General Division of the High Court · Decided 18 January 2021
GTMS Construction Pte Ltd v Ser Kim Koi (Chan Sau Yan (formerly trading as Chan Sau Yan Associates) and another, third parties)
Feedback & support[2021] SGHC 9 · Case no. Suit No 50 of 2014
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] This Suit arises from a long-standing and bitter dispute relating to the construction of three two-storey good class bungalows (Units 12, 12A and 12B) at 12 Leedon Park, Lot 98388L Mukim 04 (the “Project”) at an agreed lump sum price of $13,130,000. The Project is owned by the defendant, Mr Ser Kim Koi. The plaintiff, GTMS Construction Pte Ltd, was the main contractor for the Project. The first third party, Chan Sau Yan Associates (a sole proprietorship wholly owned by Mr Chan Sau Yan Sonny), was the architect for the Project. The relationship between the defendant, the first third party and the plaintiff started out well. However, towards the end of the Project there was mistrust and the relationship between the defendant and the first third party together with the plaintiff went south. The defendant’s allegations of a web of conspiracy and a multitude of lies now hang over the parties’ interactions. Intertwined within these allegations are complex questions of interpretation involving the Singapore Institute of Architects’ Articles and Conditions of Building Contract (Lump Sum Contract) (9th Ed, September 2010) (the “SIA Conditions”) and the implications arising therefrom.
- [2]
[2] In this Suit, the plaintiff claims for unpaid sums from the defendant. The unpaid sums arise from two interim payment claims and the final payment claim which were certified by the first third party (the “certified payment claims”). The plaintiff claims an aggregate sum of $1,103,915.48 plus interest from the defendant. The defendant refused to pay the plaintiff the certified payment claims. He also refused to pay the first third party’s unpaid fees of $60,990 plus interest.
The parties
- [4]
[4] The first third party, Chan Sau Yan Associates, was a sole proprietorship wholly owned by Mr Chan Sau Yan Sonny (TPW2, “Mr Chan”). I shall refer to both Chan Sau Yan Associates and Mr Chan, interchangeably, as the “first third party”. The second third party is CSYA Pte Ltd, which is a conversion of the first third party into a private limited company in or around October 2011. I note that there is some dispute between the parties as to whether the defendant has legal recourse against the second third party, as there was no contractual relationship between them. For reasons which I shall elaborate below, I find that the defendant has no legal recourse against the second third party. Hence, all subsequent references to “third party” shall refer to the first third party, unless otherwise specified.
- [5]
[5] By a Memorandum of Agreement dated 16 June 2009 (the “MOA”), the defendant and his wife engaged the first third party to provide professional architectural services for the Project. Further, the first third party was also authorised by the defendant and his wife to act as their agent in the matters set out or implied in the MOA and the contracts adopted for the Project (see cl 1.1(2) of the MOA).
- [6]
[6] After a full tender process that was coordinated by the defendant’s quantity surveyor (“QS”) Faithful+Gould Pte Ltd (“F+G”), the plaintiff, a Singapore-incorporated company carrying on the business of general building and construction works, was appointed as the main contractor responsible for building the Project and carrying out works thereunder (“Works”). The terms of engagement between the defendant and the plaintiff were governed by the Letter of Acceptance dated 13 May 2011 (“LOA”), which incorporated the SIA Conditions. I shall refer to all the documents comprising the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant as the “Contract” and this comprises the LOA, the SIA Conditions and all the documents cited in cl 7 of the LOA. This also includes Volumes 1A, 1B and 2 of the formal contract documents prepared by F+G and the defendant’s mechanical and engineering (“M&E”) consultant, Chee Choon & Associates (“CCA”). Although there are some disputes regarding this last category of documents, I find that they are part of the Contract and I shall elaborate further on this issue in my judgment below.
- [7]
[7] The following consultants were engaged by the defendant on the recommendations of the third party for the Project. I shall refer to them collectively as the “Consultants”:
(a) CCA, the M&E consultant;
(b) F+G, the QS;
(c) Web Structures Pte Ltd (“Web”), the civil and structural engineer; and
(d) Mr Leong Kien Keong (TPW4), the Resident Technical Officer (“RTO Leong”).
- [8]
[8] Apart from the Consultants, the defendant also engaged a group of his hand-picked individuals, comprising Mr Wilson Cheung (“Mr Cheung”), Mr Chow Kum Wai (“Mr Chow”), Mr Ng See Wah, and Dr Anand Jude Anthony (“Dr Anand”), to assist him in overseeing the Project. I shall refer to them collectively as the defendant’s “Assistants”.
The parties’ cases
The defendant’s case
- [9]
[9] The defendant’s case is that the plaintiff and the third party conspired to injure him. The defendant does not rely on any one particular incident to support his conspiracy claim. Instead, he relies on his opinionated allegations and personal inferences to establish that there was a conspiracy between the plaintiff and the third party to injure him. Further, arising out of the same facts, the defendant also alleges that the plaintiff and the third party had breached their contractual and/or tortious duties owed to him.
Tender process
- [11]
[11] The defendant alleges that the third party conspired with the plaintiff during the tender process for the tender to be awarded to the plaintiff. The tender was called on 13 October 2010 and there were initially five tenderers. Thereafter, Soil-Build Pte Ltd (“Soil-Build”) was invited to participate in the tender at the defendant’s request. The three lowest tenderers, Soil-Build, Daiya Engineering & Construction Pte Ltd (“Daiya”) and the plaintiff, were subsequently shortlisted. The defendant asserts that the third party had “push[ed]” for the plaintiff to be selected over the other tenderers. Therefore, he was unable to select Soil-Build, who was his preferred contractor. In addition, Soil-Build was also not treated equally during the tender process as the third party had “[made] life difficult” for them.
Extensions of time
- [12]
[12] The defendant submits that the third party and the plaintiff conspired regarding the three requests for extension of time (“EOT”), thereby preventing the defendant from claiming liquidated damages from the plaintiff for EOT 2 and EOT 3. Furthermore, the defendant submits that the EOTs were granted by the third party in breach of the contractual and tortious duties owed by the third party to him.
- [13]
[13] The original completion date under the LOA is 21 February 2013. Pursuant to cl 23(1) of the SIA Conditions, EOTs can be granted by the third party to the plaintiff. Clause 23(1) states:
- [14]
[14] In total, there were three EOT requests made by the plaintiff:
(a) The plaintiff’s first request of 60 days of EOT was made on 4 October 2012 due to, inter alia, delays relating to the delivery of marble to the Project (“EOT 1”). EOT 1 was rejected by the third party.
