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Grounds publishedDecided 15 Jan 2026

District Court

Paramjeet Kaur A/P Balwan Singh v Grab Rentals Pte Ltd and another

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[2026] SGDC 29Case no. [2026] SGDC 2920 paragraphs

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  1. [1] The Claimant appealed against the orders of the Deputy Registrar (“DR”) in DC/SUM 1083/2025 (“SUM 1083”) for:

  2. (a) the Claimant to furnish security of $8,000 for the 2nd Defendant’s costs by way of a bankers’ guarantee; and

  3. (b) the Claimant to furnish the security ordered within 21 days (ie, by 23 October 2025), failing which the proceedings in DC/OC 1498/2024 (“DC 1498”) are stayed until compliance by the Claimant.

  4. [2] After considering the written and oral submissions of the parties as well as the relevant authorities, I allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the DR. These are the grounds of my decision.

  5. Background

  6. [3] The Claimant, Mdm Paramjeet Kaur A/P Balwan Singh, is the widow and administratrix of the estate of Mr Kuldeep Singh A/L Amar Singh (“Deceased”). The Claimant’s action in DC 1498 is for damages arising from a road traffic accident on 15 September 2018 (“Accident”) involving a motorcycle driven by the Deceased and a private hire car (“Vehicle”) driven by the 2nd Defendant, Mr Mohamed Aydi Bin Mohamed Yusoff. At the material time, the Vehicle was owned by the 1st Defendant, Grab Rentals Pte Ltd.

  7. The applicable law

  8. [6] The applicable law is not in dispute. The applicable provision is O 9 r 12 of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”), specifically, O 9 r 12(1)(a) which reads as follows:

  9. (a) First, whether the court’s discretion to order security for costs under O 9 r 12(1) has been enlivened; and

  10. (b) Second, whether it is just to order security for costs having regard to all the relevant circumstances.

  11. [8] As regards the second stage concerning whether it is just to order security, the High Court in Cova Group Holdings noted, at [18], that this exercise entails a consideration of a non-exhaustive list of circumstances, including:

  12. (a) whether the claimant has a bona fide claim;

  13. (b) the claimant’s financial standing;

  14. (c) the ease of enforcing any judgment for costs against the claimant;

  15. (d) the relative strengths of the parties’ cases; and

  16. (e) whether the application for security for costs has been taken out to oppressively stifle the claimant’s action.

  17. (a) to protect the defendant, who cannot avoid being sued, by enabling him to recover costs from the claimant out of a fund within the jurisdiction in the event that the claim against him by the claimant proves to be unsuccessful;

  18. (b) to ensure, within the limits of protecting the defendant, that the claimant’s ability to pursue his claim is not stifled; and

  19. (c) to maintain a sense of fair play between the parties even amidst the cut-and-thrust of civil litigation.

  20. [11] I applied the above two-stage framework to this appeal with the aforesaid considerations relating to the Ideals and key purposes in mind.

  21. First Stage: Discretion to order security

  22. Second Stage: Whether it is just to order security for costs

  23. [13] The second stage of the applicable framework entails a consideration whether it is just to order security having regard to all the relevant circumstances of the case.

  24. [14] In this regard, I first considered the relative strengths of the parties’ cases and whether they have a reasonable prospect of succeeding. In this exercise, the court does not enter into a detailed examination of the merits at this stage of proceedings: see Ong Jane Rebecca v Pricewaterhousecoopers and others [2009] 2 SLR (R) 796 (“Ong Jane Rebecca”) at [22]. Rather, as the High Court in Cova Group Holdings stated at [29], “… in assessing whether the defence has a good prospect of success, it is generally sufficient for a defendant to raise a plausible defence.” This same standard of plausibility will apply in assessing the prospects of success of a claimant’s case: see Cova Group Holdings at [37].

  25. Strength of the Claimant’s case

  26. [15] To reiterate, the Claimant’s action is for damages arising out of the Accident on 15 September 2018. The Claimant pleaded that the Accident was caused by the 2nd Defendant’s negligence. The Claimant has also pleaded and provided evidence that the 2nd Defendant was subsequently charged, convicted, and sentenced to imprisonment for, inter alia, causing death by a negligent act under s 304A(b) of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) in relation to the Accident.

