High Court · Decided 23 July 2020
Joseph Clement Louis Arokaisamy v Singapore Airlines Ltd and another matter
Feedback & support[2020] SGHC 150 · Case no. Originating Summons No 1595 of 2019 (Registrar’s Appeal No 87 of 2020) · 36 paragraphs
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction and background
- [1]
[1] At the heart of these proceedings lies the following question: can a party keep re-litigating a claim indefinitely?
- [2]
[2] Mr Joseph Clement Louis Arokaisamy (“Mr Clement”) was an employee of Singapore Airlines Limited (“SIA”) from 1973 until he was dismissed in 1997. From 1997 to date, he initiated a number of actions and applications concerning his termination and continued to do so even after 2004, by which time his wrongful dismissal claim had been dismissed and had become unappealable.
History of proceedings
Re-litigation
- [5]
[5] On 6 May 2005, whilst a bankrupt, Mr Clement filed an application (by DC Summons in Chambers 6000027/2005) to re-amend his Statement of Claim in DC/S 4929/1997. By way of the application, he sought leave to plead that his dismissal was “not in accordance and not in compliance with the mandatory statutory requirements of section 13(2) of the employment act (chapter 91)”. However, his wrongful dismissal claim had already been dismissed, and he had exhausted all avenues of appeal. Moreover, both District Judge Thean and Woo J had considered s 13(2) of the Employment Act (Cap 91, 1996 Rev Ed) (“Employment Act”) and decided that it justified Mr Clement’s dismissal (see District Judge Thean’s judgment at [9]–[28], in particular [27]; and Woo J’s judgment at [12]–[47]), in particular [30]). On 30 June 2005, Mr Clement’s amendment application was dismissed.
Mr Clement’s present action
- [7]
[7] After his discharge from bankruptcy on 13 June 2017, however, Mr Clement filed HC/OS 1595/2019 (“OS 1595”) against SIA on 30 December 2019. He sought:
(a) “an interpretation of Section 13(2) of the Employment Act” (prayer 1) and “the factual circumstances under which the said section is triggered and/or applicable” (prayer 2);
(b) “The applicability of section 8 of the Employment Act” (prayer 3) and “The probable factual circumstances when section 8 is applicable” (prayer 4);
(c) “A Declaration that there was Procedural Impropriety by [SIA] and the Trial Judge in DC Suit 4929 of [1997]” (prayer 5);
(d) “A Declaration that [Mr Clement] is within time for this Application” (prayer 6); and
- [8]
[8] SIA successfully applied to strike out OS 1595.
OS 1595 was correctly struck out
- [10]
[10] At the first instance hearing of SIA’s striking out application, Mr Clement candidly admitted that he wanted a declaration that DC/S 4929/1997 (his wrongful dismissal claim) was wrongly decided.
- [11]
[11] I found that the assistant registrar was correct to strike out OS 1595.
OS 1595 is barred by res judicata
- [12]
[12] By way of OS 1595, Mr Clement sought to re-litigate his case, which was already res judicata (in the sense of cause of action estoppel) as between him and SIA. Moreover, s 13(2) of the Employment Act, which is mentioned in prayers 1 and 2 of OS 1595, had been considered by both District Judge Thean and Woo J in deciding against Mr Clement as they did (see District Judge Thean’s judgment at [9]–[28] and Woo J’s judgment at [12]–[47]).
- [13]
[13] District Judge Thean dismissed Mr Clement’s wrongful dismissal claim, Woo J upheld that decision on appeal, and Mr Clement’s two attempts to appeal to the Court of Appeal failed. The non-existence of a cause of action for wrongful dismissal has been determined as between Mr Clement and SIA. That is final and unappealable, and cause of action estoppel prevents him from continuing to assert that he was wrongfully dismissed by SIA (applying The Royal Bank of Scotland NV (formerly known as ABN Amro Bank NV) and others v TT International Ltd (nTan Corporate Advisory Pte Ltd and others, other parties) and another appeal [2015] 5 SLR 1004 (“TT International”) at [99]).
- [14]
[14] Mr Clement submitted that District Judge Thean and Woo J were wrong, in that s 13(2) of the Employment Act was never applicable to the facts of his case. The simple point is: the judges decided that s 13(2) of the Employment Act was applicable to the facts of his case, and Mr Clement cannot keep filing proceedings to reopen the matter.