(b) The plaintiff’s second request of 45 days of EOT was made on 20 December 2012 due to, inter alia, SP PowerGrid Ltd’s (“SPPG’s”) delay in connecting the main incoming power supply and SPPG’s late notice of the requirement to install the overground distribution box (“OG Box”) (“EOT 2”). The third party granted EOT 2 on 7 February 2013 for 40 days from 21 February 2013 (the original completion date) to 2 April 2013.
(c) The plaintiff’s third request of 40 days of EOT to complete the testing and commissioning (“T&C”) for M&E works and the installation of light fittings was made on 1 April 2013 (“EOT 3”), in view of SPPG’s delay. The third party granted EOT 3 on 10 April 2013 for 15 days from 2 April 2013 to 17 April 2013.
- [15]
[15] Therefore, the plaintiff was granted a total of two EOTs (ie, EOT 2 and EOT 3) totalling 55 days during the Project. The defendant alleges that these EOTs should not have been granted and were only granted due to the conspiracy between the plaintiff and the third party to injure him.
(1) EOT 1
- [16]
[16] The defendant asserts that the plaintiff and the third party conspired to injure him in relation to EOT 1, which concerned the delay in marble delivery. He alleges that the third party would have proceeded to grant EOT 1 but for the intervention of Mr Cheung, one of the defendant’s Assistants, when he enquired during a site meeting whether the delay in marble delivery was on the critical path, ie, an event that may delay the completion of the Project. Since the delay in marble delivery was a non-critical activity, it did not contractually entitle the plaintiff to an EOT. Faced with Mr Cheung’s objections, the third party had no choice but to reject EOT 1. Thus, the defendant submits that EOT 1 supports his allegation that the third party had conspired with the plaintiff to grant EOTs.
(2) EOT 2
- [17]
[17] In relation to EOT 2, the defendant submits that the third party had no basis to grant EOT 2. Among other things, this was because the plaintiff had failed to exercise due diligence, a pre-condition required by cl 23(1) of the SIA Conditions and, thus, was not entitled to any EOT. While the third party took into account SPPG’s delay in electrical turn-on, it failed to consider the plaintiff’s own delay in the electrical installation works which had to be done before SPPG could connect the incoming power supply. Pursuant to the Project’s Master Programme, the plaintiff was required to complete the construction of the electrical meter compartments by or prior to 9 July 2012. However, the electrical meter compartment doors for Units 12 and 12B were only installed on or around 1 December 2012. Due to this delay of more than four and a half months, the defendant claims that the plaintiff should not have been given any EOT.
- [18]
[18] The defendant also relies on the circumstances surrounding EOT 2 which, in his view, suggested that the result of EOT 2 was pre-determined. These circumstances were as follows:
(a) The third party had “directed” the plaintiff to include further details in its request in EOT 2 and had also given the plaintiff “further directions to regularise various errors made in its substantiation of the said EOT request”.
(b) When the plaintiff’s request in EOT 2 was circulated to CCA for “confirmation”, a pre-drafted approval was enclosed and CCA was only given one day to respond to the plaintiff’s request.
(c) Prior to the third party’s grant of EOT 2, F+G had recommended in its cost report an estimated $65,000 additional costs due to the plaintiff on the basis of EOT 2.
- [19]
[19] In court, the defendant further alleged that the plaintiff, CCA and the third party had colluded or conspired to grant EOT 2. The defendant also alleged that the plaintiff had applied improper pressure on or interfered with the third party.
(3) EOT 3
- [20]
[20] In relation to EOT 3, the defendant likewise submits that the third party had no basis to grant EOT 3. Prior to electrical turn-on, SPPG had to conduct testing and inspection on-site. The first round of testing and inspection was conducted on 14, 20 and 21 March 2013 (the “First Testing and Inspection”) for Units 12B, 12 and 12A respectively. The Project failed the First Testing and Inspection. The defendant’s position is that the reasons for the failure were due to construction-related issues caused by the plaintiff. Consequently, the plaintiff had to rectify these construction-related issues before the Project passed the second round of testing and inspection conducted on 27 March, 2 April and 8 April 2013 (the “Second Testing and Inspection”). Accordingly, the plaintiff had again failed to exercise due diligence and was not entitled to any EOT.
- [21]
[21] As with EOT 2, the defendant also relies on the circumstances surrounding EOT 3 to claim that the result of EOT 3 was pre-determined. In court, the defendant similarly alleged that the plaintiff, CCA and the third party had colluded or conspired to grant EOT 3. The defendant further alleged that the plaintiff had also applied improper pressure on or interfered with the third party. These circumstances were as follows:
(a) The plaintiff made its request for EOT 3 on 1 April 2013 and the third party had immediately issued an “in-principle” entitlement the next day without prior consultation with CCA.
(b) CCA had initially refused the plaintiff’s request for EOT 3. However, the third party eventually managed to persuade CCA to change its recommendation.
Completion certificate
- [22]
[22] The defendant submits that the third party and the plaintiff had conspired to issue the completion certificate (“CC”) to the plaintiff.
- [23]
[23] On 15 May 2013, the third party issued a CC certifying completion of the Project on 17 April 2013 pursuant to cl 24(4) of the SIA Conditions. Clause 24(4) of the SIA Conditions states that the CC “shall be issued by the [third party] when the Works appear to be complete and to comply with the Contract in all respects”. Further, cl 24(4) must also be read with the all-important Item 72 of the “Preliminaries”. The relevant portion of Item 72 of the Preliminaries states as follows:
- [24]
[24] The defendant submits that all three preconditions in Item 72 of the Preliminaries were not satisfied when the third party issued the CC. The CC was issued prematurely and without basis. Accordingly, this gives rise to an inference that the CC was issued by the third party pursuant to a conspiracy between the third party and the plaintiff.
- [25]
[25] In relation to Item 72(a) of the Preliminaries, the defendant argues that the Project was not “ready for occupation and for use” as the temporary occupation permit (“TOP”) for the Project had not been obtained. According to the defendant, it is an implied term of the Contract that the TOP must be obtained before the third party can issue the CC.
- [26]
[26] Furthermore, the Project failed the TOP inspection conducted by the Building and Construction Authority (“BCA”) on 30 April 2013 (“TOP Inspection 1”). This was prior to the date the CC was issued on 15 May 2013. The Project had also failed the BCA’s second TOP inspection on 18 June 2013 (“TOP Inspection 2”). Although the TOP for the Project was eventually obtained on 16 September 2013 by way of photographic submissions, the defendant alleges that this was the result of the plaintiff’s and the third party’s fraud and/or misrepresentation. In particular, the steps and risers in the Project remain non-compliant with statutory requirements and the Project is therefore still not “ready for occupation and for use” as of today.
