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Grounds publishedDecided 31 May 2023
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General Division of the High Court

SW Trustees Pte Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) and another v Teodros Ashenafi Tesemma and others (Teodros Ashenafi Tesemma, third party)

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[2023] SGHC 160Case no. Suit No 229 of 2021 (Registrar’s Appeal No 80 of 2023)28 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

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  1. [2] After considering the matter carefully, I have decided to allow the first defendant’s appeal in part. Although I disagree with the learned AR’s ultimate conclusion, the learned AR had written an admirably clear and carefully reasoned decision that covered several important issues. Because the learned AR has not published his decision, which would have contributed towards the understanding of this area of law, I set out my full reasons to build on his elucidation of the applicable principles in this judgment.

  2. Background facts

  3. [3] The background facts can be briefly stated. The first plaintiff was put into insolvent liquidation on 21 June 2019. The second plaintiff, Mr Farooq Ahmad Mann, was appointed as the liquidator. The underlying debt had arisen from an arbitration award obtained on 21 July 2017 by SGI SWE Limited and Schulze Global Investments Holdings LLC (“the SGI Creditors”). The SGI Creditors are the first plaintiff’s only creditors.

  4. [5] Focusing on the first defendant for the purposes of this present appeal, the plaintiffs’ case against him in Suit 229 is that he had conspired with one or more of the other defendants to wrongfully cause the first plaintiff’s assets to be sold at an undervalue to the fifth and sixth defendants, which are Sino Africa Trading Limited and Coca-Cola Sabco (East Africa) Limited, respectively. This allegedly caused the first plaintiff to become unable to pay its debts, resulting in its consequent winding up. In this regard, the first defendant was a director of the first plaintiff from 1 September 2004 until he resigned on 1 August 2017. He was also the sole shareholder of the first plaintiff from 30 May 2016 to 27 February 2018.

  5. [6] In terms of the timeline for Suit 229, general discovery was completed in October 2021. By August 2022, the parties were in the stage of specific discovery and had put together their list of witnesses and estimated the number of trial days required. The parties would have exchanged their respective affidavits of evidence-in-chief (“AEICs”) in April 2023 and trial would have taken place from late June 2023.

  6. [7] Against this timeline, the first defendant’s application for SFC was filed only on 28 February 2023. The learned AR heard the parties over a number of days in early April 2023 and issued his decision on 12 April 2023. However, on 12 April 2023, the plaintiffs informed the Registry that they intended to amend their Statement of Claim. As a result, the Registry indefinitely deferred the April dates for the parties to exchange their AEICs, and also vacated the June trial dates. The first defendant filed his Notice of Appeal against the learned AR’s decision on 24 April 2023. Accordingly, the circumstances in which I heard HC/RA 80/2023 (“RA 80”) were quite different from those that confronted the learned AR below.

  7. The parties’ positions

  8. [8] The parties largely maintain their positions taken before the learned AR for the present appeal.

  9. [11] Having set out the relevant background facts and the parties’ positions, I turn to the applicable law.

  10. The applicable law

  11. The analytical framework

  12. [12] The applicable law is not in dispute. The first defendant’s application for SFC is made pursuant to O 23 r 1(1) of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) (“O 23 r 1(1)”) and/or s 388(1). O 23 r 1(1) provides as follows:

  13. [13] In turn, s 388(1) provides as follows:

  14. The relevant circumstances in deciding whether it is just to order security for costs

  15. [16] In this regard, the cases applying O 23 r 1(1) or s 388(1) have accepted a non-exhaustive list of circumstances that a court can consider, which are by and large the same regardless of which provision applies. For example, the Court of Appeal in Creative Elegance set out some factors that would typically be considered relevant (at [18]–[25]):

  16. [17] Similarly, in the context of s 388(1), the Court of Appeal in SIC College of Business and Technology Pte Ltd v Yeo Poh Siah and others [2016] 2 SLR 118 (“SIC College”) accepted (at [76]) the list of circumstances which Judith Prakash J (as she then was) listed out in the High Court decision of L & M Concrete Specialists Pte Ltd v United Eng Contractors Pte Ltd [2001] 3 SLR(R) 208 (at [10]), as follows:

  17. In addition to these circumstances, the Court of Appeal in SIC College also pointed to the fact that it is often inappropriate to award SFC where the claim and counterclaim are co-extensive, which is a weighty factor (at [77]).

  18. [18] While there is much benefit in providing a non-exhaustive list of relevant circumstances, it is important that such a list does not obscure the connection between the listed circumstances and the rationale behind the provision of SFC. In this regard, there are at least three dangers of a non-exhaustive list of circumstances that is not properly rationalised. First, the list of circumstances may grow so long that it becomes unclear how each circumstance links back to the rationale behind the provision of SFC. Second, it may deprive the court of a common basis of comparison if parties pick a number of circumstances which are in their favour but ignore those which are not in their favour. This is exactly what has happened in the present case in so far as the parties only allude to factors that are in their favour. Third, without any indication as to the proper weight to be given to each circumstance, it may be difficult for a court to assess the relative importance of the circumstances against each other.

