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Grounds publishedDecided 16 Sep 2024

General Division of the High Court

3D Infosystems Pte Ltd (formerly known as 3D Networks Singapore Pte Ltd) v Voon South Shiong and another

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[2024] SGHC 237Case no. Suit No 744 of 2018 (Assessment of Damages No 1 of 2023)

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] 3D Infosystems Pte Ltd (“the plaintiff”) is a Singapore-incorporated company that is engaged in the supply, installation and implementation of information technology systems. Mr Voon South Shiong (“the first defendant”) was an employee of the plaintiff and last held the positions of Country Manager, Singapore and Head of Global Accounts Management before he left the plaintiff on 15 April 2018. Sunway Digital Pte Ltd (“the second defendant”) is a company incorporated in Singapore in January 2018 and is involved in the provision of digital transformation systems.

  3. [3] My detailed findings in relation to liability are set out in the Liability Judgment and are summarised at [197] therein. The facts of the case and dramatis personae are also comprehensively canvassed in the Liability Judgment. I adopt the definitions previously set out in the Liability Judgment, unless otherwise stated.

  4. [4] This judgment assesses the extent of damages to be paid by the first and second defendants to the plaintiff.

  5. Agreed Head of Claims

  6. [5] In the course of the assessment of damages, parties have come to an agreement in relation to a number of claims. The agreed heads of claim are set out in the following table. Since parties have reached an agreement, I will not examine the agreed quantum of damages to be accorded to each of these claims.

  7. [6] However, parties were not able to come to an agreement on the other claims, some of which involve large sums. These heads of claim shall be the focus of this judgment.

  8. Claim 1: Damages for Teambuilding Exercise

  9. [7] The first disputed head of claim relates to the damages to be paid by the first defendant for his breach of contract and Implied Duties, specifically, in relation to the misuse of the plaintiff’s employees for a “team-building exercise”. In the Liability Judgment, I found that the first defendant had misused the plaintiff’s employees from 29 June to 3 July 2015 to sell fruit juice and prepare marketing materials for Beesket Juice Bar (“Beesket”), under the guise of a team-building exercise (at [197(a)(vi)]). The first defendant was the sole director and shareholder of Juice Master Pte Ltd (“JMPL”), which engaged in the business of selling fruit juice through Beesket. I found this “team-building exercise” to be a farce concocted by the first defendant to divert the plaintiff’s employees to benefit his own business.

  10. [8] The plaintiff claims $38,212.59 under this head of claim, quantifying this sum by calculating the salary paid to the plaintiff’s employees for the amount of time spent on Beesket’s business during working hours. The plaintiff submits that this is a fair reflection of the plaintiff’s loss in having its employees appropriated for the first defendant’s own interests.

  11. [9] The first defendant’s position is that notional or no damages should be awarded for this head of claim. The first defendant takes issue with the manner of computation by the plaintiff, arguing that the plaintiff has not furnished any evidence that the plaintiff had indeed suffered a loss that can be quantified based on the hourly rate of the employees over the duration of the “team-building exercise”. The first defendant submits that the plaintiff’s manner of computation is premised on the value of the work done for Beesket, as opposed to loss suffered by the plaintiff, which this claim for a breach of contract should be based on.

  12. [10] The first defendant further points out that some of the employees were still able to achieve their performance targets in spite of the “team-building exercise”, and that the contributions of an employee cannot be derived or valued based on a pro-rated daily basis as an employee may work longer hours on other days to make up for any delayed work. The first defendant seeks to draw a distinction between employees subject to a corporate key performance indicator (“KPI”) and employees working on day-to-day tasks (ie, a server or store manager).

  13. [11] Lastly, the first defendant contends that there was some degree of team-building that took place in the exercise, as the employees from different business units had the opportunity to collaborate and work together in a task. I note that the first defendant does not challenge the quantification of the number of hours spent and the monthly salary of the employees involved.

  14. [12] In my judgment, the plaintiff’s claim of $38,212.59 is a reasonable sum to compensate for the loss suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the “team-building exercise”. I accept that the plaintiff’s proposed methodology provides a fair estimate of its loss, as the employees, being diverted to assist in Beesket’s business for that duration, were effectively absent from work. The salary paid by the plaintiff to its employees for the period of the “team-building exercise” would be a reasonable estimate of the loss of the employees’ services for that period of time.

  15. [13] While the first defendant’s argument that employees could still meet performance targets is attractive at first blush, the value of services under an employment contract can still be fairly estimated using the salary and working hours as a primary metric. In the present case, under the relevant contracts, the performance targets are tied directly to an employee’s bonus and not salary; an employee who makes zero sales in a month would still be entitled to his salary as long as the employee is present during working hours. Furthermore, even if a particular employee had still reached his performance goals in spite of his attendance of the “team-building exercise”, the employee could have brought in even more sales and revenue for the employer during that period of time.

