General Division of the High Court · Decided 10 February 2021
GTMS Construction Pte Ltd v Ser Kim Koi (Chan Sau Yan (formerly trading as Chan Sau Yan Associates) and another, third parties)
Feedback & support[2021] SGHC 33 · Case no. Suit No 50 of 2014 · 11 paragraphs
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] On 26 January 2021, following the release of my judgment in GTMS Construction Pte Ltd v Ser Kim Koi (Chan Sau Yan (formerly trading as Chan Sau Yan Associates) and another, third parties) [2021] SGHC 9 (“the Judgment”), the plaintiff wrote to the court to inquire whether the judgment sum of $1,103,915.48 awarded to the plaintiff on 18 January 2021 included interest. I had inadvertently omitted to award the plaintiff interest on the judgment sum. I see no reason to depart from the default interest rate of 5.33% per annum, which is prescribed by para 77 of the Supreme Court Practice Directions. Accordingly, I award the plaintiff interest at the rate of 5.33% per annum on the sums due under TI25, TI26 and TI27 from the date at which each of the respective causes of action arose.
The parties’ submissions
The plaintiff’s submissions
(a) The defendant conducted his case in an improper and oppressive manner, by making use of his financial resources to inundate the plaintiff with multiple false allegations of defects. This was a misuse of the court’s judicial resources and would result in a great loss to the plaintiff if the plaintiff is not awarded indemnity costs.
(b) The defendant abused the judicial process by raising at the trial allegations not contained in his pleadings and in his AEICs. The defendant also introduced new evidence in the middle of the trial. This dragged the matter on without plausible reason and resulted in the needless escalation of costs.
(c) By pursuing trivial claims against the plaintiff, the defendant caused the plaintiff to expend an inordinate amount of time and resources in responding to the defendant’s claims.
(d) The defendant was dishonest and lied in giving evidence.
(e) The defendant made unmeritorious allegations of fraud against the plaintiff, which dealt a huge blow to the plaintiff’s business by damaging its professional reputation.
The third parties’ submissions
(a) The defendant unreasonably rejected the third parties’ offers to mediate, which were made to the defendant on 10 May 2019 and 25 June 2019.
(b) The defendant unreasonably persisted in making unmeritorious conspiracy claims against the third parties.
(c) The defendant recklessly and dishonestly put forward an evolving set of conjured allegations. The imposition of indemnity costs is required to discourage litigants such as the defendant from bullying parties with fewer resources.
(d) In relation to the second third party, the defendant had been repeatedly informed by the third parties that the second third party should not be joined to the proceedings in the Suit. This was because the deed of novation transferring the first third party’s obligations under the MOA to the second third party was never signed. However, the defendant continued to join the second third party to the Suit. The defendant’s explanation that he had joined the second third party out of prudence was insufficient.
The defendant’s submissions
(a) The defendant had good reasons for not calling Mr Cheung as a witness to give evidence regarding the defendant’s conspiracy claims.
(b) The plaintiff and the third parties exaggerate the extent of costs incurred in having to defend against the defendant’s allegation of bribery.
(c) It was not unreasonable for the defendant to pursue his claims for defects and non-compliant works. The court found in favour of the defendant in respect of some of these claims and these claims only formed part of the defendant’s case in the Suit.
(d) The defendant had, in good faith, previously attempted mediation with the plaintiff and the third parties but parties were unable to reach a settlement. Thus, it was reasonable for the defendant to consider that any further mediation would not be beneficial to the parties.
(a) It was the first third party and not the defendant who had conducted the proceedings unreasonably, as it was only during the trial that he admitted that he had not considered Item 72 of the Preliminaries. Furthermore, according to the defendant, the court found in favour of the defendant in relation to the defendant’s claim against the first third party in negligence.
(b) The costs consequences set out in O 22A of the ROC should not apply as the offers made by the third parties to the defendant were not offers to settle. Furthermore, even if O 22A applies, the third parties cannot rely on the earlier letter dated 22 February 2017 as that letter was nullified by the third parties’ subsequent letter dated 5 July 2019.
- [9]
[9] The defendant further submits that the third parties have failed to make a formal application for a Certificate of Three Counsel. In any case, there are no exceptional circumstances or novel or complex issues of law in this case that warrant the grant of a Certificate of Three Counsel.
My decision
The applicable principles
- [13]
[13] The starting point in this inquiry as to unreasonableness is O 59 r 5 of the ROC (see Airtrust at [18]), which provides as follows:
(a) where the action is brought in bad faith, as a means of oppression or for other improper purposes;
(b) where the action is speculative, hypothetical or clearly without basis;
(c) where a party’s conduct in the course of proceedings is dishonest, abusive or improper; and
(d) where the action amounts to wasteful or duplicative litigation or is otherwise an abuse of process.
Costs as between the plaintiff and the defendant
- [16]
[16] First, the defendant indulged in speculative claims and allegations that were completely without basis. In the defendant’s counterclaim in unlawful means conspiracy, he made serious allegations of fraud against the plaintiff and the first third party as well as against other professionals involved in the Project, such as CCA, F+G and RTO Leong. However, despite the gravity of such claims, he was unable to provide even a shred of evidence to support them (see [78] of the Judgment). This speculative and exaggerated conduct extended also to the defendant’s testimony in court. As I observed at [80] of the Judgment, the defendant had a propensity to make reckless and speculative allegations against the plaintiff, the third parties, and others. One such allegation was the Bribery Allegation, which the defendant continued to maintain despite the absence of any evidence to support it (see [82] of the Judgment). Another spurious allegation made by the defendant was that the Consultants, apart from Web, were also parties to the conspiracy to injure him (see [83] of the Judgment). A non-exhaustive list of the speculative allegations made by the defendant may be found at [85] of the Judgment.
