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Grounds publishedDecided 12 Mar 2024
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General Division of the High Court

DNG FZE v Pay Pal Pte Ltd

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[2024] SGHC 65Case no. Suit No 758 of 2021 (Registrar’s Appeal No 24 of 2024 and Summons No 326 of 2024)

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Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. [2] I heard the parties in relation to RA 24 on 13 February 2024, being the first day of the scheduled trial. After hearing the parties, I allowed SUM 326 but reserved my decision for RA 24. One day later, on 14 February 2024, I dismissed RA 24 and provided brief reasons for my decision. In short, the resolution of RA 24 came down to a few points:

  2. [3] I now provide the full reasons for my decision, which are in any event elaborations of the brief reasons I have already given to the parties, before the expiry of the time period for the plaintiff to appeal.

  3. Background facts

  4. The parties and their dispute

  5. [4] I begin with the background facts. The plaintiff, DNG FZE, is a company incorporated in the United Arab Emirates. It sells various products (the “Products”) through its websites “www.techxdeal.com” and “www.hyperstech.com” (collectively, the “Stores”). Mr Karim Mohamed Astoul (“Mr Karim”) is the plaintiff’s Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”).

  6. [5] In turn, the defendant, PayPal Pte Ltd, is a company incorporated in Singapore. It provides payment services for individuals and businesses in over 200 markets.

  7. [6] The parties’ dispute can be traced back to the plaintiff’s setting up of a PayPal business account (the “Account”) with the defendant on 15 June 2020. The Account was linked to the Stores. This means that buyers who purchased the Products from the Stores could choose whether to make payment by the defendant’s payment platform. If so, such payment transactions would be reflected in the Account.

  8. The relevant clauses in the User Agreement and the AUP

  9. [8] First, the clause titled “Restricted Activities” in the User Agreement provides as follows:

  10. [9] In a related vein, the AUP states as follows:

  11. [10] Next, the clause titled “Actions We May Take if You Engage in Any Restricted Activities” in the User Agreement provides as follows:

  12. [11] Finally, the “Account Limitations” clause in the User Agreement provides as follows:

  13. The defendant’s account review and consequential actions

  14. [12] The defendant reviewed the Account on 4 August 2020. According to the defendant, it found that the plaintiff’s customers had filed at least 400 complaints and/or payment invalidation requests against the plaintiff. These buyer complaints and/or payment invalidation requests mainly concerned transactions that had occurred in June and July 2020. The defendant said that it had received at least 500 more such buyer complaints and/or payment invalidation requests from the plaintiff’s customers between 5 August 2020 and 31 December 2020.

  15. [13] Further, the defendant found that the Account was linked to at least seven other PayPal accounts that had engaged in one or more of the restricted activities that are listed in the “Restricted Activities” clause in the User Agreement. These restricted activities included conducting their businesses in a manner that led to a significant number of buyer complaints and/or payment invalidation requests being filed.

  16. [14] As a result of its review, the defendant placed a permanent limitation on the Account on 4 August 2020 (the “Permanent Limitation”). This was done pursuant to the clauses titled “Actions We May Take if You Engage in Any Restricted Activities” and “Account Limitations” in the User Agreement. The defendant notified the plaintiff of the Permanent Limitation on the same day. This prevented the plaintiff from, among other things, withdrawing, sending, and/or receiving payments through the Account.

  17. [15] Further to its review on 4 August 2020, the defendant conducted further investigations into the Account. According to the defendant, these further investigations revealed other restricted activities by the plaintiff. For example, the defendant found that the plaintiff had allegedly sold two categories of products, in transactions processed through the Account, that infringed or violated third parties’ copyright, trade mark, and/or proprietary rights. The defendant also found that the plaintiff had allegedly provided false, inaccurate, or misleading information in its advertisements. Finally, the defendant found that the plaintiff had allegedly not been in control or possession of the Products before putting them up for sale. The defendant alleged that, as a result of the plaintiff’s failure to ensure that it retained control or possession over the Products, about 50% of the buyer complaints and/or payment invalidation requests filed against the plaintiff as of 4 August 2020 stated that the buyers never received their purchased products.

  18. [16] Consequent to these findings, the defendant deducted liquidated damages of €441,843.56 and US$919,061.50 from the Account (the “LD Deduction”). This was done pursuant to the Liquidated Damages Clause, which is part of the clause titled “Actions We May Take if You Engage in Any Restricted Activities” in the User Agreement. The LD Deduction formed the nub of the parties’ dispute in the Suit.

  19. The parties’ cases for the Suit

  20. The plaintiff’s case

  21. [17] The plaintiff claimed in the Suit for a return of the LD Deduction, as well as a declaration that the Liquidated Damages Clause is void and unenforceable.

  22. [18] The plaintiff’s pleaded case in its Statement of Claim (Amendment No 1) dated 13 December 2022 was that the defendant had breached the User Agreement by making the LD Deduction. In this regard, the plaintiff pleaded that it had not been given details as to how it had violated the AUP in a manner entitling the defendant to make the LD Deduction, pursuant to the Liquidated Damages Clause. In addition, the plaintiff pleaded that the defendant was not entitled to make the LD Deduction because the plaintiff had not breached the AUP. In the alternative, the plaintiff pleaded that the Liquidated Damages Clause is void and unenforceable as it is a penalty clause.