  16. [14] The plaintiff’s proposed methodology is also consistent with s 28 of the Employment Act 1968 (2020 Rev Ed) (“EA”), which allows an employer to deduct an employee’s salary on account of the employee’s absence. Section 28(2) of the EA stipulates that the deduction:

  17. In other words, an employer is entitled to deduct up to the pro-rated sum of the employee’s salary for an employee’s period of absence. This manner of calculation is consistent with the plaintiff’s proposed methodology, which is similarly based on the diverted employee’s salary pro-rated to the number of days of absence.

  18. [15] Furthermore, a brief survey of the authorities fortifies my conclusion. In Miles v Wakefield Metropolitan District Council [1987] 1 AC 539, the House of Lords considered whether the defendant council should be allowed to deduct a pro-rated sum from the plaintiff’s salary for refusing to conduct weddings on Saturday, which was part of his duties. The plaintiff was supposed to work for three hours on Saturday, and 37 hours for the whole week. The defendant council withheld 3/37ths of his salary for that week, and the plaintiff sought to claim the withheld sum from the defendant council. The House of Lords found that the defendant council was entitled to withhold that sum.

  19. [16] The court reasoned that the defendant council lost the benefit of the plaintiff’s services during the period of time the plaintiff had shirked his duties. The court quantified the loss of the plaintiff’s services by taking reference to the salary payable for those days of service. Lord Templeman of White Lackington astutely observed (at 560), in the context of an industrial action, that:

  20. [17] Similarly, Lord Oliver of Aylmerton noted (at 568) that:

  21. [18] In Schonk Antonius Martinus Mattheus and another v Enholco Pte Ltd and another appeal [2016] 2 SLR 881 (“Schonk”), the Court of Appeal observed that an employer may be entitled to withhold payment of salary where there is a total failure of consideration (Schonk at [12]). The Court of Appeal considered that this total failure of consideration may manifest if the employee does nothing during at least a part of this period of his employment (Schonk at [12]).

  22. [19] Thus, I am satisfied that the plaintiff’s proposed methodology in calculating the pro-rated salary of the employees involved for that period of time is a reasonable quantification of the value of the plaintiff’s loss of its employees’ services as a result of the “team-building exercise”. Accordingly, I find the first defendant to be liable to the plaintiff for $38,212.59 under this head of claim.

  23. Claim 2: Account of profits for the first defendant’s disclosure of business plans

  24. [20] The second disputed head of claim concerns the first defendant’s disclosure of confidential information in providing business plans to the second defendant. In the Liability Judgment, I found that the first defendant was liable in breach of confidence for preparing and communicating business plans for the setting up of the second defendant (at [197(c)]). The first defendant was also found liable for breach of contract and his Implied Duties in relation to this disclosure (at [197(a)(i)]). Further, I found that the plaintiff was entitled to elect for an account of profits in relation to the breach of confidence in the preparation of business plans for the second defendant (at [201]). The plaintiff has chosen to do so for this head of claim.

  25. [21] The main issue with this head of claim is how to quantify the profit to be disgorged from the first defendant, given that the sums paid by the second defendant to the first defendant were by way of consultancy fees through JMPL, with no indication as to how much was paid for the first defendant’s breaches of duty and how much was paid for the first defendant’s legitimate work. The plaintiff quantifies its claim for an account of profits in reliance of the formula of A – B = C.

  26. (a) Component A: This represents the first defendant’s total monthly compensation, commission and consultancy fees received from the second defendant through JMPL from May 2018 to March 2021. The plaintiff quantifies this component to be $933,300.

  27. (b) Component B: This represents the total value of the first defendant’s legitimate services provided to the second defendant from May 2018 to March 2021. The plaintiff quantifies this component to be $407,464.

  28. (c) Component C: This represents the remuneration that can be attributed to the first defendant’s breach of duty and can be the subject of an account of profits. The plaintiff quantifies this component to be $525,836.

  29. [22] The first defendant argues that no portion of his income should be attributed to his breaches of confidence, and he was remunerated by the second defendant solely for his legitimate work for the second defendant. In the alternative, the first defendant submits that the plaintiff has understated his seniority and experience level in pegging his remuneration, and that his work experience specific to the IT industry should be acknowledged and given due recognition. The first defendant’s case is that drawing upon objective salary indicators available from the public domain, the second defendant has not overpaid the first defendant, and even on the lowest end of the salary scales, there would only be a notional overpayment of $1,040.

  30. [23] As a preliminary note, I accept that the plaintiff’s proposed formula is workable. In a claim for an account of profits, the profits sought to be disgorged must be caused by the breach of duty (UVJ and others v UVH and others and another appeal [2020] 2 SLR 336 at [98]). Thus, the profit, if any, attributable to a breach of duty must be identified, isolated and quantified. I am satisfied that the plaintiff’s proposed formula sufficiently addresses this requirement of a causal link; under the formula, the component of the first defendant’s remuneration attributable to the breach of duty is to be isolated and claimed, while the component attributable to legitimate work done for the second defendant ought to be left untouched.