- [27]
[27] As for Item 72(b) of the Preliminaries, the defendant submits that this was not satisfied as the operating instructions and warranties were only handed over by the plaintiff to the defendant on 22 June 2014, while the test certificates have not been handed over at all. In addition, the T&C for gas, electricity, air conditioning and mechanical ventilation (“ACMV”) and swimming pool services had not been carried out as of the date when the Project was certified to be complete.
- [28]
[28] Finally, with regard to Item 72(c) of the Preliminaries, the defendant asserts that there were many outstanding defects as of the date the Project was certified to be complete. These defects were identified and described in the reports prepared by Building Appraisals Pte Ltd (“BAPL”), whom the defendant engaged sometime in October 2013. These defects were as follows:
(a) The gas pipe along the driveway at the front gate of Unit 12A of the Project was punctured.
(b) There were numerous cracks, scratches, and other forms of damage to the Volakas marble flooring in the Project.
(c) There were numerous cracks and splinters in the ironwood used for the installation of the timber decking in the Project.
(d) There were dents and tonality differences in the Indian rosewood timber floor finish.
(e) The aluminium cappings on the rooftops of all three units of the Project were dented, scratched and finished with patchy and splotchy paintwork.
(f) The steps and risers of the Project were non-compliant with the statutory and contractual requirements.
(g) The swimming pools in the Project were leaking.
(h) There were only seven trellis beams constructed at Unit 12B of the Project, instead of eight as required by the Contract.
(i) The coating of the intumescent paint on the steelworks at the Project did not have a fire resistance of two hours, as required by the Contract. Furthermore, the trellis beams had only been coated on three sides, instead of on all four sides.
(j) The external boundary wall was finished in plaster and paint, instead of an “off-form” finish, as required by the Contract.
(k) The grouting at the swimming pools disintegrated easily.
(l) Loamy soil was not used for the Project as required by the Contract.
(m) The foldable glass doors did not slide smoothly and could not be properly locked.
Maintenance certificate
- [29]
[29] The maintenance period of the Project commenced on 18 April 2013 (ie, the day after completion) and ended on 17 April 2014. Clause 27(5) of the SIA Conditions states, inter alia, that the third party shall within 14 days issue a maintenance certificate (“MC”) when all defects notified by the third party to the plaintiff have been made good by the plaintiff in compliance with the third party’s directions or instructions.
- [30]
[30] The MC was issued by the third party on 7 July 2014 when the third party was satisfied that all the defects at the Project were rectified by the plaintiff, and the premises were handed over to the defendant on 21 and 23 July 2014. However, the defendant contends that as of 7 July 2014, there were still many defects which had yet to be rectified (see [28] above). The defendant, therefore, alleges that the MC was also issued pursuant to the conspiracy between the plaintiff and the third party.
- [31]
[31] Furthermore, the defendant argues that the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the MC also indicate that it was issued pursuant to the conspiracy. In support of this argument, the defendant points to the following:
(a) Firstly, the defendant was allegedly only given three days by the third party to prepare his list of outstanding defects.
(b) Secondly, the third party also failed to issue the “Schedule of Defects” within 14 days of the expiry of the maintenance period, in accordance with cl 27(2) of the SIA Conditions.
(c) Thirdly, although the defendant submitted photographs of the defects to the third party on or around April 2014 and 27 July 2014, the plaintiff allegedly wrote to the third party to urge them not to accept these photographs.
(d) Finally, the third party issued the MC without having regard to BAPL’s report.
Payment certificates
- [32]
[32] The defendant also alleges that the three payment certificates were issued by the third party pursuant to the conspiracy between the plaintiff and the third party. These three certificates were issued after the issuance of the CC:
(a) Interim Certificate No 25 dated 3 September 2013 (“IC25”) was issued pursuant to the plaintiff’s Payment Claim No 25, certifying a sum of $390,951.96 (excluding goods and services tax (“GST”)).
(b) Interim Certificate No 26 dated 6 November 2013 (“IC26”) was issued pursuant to the plaintiff’s Payment Claim No 26, certifying a sum of $189,250.21 (excluding GST).
(c) Final Certificate dated 22 June 2015 (“FC”) was issued pursuant to the plaintiff’s final payment claim of $451,494.54 (excluding GST). This sum is the balance between the final measurement and valuation of the Works in accordance with the Statement of Final Account and the sums that were previously certified by the third party.
- [34]
[34] The defendant also asserts that the release of the first half of the retention moneys in IC25 was certified by the third party without basis, given that the plaintiff had not satisfied the requirements in cl 24(4) of the SIA Conditions and Item 72 of the Preliminaries for the issuance of the CC.
The defendant’s counterclaim
- [36]
[36] In totality, the defendant makes the following counterclaim against the plaintiff:
(a) liquidated damages of $3,600 per calendar day from 21 February 2013 (the original completion date) to the present day;
(b) as an alternative claim to liquidated damages, loss of rental income due to the delay by the plaintiff in the completion of the Project (although the defendant subsequently indicated he was no longer pursuing this head of claim);
(c) costs of rectifying all defective works, quantified at $1,632,415.20;
(d) an account of moneys for the $787,742.09 paid to the plaintiff for the PC Sums;
(e) an account of moneys for the $1,757,835 paid to the plaintiff for the PC Rate items;
(f) the utilities fees paid by the defendant before the Project was handed over to him on 23 July 2014, quantified at $27,916.82; and
(g) interest and costs.
- [37]
[37] The defendant also submits that by reason of the unlawful conspiracy, the third party should be made jointly liable with the plaintiff for the abovementioned losses suffered by the defendant. The third party is also liable for the breaches of its contractual and tortious duties, and the legal expenses incurred by the defendant in the summary judgment application, the details of which are set out at [718]–[724] below. Finally, the defendant avers that the third party is liable to indemnify the defendant from and against the claim brought by the plaintiff against the defendant.
The plaintiff’s and the third party’s cases
- [38]
[38] The plaintiff and the third party adopt mutually aligned positions vis-à-vis the defendant’s case. The plaintiff and the third party strongly deny that there was a conspiracy between them to injure the defendant. The plaintiff and the third party also argue that there was no breach of their respective contractual and tortious duties owed to the defendant.
- [39]
[39] The third party avers that the tender was conducted fairly and the EOTs, CC, MC and payment certificates were issued properly, honestly and in good faith based on its independent and professional judgment.
