High Court · Decided 17 March 2020
Goh Kok Liang v GYP Properties L td and another
Feedback & support[2020] SGHC 53 · Case no. Originating Summons No 827 of 2019 and Summons No 450 of 2020 · 27 paragraphs
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] The plaintiff in Originating Summons No 827 of 2019 (“OS827”), Mr Goh Kok Liang (“Goh”), was a defendant in a previous action in Suit 1164 of 2017 (“S1164”), which was brought by the defendants in OS827, GYP Properties Limited (formerly known as Global Yellow Pages Limited) (“GYP”) and Singapore River Explorer Pte Ltd (“SRE”).
- [2]
[2] In S1164, GYP and SRE accepted an offer to settle (“OTS”) made by Goh. Consequently, S1164 was discontinued.
Background
- [4]
[4] On 6 February 2012, GYP and Leisure Empire Pte Ltd (“LE”) entered into a joint venture agreement (“JVA”) for the purposes of submitting a bid to the Urban Redevelopment Authority (“URA”) for a licence to provide water transportation services (“river taxis”) along the Singapore River. The URA awarded the licence to them. On 31 December 2012, GYP, LE and the URA entered into a Licence Agreement. LE was wholly owned by Goh.
- [5]
[5] On 19 December 2012, GYP and LE incorporated SRE as the joint venture company to operate the river taxis. GYP and LE each held 50% of the shares in SRE, and Goh was appointed as a director of SRE. SRE and LE entered into a service agreement (“Service Agreement”) for LE to provide executive management, finance, human resource and administrative services to SRE.
- [6]
[6] On 15 June 2015, SRE terminated the Service Agreement based on alleged breaches of the Service Agreement by LE, Goh and/or LE’s agents. On 31 December 2015, SRE ceased to operate the river taxis.
- [7]
[7] On 11 December 2017, GYP and SRE commenced S1164 against Goh and LE, alleging various breaches of the Service Agreement, the JVA and Goh’s duties as a director of SRE. On 13 February 2018, GYP and SRE obtained judgment in default of defence against LE.
- [8]
[8] The claims against Goh were tried before me in February 2019. On 1 March 2019, I heard closing submissions and adjourned the case to 8 March 2019 for me to give my decision. By way of a letter dated 5 March 2019, the solicitors for GYP and SRE informed me that they had accepted Goh’s OTS.
- [9]
[9] Goh’s OTS was dated 30 May 2018. On 4 March 2019, GYP and SRE served an Acceptance of the OTS on Goh. Goh disputed the validity of the Acceptance because it left out one of the terms of the OTS. On 5 March 2019, at 1.20pm, Goh served a Notice of Withdrawal of the OTS on GYP and SRE. At 4.20pm on the same day, GYP and SRE served a second Acceptance of the OTS on Goh.
- [10]
[10] I heard the parties on 8 March 2019. Goh argued that the second Acceptance was invalid because he had already withdrawn his OTS before it was accepted. Goh conceded that the second Acceptance would be valid if his Notice of Withdrawal of the OTS was not valid. I decided that Goh’s withdrawal of his OTS was invalid because he had not given at least one day’s prior notice of his intention to withdraw the offer, as required under O 22A r 3(2) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC”). Accordingly, I declared that GYP and SRE had validly accepted the OTS and that S1164 was thereby fully and finally settled between GYP/ SRE and Goh on the terms contained in the OTS.
Goh’s application in OS827
- [11]
[11] In OS827, Goh sought declarations that:
(a) he was entitled to pursue a claim for costs (and interest thereon) in respect of S1164 against GYP and SRE;
(b) GYP and SRE were to pay his costs in respect of S1164 on an indemnity basis, with such costs to be taxed; and
(c) GYP and SRE were to pay interest on such costs.
- [17]
[17] Furthermore, O 22A r 1 ROC provides that an OTS shall be in Form 33. Form 33 states:
Form 33 gives the offeror the choice of making an offer to either “settle [the] proceeding” or to settle only specific claims in the proceeding. By framing his OTS as an offer to “settle this proceeding”, Goh’s intention was clear. His OTS was an offer to settle the whole of S1164.
- [20]
[20] Having disposed of Goh’s application, it was not necessary for me to deal with the parties’ submissions in respect of O 22A r 9 ROC. However, I wish to make some observations in this respect.
(a) the OTS was expressly made without any admission of liability; and
(b) the OTS did not comply with O 22A r 10 ROC in that it was not made on behalf of LE as well.