  31. [24] I acknowledge that assumptions would have to be made and relied upon in this method of quantification. After all, there was no discussion whatsoever between the first and the second defendant as to how much remuneration could be properly attributed to the confidential information that the first defendant brought over to the second defendant. Nonetheless, as the Court of Appeal in MFM Restaurants Pte Ltd and another v Fish & Co Restaurants Pte Ltd and another appeal [2011] 1 SLR 150 (“MFM”) acknowledged, “some educated guesses have to be made – regardless of the precise methodology ultimately adopted by the court” (at [62]). In such circumstances, “the court will simply do the best that it can, having regard to all the circumstances before it” (MFM at [62]).

  32. Component A: Total remuneration of first defendant

  33. [25] The first issue relates to the quantification of the total remuneration paid to the first defendant. The second defendant, from the period of May 2018 to March 2021, paid monthly consultancy fees to the first defendant’s company, JMPL, which was wholly owned by the first defendant. The first defendant does not dispute that these monthly consultancy fees were ultimately for his benefit as remuneration for his full-time services to the second defendant.

  34. [26] The first defendant quantifies his remuneration for the entire period of his services with the second defendant to be $898,300. This is computed with reference to the first defendant’s remuneration of $26,000 per month from May 2018 to June 2020 (amounting to a subtotal of $676,000) and $24,700 per month from July 2020 to March 2021 (amounting to a subtotal of $222,300).

  35. [27] However, the invoices from November 2019 to May 2020 (a total of seven months) indicated that $31,000 was paid per month by the second defendant to the first defendant for consultancy services. It is the plaintiff’s case that these monthly payments of $31,000 reflected an increase in remuneration paid to the first defendant for the associated months. Accordingly, the monthly uplift of $5,000 for a total uplift of $35,000 during that period should be accounted for in the first defendant’s total remuneration, which would give a total of $933,300. The first defendant’s position is that these increased payments were attributable to lump sum reimbursements for expenses incurred in those seven months, and that his remuneration for those months remained at $26,000.

  36. [28] In my judgment, the plaintiff has not sufficiently proven, on a balance of probabilities, that the monthly uplift of $5,000 for the first defendant’s consultancy services can be properly attributed to the first defendant’s remuneration as opposed to reimbursement for his expenses.

  37. [29] The plaintiff drew my attention to two invoices – dated April 2019 and May 2019 – which had particularised and displayed the general expenses claims ($635.35 and $742.66 respectively) as a separate line item on the invoice. The plaintiff argues that these two invoices establish that the second defendant could and would particularise any claims for expenses as a separate line item. Hence, the second defendant, as inferred from prior practice, would have particularised the claim for expenses as a separate line item on the invoice if the uplift had indeed been meant as a reimbursement. The plaintiff further points out that the first defendant has not furnished any evidence to show his expenses for business development.

  38. [30] However, in my judgment, the first defendant has adequately explained the uplift for those few months. The first defendant’s position is that the monthly uplifts were meant to serve as lump sum reimbursements for previous unclaimed general expenses, while the previous invoices were particularised through receipts to reimburse for one-off expenses. I find this explanation to be persuasive. It seems inherently unlikely to me that the first defendant’s remuneration would remain steady at $26,000 from May 2018 to October 2019, increase by $5,000 or 19% to $31,000 from November 2019 to May 2020, before dropping back down to $26,000 in June 2020 and falling even further to $24,700 in July 2020 during the COVID-19 crisis. Such a large fluctuation, in the form of a drastic increase in remuneration for seven months followed by two consecutive monthly drops, does not make much sense. In my opinion, the invoice for June 2020 is indicative that the first defendant’s remuneration was still pegged at $26,000 for that period.

  39. [31] Furthermore, I find the first defendant’s testimony to be credible. The first defendant expressed in cross-examination that Mr Eric Sng (“Mr Sng”), the second defendant’s director who was called as the second defendant’s witness, could testify and corroborate his account. Even though the plaintiff did not pursue this line of inquiry with Mr Sng in cross-examination, this indicated that the first defendant was confident that his account would be corroborated by Mr Sng.

  40. [32] Thus, I find the total amount of remuneration properly attributed to the first defendant for his work for the second defendant to be $898,300. I am not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the uplift of $35,000 over the seven months period can be properly attributed to the first defendant’s remuneration, as opposed to reimbursement for his expenses.

  41. Component B: Value of the first defendant’s legitimate services

  42. [33] The second issue relates to the value of the first defendant’s legitimate services for the second defendant. The plaintiff quantifies this value to be $407,464.00. The plaintiff derives this amount from the median monthly salary of $13,500 associated with the role of a Business Development Manager in the Information & Communications sector, as obtained from the Ministry of Manpower’s official website, multiplied by the number of months the first defendant worked in the second defendant (35 months), and subsequently adjusted to take into account wage growth.