- [40]
[40] The plaintiff submits that there were valid grounds for the third party to grant the EOT requests and to issue the CC as there were only minor outstanding works. Furthermore, all the defects were eventually rectified by the plaintiff to the satisfaction of the third party.
Tender process
- [41]
[41] The third party denies the defendant’s allegation that it had “pushed” for the plaintiff to be awarded the tender over the other tenderers. The third party maintains that it was simply performing its professional duties to the defendant by recommending the most suitable contractor for the Project. Furthermore, there were valid grounds for the third party’s recommendation. For example, CCA had also recommended that the plaintiff be appointed, as it had the most competitive bid for the M&E installations. The third party stresses that ultimately, the defendant alone was responsible for making the decision on which contractor to appoint.
Extensions of time
- [42]
[42] The plaintiff and the third party contend that there was no conspiracy for the third party to grant EOTs to the plaintiff. The plaintiff also did not apply improper pressure on or influence the third party to secure the EOTs. The third party issued the EOTs strictly in accordance with cl 23(1) of the SIA Conditions and the EOTs were reasonable, made properly, honestly and in good faith.
(1) EOT 1
- [43]
[43] At the trial, the third party’s counsel, Mr Thio Shen Yi SC, pointed out to the defendant that his characterisation of the events surrounding EOT 1 is flawed. The contemporaneous documents, particularly the minutes of the site meetings, do not support the defendant’s assertion that it was Mr Cheung who had raised the issue of the critical path, thereby preventing EOT 1 from being granted. Instead, it was the third party who first raised the issue of the critical path, within a week of the plaintiff’s request. This request was made repeatedly at the following site meetings, as reflected in the minutes. Accordingly, far from supporting the defendant’s conspiracy allegation, the third party’s evaluation process in EOT 1 illustrates its professional and independent assessment of the plaintiff’s EOT requests.
- [44]
[44] Further, the plaintiff contends that there were indeed genuine and legitimate reasons for its application for EOT 1 on account of the delay by the defendant in marble selection and confirmation, thereby affecting marble delivery. According to the plaintiff, the screeding work progress includes various areas for laying marble, ceramic tile and timber parquet and the sequence of work started from the laying of the marble. At the material time when the plaintiff applied for EOT 1, it had yet to receive 70% of the marble required to complete the Project. Furthermore, the arrival of the marble slabs in the warehouse of the supplier did not automatically mean that it was ready for delivery because the marble slabs needed to be processed for the Project before they were ready to be sent to the work site. This included quality checks, defect rectification such as pin-hole patching, fissure or open vein patching, polishing, cutting to size as per shop drawing, colour tone matching, and finally the packing of the marble pieces for delivery to the worksite.
(2) EOT 2 and EOT 3
- [45]
[45] The plaintiff and the third party deny the defendant’s allegation that the third party had no basis to grant EOT 2 and EOT 3. The plaintiff and the third party submit that the delays for which EOT 2 and EOT 3 were granted were solely caused by SPPG and not the plaintiff. There was an inordinate delay by SPPG in arranging for the power connection. Furthermore, SPPG had by way of a letter dated 21 November 2012 introduced a new and unexpected requirement for an OG Box at a very late stage in the Project. Since the plaintiff had acted with due diligence at all times, it was entitled to EOTs for the delay in electrical turn-on by SPPG, which would in turn cause delay to the T&C of the M&E works at the Project.
- [46]
[46] In so far as EOT 2 is concerned, the plaintiff argues that the electrical meter compartments were ready as of 8 October 2012. The third party similarly accepts that the electrical meter compartment, including the doors, were only made ready by the plaintiff in or around October 2012. Accordingly, the plaintiff was in delay pursuant to the Master Programme. But the timelines in the Master Programme were not peremptory, instead they were flexible with built-in buffer time. The third party had assessed that but for the delay events by SPPG, the Project could still be completed on schedule, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s delay in installing the electrical meter compartment doors. The plaintiff’s delay in installing the electrical meter compartment doors and SPPG’s delay in electrical turn-on were entirely independent of one another. Thus, it could not be said that the plaintiff’s failure to exercise due diligence, if any, contributed to SPPG’s delay in electrical turn-on.
- [47]
[47] The plaintiff and the third party disagree with the defendant that the plaintiff had failed to exercise due diligence in relation to the delay in installing the electrical meter compartment doors. They contend that the purpose of the Master Programme is primarily to monitor the reasonable progress of the Works. The Master Programme does not stipulate contractual deadlines for the plaintiff to strictly adhere to, failing which it would have failed to act with due diligence.
- [49]
[49] For EOT 3, the plaintiff and the third party deny that the failure of the First Testing and Inspection is evidence of the plaintiff’s lack of due diligence. Although the Project failed SPPG’s First Testing and Inspection because certain mechanical and electrical items did not comply with SPPG’s safety and connection requirements, these were not construction faults. The plaintiff had constructed the electrical installation works fully in accordance with the M&E construction drawings for the Project. The comments arising from SPPG’s First Testing and Inspection required the plaintiff to make some amendments on the single line diagram. There were also comments for the plaintiff to rectify some signage, earthing and minor statutory non-compliance issues. Accordingly, the plaintiff could not be said to have acted without due diligence.
- [50]
[50] In addition, the plaintiff and the third party deny that the circumstances surrounding EOT 3 suggest that the result of EOT 3 was pre-determined. Although CCA had initially refused to support the plaintiff’s request for EOT 3, CCA acknowledged that their initial refusal was “too hasty”. In any event, it was the third party who had to make the ultimate decision of whether or not to grant EOT 3. The third party honestly believed that the plaintiff was entitled to EOT 3 as the request for EOT 3 arose from the same set of issues in EOT 2.
Completion certificate
- [51]
[51] The third party asserts that the CC was issued properly, honestly and in good faith based on its independent and professional judgment. The plaintiff agrees that the third party was entitled to certify completion on 17 April 2013.
- [52]
[52] Firstly, the third party was of the honest opinion that the Project was “ready for occupation and for use”. Therefore, Item 72(a) of the Preliminaries was satisfied. In this regard, both the plaintiff and the third party are of the opinion that it is not a condition precedent for the TOP to be awarded by the BCA before the CC can be issued. The Project “was for all practical intents and purposes, physically ready for occupation and use”. The third party was of the opinion that any further work on the Project, including the rectification of the steps and risers, were “minor outstanding works”.
- [53]
[53] Secondly, the plaintiff and the third party also submit that Item 72(b) of the Preliminaries was satisfied as, save for the gas supply, all the services at the Project were tested, commissioned and operating satisfactorily at the time the CC was issued. The gas supply was not tested and commissioned prior to the issuance of the CC due to safety concerns raised by CCA and the defendant consented to this.