  19. [23] Parenthetically, a specific consideration may, in certain instances, simultaneously engage more than one of the three key purposes stated. For example, in the present case, at least according to the plaintiffs, the consideration of whether the first defendant’s application was taken out too late not only affects the sense of fair play between the parties, but it also directly impacts the plaintiffs’ ability to pursue their claim in Suit 229 because the first plaintiff is an insolvent company. In sum, while the relevant circumstances remain non-exhaustive, considering them under the main purposes behind the provision of SFC will hopefully provide clarity that recourse to an otherwise open-ended list cannot give.

  20. [24] With this general analytical framework in mind, I turn to the facts at hand.

  21. The first defendant satisfies the first stage of the applicable test

  22. [27] Second, in relation to the second plaintiff, the relevant provision is O 23 r 1(1)(b), which provides:

  23. It is clear that the second plaintiff, being the liquidator of the first plaintiff, is such a “nominal plaintiff”. Further, it is also clear, pursuant to the indemnity that the SGI Creditors have undertaken to provide, that the second plaintiff himself will not pay any of the first defendant’s costs.

  24. The first defendant also satisfies the second stage of the applicable test

  25. The circumstances that pertain to protecting the first defendant from adverse costs consequences

  26. The prospects of the first defendant succeeding in Suit 229

  27. (1) The applicable principles

  28. [30] I begin with the first defendant’s prospects of succeeding in Suit 229, which in turn requires a consideration of the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim against him. In this respect, the plaintiffs rely on the High Court decision of Frantonios Marine Services Pte Ltd and another v Kay Swee Tuan [2008] 4 SLR(R) 224 (“Frantonios Marine”) (at [46]), where Chan Seng Onn J quoted the English Court of Appeal decision of Kufaan Publishing Limited v Al-Warrak Publishing Limited (Unreported, 1 March 2000):

  29. [31] The plaintiffs also rely on another related passage in Frantonios Marine (at [49]):

  30. [34] This conclusion is entirely in line with the Court of Appeal’s analysis in Creative Elegance. In that case, the court discussed a line of cases on O 23 r 1(1)(a) and s 388(1), observing that in all those cases, the strength or weaknesses of the plaintiff’s case is one of the relevant circumstances to be taken into account (at [25]). Indeed, it is telling from the Court of Appeal’s statements that the strength of the plaintiff’s case goes towards the weight to be given to this consideration, as opposed to whether this consideration can be taken into account in the first place. In this regard, I refer to the following passage in Creative Elegance (at [25]):

  31. [35] With this in mind, I now turn to the separate question of how a court should assess the merits of the parties’ case. In this regard, I do not think it makes sense to say that a court will not enter into a detailed assessment of the merits unless the evidence is so clearly in favour of one party. This is because a court can only conclude that the evidence is so clearly in favour of one party if it performs an assessment of the merits. Accordingly, in so far as the High Court Registry in StreetSine Singapore Pte Ltd v Singapore Institute of Surveyors and Valuers and others [2019] SGHCR 1 suggested this proposition (at [18]), I respectfully disagree. Rather, what the cases say is that in the assessment of the merits, the court should not be required to perform an elaborate or detailed investigation of the evidence. As such, as the learned AR in the present case again clearly put it, “any contention about reasonable prospects or high probability of success should be one that is apparent on the face of the evidence or the pleadings”. There ought not to be a distinction between a “detailed” and “non-detailed” assessment depending on the state of the evidence. It is after this summary assessment of the evidence that the court should decide on the weight to be placed on the merits of the parties’ cases.

  32. (2) My decision: the first defendant’s prospects of success in Suit 229 is a neutral factor

  33. [36] Returning to the present case, I am of the view that the first defendant’s success in Suit 229 (and correspondingly the plaintiffs’ case against him) is at best a neutral factor in deciding whether to grant SFC.

  34. [37] As for the assessment of the merits of the first defendant’s case, it is useful to start by setting out the plaintiffs’ case. In sum, the plaintiffs’ case in Suit 229 is that the first defendant had, in a conspiracy with one or more of the defendants, caused the first plaintiff to transfer its shares in two companies, AMBO Holdings International Ltd (“the AMBO Shares”) and Southwest Energy (BVI) Limited (“the SWE Shares”), to the fifth and sixth defendants for no consideration. The plaintiffs’ case is premised on the first plaintiff’s financial statements recording these shares as assets between Financial Year 2010 and Financial Year 2016. There were also other contemporaneous documents that the plaintiffs say confirmed the first plaintiff’s beneficial ownership of the AMBO Shares and the SWE Shares. However, in the unaudited financial statements for Financial Year 2017, the shares were written down and no longer reflected as the first plaintiff’s assets. As the learned AR put it below, the plaintiffs’ case appears to be that there was a wrongful disposal of these shares which was intended to frustrate the enforcement of the arbitration award that the SGI Creditors had obtained against the first plaintiff.