  43. [34] In contrast, the first defendant relies on the 2024 Technology Salaries Guide in Singapore, compiled by Morgan McKinley (the “Morgan McKinley salary guide”), as a benchmark. The first defendant pegs his salary to be based on either consulting with 15 years and above experience, which yields an annual salary range of $350,000 to $550,000, or direct sales with 15 years and above experience, which yields an annual salary range of $350,000 to $450,000. Relying on the average salary of $450,000, the first defendant argues that there is no basis to infer that the second defendant had paid him any amount for the breaches of duty. Even if the lower end of the scale ($350,000) were adopted instead, the first defendant would only be liable for a notional sum of $1,040.00. In my opinion, the Morgan McKinley salary guide, which measures specifically the salaries of the technology sector, provides a better indicator than the Ministry of Manpower’s statistics, which reflects the salaries associated with the more general Information & Communications sector.

  44. [35] In my judgment, neither the plaintiff nor the first defendant’s proposed methods of calculation provide the best way to quantify the value of the first defendant’s legitimate services. During cross-examination, the first defendant broke down his job scope into three major components and assigned a weightage to each component of work – 50% for Solution & Technology Strategy Development, 30% for Regional Strategic Partnership Development, and 20% for Pricing Strategy/Analyst. I find this breakdown to be useful in determining a value to be attributed to his services. Indeed, the plaintiff’s own case is that the first defendant has been involved in pricing strategy and decisions in his role with the second defendant. Pegging his salary solely to that of a Business Development Manager may not be sufficiently representative. In my opinion, two components – Solutions & Technology Strategy Development and Regional Strategic Partnership Development – can in turn be seen to represent different facets of the plaintiff’s work in business development.

  45. [36] At the hearing, the plaintiff submitted a table of calculations, premised on the first defendant’s job scope and salary indicators extracted from Morgan McKinley, even though the plaintiff ultimately did not rely on these calculations in its submissions. The plaintiff further pro-rated the respective salary indicators according to the first defendant’s breakdown of his job scope. The table of calculations is reproduced below.

  46. -

  47. [37] In my opinion, an appropriate benchmark for the value of the first defendant’s services would be to take reference to the middle to highest tier of the table in relation to Solutions & Technology Strategy Development and Strategic Partnership Development and the highest tier for Pricing Strategy and Analysis. When the first defendant was recruited to join the second defendant in 2018, he had over 16 years of experience in the industry. However, as acknowledged by the first defendant, the scope of his work in the plaintiff and in the second defendant was at least moderately different. In the plaintiff, the first defendant had oversight over the sales team and operational team. In the second defendant, the first defendant did not oversee the sales team and the operational team; instead, his role primarily related to giving advice on business development opportunities to further expand the company.

  48. [38] I find that this change in job scope justifies applying a discount to the first defendant’s work experience, with reference to the salary benchmarks referred to above. Nonetheless, I note that the first defendant’s experience in sales and operations would inform his business development advice and his work experience would be largely transferrable, especially since he was working in the same industry and would be broadly familiar with the industry players. Furthermore, his experience in sales and operations directly translates into experience in pricing strategy and analysis. Hence, I am satisfied that the middle-to-highest salary tier and the highest salary tier would be an appropriate benchmark for the first defendant’s business development services and his pricing strategy and analysis services respectively.

  49. [39] Therefore, I estimate the value of the first defendant’s services to be $150,000 per annum in relation to Solutions and Technology Strategy Development, $62,250 per annum in relation to Regional Strategic Partnership Development, and $32,000 per annum in relation to Pricing Strategy and Analysis, for a total of $244,250 per annum. The total value of the first defendant’s services for 35 months would work out to $712,395.83.

  50. Component C: Amount of profit to be accounted for

  51. [40] Deducting Component B from Component A, I find that the first defendant is liable to the plaintiff for a sum of $185,904.17. This represents the first defendant’s remuneration associated with his breach of confidence in the preparation of the second defendant’s business plans, to be disgorged in an account of profits.

  52. Claim 3: Damages for the solicitation of employees

  53. [41] The third disputed head of claim relates to the defendants’ solicitation of the plaintiff’s Former Employees and the damages to be paid thereof by the defendants. In the Liability Judgment, I found the first defendant to be liable for breach of contract and his Implied Duties for assisting in the second defendant’s solicitation of Ms Lerraine Chua and Ms Alicia Tan (at [197(a)(ii)]). I also found both defendants to be liable in unlawful means conspiracy for the plaintiff’s contractual breaches as well as lawful means conspiracy for the plaintiff’s contractual breaches and the solicitation of the Former Employees apart from Ms Chua and Ms Tan (at [197(f)]).

