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Grounds publishedDecided 31 Mar 2023

General Division of the High Court

Kotagaralahalli Peddappaiah Nagaraja v Moussa Salem and others

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[2023] SGHC 68Case no. Suit No 663 of 2020

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The plaintiff commenced this action seeking to vindicate his claim to be the beneficial owner of one share or one-third of the shares in the third defendant under or by reason of a trust declared by the second defendant by deed on 23 July 2015 (“the 2015 Trust Deed”). I delivered my judgment on the merits of this action in January 2023 (see Kotagaralahalli Peddappaiah Nagaraja v Moussa Salem and others [2023] SGHC 6 (“KPN”)). In that judgment, I dismissed the plaintiff’s claim in its entirety.

  3. [3] The plaintiff’s statement of claim in this action originally pleaded four claims against four defendants: (a) breach of contract; (b) a conspiracy against him by two or more of the defendants; (c) minority oppression under s 216 of the Companies Act 1967 (2020 Rev Ed); and (d) breach of the express trust constituted by the 2015 Trust Deed.

  4. [4] In December 2020, I struck out as being plainly and obviously unsustainable all of the plaintiff’s claims except for the last claim: that that there had been a breach of the express trust constituted by the 2015 Trust Deed. It is that single claim which proceeded to trial and which I adjudicated upon on the merits in KPN. I shall refer to the plaintiff’s claims which I struck out in December 2020 collectively as “the unsustainable claims”.

  5. [6] In KPN, I held that the presumption of a resulting trust arose over the Shares in favour of the first defendant because the first defendant: (a) paid the direct consideration for the Shares; and (b) undertook and discharged the contractual obligation which had causative force in vesting the Shares in the second defendant (KPN at [84]–[92] and [122]–[124]). I found further that this presumption stood unrebutted because there was no objective intention that anyone other than the first defendant was to have any part of the beneficial interest in the Shares (KPN at [93]–[118]).

  6. [7] As a result, I held that the first defendant was the sole beneficial owner of all of the Shares. The 2015 Trust Deed was nothing more than an imperfect gift which equity would not assist the plaintiff to perfect, the plaintiff being a volunteer (KPN at [118]). I therefore dismissed the plaintiff’s action in its entirety.

  7. The first defendant

  8. The event

  9. Standard or indemnity basis

  10. Action commenced in bad faith and with an improper purpose

  11. (1) The costs of the unsustainable claims

  12. (2) The costs of the claim on the 2015 Trust Deed

  13. [24] Even if I were to assume, in favour of the first defendant, that the plaintiff advanced the unsustainable claims in bad faith and for an improper purpose, I do not consider that to be a proper basis from which to draw the inference that the plaintiff advanced his claim on the 2015 Trust Deed in bad faith and for an improper purpose.

  14. [25] It is certainly true that the abject failure of all but one claim in the plaintiff’s elaborate case to survive a striking out application could justify the inference that the first defendant invites me to draw (see [16] above) about the only claim which did survive. It is also true that that single claim is a fairly narrow and technical claim on the 2015 Trust Deed. But that claim cannot on its face be stigmatised as tenuous or contrived. It is an objectively sustainable claim, both on the facts and on the law. That is the very reason I did not strike it out and allowed it to continue to trial. I do not consider that it would be correct in principle for me to draw – from the nature or the failure of this claim – the inference that the first defendant invites me to draw about the plaintiff’s motive in bringing his claim on the 2015 Trust Deed.

  15. [26] Before I leave this point, I should make clear that none of what I have said about the nature of the plaintiff’s unsustainable claims or my decision to strike them out is intended as any criticism of the plaintiff’s solicitors. I am satisfied that they conducted themselves at all times in accordance with their instructions and, more importantly, with their professional duties both under written law and at common law, in advancing his many claims.

  16. Case constantly evolving

  17. Stop notice

  18. [37] The first defendant also relies the plaintiff’s refusal to withdraw the stop notice after I handed down my judgment in KPN in January 2023 as evidence of the plaintiff’s dishonest, abusive or improper behaviour. However, the reason which the plaintiff gave for his refusal was that he was considering his right of appeal against my decision in KPN. It is, of course, true that my decision in KPN bound the plaintiff with immediate effect as soon as it was handed down, and that it did so even if he intended to or actually did file an appeal. He was so bound until and unless my decision was reversed on appeal or was stayed pending appeal. So the plaintiff’s conduct in refusing to withdraw the stop notice undoubtedly amounts to arrogating to himself the benefit of a stay of execution without taking the trouble to apply for one, let alone securing one. But I do not consider it correct to characterise conduct of this type as dishonest, abusive or improper. I would characterise it at worst as being overly optimistic and an overreach.