- [15]
[15] Before me, Mr Clement tried to distance OS 1595 from the termination of his employment, but to no avail. He sought to characterise OS 1595 as merely seeking an interpretation of written law and other relief. However, he sued SIA as a defendant, sought to reargue the applicability of s 13(2) of the Employment Act to the facts of his case, and sought a declaration of procedural impropriety in respect of District Judge Thean’s decision against him, all of which made it readily apparent that OS 1595 was nothing more than a smokescreen for reopening the long concluded matter of DC/S 4929/1997. In any event, not only did District Judge Thean and Woo J interpret s 13(2) of the Employment Act, they also found that it applied on the facts of Mr Clement’s wrongful dismissal claim.
- [16]
[16] Mr Clement’s reference to s 8 of the Employment Act, as another basis for overturning the decisions against him, did not improve his position. He was still making a direct attack on the decisions against him, and cause of action estoppel applies (see TT International at [99]). Where cause of action estoppel has arisen, the bar against re-litigation is absolute save for fraud or collusion, which I found to be absent here, as I will explain below (see TT International at [103]).
- [17]
[17] I considered that the reference to s 8 of the Employment Act is caught by cause of action estoppel; but even if that were not so, it would still be caught by the “extended” doctrine of res judicata (see TT International at [101]–[102], and Mr Clement cannot argue that point in the absence of special circumstances, of which there are none. Any point about s 8 of the Employment Act ought properly to have been raised and argued in DC/S 4929/1997, but it was not. It was not raised in DCA 17/2003 either. Mr Clement cannot now do so.
The s 8 Employment Act argument is totally without merit
- [18]
[18] In any event, I saw no merit whatsoever in Mr Clement’s argument relating to s 8 of the Employment Act. Mr Clement accepted in the course of oral submissions that s 8 of the Employment Act had no application here, and informed me that he was withdrawing that aspect of OS 1595.
- [19]
[19] That section (in the terms in force when Mr Clement was terminated) reads:
- [20]
[20] As I explained to Mr Clement, s 8 contemplates a comparison of the terms of an employment contract, with the conditions of service prescribed by the Employment Act. However, the “term” that Mr Clement was complaining of was s 13(2) of the same Act, rather than any term in his employment contract. Mr Clement could not explain how s 8 might override s 13(2), other than to point to the phrase “less favourable” in s 8. SIA could and did terminate his employment on the basis of the deeming provision in s 13(2) of the Employment Act; s 8 of the Employment Act does not apply to s 13(2), which is not a “term of a contract of service” but part of the same Act.
- [21]
[21] In any event, the courts have already decided that s 13(2) of the Employment Act justified SIA’s termination of Mr Clement’s contract. Section 13(2) of the Employment Act deemed Mr Clement to have broken his contract of service for having been continuously absent from work for more than two days without informing or attempting to inform SIA of the excuse for such absence, and SIA had terminated his contract accordingly (see District Judge Thean’s judgment at [27], and Woo J’s judgment at [30] where Woo J expressly said that where s 13(2) of the Employment Act applies, what is deemed is not merely a breach of contract but a repudiation which entitles an employer to terminate).
- [22]
[22] In so far as Mr Clement’s argument was about the validity of SIA’s termination letter of 5 March 1997 purporting to terminate his employment with effect from 21 February 1997 (which was when his period of absence began), this argument had already been addressed in Woo J’s judgment at [60]–[71], in a section captioned, “New issue: Whether the termination letter was valid”. At [63], Woo J noted that the point had not been pleaded or argued before the trial judge; adopting the observations of Lord Birkenhead LC in North Staffordshire Railway Company v Edge [1920] AC 254 at 263–264, he rejected the point accordingly (at [71]).
Mr Clement’s new grounds for re-litigation are barred and are totally without merit
- [23]
[23] Mr Clement’s written submissions for the Restraint OS (filed on 9 July 2020) appeared to raise further grounds for, in his own words, “reopening the matter now”. In those submissions, he said he was “seeking for justice as the rule of law must be applied fairly and no one is above the law and all are equally given the same rights under the law” (at para 11); he emphasised the same in oral submissions. In his written submissions for OS 1595, he raised the following:
(a) Fraud and mistake – he said that SIA had “acted fraudulently (bad faith) and made a mistake in law and have mislead the trial judge and the plaintiff who was in person during the DC Suit 4929. The judgment was obtain fraudulently” (at para 3). He elaborated as follows:
(i) “Firstly the judgment was obtain fraudulently by the respondent’s and a judgment which was obtain in such a manner, the principles of res judicata is not applicable at all” (at para 16).