- [23]
[23] In any event, it was no longer open to GYP and SRE to challenge the validity of the OTS. In S1164, they had pre-empted a decision by accepting the OTS at the eleventh hour. GYP and SRE had clearly proceeded on the basis that the OTS was valid and capable of acceptance under O 22A. On his part, Goh had not argued that his OTS was invalid; his case was simply that he had validly withdrawn his OTS. In the circumstances, it would have been unjust to allow GYP and SRE to now argue that the OTS was invalid for non-compliance with O 22A. Before me, counsel for GYP and SRE accepted that it was no longer open to GYP and SRE to now argue that the OTS was invalid.
- [24]
[24] I also did not agree with GYP’s and SRE’s submission that an OTS under O 22A cannot be made without an admission of liability. GYP and SRE referred me to Colliers International (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Senkee Logistics Pte Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 230 (“Colliers”) in which the High Court stated (at [119]) as follows:
- [25]
[25] No explanation was given in Colliers for the statement set out above. Counsel for GYP and SRE informed me that he did not find any other authority on this point. In my respectful view, there is no reason why an OTS cannot be made without an admission of liability. While O 22A r 1 ROC states that an OTS shall be in Form 33, there is nothing in Form 33 that prohibits such a qualification. Neither does such a qualification make the OTS any less of an offer to settle the proceedings.
- [27]
[27] As for GYP’s and SRE’s submission that the OTS was invalid because it had not been made on behalf of LE and therefore did not comply with O 22A r 10 ROC, the simple answer was that default judgment had already been entered against LE by the time Goh served his OTS on 30 May 2018. There was no basis to include LE in the OTS since the claims against LE had already been disposed of. In the circumstances, O 22A r 10(b) ROC was simply irrelevant.
Goh’s application for leave to appeal
- [28]
[28] By way of Summons No 450 of 2020, Goh applied for leave to appeal against my dismissal of OS827. It is well-established that leave to appeal may be granted where there is:
(a) a prima facie case of error;
(b) a question of general principle decided for the first time; or
(c) a question of importance upon which further argument and a decision of a higher tribunal would be to the public advantage.
See Lee Kuan Yew v Tang Liang Hong and another [1997] 2 SLR(R) 862 at [16].
- [29]
[29] In oral submissions before me, Goh submitted that:
(a) There was a prima facie case of error in the interpretation of the OTS.
(b) There was a question of general principle in respect of which a decision of the Court of Appeal would be useful.
Prima facie case of error
- [30]
[30] Goh first submitted that I had not taken into account the words “against him” in the OTS when interpreting the terms of the OTS. This was clearly incorrect and he subsequently accepted that I had considered those words when interpreting the terms of the OTS.
- [34]
[34] Finally, Goh referred to his OTS in DC542. I have already dealt with this at [18] above.
- [35]
[35] In my view, Goh had not shown any prima facie error of law. It was clear to me that what Goh really disagreed with was my interpretation of his OTS. This was in itself no reason for leave to appeal to be granted.
Question of general principle
- [36]
[36] Goh submitted that the correct approach to be adopted in interpreting the terms of an OTS was a question on which a decision of the Court of Appeal would be useful. To be granted leave to appeal based on this limb, Goh had to show that:
(a) there were different approaches that could be used in interpreting the terms of an OTS; and
(b) one of these approaches would have yielded the interpretation that was put forth by Goh.
- [37]
[37] Goh submitted that the correct approach was to apply principles of contractual interpretation while bearing in mind the context of the O 22A scheme. When queried as to possible alternative approaches, Goh could only come up with the vague suggestion of ignoring contractual principles and interpreting the OTS based on the broad policy aims of O 22A.
- [38]
[38] I agreed with Goh that in interpreting the terms of an OTS, the court should apply principles of contractual interpretation and that in so doing, the scheme under O 22A was a relevant context. However, in my view, the alternative approach suggested by Goh was too vague to be meaningful.
- [39]
[39] Goh also referred me to Ong & Ong Pte Ltd v Fairview Developments Pte Ltd [2015] 2 SLR 470 (“Ong & Ong”), in which the Court of Appeal said (at [53]):
- [40]
[40] In making the statement that “a regime like O 22A must be interpreted according to its own terms and not according to contractual principles”, the Court of Appeal was dealing with the question of whether contractual principles governing offer and acceptance applied to an OTS under O 22A. The Court of Appeal held (at [47]) that these contractual principles are not to be applied to the O 22A regime, noting that O 22A rr 3 and 6(2) ROC expressly modified the contractual rules on the withdrawal of an offer and the effect of a rejection of an offer respectively. The second statement in [53] of Ong & Ong recognised that contractual principles had a place in relation to O 22A r 8(1) ROC (see Ong & Ong at [56], [63] and [69]). Ong & Ong did not concern the interpretation of the terms of an OTS. In any event, Ong & Ong did not assist Goh in framing the question of general principle that required a decision from the Court of Appeal.
- [42]
[42] In the circumstances, there was in reality no question of general principle on which a decision of the Court of Appeal would be useful.