  54. [42] The plaintiff seeks a sum of $175,604.40 against the defendants jointly and severally. This sum is broken down into two components – (a) $97,283.40 to compensate for the plaintiff’s headhunter fees in replacing its employees Bryan Tay, Kurniawan Chandrajaya and Yeo Choon Seng; and (b) $78,321.00 to compensate for the plaintiff’s loss as a result of the solicitation of the Former Employees, quantified as three months’ profit in 2018 that the plaintiff had lost.

  55. [43] In addition, the plaintiff seeks a sum of $181,836.70 against the first defendant, premised on the first defendant’s purported consent to liability of $269,638.90 under this head of claim at the hearing. The sum of $269,638.90 is broken down into (a) S$156,443.40, being the plaintiff’s headhunter fees along with the additional salaries that the plaintiff had to pay for the some of the employees and (b) S$113,205.50, being the plaintiff’s loss of profit. The plaintiff derives the sum of $181,836.70 by taking the difference of $269,638.90 and 50% of the sum of $175,604.40 (ie, $269,638.90 – (0.5 x $175,604.40)). The plaintiff argues that the first defendant should be held to his consent.

  56. [45] I will first consider the issue of whether the first defendant had consented to the plaintiff’s quoted sum of $269,638.90, such that there is a settlement between the plaintiff and first defendant on this head of claim. The plaintiff cites two instances, during the course of the hearing, where the first defendant appeared to have given his consent.

  57. [46] The plaintiff points towards the consent furnished by counsel for the first defendant, Mr Hua, on behalf of the first defendant during the hearing on 8 March 2024. The plaintiff further argues that the first defendant had also personally consented to the sum during the hearing on 25 March 2024.

  58. [47] The relevant extracts of the transcripts are produced here for reference.

  59. [48] I find that at that particular point in the hearing, Mr Hua had expressed consent to the claim of $156,443.40 for the headhunter fees and the additional salaries that the plaintiff had to pay for the some of the employees. However, consent in relation to the loss of profit claim was only limited to a quantification of $113,205.50. The first defendant had not accepted the principle behind the loss of profit claim, arguing that there were other causative factors, and thus there was no consent to the loss of profit claim as a whole.

  60. [49] However, after some back and forth, Mr Hua expressed consent on behalf of the first defendant to the claim of $113,205.50.

  61. [50] During the hearing on 8 March 2024, after the abovementioned series of exchanges and further discussions as to the workability of different judgment sums in relation to the first and second defendants with joint and several liability, I summarised the discussion as such:

  62. [51] Counsel for the first defendant, Mr Hua did not object to my characterisation of the positions taken by the first defendant. Indeed, Mr Hua noted that he “[did not] like to play dice”.

  63. [52] Subsequently, during the plaintiff’s cross-examination of the first defendant on 25 March 2024, counsel for the plaintiff took the opportunity to confirm with the first defendant on his consent to the various agreed heads of claim. Counsel for the plaintiff questioned the first defendant specifically as to whether he agreed to be liable for $269,638.90 under this head of claim.

  64. [53] The transcript is clear. I find that the first defendant did consent to the sum of $269,638.90 for this head of claim.

  65. [54] The first defendant’s position is that it had unequivocally withdrawn any such prior consent in the course of the first defendant’s cross-examination by the plaintiff. The first defendant points towards the following exchange on 1 April 2024 between him and the counsel for the plaintiff, Ms Toh, as proof that he had withdrawn his consent.

  66. [56] As such, this exchange does not reflect withdrawal of consent. The plaintiff did not double claim for headhunter fees, and this was promptly clarified by Ms Toh and myself immediately after the exchange.

  67. [57] Therefore, I find that the first defendant did not withdraw his consent during cross-examination. The first defendant was confused and thought that there was an overlap in claims. However, this confusion was subsequently dispelled, and neither the first defendant nor his counsel sought to clarify his position or withdraw his consent during the oral hearings subsequent to this exchange. Hence, I find that the first defendant’s consent to the liability of $269,638.90 was still standing at the conclusion of the oral hearings.

  68. Should the first defendant be permitted to withdraw consent in closing or reply submissions?

  69. [58] Next, I consider the issue of whether the first defendant should be allowed to withdraw his consent in his closing and reply submissions.

  70. [59] I pause to observe that the plaintiff’s and first defendant’s positions on this issue have not been entirely consistent and there appears to be some degree of confusion. The plaintiff, in its closing submissions, only argued that the first defendant consented to $113,205.50 for loss in profit, and did not assert that the first defendant consented in relation to $156,443.40 for the headhunter fees and the additional salaries that the plaintiff had to pay for the some of the employees. The first defendant did not even address this issue of consent in its closing submissions by seeking permission to withdraw his consent, and continued instead its argument against the plaintiff’s claim on principle and quantification. As a result, I convened a clarificatory hearing on 19 June 2024 and directed parties to address me on this issue.