(ii) “Secondly an action for fraud can only brought after a judgment and fraudulently judgment is void from the beginning” (at para 17).
(b) Lack of power – “Thirdly the District Court under certain provisions of the District Courts Act (Currently the States Courts Act) does not have the authority or power to interpret a written law” (at para 18).
(c) Judicial review – “Fourthly a declaration for procedural impropriety can only be decided by the high court by way of judicial review” (at para 19).
- [24]
[24] The various ways in which Mr Clement sought to overturn the final and unappealable court decisions against him all offend res judicata. They are, moreover, totally without merit, and only show the lengths to which he will go in persistently re-litigating the matter.
- [25]
[25] First, regarding fraud and mistake, Mr Clement’s argument is along these lines: the judges were wrong; SIA misled the judges; SIA (represented by reputable lawyers) knew they were not entitled to rely on s 13(2) of the Employment Act in the first place – so SIA defrauded the courts. But Mr Clement had no basis for saying SIA knew they were not entitled to rely on s 13(2) in the first place. All that I see is that SIA relied on s 13(2) of the Employment Act to justify their termination of Mr Clement’s employment, and the judges agreed that they were entitled to do so. There is no fraud to speak of.
- [27]
[27] Third, it is misconceived for Mr Clement to seek judicial review of District Judge Thean’s decision on the grounds of procedural impropriety, namely, that she acted beyond her powers and ultra vires a written law (s 13(2) of the Employment Act). Whether his termination was justified under s 13(2) of the Employment Act was argued at first instance, and he lost; it was argued again on his appeal to the High Court, and he lost again; and the Court of Appeal declined to let him appeal further.
OS 1595 is time-barred
- [28]
[28] For completeness, I also considered that OS 1595 is time-barred. Mr Clement sought, among other things, to revisit his termination of employment in 1997 and obtain a declaration of procedural impropriety against the trial judge in DC/S 4929/1997 (which concluded with judgment against him on 16 June 2003). Mr Clement cited s 29(1) of the Limitation Act (Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed) (“Limitation Act”) and argued that he was still within time because it was only some time in July 2013 that he discovered what he called a “serious mistake in law” made by both District Judge Thean and SIA; he further claimed to have discovered that SIA had breached the rules of natural justice and had also acted in bad faith (see paras 23–24 of his 30 December 2019 affidavit in OS 1595).
- [29]
[29] I did not consider s 29(1) of the Limitation Act to be of any help to Mr Clement. In relation to s 29(1)(b), Mr Clement’s right of action for wrongful dismissal was not concealed (let alone fraudulently concealed) by SIA. He sued for wrongful dismissal in 1997, the same year he was dismissed.
- [30]
[30] As for s 29(1)(c) of the Limitation Act, that applies only where “the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake”, and this was not such a case – Mr Clement’s claim was (and always had been) for wrongful dismissal, ie, an alleged breach of contract by SIA.
- [31]
[31] In any event, s 29(1) of the Limitation Act merely provides that the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud or mistake, as the case may be, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. On Mr Clement’s own position that he discovered certain matters in July 2013, even if s 29 of the Limitation Act applied, he would still have had to commence action within six years thereafter (six years being the limitation period for actions founded on a contract under s 6(1)(a) of the Limitation Act), ie, by July 2019. OS 1595 was however only commenced on 30 December 2019, beyond any conceivable limitation period. He did put forward various excuses as to why he was unable to file proceedings earlier, but those do not justify extending the limitation period.
- [32]
[32] Moreover, I did not consider his excuses to be a satisfactory explanation for OS 1595 being filed only in December 2019 (or indeed, at all). One of the excuses was that he was a bankrupt until 13 June 2017, and he could not get permission from the Official Assignee to file further proceedings after V K Rajah J directed (in dismissing HC/OS 1310/2005) that the Official Assignee be informed that “further litigation to reopen matters decided in DC Suit 4929 of 1997 have absolutely no merit”. Mr Clement’s inability to get permission from the Official Assignee for further unmeritorious re-litigation is hardly a good reason to allow such re-litigation now. That direction, moreover, would only have been effective during his bankruptcy. There still remained a gap of some two and a half years between 13 June 2017 when he was discharged from bankruptcy, and 30 December 2019 when he commenced OS 1595.
