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Grounds publishedDecided 30 Sep 2019

High Court

Ng Kian Huan Edmund v Suying Metropolitan Studio Pte Ltd and others

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[2019] SGHC 234Case no. Suit No 867 of 201513 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. [2] Briefly, in 2012, the plaintiff, Mr Ng Kian Huan, Edmund (“Edmund”), was running an architectural firm, Metropolitan Office Experimental (“MOX”), while the 3rd defendant, Ms Tan Teow Feng Patty (“Patty”) ran an interior design company, Suying Design Pte Ltd (“SDPL”), the 2nd defendant. Edmund, Patty and two others agreed to join forces and formed a new company, Suying Metropolitan Studio Pte Ltd (“SMSPL”), the 1st defendant. The agreement was made orally (“the Oral Agreement”) and, not surprisingly, its terms were disputed.

  2. [3] In these proceedings, Edmund’s main claim was for minority oppression under s 216 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) against Patty in connection with the affairs of SMSPL. Some of the grounds relied upon in the oppression claim involved certain payments made by SMSPL to SDPL and Patty, as well as certain payments that were payable by SDPL to SMSPL. As part of his claim, Edmund sought orders requiring SDPL and Patty to pay these sums of money to SMSPL.

  3. [4] Edmund also sought certain orders against SMSPL in relation to his salary, director’s fees and dividends.

  4. [5] SMSPL made numerous counterclaims:

  5. (a) Counterclaims against Edmund for repayment of director’s fees and dividends received by Edmund, breaches of director’s duties in connection with numerous projects, breaches of confidentiality, negligence in connection with several projects, payment of monies received by Edmund, repayment of Edmund’s vehicle allowance, and advances to Edmund.

  6. (b) Counterclaims against MOX for reimbursement for the use of SMSPL’s resources.

  7. (c) A counterclaim against Edmund and MOX in respect of certain expenses charged to SMSPL.

  8. (d) A counterclaim against Edmund and his wife, Ms Chong Chin Fong (“Jazz”) for an indemnity.

  9. (e) A counterclaim against Jazz for services rendered.

  10. [7] In the Judgment,

  11. (a) I accepted Edmund’s version of the terms of the Oral Agreement (the Judgment at [76]).

  12. (c) I directed SMSPL’s accounts for 2012 and 2013 to be adjusted to give effect to my findings on certain issues that affected the accounts (the Judgment at [364]).

  13. (i) $672,000 that Patty had wrongfully caused SMSPL to pay to her (the Judgment at [232]); and

  14. (ii) $39,276 that had been wrongly accrued to Patty’s director’s account in SMSPL (the Judgment at [241]).

  15. (i) $872,864 which Patty had wrongfully caused SMSPL to pay to SDPL (the Judgment at [220]);

  16. (ii) $1,388 which SDPL admitted had been paid to it by SMSPL by mistake (the Judgment at [226]);

  17. (iii) $48,333.72 which SDPL admitted it had wrongly billed SMSPL for and had been paid (the Judgment at [227]);

  18. (iv) $169,507.67 being SDPL’s income tax and GST liabilities which SMSPL had paid on behalf of SDPL (the Judgment at [229]); and

  19. (v) $194,290.08 which was due from SDPL to SMSPL and which Patty had wrongfully caused SMSPL to write off (the Judgment at [230]).

  20. (i) $4,063.45 being his outstanding salary (the Judgment at [248(a)]); and

  21. (ii) $265,000 being his director’s fees for 2013 (the Judgment at [248(c)]).

  22. (h) I declared that a sum of $200,000 paid to Edmund in 2013 was paid to him as director’s fees for 2012 (the Judgment at [248(b)]).

  23. (i) $225,750 being total damages for Edmund’s breaches of duties and/or negligence in respect of four projects under SMSPL (the Judgment at [272], [281], [287] and [325]);

  24. (ii) $3,000 being total nominal damages for Edmund’s breaches of duties in respect of three projects under SMSPL (the Judgment at [266], [267] and [283]);

  25. (iii) $1,000 being nominal damages for Edmund’s technical breach of his confidentiality obligations (the Judgment at [297]); and

  26. (iv) $5,000 being personal expenses that Edmund had charged to SMSPL (the Judgment at [356]).

  27. (j) I found Edmund liable to indemnify SMSPL for the fees for one project to the extent that the fees were not recoverable from the client otherwise than due to SMSPL’s own omission or fault (the Judgment at [269]).

  28. (k) I found Edmund was liable to account to SMSPL for the profits made by him in respect of another project (the Judgment at [276]).

  29. (l) I dismissed all the other claims and counterclaims.

  30. [8] Edmund, Patty and SDPL have filed appeals against the Judgment.

  31. Costs between Edmund and Patty

  32. [12] Edmund succeeded in his oppression claim. He succeeded in proving his version of the terms of the Oral Agreement. The dispute over the terms of the Oral Agreement was a major issue at the trial. Resolution of this dispute also had a bearing on whether certain payments and transactions were wrongful. Further, Edmund substantially succeeded in proving his allegations against Patty in respect of her conduct of the affairs of SMSPL. It was clear that however one analysed the case, Edmund was the successful party in the oppression claim.

  33. [13] Edmund also succeeded in most of his claims against Patty for payments to be made by Patty to SMSPL and for Patty to procure SDPL to make payments to SMSPL. Finally, Patty failed in her counterclaim against Edmund.

  34. [14] Patty submitted that Edmund unreasonably complicated the proceedings by amending his claim to include unmeritorious claims. Edmund did not succeed in proving all his claims. The reasons are set out in the Judgment. It should also be noted that some of Edmund’s claims were made in the alternative. They became irrelevant when I accepted Edmund’s version of the Oral Agreement. Clearly, Edmund was entitled to make these allegations in the alternative. In my view, Edmund had not acted unreasonably in making the allegations that he did; neither did these allegations unreasonably complicate the proceedings.

  35. (a) the costs of Edmund’s oppression action and his claims against Patty; and

  36. (b) the costs of Patty’s counterclaim.

  37. Costs between Edmund and SMSPL

  38. Costs between Edmund and SDPL

  39. Costs between SMSPL and MOX/Jazz

  40. [24] In DB Trustees (Hong Kong) Ltd v Consult Asia Pte Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 542 (“DB Trustees”), the Court of Appeal summarised the relevant principles as follows (at [36]):

  41. (a) costs orders may be made against non-parties where it is just to do so in all the circumstances of the case; and

  42. (b) in assessing whether it would be just to do so, a variety of factors may be relevant but ordinarily, considerable weight would be placed on the presence of two factors, viz, a close connection between the non-party and the proceedings and a causal link between the non-party and the incurring of costs.

  43. [25] Examples of a close connection between the non-party and the proceedings include where the non-party either funds or controls the legal proceedings with the intention of ultimately deriving a benefit from them, or where the non-party was responsible for initiating an unwarranted application: DB Trustees at [30] and [33].

  44. [26] In the present case, Patty was not a party to SMSPL’s counterclaims against MOX and Jazz. However, it was clear that Patty was the one who caused SMSPL to pursue these counterclaims and that she both funded and controlled the same. In my view, Patty’s objective was to throw as many counterclaims at Edmund, MOX or Jazz, as she could come up with, regardless of whether there was a sound basis.

  45. Conclusion

  46. (a) the costs of Edmund’s oppression action and his claims against Patty; and

  47. (b) the costs of Patty’s counterclaim.

  48. [33] I directed that Edmund’s, Jazz’s and MOX’s disbursements were to be fixed by me if not agreed between the parties.