- [54]
[54] As for the requirement for all test certificates, operating instructions and warranties to be handed over to the defendant before the issuance of the CC, the third party took a “practical approach” and decided that these documents could be prepared during the maintenance period. The focus was to deliver on the “key deliverable”, which was the construction of the Project. The plaintiff also states that the defendant refused to take over the Project after the CC and the TOP were issued. This further resulted in the late handing over of the test certificates, operating instructions, and warranties.
Maintenance certificate
- [56]
[56] The third party submits that it issued the MC on 7 July 2014 as it was satisfied that all the defects, including those validly raised by the defendant through BAPL, had been rectified. Furthermore, the third party avers that there was sufficient time given to the defendant and BAPL to prepare their list of defects. In addition, there was no need to issue a Schedule of Defects as the MC was only issued when the third party was satisfied that all the valid defects had been rectified by the plaintiff. The plaintiff agrees with the third party. Furthermore, the plaintiff adds that even as late as 30 April 2014, the list of defects highlighted by BAPL continued to expand and most of the items identified were repetitive and some were merely photographs without any proper indication of the exact locations of the defects. The plaintiff also denies that it requested the third party not to accept the list or photographs of the alleged defects.
Payment certificates
- [57]
[57] The plaintiff and the third party argue that IC25, IC26 and the FC were issued by the third party properly, honestly and in good faith based on the third party’s independent and professional judgment. The third party had exercised reasonable skill and care in issuing the three payment certificates.
- [58]
[58] With regard to the retention sum, the third party withheld it until such time as the outstanding works stated in the schedule of the CC were completed. After the issuance of the CC, the plaintiff made a claim for the release of the first half of the retention sum. The third party only certified the release of half of the retention sum in IC25 when it was satisfied that the corresponding amount of works was completed. The other half of the retention sum was withheld and certified for release only in the FC.
- [59]
[59] The third party also avers that it exercised its professional judgment in coming to the conclusion that there was no delay to the Project. Accordingly, there was no basis to issue a delay certificate for liquidated damages payable by the plaintiff to the defendant.
- [60]
[60] Finally, the third party argues that it properly accounted for the PC Sums and the PC Rate items claimed by the plaintiff. The third party was provided with all the necessary supporting documents to verify and approve the amounts claimed. Copies of these supporting documents were provided by F+G to the defendant’s solicitors on 23 June 2014. The supporting documents were again given to the defendant on 28 October 2014. In any event, the third party submits that the Contract does not mandate the provision of supporting documentation by the plaintiff to the third party before an architect’s instruction can be issued.
Architect’s fee
- [62]
[62] Under the MOA, the defendant was to pay the third party for the provision of professional services for the Project. Clause 2 of the MOA states:
- [63]
[63] The amount of fees payable to the third party (“Architect’s Fee”) is set out in the Schedule of Architect’s Fee in the MOA. The relevant clauses are cll 2.2(m) and 2.2(n) read with cl 2.1(5)(b) of the MOA, which stipulate how and when the portions of the Architect’s Fee become progressively payable. Under cl 2.2(m), 3% of the Architect’s Fee became payable when the Project obtained a TOP while under cl 2.2(n), 2% of the Architect’s Fee became payable when the Project obtained a Certificate of Statutory Completion (“CSC”).
- [64]
[64] The TOP for the Project was obtained on 16 September 2013 and the CSC for the Project was obtained on 12 May 2014. Thus, the third party is now claiming from the defendant 5% of their Architect’s Fee, which is in the sum of $60,990 with interest.
The summary judgment application
- [65]
[65] Having provided the relevant background to this dispute, it is now necessary to highlight that the plaintiff had filed an application to enter summary judgment against the defendant for the non-payment of IC25 and IC26 under O 14 r 1 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“Rules of Court”). The plaintiff argued that cl 31 of the SIA Conditions entitled it to full payment of the claimed sums. The relevant portions of cl 31 state as follows:
- [67]
[67] The assistant registrar granted the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment. On appeal, I upheld the assistant registrar’s decision on the basis that the certificates were not tainted by fraud, improper pressure or interference. However, on further appeal by the defendant, the Court of Appeal (“CA”) in Ser Kim Koi v GTMS Construction Pte Ltd [2016] 3 SLR 51 (“Ser Kim Koi (Court of Appeal)”) found that on the facts of the case and the evidence before the court at the enforcement stage, the third party issued the CC, IC25 and IC26 at least without belief in their truth and/or recklessly without caring whether they were true or false. Further, the CA was of the view that the CC, IC25 and IC26 were not issued properly under the terms and conditions of the Contract (at [67] and [98]). Accordingly, the CA allowed the defendant’s appeal.
- [68]
[68] It must be emphasised that the CA expressly acknowledged at [105] that its “findings at [the] enforcement stage … will necessarily be prima facie and non-conclusive at the substantive and final determination of the disputes between the parties”. This general principle in summary judgment applications must apply with greater force when one considers the following facts. The third party was not a party to the summary judgment application and did not make submissions in Ser Kim Koi (Court of Appeal). It had only filed a brief affidavit in support of the plaintiff’s application. This was also acknowledged by the CA, who stated at [77] that the third party ought to have provided more detailed explanations about the certificates in question. In addition, given that the summary judgment application was not concerned with the merits of the certificates, but only with enforcement, the relevant and complete documents were not produced before the CA. Furthermore, the parties were not cross-examined. I shall elaborate on the CA’s judgment in greater detail below.
My decision
- [69]
[69] The main protagonist in this case is the defendant. He refuses to pay the plaintiff for the sums arising from the certified payment claims and the balance of the Architect’s Fee. The defendant’s primary grievances are that the plaintiff and the third party conspired to injure him and that the third party breached its contractual and/or tortious duties owed to him. As the conspiracy to injure the defendant is the central feature of the defendant’s claim that purportedly tainted all the transactions in the Project, I shall first address the defendant’s claim of unlawful means conspiracy.
The defendant’s claim in unlawful means conspiracy
The relevant legal principles
- [70]
[70] The CA in EFT Holdings, Inc and another v Marinteknik Shipbuilders (S) Pte Ltd and another [2014] 1 SLR 860 (“EFT Holdings”) at [112] sets out the following requirements to establish the tort of unlawful means conspiracy:
(a) there must be a combination of two or more persons to do certain acts;
(b) the alleged conspirators had the intention to cause damage or injury to the claimant by those acts;
(c) the acts were unlawful;
(d) the acts were performed in furtherance of the agreement; and
(e) the claimant suffered loss as a result of the conspiracy.
