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Grounds publishedDecided 31 Jan 2022

General Division of the High Court

EFG Bank AG, Singapore Branch v Surewin Worldwide Ltd and others

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[2022] SGHC 26Case no. Suit No 732 of 201612 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. The plaintiff’s submissions

  3. [5] Even if those four points of principle were been common ground, I would have arrived at them as my findings.

  4. [6] Beyond these four points of principle, however, there is little agreement between the plaintiff and the second defendant, whether on principle or on quantum.

  5. Costs

  6. [11] I take these three figures in turn.

  7. $555,000 for work done up to filing the costs schedule

  8. [15] I consider the extent of that variance to be reasonable, bearing in mind the complexity of this case and the novelty of the issues which it gave rise to. This action raised novel and complex issues of Taiwanese law and Jersey law as well of Singapore law, particularly on the issue of foreign illegality in light of Teng Wen-Chung v EFG [2018] 2 SLR 1145. This action also raised the issue of whether a Taiwanese arbitration award can give rise to an issue estoppel under Singapore law. That issue in turn required the parties to analyse not just the Taiwanese Award but also the effect of the Taiwanese court’s decision to uphold the award and the Hong Kong court’s decision to decline to enforce the award. Further, as the plaintiff points out, the documents in this action were voluminous, requiring much time and labour to be expended. The agreed bundle of documents spanned over 60 volumes and over 35,000 pages.

  9. [18] There were three broad issues in this action: (a) whether the Taiwanese Award gave rise to an issue estoppel; (b) whether EFG took its security interest under the SFIP-1 Pledge subject to the second defendant’s beneficial interest in the charged assets; and (c) whether the SFIP-1 Pledge was illegal and therefore unenforceable under Taiwanese law. I found in favour of the plaintiff on each of these three broad issues.

  10. [19] The second defendant submits that each of these broad issues in fact contained within it a number of subsidiary issues, all of which I determined against the plaintiff and in favour of the second defendant, eg:

  11. (a) Whether cl 2.10(e) of the Trust Deed and Volaw’s resolution dated 7 March 2008 amounted to the second defendant’s prior consent in writing to the SFIP-1 Pledge for the purposes of cl 8.2.16 read with cl 17.1 of the Trust Deed.

  12. (b) Whether cl 9.3 of the Trust Deed and Article 55 of the Trusts (Jersey) Law had the effect of leaving the plaintiff’s rights under the SFIP-1 Pledge unaffected.

  13. (c) Whether the SFIP-1 Unit Trust violated Article 146-4 of the TIA.

  14. (d) Whether Mr Teng had actual authority to subscribe for units in the SFIP-1 Unit Trust under Taiwanese law.

  15. (e) Whether Mr Teng had apparent authority to consent to the SFIP-1 Pledge by virtue of the Account Opening Booklet and the minutes of a board resolution apparently passed at a board meeting on 30 January 2008.

  16. $13,500 for interlocutory matters for which costs were ordered to be in the cause

  17. (1) HC/SUM 515/2018

  18. (2) HC/SUM 1652/2018

  19. (3) HC/SUM 2241/2018

  20. (4) HC/SUM 2765/2018

  21. (5) HC/SUM 429/2020, HC/SUM3336/2020 & HC/SUM3395/2020

  22. $20,000 for work done after filing the plaintiff’s costs schedule

  23. [31] I now turn to consider the plaintiff’ claim for disbursements incurred in this action.

  24. Disbursements

  25. [32] The plaintiff claims just over $1.7m in disbursements. Of this, almost $1.6m is for the plaintiff’s experts’ fees:

  26. (a) The plaintiff claims US$68,400 for the fees of Professor Huang, the plaintiff’s expert on Taiwanese law;

  27. (b) The plaintiff claims £196,225.03 for the fees of Mr Gleeson, the plaintiff’s expert on Jersey law;

  28. (c) The plaintiff claims US$475,605.28 for the fees of Mr Mark, the plaintiff’s expert on banking law; and

  29. (d) The plaintiff claims £276,388.02 for the fees of Ms Melis, the plaintiff’s expert on banking law.

  30. [33] The plaintiff claims that all of these sums are reasonable fees for expert witnesses who were reasonably engaged. The second defendant submits that some of these fees were unreasonably incurred and that all of the fees are excessive in quantum. I agree with the second defendant.

  31. [34] As the second defendant points out, I did not accept the expert evidence of Professor Huang and Mr Green on a number of issues, on which I preferred the expert evidence of the second defendant’s expert. Further, the plaintiff’s experts’ fees are consistently higher than the equivalent expert called by the second defendant. That is, of course, only a qualitative indication of the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s experts’ fees. I also accept the second defendant’s submission that: (a) there was no need for the plaintiff to have called two banking experts; and (b) a large part of the banking expert’s evidence was either not directly relevant to the issues in this action or overlapped with the other banking expert’s evidence.

  32. [35] Viewing matters in the round, I consider that the sums claimed by the plaintiff for the fees of its expert witnesses were unreasonably incurred as to 30%. I therefore allow the plaintiff’s claim for the fees of each expert witness only to the extent of 70% of the sum claimed.

  33. The third defendant’s submissions

  34. Conclusion

  35. [42] In summary, I hold as follows:

  36. (a) The second defendant shall pay to the plaintiff its costs of and incidental to this action in the sum of $588,000 as claimed;

  37. (b) The second defendant shall pay to the plaintiff its disbursements of and incidental to this action as claimed, save only that the second defendant shall pay to the plaintiff only 70% of the fees which the plaintiff claims in respect of each of its expert witnesses; and

  38. (c) The third defendant shall not be entitled to recover any of its costs or disbursements of or incidental to this action from the second defendant.