The extended civil restraint order should be granted
- [33]
[33] I agreed with SIA that Mr Clement should be restrained from further re-litigating his wrongful dismissal claim and the issues in it.
- [34]
[34] The Restraint OS was brought pursuant to the court’s inherent powers and/or s 73C of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”). While SIA referred to the court’s “inherent jurisdiction” in their submissions, I will instead refer to the court’s “inherent powers”. The latter is more precise (see Re Nalpon Zero Geraldo Mario [2013] 3 SLR 258 at [41]) and also accords with the language of O 92 r 4 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed). I note that Mr Clement too invoked the court’s inherent powers, in relation to OS 1595.
- [36]
[36] Mr Clement’s actions or applications that are totally without merit include:
(a) his application to amend his pleadings in DC/S 4929/1997, after that suit had been dismissed and his appeals against that decision had been exhausted (which application was duly dismissed);
(b) HC/OS 1310/2005 (dismissed with a direction to the effect that the Official Assignee should not give permission for any further re-litigation);
(c) OS 1595; and
(d) HC/RA 87/2020 (his appeal against the striking out of OS 1595).
- [39]
[39] I also noted that on 23 January 2008, Mr Clement had obtained SIA’s consent to his proposed discharge from bankruptcy on the basis of (amongst other things) his undertaking “not to make any further claims or commence further proceedings of any nature against [SIA]”. However, he resiled from that undertaking, and from 16 June 2011 to 10 October 2014, Mr Clement wrote to SIA repeatedly to give them notice of his intention to pursue his termination by further court action. This correspondence foreshadowed OS 1595.
- [41]
[41] I noted that prayer 1 of the Restraint OS was worded as follows: “that [Mr Clement] be restrained from commencing or issuing any legal proceedings concerning any matter involving, relating to, touching upon or leading to the termination of his employment with [SIA], including DC Suit No. 4929 of 1997, DCA No. 17 of 2003, Civil Appeal No. 11 of 2004/C, Originating Motion No. 24 of 2004/X, Originating Summons No. 1310 of 2005/J, HC/OS 1595/2019 and the issues and the parties set out there in, without the leave of the court and, in case [Mr Clement] should without such leave issue or commence any such legal proceedings, [SIA] is not to attend or otherwise deal with such legal proceedings unless the court on the return thereof shall so direct and, unless the court shall think fit to give such directions, the legal proceedings shall be summarily dismissed without being heard”.
- [42]
[42] This had some differences with what is set out in ss 73C(2) and 73C(4) of the SCJA, which read:
- [43]
[43] Of particular note is that SIA sought a restraint of indefinite length against Mr Clement. At this juncture, I prefer to impose a two-year restraint which is in line with s 73C of the SCJA, although this period may be extended thereafter under the SCJA (see ss 73C(4) and 73C(5) of the SCJA) or under the court’s inherent powers. While Mr Clement has, to date, brought four actions or applications that are totally without merit (see [36] above), the number of actions or applications alone does not justify an indefinite restraint against him. The word “persistently” in s 73C(1) of the SCJA indicates that more than one unmeritorious action or application would have to be brought before s 73C of the SCJA comes into operation. Nonetheless, Parliament has expressly provided for a two-year limit in extended civil restraint orders (per s 73C(4) of the SCJA). I was not satisfied that the facts before me justified a departure from the general position in s 73C(4) of the SCJA into the realm of an indefinite restraint.
(ii) without the need for any other party to be heard on the merits of that action or application.
4. The parties shall have liberty to apply.
Conclusion
- [47]
[47] Can a party keep re-litigating a claim indefinitely? The answer is a resounding “no”.
- [48]
[48] I conclude with a quote from Lord Bingham of Cornhill CJ’s judgment in Attorney-General v Barker [2000] 1 FLR 759 at 764 (also quoted in Cheong Wei Chang at [74]): “The essential vice of habitual and persistent litigation is keeping on and on litigating when earlier litigation has been unsuccessful and when on any rational and objective assessment the time has come to stop.”