(a) the plaintiff and the third party agreed or combined to do certain acts. This may be inferred from the circumstances and the acts of the alleged conspirators, but such inference can only be drawn from overt acts (see Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd and others v Yeo Boong Hua and others and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 655 (“Turf Club”) at [347]);
(b) the plaintiff and the third party had the intention to cause damage or injury to the defendant by those acts. This involves an examination of their subjective knowledge and intention at the relevant time (see Turf Club at [354]). Reasonable foreseeability that the defendant would or might suffer damage is not sufficient (see EFT Holdings at [99]);
(c) the acts were unlawful. A breach of contract can constitute an unlawful act (see Turf Club at [356]);
(d) the acts of the plaintiff and the third party were performed in furtherance of the agreement; and
(e) the defendant suffered loss as a result of the conspiracy.
- [72]
[72] The defendant’s claim of unlawful means conspiracy is an enormously serious allegation, especially when it is made against professionals who rely on their reputation for their livelihoods. This claim is premised on the plaintiff and the third party committing fraud on the defendant. In this regard, the elements of fraud were set out by Lord Herschell in Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337 at 374, cited also in Ser Kim Koi (Court of Appeal) ([67] supra) at [38]:
- [73]
[73] Further, the nature of the evidence required to establish fraud is well established. As stated by the CA in Broadley Construction Pte Ltd v Alacran Design Pte Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 110 at [18]:
- [74]
[74] This principle was explained by the CA in Tang Yoke Kheng (trading as Niklex Supply Co) v Lek Benedict and others [2005] 3 SLR(R) 263 at [14] as follows:
- [75]
[75] The defendant was the only factual witness who testified in support of his claim in unlawful means conspiracy. Although he had engaged Assistants who were his personal private advisers to closely monitor the progress of the construction of the Project, he did not call them as his witnesses. In his pleadings he alleged that the plaintiff and the third party had conspired to:
- [77]
[77] I accept that an agreement between conspirators is often tacit and conceived in private (see SH Cogent Logistics Pte Ltd and another v Singapore Agro Acricultural Pte Ltd and others [2014] 4 SLR 1208 at [51]). Thus, I appreciate that it might be difficult to provide direct evidence of a concrete or tangible agreement being reached by all the conspirators (see Syed Ahmad Jamal Alsagoff (administrator of the estates of Shaikah Fitom bte Ghalib bin Omar Al-Bakri and others) and others v Harun bin Syed Hussain Aljunied and others and other suits [2017] 3 SLR 386 at [60]). However, it must be emphasised that a “mere unsubstantiated assertion is clearly insufficient. And even something that goes a little more beyond mere assertion is still insufficient” (see Wu Yang Construction Group Ltd v Zhejiang Jingyi Group Co, Ltd and others [2006] 4 SLR(R) 451 at [93]).
- [78]
[78] In the present case, the evidence of conspiracy and fraud adduced by the defendant was wholly speculative and spurious. Having regard to the lack of veracity and credibility of his evidence, I find that the defendant has failed to discharge his burden to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that there was an agreement, whether expressly or impliedly, between the plaintiff and the third party to defraud or injure the defendant. Neither did the defendant establish on a balance of probabilities any of the other requirements of a claim in unlawful means conspiracy. The strength and cogency of the evidence that was furnished by the defendant to support his allegations of conspiracy and/or fraud are far from adequate. I should add that even if the nature of evidence required were similar to that in a normal civil action, the defendant would still have failed to establish that the plaintiff and the third party were in a conspiracy to defraud him. I shall now explain my decision.
My general findings in relation to the conspiracy claim
- [79]
[79] Even before turning to the numerous specific allegations raised by the defendant, set out at [383]–[576] below, I set out my general findings with regard to the overarching conspiracy claim that allegedly tainted the entire Project from the very beginning (ie, the tender process) to the end (ie, the issuance of the CC, the MC, and the FC by the third party). Firstly, I find that the defendant had a propensity to rely on speculations and suspicions that were not supported by any reliable evidence. Secondly, the defendant’s narrative, particularly regarding his allegations of conspiracy, was very incredible. Lastly, the defendant also refused to call any of his Assistants, whom he had engaged to safeguard his interests in this Project, to testify on his behalf. This is highly suspicious as these Assistants would be the very individuals who would be able to support any claims he had in relation to his allegation of conspiracy. I shall elaborate on each of these general findings in greater detail in the following sections.
The defendant had a proclivity for speculations and suspicions
- [80]
[80] The defendant had a propensity to make reckless and speculative allegations, despite knowing that these allegations and suspicions were tenuous and unsupported by evidence. To use the defendant’s own expression, these allegations were based on his mere “feelings”. There was no direct or even circumstantial evidence to support these allegations. In most instances, these allegations were not even pleaded or included in the defendant’s AEIC.
- [82]
[82] The Bribery Allegation was later retracted by the defendant on the same day after he conceded that he did not have any evidence that the plaintiff had bribed the third party. However, this retraction was equivocal, in so far as the defendant later re-surfaced the allegations of bribery and corruption in cross-examination. The defendant expressly acknowledged that these allegations were only speculative:
- [83]
[83] The defendant also alleged that the Consultants, apart from Web, were parties to the conspiracy to injure him. When asked by the third party’s counsel what motivation or reason the Consultants had to injure him, the defendant again raised allegations of bribery and corruption. The premise of the defendant’s allegations was his observation that the Consultants had changed to “bigger and better car[s]”:
- [84]
[84] The allegations of bribery and corruption did not advance the defendant’s case at all. In fact, these allegations revealed that the defendant is, at his core, someone who is deeply distrustful of others who did not decide in his favour regardless of the merits. The defendant would make certain observations (eg, that some Consultants had changed their cars, or that the plaintiff had repaired RTO Leong’s house) and thereafter draw the wholly unmeritorious conclusion that the plaintiff, the third party and the Consultants had been conspiring to injure him at the material time.
- [85]
[85] Furthermore, I note that there were numerous other allegations made by the defendant that were based on his speculations and suspicions. These allegations were not borne out by the contemporaneous correspondence and documents. A non-exhaustive list of these allegations include:
(b) The defendant’s allegation that there were tenders which were submitted late, possibly including the plaintiff’s tender. This was based on what he apparently heard from a lady at the third party’s office, which was in any event hearsay.
(c) The defendant’s allegation that Soil-Build was discriminated in the way the tender process was implemented. This was based on what Soil-Build purportedly told him, which was also hearsay.