  35. [38] As against the plaintiffs’ case, the first defendant’s defence is that the AMBO Shares and the SWE Shares had always been held on trust by the first plaintiff for the benefit of an entity known as SW Development Trust. The first plaintiff had then been authorised by SW Development Trust to dispose of the shares. In support of his case, the first defendant points to several documents, including certain share certificates, said to support his assertions. The first defendant also alludes to the fact that he had, in negotiations with the sixth defendant, represented to them that the first plaintiff was a trustee. However, the plaintiffs dispute the authenticity of those documents. In essence, the first defendant does not dispute that the AMBO Shares and the SWE Shares had been disposed of. However, the first defendant argues that these shares had been disposed of rightfully because the first plaintiff was never the owner of these shares.

  36. The public policy in favour of awarding security for costs in relation to impecunious companies

  37. [40] More broadly and beyond the merits of the parties’ cases, the first defendant relies on the Court of Appeal decision in Ho Wing On Christopher and others v ECRC Land Pte Ltd (in liquidation) [2006] 4 SLR(R) 817 (“ECRC Land”) to argue that public policy militates against allowing an impecunious company, such as the first plaintiff, to commence legal proceedings against a defendant without giving the latter the protection of SFC. In this regard, the Court of Appeal had said this (at [72]):

  38. [43] Another countervailing interest, which the plaintiffs raise in this present appeal, is that of the plaintiff’s interest in knowing the defendant’s position in relation to SFC “before it embarks further on the litigation and before it decides to commit further and more substantial sums of money in litigating its claim”, in the words of the learned AR. This was why the learned AR concluded that “[p]olicy therefore protects the defendant in so far as he avails himself at an opportune time of the right to security and takes steps to protect his position”. I will address this point in a subsequent part of this judgment, but for now, it suffices to say that I agree with the learned AR’s view that a defendant’s delay in bringing a SFC application can point against the granting of SFC.

  39. Whether the first defendant will recover his costs in any event if SFC were not granted?

  40. Summary

  41. The circumstances that pertain to avoiding stifling the plaintiffs’ ability to pursue their claim

  42. The prospects of the plaintiffs succeeding in Suit 229

  43. The first defendant’s delay in bringing the application for security for costs

  44. (1) The applicable principles

  45. [51] To begin with, it is important to be clear as to how any alleged delay is to be analysed. The preliminary issue is to consider the length of the alleged delay. To do so, the court must determine the point in time from which such delay is to be measured. After the court assesses the length of the delay, it must decide how much weight to give to the delay. In this weighing exercise, the rule of thumb is that SFC “is not a card that a defendant can keep up its sleeve and play at its convenience” [emphasis in original], as the Court of Appeal in SIC College put it (at [79]). Therefore, to ensure that SFC applications are not used as such, it is important to examine whether the defendant can provide a good reason for the delay (see the Court of Appeal decision of Tjong Very Sumito and others v Chan Sing En and others [2011] 4 SLR 580 (“Tjong Very Sumito”) at [61]).

  46. [54] In summary, there are three separate questions that a court may have to examine when delay is alleged in the context of an application for SFC.

  47. I will consider each of these questions below.

  48. (2) The first defendant provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay in applying for security for the costs of trial and post-trial work

  49. (3) There would been no prejudice to the plaintiffs in any event

  50. [65] Parenthetically, while I observe that applications for SFC under the new Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”) are to be made early on in the proceedings under a single application pending trial (“SAPT”) (see O 9 r 9(2) and O 9 r 9(4)(d) of the ROC 2021), I do not think that this detracts from my conclusion above. Although the SAPT should now include requests for SFC, this does not mean that it is impermissible to make an application for SFC after the SAPT. Indeed, O 9 r 9(7) of the ROC 2021 contains a qualification that “[n]o application may be taken out by any party at any time [outside of the SAPT] other than as directed at the case conference or with the Court’s approval” [emphasis added]. This therefore gives the court the power to allow a defendant to apply for SFC even after the SAPT if new information emerges so as to enable the defendant to better quantify the SFC that it needs with respect to later stages of the proceedings.

  51. Whether an order for security for costs would prevent the plaintiffs from pursuing their claim in Suit 229?

  52. Summary

  53. Summary of the analysis under the second stage of the applicable test

  54. [71] While I have concluded that the considerations as viewed from the first defendant’s and the plaintiffs’ perspective are neutral, I decide that the first defendant is nevertheless entitled to SFC. This is to give effect to the key consideration of affording protection to defendants facing litigation from an impecunious company. In connection with this, I do not think that the plaintiffs can claim to be surprised by the first defendant’s application for SFC, at least for some aspects, when they have been legally advised such that they know that applications for SFC often take place in stages.

  55. Conclusion and the appropriate quantum of SFC