- [17]
[17] Second, the claims made by the defendant against the plaintiff and the first third party were highly unreasonable and exaggerated (see [136]–[148] of the Judgment). The quantum of the defendant’s claims was excessive, the defendant unreasonably refused to mitigate his losses, and he unreasonably insisted on total and absolute rectification of all the alleged defects. This resulted in the claiming of sums that were completely out of proportion to the nature and extent of the alleged defects. I also note that some of these claims were relatively trivial (see [416] of the Judgment). Although the defendant succeeded in certain aspects of his counterclaim against the plaintiff and was awarded damages in the sum of $47,496.82, this must be seen in the context of his numerous other unmeritorious claims. Out of the $47,496.82 awarded to the defendant, $18,871.60, which relates to the screed, the grouting and the intumescent paint, was conceded by the plaintiff’s witnesses. As regards the remaining sum of $28,625.22, which relates to the missing trellis beam and the utility fees, the plaintiff had agreed in the course of the proceedings to pay such sum to the defendant.
- [18]
[18] Third, in the course of the trial, the defendant raised new evidence and new allegations that had not been set out in his pleadings or in his AEICs. I give two examples of such conduct:
(a) At the first and third tranches of the trial, the defendant sought to introduce new evidence in relation to the gas pipe (see [396] of the Judgment). On both occasions, this was done weeks after that particular tranche of hearings had commenced. Eventually, the evidence proved irrelevant to the defendant’s pleaded case (see [403] of the Judgment) and I dismissed the defendant’s claim in relation to the alleged defects in the gas pipe.
(b) In the course of his testimony in court, the defendant made fresh allegations of fraud. He claimed that the conspiracy between the plaintiff and the first third party had started from the tender process of the Project (see [10] of the Judgment). He also made the Bribery Allegation and alleged that all of the Consultants (except Web) had been part of the conspiracy against him (see [82]–[83] of the Judgment).
Costs as between the third parties and the defendant
The offers to settle
- [20]
[20] Two letters containing offers to settle were sent by the third parties to the defendant, as follows:
(a) The first was a letter with an open offer to settle dated 22 February 2017 (“the 22 February 2017 Offer”). The third parties offered to settle the Suit on the basis that (i) the third parties would pay the defendant the differential between the solicitor-and-client costs and the party-and-party costs arising out of the Court of Appeal hearing, the sum of which was to be agreed or determined at a taxation hearing; and (ii) parties were to bear their own costs of the Suit.
(b) The second was a Calderbank letter dated 5 July 2019 (“the 5 July 2019 Offer”). Here, the third parties offered to settle the Suit on the basis that (i) the third parties would pay the defendant up to a maximum of $100,000; and (ii) the parties were to bear their own costs of the Suit and HC/S 875/2015 (“Suit 875”). Should the defendant accept this offer after 19 July 2019, the defendant was to bear the third parties’ costs in relation to the Suit and Suit 875 on a standard basis up till 19 July 2019, and on an indemnity basis from 20 July 2019 up till the date of acceptance of the offer.
- [25]
[25] I shall now address some of the arguments raised by the defendant. The defendant submits that the 22 February 2017 Offer and the 5 July 2019 Offer were not offers to settle under O 22A of the ROC because they had been made on a without admission of liability basis. In support of this argument, the defendant relies on Colliers International (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Senkee Logistics Pte Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 230 (“Colliers”), in which Lai Siu Chiu J observed at [119] that “[a]n offer to settle cannot be qualified as a non-admission of liability nor can it be an ex gratia offer”.
Distinction between the costs of the first third party and the second third party
Certificate of Three Counsel
- [34]
[34] A Certificate of Three Counsel should only be granted where the use of more than two solicitors is reasonable, having regard to Appendix 1 to O 59 (see Ng Eng Ghee and others v Mamata Kapildev Dave and others (Horizon Partners Pte Ltd, intervener) and another appeal [2009] 4 SLR(R) 155 at [36]). In this regard, para 1(2) of Appendix 1 sets out the following factors:
(a) the complexity of the item or of the cause or matter in which it arises and the difficulty or novelty of the questions involved;
(b) the skill, specialised knowledge and responsibility required of, and the time and labour expended by, the solicitor;
(c) the number and importance of the documents (however brief) prepared or perused;
(d) the place and circumstances in which the business involved is transacted;
(e) the urgency and importance of the cause or matter to the client; and
(f) where money or property is involved, its amount or value.
- [35]
[35] Having regard to the above factors and all the circumstances of the case, I find that the circumstances do not warrant the grant of a Certificate of Three Counsel. Although the trial was lengthy and there were voluminous documents, this is often the case in construction-related disputes. While this case did involve complex questions of interpretation involving the SIA Conditions, I do not think that the factual and legal issues at play were so complex as to justify the use of more than two solicitors. Finally, although I do not doubt that the matter was of great personal and professional importance to the third parties, it cannot be said that this went beyond what would usually be the case for parties personally involved in litigation. In these circumstances, I decline to grant a Certificate of Three Counsel as requested by the third parties.
Summary of findings
- [36]
[36] In summary, my findings are as follows:
(d) The circumstances do not warrant the grant of a Certificate of Three Counsel. The length of the trial and the amount of documents involved did not exceed what is often the case in construction-related disputes. Neither were the factual and legal issues so profoundly complex as the third parties have suggested. Although the matter may have been of great personal and professional importance to the third party, this did not go beyond what would usually be the case for parties personally involved in litigation.
Conclusion