  19. Evasive and untruthful

  20. [40] It is true that I found that the plaintiff’s evidence was, in critical respects, at variance with the contemporaneous documents and the inherent probabilities. It is also true that I found that the plaintiff changed his evidence in critical respects under cross-examination. However, I did not find that the plaintiff was deliberately or knowingly untruthful or evasive, whether in his written or his oral evidence. That is not to say that I found him not to be deliberately or knowingly untruthful. It was simply unnecessary for my decision on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim or of the first defendant’s defence to make any finding as to the cause of the variance between the plaintiff’s evidence and the contemporaneous documents or the inherent probabilities, one way or the other. It sufficed for me merely to find that there was a variance and that the variance warranted rejecting his evidence.

  21. Conclusion

  22. Quantum

  23. Section 1 costs

  24. (1) Courts should not depart from Appendix G too readily

  25. [50] The third purpose that Appendix G serves is to set a marker for legal fees as between solicitor and client, however faint that marker might be. It is true that paragraph 3 of Appendix G expressly provides that nothing in Appendix G is intended to guide or influence the charging of fees payable to a solicitor by his own client. That must undoubtedly be the case. Fees as between solicitor and client are a matter of contract. This is subject, obviously and always, to the legal and ethical constraints found in the Legal Profession Act 1996 (2020 Rev Ed), in its subordinate legislation and in the written law and the common law of legal professional ethics. This is also subject to the Supreme Court’s supervisory jurisdiction over solicitors (see eg, Law Society of Singapore v Syn Kok Kay [2023] SGHC 7 at [21]–[24]). Subject to these constraints, and in particular to the very important constraint imposed by r 17(7) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, there is nothing to prevent a client from agreeing by contract to pay his solicitor a fee which is 30% above the guidelines in Appendix G or 300% above those guidelines. There is nevertheless a clear connection between the guidelines in Appendix G and the fees agreed between solicitor and client. Appendix G is a guideline for fixing the quantum of the policy-based deemed indemnity which the receiving party can recover against the fees it has agreed to pay its own solicitor. Appendix G therefore lays down a marker of reasonableness – a marker which is deliberate, even if it is deliberately indirect and deliberately diffident – for the contractual bargains on fees that solicitors as a class reach with clients as a class.

  26. (2) This is not an appropriate case to depart from Appendix G

  27. [52] Bearing the foregoing analysis in mind, I do not consider that this is an appropriate case to depart from Appendix G. I say that for three reasons.

  28. [55] Third, the first defendant does not submit that there is any feature related to the factual or legal complexity of this litigation that takes it beyond the general run of equity and trusts cases catered for by the guidelines for this class of case in Appendix G. In so far as litigation involving equity and trusts is more factually and legally complex than litigation in other areas of law, Appendix G has already taken that into account in setting the guidelines for pre-trial, trial and post-trial work in this class of case.

  29. (3) Application of Appendix G

  30. (a) $80,000 for pre-trial costs. The plaintiff arrives at this figure by taking as his starting point the figure of $90,000 which the first defendant has claimed in his costs schedule and discounting it by $10,000.

  31. (b) $120,000 for trial costs. The plaintiff arrives at this figure by taking the maximum daily tariff set out in Appendix G of $16,000 per day of trial and multiplying that by the 7½ days that the trial of this action took.

  32. (c) $45,000 for post-trial costs. The plaintiff arrives at this figure by taking the maximum tariff set out in Appendix G for post-trial work and adding to it $10,000 for the one-day hearing for oral closing submissions.

  33. [58] With one exception (see [59]–[60] below), I accept that the basis on which the plaintiff has arrived at these figures is a correct application of the guidelines in Appendix G for an equity and trusts case to the facts of this case.

  34. [61] In any event, it appears to me that the pre-trial work done in this litigation for the first defendant alone, both before and after the discontinuance, warrants an award at the top end of the tariff ie, $90,000.

  35. [62] It is of course a relevant factor that the first defendant was very ably represented by senior counsel throughout these proceedings, and in particular at trial and in closing submissions. I have taken that factor into account in adopting figures under Appendix G which are at the very top of each tariff.