  71. [60] The plaintiff, in its reply submissions, subsequently revised its position in relation to the consent sum, and argued for the sum of $269,638.90. The first defendant, in its reply submissions, only addressed the plaintiff’s contention for $113,205.50 in the plaintiff’s closing submissions. However, the first defendant’s arguments were equally applicable to the sum of $269,638.90 as it went to the issue of consent for both sums.

  72. [61] The plaintiff argues that it would be prejudiced by the first defendant’s withdrawal of consent at the closing submissions stage. The plaintiff’s position is that counsel for the plaintiff, in reliance on the first defendant’s agreement, did not further cross-examine the first defendant in relation to this head of claim.

  73. [63] Second, permitting the withdrawal of consent would prejudice the plaintiff. As rightly pointed out by the plaintiff, the first defendant was not cross-examined on this particular issue. The first defendant’s evidence and position on this issue could not be tested in reliance on this agreement. The first defendant could have raised this issue and sought permission to withdraw its consent at any time during the hearing, when cross-examination of the first defendant on this issue would still have been possible upon permission being granted. The first defendant’s withdrawal of consent only in its closing and reply submissions is much too belated.

  74. [64] While I acknowledge that this case, with its numerous heads of claim, may lead to some degree of confusion, it is incumbent on counsel to adroitly navigate the complexities of the case and meticulously keep track of the status of each head of claim. When counsel may be uncertain as to the status of a claim, counsel should surface these concerns and seek clarification as soon as possible, such that prejudice may be avoided or at the very least, minimised. There were two more days of hearing after the first defendant had purportedly and impliedly withdrawn his consent on 1 April 2024. The first defendant had ample opportunity to expressly raise its concerns in relation to the agreed sum during the hearing and seek the necessary clarification.

  75. Liability of the second defendant

  76. [66] To recap, the plaintiff seeks a sum of $175,604.40 against the second defendant jointly with the first defendant after some adjustments were made to the quantum of the claim in the plaintiff’s closing submissions. This sum is broken down into two components – (a) $97,283.40 for the plaintiff’s headhunter fees in replacing its employees; and (b) $78,321.00 for the plaintiff’s loss as a result of the solicitation of the employees, quantified at three months’ profit in 2018 that the plaintiff had lost.

  77. Plaintiff’s headhunter fees

  78. [67] The plaintiff claims $97,283.40 in headhunter fees expended to recruit replacements for three of the solution consultants – Bryan Tay, Kurniawan Chandrajaya and Yeo Choon Seng. The plaintiff has chosen not to pursue its claim for the increase in salary of the replacements as compared to the Former Employees, as it had previously sought to do earlier in the proceedings. The second defendant does not dispute the quantification of the headhunter fees, but argues that there were salary savings and a reduced payroll as a result of lower salaries paid to some of the other newly recruited employees, amounting to $141,438.60 over a 12-month period, which should be used to offset the headhunter fees.

  79. [71] Second, I find that it is improbable that the services of the former employee and new employee can be directly comparable to the degree that the salary difference can be relied upon as a benefit. After all, a new employee may be performing at a lower capacity than a former experienced employee.

  80. Plaintiff’s loss in profits

  81. [73] The plaintiff’s position is that it required time to replace the Former Employees as well as to acclimatise the replacement employees before the replacement employees could work at full capacity. The plaintiff argues that the average time taken to replace the Former Employees was about two months, and the employees would require about one month to be familiar with and attain the level of productivity of the Former Employees. As such, the plaintiff’s claim for damages in terms of loss of profit is quantified to be the profit that the plaintiff would have earned over three months in 2018 had the Former Employees not been solicited.

  82. [76] I find that the plaintiff’s proposed calculation table does not support its case at all. In fact, it undermines the plaintiff’s case as it shows that the plaintiff did not suffer a loss in profits. By the plaintiff’s own calculations, the second defendant had suffered a loss in FY2019 of $139,539. As a result, the hypothetical amalgamated company would make less money than the plaintiff had in FY2019 – the plaintiff made $452,822 in FY2019, as compared to $313,283 that the hypothetical amalgamated company would make in the same financial year. Construing the sum of $78,321, this sum represents the reduced profit of the hypothetical amalgamated company in three months. The calculations suggest that the plaintiff may actually be better off without the Former Employees.

  83. [77] Hence, I do not need to turn to the second defendant’s counterarguments in relation to the proper means of calculation. The plaintiff has failed to adduce sufficient proof to show that it suffered a loss in profits as a result of the solicitation of its Former Employees.

