which it claims it cannot recover because of the breach, the burden is on the defendant to show that the plaintiff would not, in any event, have been able to recover the sum in question: Liu Shu Ming and another v Koh Chew Chee and another matter [2023] 1 SLR 1477 at [131] and [164]–[167]. On this basis, it might be said that a defendant faced with a shift in burden should be allowed to expand on and particularise its defence to meet its new burden. Furthermore, at the hearing of SUM 63, counsel for the appellants had acknowledged that inasmuch as they were to be allowed to modify their position as to the reliefs sought, then so too should the respondents be allowed to do the same:

  26. [41] We take a different view. The respondents could and should have provided fuller pleadings on wasted expenditure at the outset, including the Winding Up Defence. After all, they knew from the appellants’ pleadings that the appellants were claiming for lost profits, and in the alternative, wasted expenditure. It was therefore abundantly clear from the outset that they would have to shoulder the burden of proof in so far as the appellants’ claim for wasted expenditure was concerned. There was, as far as we could see, no reason why they could not have pleaded the Winding Up Defence earlier. Indeed, we note that the Winding Up Defence would also have been an answer to the loss of profits claim. One could even go so far as to say that the respondents should have pleaded the Winding Up Defence at the outset – this could have better informed the appellants’ choices on the conduct of the litigation. Pleadings are meant to give the opposing party notice of one’s case (see Writers Studio Pte Ltd v Chin Kwok Yung [2022] SGHC 205 at [135]), and this becomes especially important in large, complex cases such as this one, because advance notice of each party’s case aids in case management. For instance, issues such as how the hearing is to be split across the different tranches, whether a trial of a preliminary issue is necessary, and even whether expert evidence will be allowed, will necessarily have to be determined with reference to the pleadings.

  27. [42] We also do not think the case comes within the exception in Kaines (see [32] above). Had the Winding Up Defence been pleaded earlier, it is not at all clear that the appellants would have run their case in the same way. It is unconvincing for the respondents to point to what the appellants did in fact do in this case, after the late amendment was introduced, to demonstrate what the appellants would have done if the defence had been pleaded earlier. After all, up to the threshold of the third tranche, the appellants had achieved substantial successes on many key issues of legal significance. By that late stage of the litigation, and having expended considerable resources on the earlier tranches over the preceding years, it would have been a difficult and unlikely decision for the appellants to surrender on the basis of an amended pleading.

  28. [43] The Winding Up Defence had a decisive impact on the outcome of the case. It was on the basis of this defence that we upheld the SICC’s decision in the Third Tranche Appeal Judgment. The respondents submit that the defence was not singularly determinative, because they had a second string to their bow: even if it were found that KSC would not have been wound up, BCBCS would still not have recouped its wasted expenditure. In essence, BR’s coal supply obligations would have come to an end before KSC’s cash flow became sufficient for the wasted expenditure to be recouped. There are two difficulties with this submission. First, the issue was ultimately not decided in the Third Tranche Appeal Judgment. It cannot be assumed that, had the issue been decided, it would have been decided in the respondents’ favour. Second, this alternative submission is not free from pleading difficulties either, and may be subject to the same criticisms as the Winding Up Defence. Indeed, on our reading of the D&CC, this does not even appear to have been pleaded as a discrete point.

  29. [44] Given the respondents’ late amendment to their pleadings, which substantially altered the case to be met and decisively impacted the outcome of S 1, we are inclined to agree that S 1 may be an appropriate case for the Beoco approach to be applied.

  30. The issue-based approach

  31. (1) The development of the issue-based approach

  32. (2) Limitations of the issue-based approach

  33. (A) Criticisms from principle

  34. (B) Practical considerations

  35. [64] On the other hand, we think the practical difficulties associated with the issue-based approach present a more formidable obstacle standing in the way of its widespread or ready adoption.