  36. [63] I therefore fix the plaintiff’s award for Section 1 at $255,000. For the reasons I have given, I have assessed that figure on the standard basis and in accordance with Appendix G for an equity and trusts case.

  37. Disbursements

  38. [64] The first defendant claims from the plaintiff disbursements of $236,464. The plaintiff objects to the following five large disbursements totalling $165,244 out of this claim:

  39. (a) $91,300 for Mr Baldock’s fee for all attendances in relation to this action.

  40. (b) $22,272 for Mr Jordan’s fee in connection with preparing the affidavits of evidence in chief.

  41. (c) $17,952 for Mr Jordan’s fee for attendance at trial.

  42. (d) $16,547 for the first defendant’s travel expenses between Singapore and London in May 2022.

  43. (e) $17,173 for a return airfare for Mr Gluck between London and Singapore.

  44. [65] The plaintiff also points to a number of smaller disbursements which the first defendant claims, including $235 for a limousine transfer from Changi Airport to the Fullerton Hotel and Mr Gluck’s minibar purchases such as a bottle of Evian water at $26. But the plaintiff quite sensibly accepts that these smaller disbursements are de minimis and takes no objection to the first defendant’s claim to recover them.

  45. (1) Mr Baldock’s fee

  46. [67] The plaintiff’s objections to the first defendant’s claim for Mr Baldock’s fee are aimed at the condition precedent and the second element. The plaintiff does not, quite rightly, take any point on the first element by suggesting that Mr Baldock’s fee was unreasonably incurred. Mr Baldock was quite clearly a material witness of fact on at least three critical issues: (a) the circumstances surrounding the third defendant’s incorporation (KPN at [19] and [88]); (b) the facts said to give rise to a resulting trust over the Shares in the first defendant’s favour (KPN at [91]); and (c) whether the first defendant had any donative intent in favour of the plaintiff when the 2015 Trust Deed was conceived and executed (KPN at [99] and [108]).

  47. [69] The first defendant’s responses to the plaintiff’s objections are threefold. First, the first defendant has indeed borne Mr Baldock’s fee, even though the invoice is addressed to the third defendant. Second, Mr Baldock’s fee is recoverable in principle as between party and party on the authority of Mero Asia Pacific Pte Ltd v Takenaka Corp [2002] 2 SLR(R) 1083 (“Mero Asia Pacific”) at [6]. Third, Mr Baldock’s fee is reasonable in amount.

  48. (A) The first defendant incurred Mr Baldock’s fee

  49. [72] In this case, Mr Baldock’s fee was invoiced to the third defendant, not to the first defendant. In a letter to the court dated 20 February 2023, the first defendant’s solicitors assert as a fact, on instructions, that the first defendant has in fact borne Mr Baldock’s fee. But this assertion and the first defendant’s instructions are not evidence. Furthermore, this assertion is entirely unsupported. The first defendant has produced no evidence, documentary or otherwise, showing that the first defendant has paid Mr Baldock his fee or has either reimbursed or undertaken to reimburse the third defendant for paying Mr Baldock’s fee.

  50. [74] The benefit of Mr Baldock’s evidence at trial therefore accrued to, and only to, the first defendant. If the third defendant has paid Mr Baldock’s fee even though only the first defendant derived the entire benefit arising from the services underlying the fee, it is my view that the first defendant is under an obligation in equity to reimburse the third defendant for that fee. If the third defendant has not yet paid Mr Baldock’s fee, the same principle would subject the first defendant to an obligation in equity to indemnify the third defendant against its liability to pay Mr Baldock’s fee.

  51. (B) Mr Baldock’s fee is recoverable in principle

  52. [84] I therefore accept that the first defendant can recover Mr Baldock’s fee in principle as between party and party.

  53. (C) The first defendant has failed to prove that Mr Baldock’s fee is reasonable in amount

  54. [86] The first defendant has therefore failed to discharge his burden of proving that Mr Baldock’s fee is reasonable in amount. It would be wholly disproportionate, however, to disallow Mr Baldock’s fee in its entirety on this ground, particularly given my finding about the importance of Mr Baldock’s evidence (see [67] above) and that it was reasonable for the first defendant to have incurred Mr Baldock’s fee (see [78]–[84] above). Instead, I prefer to assess what is a reasonable amount for Mr Baldock’s fee on a broad-brush approach. On that broad-brush approach, I allow only two-third of Mr Baldock’s fee ie, $60,867 as the sum recoverable for that fee as between party and party.