  84. [79] In my judgment, the plaintiff is entitled to a conventional award of $50,000. While the plaintiff may not have been able to prove a loss based on its financial year accounting, I am satisfied that the plaintiff had suffered a loss in capacity in the period of March to April 2018, when the Former Employees left the plaintiff to join the second defendant and when its replacement employees would have needed some time to get up to speed. This would likely have resulted in some difficulty in procuring customers for that period of time. Even though the plaintiff managed to bounce back from the loss of its employees to make a profit in FY2019, the plaintiff had nonetheless suffered a loss of business capacity in in the period of transition, and this ought to be compensated for.

  85. Allocation of liability

  86. Claim 4: Damages for the disclosure of the plaintiff’s Internal Manuals

  87. [82] The fourth disputed head of claim concerns the first defendant’s disclosure of the plaintiff’s Guide to Business Conduct and Ethics, Employee Handbook and IT Service Management Services Manual (“ITSMS Manual”) (collectively, the “Internal Manuals”) to the second defendant.

  88. [83] In the Liability Judgment, I found the first defendant liable for breach of contract and Implied Duties, as well as breach of confidence, for disclosing the plaintiff’s Internal Manuals to the second defendant (at [197(a)(i)] and [197(c)]). Further, I found the first and second defendants jointly liable in lawful and unlawful means conspiracy for the first defendant’s breach of contract (at [197(e)–[197(f)]). I note that I did not find the second defendant liable for breach of confidence as it was not sufficiently articulated in the pleadings (at [155]–[156]).

  89. [84] For this head of claim, the plaintiff claims $25,612.06 in damages against the defendants jointly and severally. This is broken down into $224.78 for the Guide to Business Conduct and Ethics, $16,988.89 for the Employee Handbook (excluding Appendix 5), $2,331.72 for Appendix 5 of the Employee Handbook and $6,066.67 for the ITSMS Manual.

  90. Applicability of equitable damages

  91. [88] I pause to observe that while it is established that the Singapore courts have the jurisdiction to award equitable damages (I-Admin at [77]), the courts must still consider if equitable damages are an appropriate remedy for a particular cause of action. In Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd and others v Yeo Boong Hua and others and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 655 (“Turf Club Auto”), the Court of Appeal observed that for a conspiracy to injure premised on breaches of contract, the plaintiff’ remedial position for the tortious claim would be identical as the remedial position for the underlying claim for a breach of contract, as the tort was to thwart the proper performance of the contract (at [387]).

  92. Internal Manuals

  93. [90] Next, I turn to quantify the first defendant’s liability in equitable damages for the disclosure of the Internal Manuals. The plaintiff has relied on I-Admin for the proposition that it does not have to prove use of the Internal Manuals to establish damages in a breach of confidence claim. The plaintiff cites I-Admin at [66]:

  94. [92] In response, the second defendant argues that in I-Admin, the respondents had used the confidential information. In contrast, in the present case, there was no such finding of fact, and no evidence has been tendered by the plaintiff to show that the second defendant had used the plaintiff’s confidential information. In the Liability Judgment, there was only a finding of transmission of the Internal Manuals from the first defendant to the second defendant. Hence, the second defendant’s position is that there would be no basis for an award of damages beyond a notional amount. The first defendant aligns himself with the second defendant’s position.

  95. [93] In my judgment, I-Admin can be distinguished on the facts from the present case. In I-Admin, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the respondents had been “able to refer to and even extract content from the appellant’s confidential information” and had “used the appellant’s materials as a ‘springboard’ […] to create their own intellectual property” (at [78]). This was the basis of the Court of Appeal’s quantification methodology, as the respondents “were saved the additional expense of compiling this information themselves or having to employ additional members of the staff” (ibid). The Court of Appeal further directed that (at [79]):

  96. [99] The second defendant avers that it did not refer to the Internal Manuals in drafting its own materials. In relation to the Guide to Business Conduct and Ethics, the second defendant’s position is that its equivalent of the guide was a one-page document titled “Code of Conduct & Business Ethics Policy – Annual Staff Declaration Form”. In contrast, the plaintiff’s Guide to Business Conduct and Ethics was five pages long. In relation to the ITSMS Manual, the second defendant’s witness, Mr Sng, testified that the second defendant had engaged an external consultant to produce a document on IT security in accordance with ISO standards sometime after 2018, and no reference was made to the ITSMS Manual.

  97. [100] In relation to the Employee Handbook, Mr Sng further testified that the second defendant had originally published a ten-page version of the Sunway Employee Handbook on 5 January 2018, before the Sunway Employee Handbook was subsequently updated on 28 January 2019 and 1 November 2019. Since the Internals Manuals were transmitted only on 26 January 2018, the Employee Handbook could not have been used as reference in the drafting of the original Sunway Employee Handbook. Furthermore, the Sunway Employee Handbook was only updated on 28 January 2019, about a year after the transmission of the Internal Manuals.