(d) The defendant’s allegation that CCA’s statement in its final tender report that “[t]he [plaintiff’s] tender submission is generally complete and in compliance with the tender specifications” was incorrect. However, the defendant could not explain why he disagreed with CCA’s statement.
(e) The defendant’s allegation that Daiya had submitted the schedule for deviations, contrary to what CCA had stated. The defendant’s allegation was based on what Daiya’s boss had apparently told Ms Linda Chua Hwee Hwee (TPW7, “Ms Chua”) of CCA, which was in any event hearsay.
(f) The defendant’s allegation that Soil-Build must have complied with the tender given that it is a listed company.
- [86]
[86] When questioned on the numerous inconsistencies in his evidence, the defendant also sought to shy away from responsibility. On occasion, when he was caught or cornered with inconsistent statements in cross-examination, he went as far as to state:
- [87]
[87] It is difficult to accept the evidence of the defendant who has a penchant for suspicions and who would take the slightest opportunity to impugn those around him who are not on his side.
The defendant’s version of events was incredible
- [88]
[88] In his testimony in court, the defendant claimed to have knowledge of the conspiracy as early as between March and May 2011, when the tender was awarded to the plaintiff. Yet, the defendant refused to take any action after he supposedly was convinced that there was a conspiracy by the plaintiff and the third party to plot against him. This can only be described as bizarre if he had, indeed, known that he was a victim of a conspiracy to defraud him at the nascent stage of the Project. This aspect of the allegations he made in court is not in the defendant’s pleadings or in his AEIC. It is unbelievable that the defendant, an experienced, shrewd and very wealthy businessman, would sit idly by and allow the plaintiff and other professionals to conspire to defraud him of millions of dollars.
- [89]
[89] The defendant also claims that he is a man of principle. He explained that he does not intend to seek alternative settlement of this case as he wishes to contest this case as a matter of principle. Yet when he purportedly discovered the conspiracy against him by the third party, the plaintiff, and the Consultants at the early stage of the Project, he claimed that he did not do anything as he just wanted the Project to be completed. This is deeply inconsistent with the behaviour one would expect from a man of principle. This suggests that there is no truth in the defendant’s allegations that he knew there was a conspiracy to injure or defraud him.
- [90]
[90] I also find that the defendant’s allegations of conspiracy on the part of the third party, the plaintiff and the Consultants are incredible. In his pleadings and AEIC, the defendant alleges that the conspiracy involved only the plaintiff and the third party. However, during his cross-examination by the third party’s counsel, the defendant essentially alleged that the entire team of professionals involved in the Project, apart from his Assistants and Web, was conspiring to injure him.
- [91]
[91] It is clear that to the defendant’s mind, the entire Project team slowly devolved into a cesspit of lies and conspiracy. However, this conspiracy theory simply is not borne out on the facts. I highlight two general difficulties that present themselves in relation to his claim of conspiracy.
(1) The defendant’s assertion that CCA, F+G and RTO Leong were conspiring against him
- [92]
[92] From the defendant’s pleadings and AEIC, it is clear that the parties to the alleged conspiracy to injure him were only the plaintiff and the third party. This was also the position taken in the defendant’s opening statement. There was not the slightest hint that the Consultants, excluding Web, were co-conspirators as well. However, when cross-examined by the third party’s counsel, the defendant then expanded the number of conspirators to almost every professional involved in the Project. The only individuals who were spared were Jessie Tan (TPW8, “Ms Tan”) from Web, the defendant’s wife and his Assistants. The defendant took the position that eight other professionals involved in the Project were all lying and he was the only factual witness that was telling the truth. The list of conspirators is as follows:
(a) in relation to the tender process, Mr Dennis Tan (PW1, “Mr Tan”) and Mr Angamuthu Manoosegaran (PW2, “Mr Manoosegaran”) (from the plaintiff), Mr Phillip Yong (TPW1, “Mr Yong”), Ms Pakawadee Chiyachan (TPW3, “Ms Chiyachan”) and Mr Chan (TPW2) (from the third party), and Ms Chua (TPW7) (from CCA);
(b) in relation to EOT 1, Mr Tan and Mr Manoosegaran (from the plaintiff), Mr Yong, Ms Chiyachan and Mr Chan (from the third party), and Mr Daniel Ng Pak Khuen (TPW6, “Mr Ng”) from F+G;
(c) in relation to EOT 2 and EOT 3, Mr Tan and Mr Manoosegaran (from the plaintiff), Mr Yong, Ms Chiyachan and Mr Chan (from the third party), Ms Chua (from CCA) and Mr Ng (from F+G);
(d) in relation to the CC and the MC, Mr Tan and Mr Manoosegaran (from the plaintiff), Mr Yong, Ms Chiyachan and Mr Chan (from the third party), Ms Chua (from CCA), Mr Ng (from F+G) and RTO Leong; and
(e) in relation to IC25, IC26 and the FC, Mr Tan, Mr Manoosegaran and the plaintiff’s QS (from the plaintiff), Mr Yong, Ms Chiyachan and Mr Chan (from the third party), Ms Chua (from CCA), Mr Ng (from F+G) and RTO Leong.
- [93]
[93] Although CCA, F+G and RTO Leong were not joined as third parties to the Suit, the defendant ought to have pleaded that they were co-conspirators and mentioned their involvement in the alleged conspiracy in his AEIC. But this is not the case. This glaring omission in identifying the parties to the conspiracy weakened the defendant’s conspiracy claim significantly.
- [94]
[94] This allegation of conspiracy was vehemently objected to by Mr Ng, on behalf of F+G, as follows:
- [95]
[95] It was apparent that this was the first time Mr Ng had heard about the defendant’s allegation of conspiracy on the part of F+G, and that it was so incredible to him that he had to clarify whether he was the individual identified. That much speaks about the credibility of the defendant’s claim.
- [96]
[96] Furthermore, if F+G was one of the conspirators with the plaintiff and the third party, why did the defendant through Mr Cheung, on 31 December 2013, engage F+G to “prepare a valuation of the defective works found in the Units”? Going by the defendant’s allegations, in December 2013 the relationship between the defendant, the plaintiff and the third party was not working out well and the defendant was already highly suspicious of the plaintiff and the third party. If F+G truly was a party to the conspiracy, the defendant would not have trusted F+G to conduct a valuation of the defective works.