  55. (D) Conclusion on Mr Baldock’s fee

  56. [87] In conclusion, I am satisfied that the first defendant incurred Mr Baldock’s fee either because he was under an obligation in equity to reimburse the first defendant for it or because he has assumed an obligation by his undertaking to reimburse the first defendant for it in circumstances in which it is reasonable for him to do so. I accept that Mr Baldock’s fee was reasonably incurred. And I find that the sum of $60,867 is a reasonable amount for his fee.

  57. [88] I therefore hold that the first defendant is entitled to recover from the plaintiff the sum of $60,867 as a deemed indemnity for Mr Baldock’s fee.

  58. (2) Mr Jordan’s fees

  59. [91] No question arises as to who incurred both of Mr Jordan’s fees, as his firm invoiced the first defendant personally for the fees.

  60. (A) Preparing affidavits of evidence in chief

  61. [92] I do not accept the plaintiff’s objection to the first of Mr Jordan’s fees: the work done in connection with preparing affidavits of evidence in chief.

  62. [95] On the facts of this case, I accept that it was reasonable for Mr Jordan to prepare his own affidavit of evidence in chief. I therefore hold that the first defendant is entitled in principle to recover the first of Mr Jordan’s two fees from the plaintiff.

  63. (B) Attendance at trial

  64. [96] As in Mr Baldock’s case, I do not accept the plaintiff’s objection to the second of Mr Jordan’s two fees: for attendance in relation to the trial. I reject this objection for the reasons I have already given when rejecting this objection to Mr Baldock’s fee: the objection is not well-founded in law (see [78]–[81] above).

  65. [98] I therefore hold that the first defendant is entitled in principle to recover the second of Mr Jordan’s two fees from the plaintiff.

  66. (C) The first defendant has failed to prove that Mr Jordan’s fees are reasonable in amount

  67. [100] The first defendant has therefore failed to discharge his burden of proving that Mr Jordan’s fees are reasonable in amount. It would be wholly disproportionate, however, to disallow Mr Jordan’s fee in its entirety, particularly given my finding about that Mr Jordan was a material witness (see [97] above) and that it was reasonable for the first defendant to have incurred his fees (see [92]–[98] above). Instead, I prefer to assess what is a reasonable amount for Mr Jordan’s fees on a broad-brush approach. On that broad-brush approach, I allow only two-third of Mr Jordan’s fees ie, $26,816 as the sum recoverable for that fee as between party and party.

  68. [101] I therefore hold that the first defendant is entitled to recover from the plaintiff the sum of $26,816 as a deemed indemnity for Mr Jordan’s fees.

  69. (3) The first defendant’s travel expenses

  70. [102] The first defendant claims $21,348 for his travel expenses to and from Singapore for the trial of this action. This sum covers the following three airfares:

  71. (a) A one-way airfare from London to Singapore on 3 May 2022 costing $4,801 (“Airfare 1”).

  72. (b) A return airfare between Singapore and London on 5 and 15 May 2022 costing $13,252 (“Airfare 2”).

  73. (c) A one-way airfare from Singapore to London on 18 May 2022 costing $3,295 (“Airfare 3”).

  74. [103] The plaintiff objects to the first defendant’s claim for Airfare 2 and Airfare 3, totalling $16,547, on the primary ground that it was unreasonable for the first defendant to incur more than one airfare to travel to Singapore for trial. The plaintiff therefore submits that only Airfare 1 is recoverable. Further, the plaintiff points out that the travel agent’s invoice for Airfare 3 shows that a third party and not the first defendant incurred this airfare.

  75. [104] The plaintiff does not submit that any of the airfares are unreasonable in amount if I were to find that they were reasonably incurred.

  76. [105] The first defendant submits that all of these airfares were reasonably incurred. He incurred Airfare 1 because he was concerned about the time difference between his home in London and Singapore and possible technical issues arising if he were to use videoconferencing to observe the trial from London while waiting for his turn to take the stand. Airfare 2 was incurred for religious reasons, because he wanted to spend the Sabbath at home in London and return to Singapore just before he was due to take the stand as a witness in his own defence. Airfare 3 was necessary for him to return to his home in London after trial.

  77. [109] Although the first defendant claims three airfares, his claim amounts in substance to two return trips. Airfare 2 is for a return trip from Singapore to London. Airfare 1 and Airfare 3 are for one-way trips to and from Singapore respectively. These two airfares taken together make up a second return trip from London to Singapore. The three airfares taken together therefore amount to two return trips from London to Singapore.