  98. [102] However, I find that a conventional award of $1,000 against the first defendant would be appropriate, in so far as the plaintiff has managed to establish two instances where the second defendant had referred to the Employee Handbook. This conventional award acknowledges and affirms the plaintiff’s interest in protecting the confidentiality of its Internal Manuals. Furthermore, I bear in mind the general availability of comparable employee handbooks, guides to business ethics and IT service management manuals online. In my opinion, the Internal Manuals are not so exclusive as to justify a higher conventional award. I am satisfied that the award of $1,000 fairly reflects the value of the confidential information.

  99. Claim 5: Damages for inducing Ms Lee’s breach of contract

  100. [103] The fifth disputed head of claim relates to Carol Lee’s (“Ms Lee”) breach of contract in preparing and disclosing a confidential list of equipment and services provided by the plaintiff to Singapore Power (“SP”) as well as projects undertaken by the plaintiff for SP (“SP Inventory List”). In the Liability Judgment, I found the second defendant to be liable for inducing of Ms Lee’s breach of her contractual confidentiality obligation in her disclosure of the SP Inventory List (at [197(d)]). I further found both the first and second defendant to be liable in unlawful and lawful means conspiracy for the inducement of breaches of contract (at [197(e)–(f)]).

  101. Salary paid to Ms Lee

  102. [105] First, the plaintiff claims $8,370.00, being the salary paid by the plaintiff to Ms Lee for her last month of work in May 2018. The plaintiff points out that Ms Lee testified that her last day of work was supposed to be 28 April 2018, but she was asked to stay on for an additional month to end-May to compile the SP Inventory List. In the Liability Judgment, I found that Ms Lee had stayed on for that month at the request of the second defendant and compiled the list for the second defendant’s use. The plaintiff notes that according to Ms Lee’s testimony, she was ready to hand over all her work relating to the plaintiff by the end of April. The plaintiff thus argues that Ms Lee’s salary for that month should be claimable as compensation for the plaintiff’s loss, given that the plaintiff did not receive the benefit of her services.

  103. [106] The defendants argue that the SP Inventory List was circulating as early as 10 May 2018 within the second defendant. Ms Esther Foo (“Ms Foo”), an employee of the second defendant, had circulated the list to various other employees by email. The defendants further submit that since the SP Inventory List was completed by 10 May 2018, there was no proof that Ms Lee was working exclusively for the second defendant after the completion of the list. Thus, the defendants’ case is that the claimable salary should only be for the period up to 10 May 2018.

  104. [108] In my judgment, the plaintiff is entitled to claim for Ms Lee’s salary for the full period of May 2018. Even though the evidence shows that the list had been circulated on 10 May 2018, I find that Ms Lee would have had to follow-up and address several queries that had been directed to her as indicated in the SP Inventory List attached to the 10 May 2018 email. This is supported by evidence which shows multiple logins by Ms Lee from 1 May 2018 to 22 May 2018. Regardless, it would appear to me that the direct cause of Ms Lee staying for this additional one month is the second defendant’s request for her to obtain the information for the second defendant’s benefit, since by her own testimony, she was ready to hand over all her work by the end of April 2018. There was also no evidence that Ms Lee had done any other substantial work for the plaintiff. Thus, I am satisfied that the first and second defendant should be liable to compensate for the plaintiff’s loss in paying for Ms Lee’s salary for the month of May 2018, quantified at $8,370.00.

  105. Value of the SP Inventory List

  106. [113] However, I find that the plaintiff’s suggestions lack any hard evidence and are merely conjectures, and no other concrete instances of use could be identified. The plaintiff is essentially speculating without proof that the SP Inventory List had in fact been used and does not furnish any basis to support its estimate of the second defendant’s time savings. Therefore, even if I had found equitable damages to be applicable in this cause of action, I would have declined to award the sum of $49,140.00 and instead accorded a conventional award to the plaintiff in recognition of the two identified instances of use.

  107. [114] Accordingly, I find the first and second defendant jointly and severally liable for $8,370 in relation to the inducement of Ms Lee’s breach of her contractual confidentiality obligation.

  108. Claim 6: Damages in relation to the SCADA 227 Project

  109. [115] The sixth disputed head of claim concerns the SCADA 227 Project, for which the plaintiff’s tender bid was rejected in favour of the second defendant’s bid. Notably, the plaintiff’s bid ranked second to the second defendant’s winning bid.

  110. [116] In the Liability Judgment, I found the first defendant to be liable for breach of contract and his implied duty of good faith and fidelity for disclosing the plaintiff’s pricing strategy in relation to the SCADA 227 Project (at [197(a)(iii)]). The first defendant is also liable in breach of confidence for the disclosure (at [197(c)]). Both defendants are liable in lawful and unlawful means conspiracy for the first defendant’s contractual breaches, and lawful means conspiracy for the solicitation of the Former Employees (at [197(e)–(f)]). Pursuant to these breaches, the plaintiff has elected to claim for a loss in profit in relation to the SCADA 227 Project against the defendants jointly and severally.

  111. Causation

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