General Division of the High Court · Decided 27 June 2023
Cova Group Holdings Ltd v Advanced Submarine Networks Pte Ltd and another
Feedback & support[2023] SGHC 178 · Case no. Originating Claim No 236 of 2022 (Registrar’s Appeals Nos 57, 58, 74 and 75 of 2023) · 26 paragraphs
✱ What happened, in plain English
There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.
Ask about this judgment →Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
- [3]
[3] After considering the parties’ submissions and other relevant documents, I dismiss the claimant’s appeals in RA 57 and RA 58. I also dismiss RA 74 and RA 75. I provide the reasons for my decision in this judgment.
Background facts
- [4]
[4] I begin with the background facts, which apply to all four appeals. On or around 28 February 2019, the claimant agreed to rent its construction equipment (“the Equipment”) to Global Explorer Sdn Bhd (“Global Explorer”), who was a subcontractor of the first defendant. The Equipment was loaded on board the barge MUTIARA 280 (“the Barge”) and remains on board to the present day. The second defendant is the owner of the Barge.
- [6]
[6] The two defendants became involved in this dispute with the claimant due to the Taiwan Project. The first defendant became involved as it had subcontracted Global Explorer to provide it with cable storage solutions, and this caused Global Explorer to rent the claimant’s carousel and tensioner to the first defendant. As for the second defendant, it had chartered the Barge to the claimant for the duration of the Taiwan Project. This was so that the claimant could place its Equipment on the Barge.
- [7]
[7] On 7 July 2022, Global Explorer entered into liquidation in Malaysia. The claimant terminated the Proposal on 14 July 2022. Pursuant to the terms of the Proposal, the claimant was entitled to immediate possession of the carousel and tensioner. As such, the claimant wrote to the first and second defendants on 14 July 2022 and 22 July 2022, respectively. The claimant made known in its letters that it was the owner of the Equipment, and that no one should operate the Equipment without its express permission. However, on 19 July 2022, the claimant was notified that the second defendant had exercised a purported lien over the Equipment due to Global Explorer’s failure to pay charter hire fees to it.
- [8]
[8] On 22 August 2022, the claimant, once again, wrote to the defendants to inform them that it owned the Equipment, and demanded their return. However, the defendants did not do so. Instead, the first defendant continued to use the carousel and tensioner for the purposes of the Taiwan Project. The second defendant also continued to maintain its purported lien over the Equipment. This state of affairs remains the status quo at the time of the hearing before me.
- [9]
[9] The claimant therefore commenced HC/OC 236/2022 (“OC 236”) against the defendants (being the main action from which these present appeals arise). The claimant’s pleaded case in OC 236 is that both defendants have committed the torts of conversion, trespass, and detinue. The claimant also claims in OC 236 that the first defendant is liable for unjust enrichment.
- [10]
[10] The defendants have mounted several arguments in their pleaded defences against the claimant’s claims in OC 236. In particular, the first defendant has said that, among others, one Mr Peter Parkinson (“Mr Parkinson”), acting on behalf of Global Explorer, represented to them that Global Explorer owned and had good title to the Equipment. Mr Parkinson is a director of Global Explorer and is also the sole director of the claimant. Similarly, the second defendant has also said that the claimant ought to be estopped from asserting ownership over the Equipment because Mr Parkinson had, by his conduct, represented that Global Explorer was the owner of the Equipment. Importantly for present purposes, both defendants have brought counterclaims against the claimant. In this regard, the first defendant has counterclaimed against the claimant for its losses suffered as a result of the injunction obtained by the claimant on 2 September 2022 in HC/SUM 3259/2022, which prevented the defendants from operating the Equipment. In turn, the second defendant has counterclaimed against the claimant for fraudulent misrepresentation and for conspiracy to cause loss by unlawful means.
- [12]
[12] With these background facts in mind, I turn to the broadly applicable law.
The applicable law
The analytical framework
- [14]
[14] The predecessor of O 9 r 12(1) in the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC 2014”) is O 23 r 1(1) (“O 23 r 1(1)”), which provides as follows:
The relevant circumstances in deciding whether it is just to order security for costs
- [19]
[19] Similarly, in the context of s 388 of the Companies Act, the Court of Appeal in SIC College of Business and Technology Pte Ltd v Yeo Poh Siah and others [2016] 2 SLR 118 (“SIC College”) at [76] accepted the circumstances which Judith Prakash J (as she then was) listed out in the High Court decision of L & M Concrete Specialists Pte Ltd v United Eng Contractors Pte Ltd [2001] 3 SLR(R) 208 (at [10]), as follows:
In addition to these circumstances, the Court of Appeal in SIC College also pointed to the fact that “it is often inappropriate to award security for costs where the claim and counterclaim are co-extensive”, which is a weighty factor (at [77]). Indeed, this is a circumstance that the claimant has raised quite strongly in the present case.