  27. [16] In my assessment, on the face of the pleadings and evidence, the Claimant has a bona fide and plausible claim with a good prospect of success. If the Claimant is successful in her action, she will be entitled to a substantial amount of damages, including for loss of dependency given that the Claimant was a dependent of the Deceased who was only 48 years old at the time of his demise.

  28. Strength of the 2nd Defendant’s defence

  29. [17] Against this, the 2nd Defendant avers that the Claimant’s claim is time-barred under s 24A(2) of the Limitation Act 1959. This provision and s 24A(6) read as follows:

  30. [18] The main defence raised by the 2nd Defendant is that the Claimant’s claim is time-barred as DC 1489 was commenced on 5 September 2024, more than 3 years after the accident which occurred on 15 September 2018. In essence, the 2nd Defendant contended that the Claimant, having appointed solicitors in August 2020 to assist in obtaining letters of administration, could have applied for the Coroner’s certificate dated 15 March 2019 (“Coroner’s Certificate”) that sets out the circumstances of the accident and the identity of the 2nd Defendant. As such, the 2nd Defendant contended that the Claimant need not have waited until she was contacted by the Traffic Police on 20 September 2021 to uncover the identity of the 2nd Defendant and commence the present action.

  31. [19] Alternatively, the 2nd Defendant argued that the Claimant could be deemed to have constructive knowledge of the identity of the 2nd Defendant from August 2020 based on her appointment of solicitors and the availability of the Coroner’s Certificate. On this basis, the Claimant’s claim would still have been commenced outside the limitation period calculated 3 years from August 2020.

  32. [20] On the other hand, the Claimant’s position is that she was in Malaysia at the material time, and despite her numerous attempts to obtain the necessary information and documents the regarding the identity of the tortfeasor, the identity of 2nd Defendant was only made known to her after she received a letter from the Traffic Police dated 21 September 2021. As such, the Claimant submitted that she only had all the necessary details, including the identity of the 2nd Defendant, in September 2021. The Claimant’s position is that commencement of DC 1489 on 5 September 2024 was thus within the limitation period. Related to this, the Claimant contended that she had commenced an earlier action in DC/DC 1933/2021 to preserve her position in view of the time bar. This action was subsequently withdrawn after the Claimant was informed of the 2nd Defendant’s role in the Accident.

  33. [21] At this juncture, I reiterate that the court will not embark on a detailed examination of the merits of the parties’ cases. It suffices to note that in deciding whether the Claimant had knowledge, the court will apply an objective test, and ask whether, given the circumstances, the Claimant could reasonably have been expected to acquire knowledge from facts observable and ascertainable by her: see Leow Peng Yam v Kang Jia Dian Aryall [2022] 2 SLR 725 at [32]-[34]. In the present case, it would appear that the 2nd Defendant’s defence of time bar is predicated on constructive knowledge rather than actual knowledge of the Claimant, and it is evident that the determination of the issue of whether a personal representative (such as the Claimant) had the requisite knowledge to bring an action is a determination that will turn on findings of fact.

  34. [22] Seen in this light, although it can be said that the 2nd Defendant has a plausible limitation defence, it is evident that the success or failure of this defence cannot be fully determined without a trial.

  35. Claimant’s impecuniosity

  36. [26] After considering the case of Ho Wing On Christopher v ECRC Land Pte Ltd [2006] 4 SLR(R) 817, the High Court in Ong Jane Rebecca observed at [30] that “[i]t is plain from the above passage that where the litigant is a natural person, public policy leans much more towards encouraging access to the courts.” This is particularly germane to the present appeal, as the Claimant is a natural person who is impecunious.

  37. [27] At [33], the High Court in Ong Jane Rebecca held:

  38. No security for costs ordered

  39. [30] In conclusion, it is apposite to recall the following observations of the High Court in Ong Jane Rebecca at [31]:

  40. Costs of the appeal

  41. [38] Mr Yeo withdrew his submission after considering these two authorities. Nevertheless, he urged the court to consider the concern that the 2nd Defendant will be entirely out of pocket if he succeeds in his defence.

  42. Edwin San District Judge