  78. [111] In any event, I consider it reasonable for the first defendant now to assume voluntarily an obligation to reimburse the third party for Airfare 3, even if he has been under no obligation in equity to do so up to this point. I therefore asked counsel for the first defendant in the course of oral submissions whether the first defendant was prepared to give the same formal undertaking to the court in respect of Airfare 3 as I sought in respect of Mr Baldock’s fee (see [76] above), mutatis mutandis.

  79. (4) Mr Gluck’s travel expenses

  80. [114] The first defendant claims $17,173 for Mr Gluck’s return airfare from London to Singapore for the trial of this action. The plaintiff objects to this disbursement on the ground that the travel agent’s invoice shows that these travel expenses were incurred by the same third party, MG Sugars Lanka (Private) Limited, and not by the first defendant. The first defendant’s response is that he has borne this disbursement.

  81. [115] Further, out of this total sum of $17,173, a sum equivalent to $7,229 was invoiced as an “Upgrade and Change Fee” for Mr Gluck’s flight from Singapore to London on 15 May 2022. From the description, it appears that this fee was incurred to change the date of Mr Gluck’s return flight from Saturday 14 May 2022 to Sunday 15 May 2022 and to upgrade his class of travel. The plaintiff objects to this fee on the additional ground that it “is not something [the first defendant] can legitimately claim against [the plaintiff]”. I take that to be an objection that the fee was not reasonably incurred ie, that it was incurred purely for Mr Gluck’s own comfort and convenience and was not reasonably necessary for Mr Gluck to give evidence at the trial of this action. The first defendant’s response is that this fee was reasonably incurred in that Mr Gluck had planned to return to London by 14 May 2022. However, he had to incur this fee because his cross-examination extended to 13 May 2022.

  82. [117] In any event, I consider it reasonable for the first defendant now to assume voluntarily an obligation to reimburse the third party for Mr Gluck’s travel expenses, even if he has been under no obligation in equity to do so up to this point. I therefore asked counsel for the first defendant in the course of oral submissions whether the first defendant was prepared to give the same formal undertaking to the court in respect of Mr Gluck’s travel expenses as in respect of Mr Baldock’s fee (see [76] above) and Airfare 3 (see [113] above), mutatis mutandis.

  83. [119] I now turn to address the first defendant’s specific claim for the fee of $7,229. I accept the plaintiff’s submission that this fee is not recoverable as between party and party. The first defendant has failed to discharge his burden of showing that this fee was reasonably incurred. If Mr Gluck initially planned to return to London on 14 May 2022, the fact that his evidence extended to 13 May 2022 does not on its face necessitate changing the date of travel. Mr Gluck was released as a witness at around 12 noon on 13 May 2022. The first defendant does not suggest, let alone produce any evidence, that Mr Gluck did not have sufficient time after he was released as a witness to catch his originally scheduled flight on 14 May 2022. Further, the first defendant offers no explanation as to how upgrading his class of travel was reasonably necessary for him to give evidence at the trial of this action. I am therefore not satisfied that this fee of $7,229 was reasonably incurred. This fee is irrecoverable as between party and party.

  84. The second defendant

  85. The second defendant is entitled to costs

  86. [124] It is true that the second defendant took little active part in this action both before and after December 2020, leaving it to the first defendant to take the lead. It is also true that the second defendant did not give any discovery or file any affidavits of evidence in chief for the trial of this action. But I do not accept that she was a “nominal” party to this action, either when the plaintiff commenced this action or after I struck out the plaintiff’s unsustainable claims.

  87. [126] It is true, however, that in no iteration of the plaintiff’s statement of claim ever sought any relief related to the breach of trust alleged against the second defendant. Further, the plaintiff indicated at an early stage that he would not seek a finding that the second defendant was in fact in breach of trust. But that does not alter my analysis for three reasons. First, the plaintiff’s approach meant that an allegation that the second defendant had acted in breach of trust remained on the record in the pleadings throughout this action. Second, the second defendant is a professional trustee, against whom this is an especially serious allegation even if it does not or cannot lead to a finding that she acted in breach of trust. Finally, it was open to the plaintiff at any time to withdraw his indication and to invite me to make a finding against the second defendant that she had acted in breach of trust as pleaded. I therefore do not consider it correct to say that the second defendant was a purely nominal party to this action, either when the plaintiff commenced this action or after December 2020.

  88. The award of costs

  89. Standard basis or indemnity basis

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