First stage: the defendants come within one of the grounds in O 9 r 12(1)
Second stage: the relevant circumstances point towards the provision of security for costs
The circumstances that pertain to protecting the defendants against adverse costs consequences
The prospects of the defendants succeeding in the proceedings
- [26]
[26] I consider specifically the prospects of the defendants succeeding in the proceedings, subject to the practical circumstance that the court will not investigate in considerable detail the likelihood of success in the action. In this regard, the defendants have mounted several defences against the claimant’s claims in OC 236. These defences centre on, among others, representations made by Mr Parkinson that Global Explorer owned and had good title to the Equipment.
- [27]
[27] The claimant resists the defendants’ defences. In relation to the first defendant, the claimant says that there is a low likelihood of it succeeding in its defences in OC 236. In particular, the claimant points out that the first defendant has said in its supporting affidavit to SUM 4260 that the “key issues in dispute include whether the [c]laimant is a legitimate company at all and whether the [c]laimant actually owns the Equipment”. The claimant says that these defences are without merit because it has furnished more than sufficient proof that it owns the Equipment. The evidence includes the certification of equipment ownership, purchase orders, invoices, and payment receipts.
- [28]
[28] In relation to the second defendant, the claimant says that its arguments are untenable as the claimant was never involved in any discussions with the second defendant in relation to the Equipment. The claimant is also not a party to the contract between Global Explorer and the second defendant. As such, the claimant submits that it could not have known of the existence of any representations that Global Explorer owned and had good title to the Equipment. In essence, the claimant says that the second defendant is really trying to impute Mr Parkinson’s knowledge to the claimant because he is the claimant’s sole director. In this regard, the claimant submits that there is no hard and fast rule that the knowledge or conduct of a sole director or shareholder must be attributed to the company (see the Court of Appeal decision of Red Star Marine Consultants Pte Ltd v Personal Representatives of Satwant Kaur d/o Sardara Singh, deceased and another [2020] 1 SLR 115 (“Red Star Marine”) at [41]).
- [29]
[29] While the claimant has also addressed the other defences raised by the defendants, it is sufficient for me to focus on the aforementioned defences. This is because once I find that the defendants have raised a plausible defence, then it must follow that they would have a good prospect of defending against OC 236. Indeed, given that the court will not generally enter into a detailed examination of the merits at this stage of the proceedings (see the High Court decision of Sembawang Engineering Pte Ltd v Priser Asia Engineering Pte Ltd [1992] 2 SLR(R) 358 at [25]), I am of the view that, in assessing whether the defence has a good prospect of success, it is generally sufficient for a defendant to raise a plausible defence. On these premises, I find that the defendants have a good prospect of succeeding in their defences.
- [30]
[30] First, in relation to the first defendant, I accept that there is an arguable case concerning the veracity of the documents which the claimant provided to prove its ownership of the Equipment. For instance, many of the documents are, in fact, undated certificates that the claimant has drawn up purporting to certify its ownership of the Equipment that do not even bear signature guarantees. As such, I accept that there is an arguable case that these documents which the claimant relies on actually show that the Equipment may have been purchased and paid for by another entity.
- [31]
[31] Second, in relation to the second defendant, I find that there is an arguable case that Mr Parkinson’s knowledge can be imputed to the claimant on the basis that he is the claimant’s sole director. Indeed, even by the claimant’s own case, whether a director’s knowledge can be attributed to the company is dependent on the legal and factual context of the case (see Red Star Marine at [41]). If this is correct, then I do not see how the claimant can deny the possibility that the second defendant can show that, on the facts, Mr Parkinson’s knowledge should be so attributed. Indeed, even as a proposition of law, the second defendant has raised authorities, such as the Court of Appeal decision of Ho Kang Peng v Scintronix Corp Ltd (formerly known as TTL Holdings Ltd) [2014] 3 SLR 329 at [70] and the UK Supreme Court decision of Bilta (UK) Ltd (in liquidation) and others v Nazir and others (No 2) [2016] AC 1 at 36, which show that director’s knowledge should be attributed to the company where the infringement of third-party rights is the subject of an action against the company. I do not think that these authorities can be dismissed out of hand in the circumstances of the present case.