- [97]
[97] The defendant’s allegations of conspiracy on the part of RTO Leong are equally incredible. His speculations of such conspiracy are captured in the following exchange in court between the defendant and the third party’s counsel:
- [98]
[98] When RTO Leong was questioned about this in court, he testified as follows:
- [99]
[99] I note at this point that RTO Leong’s evidence must be treated with caution. There was one instance in which he revealed candidly that he signed that he had witnessed the testing and commissioning of the swimming pools for the Project on 15 July 2013 when he did not do so. He said he was asked to do so by Mr Sankar (one of the plaintiff’s staff), who informed him that Ms Chua had asked him to sign. As Ms Chua was the M&E engineer and his superior in the Project, RTO Leong felt pressured to comply. However, this was contradicted by Ms Chua on the stand who denied making such a request to RTO Leong through Mr Sankar.
- [100]
[100] Notwithstanding this, the very veracity of the defendant’s claim is dubious. The defendant alleges that RTO Leong sought the plaintiff’s assistance to repair the leaks in RTO Leong’s house. When RTO Leong was asked in court about this matter, he said that the plaintiff was called to repair leaks in the defendant’s house. Thus, it is unclear whether it was the defendant’s house that was leaking or RTO Leong’s. There was no contemporaneous evidence of the defendant’s claim in this regard beyond his own assertion, which is, at its very best, questionable. Even if the defendant were to be believed, it is incredible that he was able to infer that there was a conspiracy simply because the plaintiff had separately assisted RTO Leong to repair the leak in the latter’s house.
- [101]
[101] Similar to what the defendant had done with F+G, he had in fact employed RTO Leong directly to work for him, after RTO Leong was released from the Project on 1 July 2013. He wanted RTO Leong to identify more defects and to monitor the defect rectification on his behalf because of RTO Leong’s familiarity with the Project. This was reflective of the defendant’s relationship with RTO Leong at the time of the Project, as RTO Leong testified:
- [102]
[102] If RTO Leong truly was a party to the conspiracy, the defendant would not have trusted him to identify defects and oversee the rectification of the defective works. Despite their previously close relationship, the defendant now has no qualms about tarnishing RTO Leong’s reputation and branding him as a co-conspirator.
- [103]
[103] This lends weight to the conclusion that the entire conspiracy claim is untrue and a mere afterthought. It is a figment of the defendant’s biased imagination that he conjured when he was in the witness stand to amplify his conspiracy defence to defeat the plaintiff’s and the third party’s claims.
(2) The conspiracy claim is inconsistent with the contemporaneous evidence
- [104]
[104] The defendant claims that he was aware of the purported conspiracy between the plaintiff and the third party from as early as March to May 2011, which was when the tender for the main contractor of the Project was processed. This was at the start of the Project. However, in spite of this knowledge, the defendant did not protest or even entertain the idea of replacing the plaintiff and the third party. The defendant claimed that he still wanted to “trust” the plaintiff and the third party, even though he knew that they were defrauding him of millions of dollars. The defendant’s explanation is unconvincing and unbelievable. Any reasonable individual, let alone an experienced and principled businessman, as the defendant claimed he was, would have dismissed the plaintiff and the third party if he knew that he was indeed a victim of fraud.
- [105]
[105] Further, the defendant did not even tell anyone, including his wife and his trusted Assistants, about his knowledge of the alleged conspiracy. It is strange that he did not even alert his hand-picked Assistants who he personally employed to safeguard his interests in the Project about the alleged conspiracy. The defendant has also, to date, not made a police report in relation to the conspiracy, nor has he made complaints about the conspiracy to injure him against the professionals involved in this Project to the respective professional bodies. The defendant, by his own account, essentially did nothing when he purportedly suspected the alleged conspiracy. There are also no records in the contemporaneous correspondence and documents, including the minutes of the site meetings, to suggest even the slightest hint of any conspiracy between the plaintiff and the third party.
- [106]
[106] Accordingly, the defendant’s own conduct and the contemporaneous evidence do not support the defendant’s contention that there was a conspiracy from as early as March to May 2011. In all probability, the defendant pieced together the conspiracy claim after the plaintiff tried to enforce its certified payment claims in an attempt to avoid his contractual liability.
The defendant refused to call any of his Assistants to testify
- [108]
[108] I begin with Mr Chow, who attended most of the site meetings. According to the defendant, Mr Chow’s “main job” was to “make sure that the waterproofing when they are putting up the membrane, he take a look and make sure that it is fully covered [sic]”. In fact, he had been brought in by the defendant as an additional check on the progress of the plaintiff and the Consultants:
- [109]
[109] Mr Chow was, thus, heavily involved in the Project, at least in relation to the construction of the swimming pools. Based on the defendant’s evidence, he was allegedly the one who had first noticed that there were issues with the waterproofing.
- [110]
[110] Similarly, in the case of Dr Anand, although he was involved in the Project for a short duration, he attended the site meetings fortnightly during the period of his involvement. According to the defendant, Dr Anand’s role was as follows:
- [111]
[111] Dr Anand’s role was, thus, to meticulously place on record every occurrence and discussion at the site meetings. He had been brought in to do this and was remunerated well, because the defendant was of the opinion that the plaintiff and the third party had refused to keep proper records. In fact, it appears that Dr Anand attended the site meeting on behalf of the defendant when the defendant was on holiday. Both Mr Chow and Dr Anand were well positioned to provide evidence as to the existence of any conspiracy, given their heavy involvement in the Project. This fact raises the irresistible and obvious question of why the defendant refused to call them as his witnesses.
- [112]
[112] Mr Cheung was the general manager and director of BKAsiaPacific (Singapore) Pte Ltd, a claims consultancy which specialises in infrastructure and construction claims. According to his curriculum vitae, which was tendered by the third party, Mr Cheung regularly provides expert reports and advice in relation to construction and infrastructure projects. Mr Cheung also has vast experience in giving evidence in court as an expert witness.
- [113]
[113] Notwithstanding Mr Cheung’s significant expertise and experience, the defendant claimed that he paid Mr Cheung a $5,000 “token sum” monthly to perform “only administrative” work. Specifically, the defendant alleged that Mr Cheung was apparently engaged only to send and receive e-mails on behalf of the defendant and to record minutes of the site meetings. The defendant strongly disagreed with the third party’s counsel that Mr Cheung was his “adviser”, “main agent”, or that he was heavily involved in the Project.
- [114]
[114] However, nothing could be further from the truth. Unbeknownst to the defendant, the third party’s counsel was in fact simply using the defendant’s own description of Mr Cheung’s role in the Project from the defendant’s earlier affidavits dated 20 March 2017 and 20 April 2017 as his adviser and main agent for the Project. The defendant was unable to explain the clear and obvious contradictions in his evidence, as revealed in the following excerpt:
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