  36. [65] The first difficulty is one of separation. Given that issues regularly overlap, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to clinically delineate the issues in any given case, which is a necessary antecedent to identifying the winning party for each issue: see Smithkline Beecham plc and others v Apotex Europe Limited and others [2004] All ER (D) 246 (Dec) (“Smithkline”) at [4]–[5]; Fortune Link Engineering Co Ltd v Sui Chong Construction & Engineering Co Ltd [2016] HKCU 1611 at [13]; Cyberworks Audio Video Technology Ltd v Mei Ah (HK) Co Ltd [2020] HKCU 3816 at [17]. As Beldam LJ had noted, in a related context, in Re Elgindata Ltd (No 2) [1993] 1 All ER 232 (“Elgindata”) at 241D:

  37. [72] The rationale behind r 44.3(7) was explained in English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 2409 at [115] and [116] (see also Budgen v Andrew Gardner Partnership [2002] EWCA Civ 1125 at [27]; McGlinn v Waltham Contractors Ltd and others (No 4) [2007] EWHC 698 at [83]; and National Westminster Bank plc v Kotonou [2007] EWCA Civ 223 at [22]):

  38. (3) Conclusion

  39. Should the costs order only be made against BCBCS and not BCBC?

  40. Principles relating to costs orders made where there are two or more unsuccessful claimants

  41. (a) the factors (established by case law) that determine whether the claimants acted jointly are markedly absent;

  42. (b) one claimant had minimal involvement in the litigation and there is an underlying public policy to avoid joint and several liability; or

  43. [83] We turn to consider when the court may depart from this general rule. It appears that courts rarely depart from the rule where there is a certain degree of commonality between: (a) the parties on the same side of the litigation; (b) the approach taken by the parties in the conduct of proceedings; and (c) the claims or issues and the facts and evidence that underlie them. We mention a number of cases which are illustrative of this.

  44. [84] In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Select AFSL Pty Ltd (No 3) [2023] FCA 723, the court declined (at [309]–[310]) to depart from the general rule, noting that there was not only a common substratum of facts, but also a commonality of parties, as the fourth defendant was the controlling mind of the other three corporate defendants. It was also the case that the corporate defendants took a common approach to the conduct of proceedings.

  45. [87] Rowe also serves as a useful reminder that the general rule applies not only to cases where parties have “true joint claim[s]”, but also where they bring what is in effect a single claim or a single group of claims (at [11]):

  46. [89] In Stumm v Dixon & Co and Knight (1889) 22 QBD 529 (“Stumm”), there was no connection between the unsuccessful parties, and they were not running a single case. Lord Esher MR, in deciding to depart from the general rule, commented (at 533–534) that where defendants have put in separate defences with different issues being tried and different amounts of time being taken in respect of the various issues, it may be appropriate to depart from the general rule. This emphasis was clear from Lord Esher’s framing of the issue (at 530–531):

  47. Whether BCBCS and BCBC should be jointly and severally liable for costs

  48. [92] In the present case, BCBC had pursued what was essentially a separate claim as against the respondents, and not a common claim with BCBCS. There was undoubtedly some overlap with BCBCS’ claims, which formed the thrust of S 1, in that the guarantee was factually connected with the operation of the joint venture and its terms made reference to losses suffered by BCBCS. Notwithstanding this factual overlap, BCBC’s claim was based on the guarantee, for which it sought, amongst other things, specific performance of that guarantee, as well as damages pursuant to clauses 2.2 and/or 2.3 of the guarantee in the alternative, but that did not involve BCBC positively promoting any such claim which fell to be decided in the proceedings brought by BCBCS against BR. In contrast, the claim mounted by BCBCS centered on the alleged breach of the JV Deed.

  49. Conclusion

  50. (a) BCBCS is liable to BR for its post-transfer costs to the following extent. From the claimed figure of $4,947,753.70 (see Costs Judgment at [67]), costs solely attributable to BCBC’s withdrawn claim (which are to be determined in the manner outlined below) are to be deducted. The resulting figure is subject to a 10% discount for the respondents’ lack of particularisation (see Costs Judgment at [67]), and a further 70% discount (see [31] above).

  51. (b) BCBC is liable to BI for its post-transfer costs, in so far as these are solely attributable to BCBC’s withdrawn claim. Because this is a subset of the total costs claimed by BR and BI collectively, and which the SICC considered should be discounted by 10% on account of the lack of particularisation, we consider that the final amount determined to be payable by BCBC to BI should be subject to the same discount of 10%. As to the actual quantum of such costs, we expect the parties should be able to agree on this, but in the unlikely event they are not able to, they are to write to the court, within 14 days of this judgment, to indicate their respective positions (this to be no longer than five pages), to enable us to fix the quantum.