The ease by which the defendants may enforce a judgment for costs
The circumstances that pertain to avoiding stifling the claimant’s ability to pursue its claim
- [35]
[35] Second, I consider the circumstances that pertain to avoiding stifling the claimant’s ability to pursue its claim.
The prospects of the claimant succeeding in the proceedings
- [36]
[36] While I have found that the defendants have a reasonable prospect of succeeding in the proceedings, this does not preclude a finding that the claimant likewise has a reasonable prospect of succeeding here. I find that the claimant has such a reasonable prospect.
- [37]
[37] First, in relation to the first defendant, just as I have said that the documents which the claimant has provided to prove its ownership of the Equipment are questionable, it is equally plausible that the documents prove such ownership. At this point of the proceedings, it is simply not possible to state so one way or the other, nor should I attempt to do so. Second, as for the second defendant, just as I have said that whether Mr Parkinson’s knowledge can be attributed to the claimant is dependent on the factual and legal context, it must be that the claimant may eventually prevail on this point.
An order for security for costs precluding the claimant from pursuing its claim
Impecuniosity of the claimant arising out of the defendant’s alleged breaches
- [42]
[42] Given my conclusion that the claimant has not proven that it is impecunious such that the granting of security would stifle its claims, its related assertion that its impecuniosity has been brought about by the defendants’ conduct also falls away. It cannot be said that the impecuniosity of the claimant arises out of the defendants’ alleged breaches when the assertion that the claimant is impecunious is not made out to begin with. Be that as it may, I take this opportunity to summarise the principles applicable to cases where a claimant alleges that its impecuniosity arises out of the defendant’s alleged breaches.
- [43]
[43] First, it is well established that the court may consider the extent to which the claimant’s impecuniosity may be due to the actions of the defendant which form the basis for the claimant’s claim (see SIC College at [76(e)]; see also the Supreme Court of British Columbia decision of Gray v Powerassist Technologies Inc [2001] BCJ No 1722 at [19(c)]). This principle may be traced back to the early decision of Farrer v Lacy Hartland & Co (1885) 28 Ch D 482, where Bowen LJ opined (at 485):
The circumstances that pertain to a sense of fair play: overlap between the defence and counterclaim
The parties’ positions
The applicable law
The first defendant’s defence and counterclaim
- [58]
[58] Indeed, this scenario was what Bingham LJ alluded to in the English Court of Appeal decision of Hutchison Telephone (UK) Ltd v Ultimate Response Ltd [1993] BCLC 307 (“Hutchison”) at 317, as follows:
The second defendant’s defence and counterclaim
- [60]
[60] I turn now to address the parties’ argument regarding the alleged overlap between the second defendant’s defence and counterclaim. The claimant argues that while the second defendant’s counterclaim includes claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and conspiracy to cause loss by unlawful means, the alleged facts that the second defendant relies on in support of its counterclaim are essentially the same as those raised in support of its defence. As such, the claimant says that the second defendant would need to prove essentially the same allegations in its defence and the counterclaim.
- [62]
[62] I agree with the second defendant that, while there is some overlap, its defence comprises significant factual elements that do not overlap with its counterclaim. In other words, there is no substantial overlap between the second defendant’s defence and its counterclaim. To start with, there is some overlap because the claimant’s claims against the second defendant in the torts of trespass, detinue, and conversion are premised, among others, on the claimant’s assertion that it has ownership over the Equipment. In its defence, the second defendant says that the claimant is estopped from asserting such ownership because of representations that it made to the second defendant. This assertion overlaps with the second defendant’s counterclaim for the claimant’s fraudulent misrepresentation (see [28] above).
Summary: the defendants are entitled to security for costs
The quantum of security for costs
- [66]
[66] Finally, I see no reason to disturb the learned AR’s determination of the appropriate quantum of security. In this regard, it is trite that the court has complete discretion in the amount of the security to be provided and will determine the appropriate sum considering the circumstances of the case (see the High Court decision of Credit Suisse AG v Owner of the Vessel “CHLOE V” [2022] SGHCR 9 (“Credit Suisse”) at [53]; citing an earlier edition of Prof Jeffrey Pinsler, Singapore Court Practice (LexisNexis, 2023) (“Singapore Court Practice”) at para 9/12/12).
- [68]
[68] Additionally, some further considerations which, although made in the context of determining the quantum of security furnished for the purposes of an appeal, are also helpful (see Singapore Court Practice at para 57/3/7; cited with approval in the Court of Appeal decision of Yuanta Asset Management International Ltd and another v Telemedia Pacific Group Ltd and another [2017] SGCA(I) 2 at [4]):
Conclusion