  23. The defendant’s case

  24. [19] The defendant’s defence consisted of three main planks. First, the defendant had been contractually entitled to place the Permanent Limitation and make the LD Deduction, in accordance with the various clauses in the User Agreement, and because the plaintiff had breached the AUP. Second, the Liquidated Damages Clause is enforceable since the quantum of the liquidated damages provided is a genuine pre-estimate of the defendant’s conceivable loss as a result of an AUP violation. Third, it would be contrary to public policy if the plaintiff could recover the LD Deduction as this sum represented the proceeds from its own crime.

  25. [20] The defendant also counterclaimed for damages against the plaintiff for breaching the AUP and the User Agreement by, among other things, engaging in the restricted activities. The defendant then advanced a defence of set-off against the plaintiff’s claims on the assumption that its counterclaim would be successful.

  26. The AR’s decision to strike out the plaintiff’s case

  27. Events leading to the AR’s decision

  28. [21] Against the background facts and the parties’ cases, I come to the events that led to AR Koonar’s decision below to strike out the plaintiff’s case.

  29. HC/SUM 1966/2022

  30. (a) all email notifications sent to the email address [email address redacted] in relation to each buyer dispute filed with the defendant against the plaintiff (“Category 1”);

  31. (b) all correspondence and written documents evidencing that the plaintiff had not falsely advertised and represented that its products had certain performance characteristics, accessories, qualities, uses, and/or benefits which they do not have and were of a particular standard and/or quality (“Category 2”); and

  32. (c) in respect of disputes raised by the plaintiff’s customers on the grounds that the items purchased were not received, all documents, including but not limited to certificate of posting, bill of lading, and/or shipping invoices, that show proof of delivery (“Category 5”).

  33. [24] On 8 November 2022, the plaintiff filed its Supplementary List of Documents (“PSLOD”) and Affidavit Verifying Plaintiff’s Supplementary List of Documents.

  34. [25] Subsequently, the defendant changed its solicitors on 13 June 2023. The defendant then amended and filed its Defence and Counterclaim (Amendment No 2) (“D&CC2”) on 21 August 2023. The parties were then directed on 22 August 2023 to file their respective Supplementary Lists of Documents (“SLODs”) and Affidavits Verifying Supplementary Lists of Documents (“AVSLODs”) (if any) by 8 September 2023. On 8 September 2023, the plaintiff informed the defendant shortly before the close of business hours that it required more time to file its SLOD. Following this, on 11 September 2023, the plaintiff made a belated request to the court for the deadline for filing its SLOD to be extended. The court rejected the request. Despite this, the plaintiff still failed to comply with its own proposed deadline to file its SLOD and AVSLOD by 13 September 2023.

  35. The First Unless Order and the First Striking Out Application

  36. [27] On 22 September 2023, the plaintiff filed a blank Plaintiff’s 2nd Supplementary List of Documents (“P2SLOD”). Further, in its Affidavit Verifying Plaintiff’s 2nd Supplementary List of Documents (“AVP2SLOD”), the plaintiff stated that “[n]either the Plaintiff nor its Solicitors nor any other person on their behalf, has now, or ever had, in their possession, custody or power any document of any description whatever relating to any matter in question in this action, other than the documents enumerated in Schedule 1 hereto”.

  37. [29] At a further PTC on 10 October 2023, AR Liew directed the plaintiff to produce the documents it had agreed to produce by 13 October 2023. The learned AR also directed the defendant to file its application for specific discovery, if any, by 16 October 2023. On 13 and 16 October 2023, Solitaire wrote to D&N to update D&N on the discovery process. In essence, Solitaire stated that it could not meet the court-imposed deadline of 13 October 2023. Then, on 18 October 2023, Solitaire wrote to D&N with a table listing the documents requested in the D&N 27 September Letter. However, on 30 October 2023, D&N wrote to Solitaire to state the defendant’s position, which was that the plaintiff still had not provided full discovery of the documents requested in the D&N 27 September Letter.

  38. The Second Unless Order and the Second Striking Out Application

  39. [32] AR Koonar therefore made, among others, orders that:

  40. (i) Category 1;

  41. (b) in addition to filing a SLOD and AVSLOD, the plaintiff was to file a further affidavit to explain the steps taken to obtain and provide discovery of the documents above; and

  42. (c) if the plaintiff failed to comply with the first and/or second orders above, the plaintiff’s case shall be struck out.

  43. The AR’s decision to strike out the plaintiff’s case

  44. [40] As such, AR Koonar decided that the plaintiff had “played a protracted game of cat and mouse with the Court and the Defendant during discovery” and that its conduct “is inexcusable and is a blatant abuse of process”. AR Koonar rejected the plaintiff’s argument that because the parties were on the doorstep of trial, the trial should proceed so that the Suit could be decided on its merits. He considered this argument to be unprincipled because discovery is intended to secure a fair trial, which the plaintiff’s non-compliance had jeopardised. Moreover, this argument, if accepted, would create a perverse incentive for parties to prolong their non-compliance with their discovery obligations to as close as the trial as possible, in the hope of escaping these obligations on the excuse that the trial should procced. Accordingly, AR Koonar decided that this was a “plain and obvious case for striking out under O 24 r 16 of the Rules of Court 2014” and accordingly struck out the plaintiff’s case.

  45. [41] With the above in mind, I turn now to SUM 326, which was the plaintiff’s application to admit new evidence in RA 24.

  46. SUM 326: application to admit new evidence

  47. The new evidence

  48. [46] I had difficulty understanding this sentence. After all, the joint update of 15 November 2022 was made by the plaintiff’s current solicitors and the defendant’s previous solicitors, Dentons, as the defendant had not yet changed its solicitors at that time. It was unclear to me how or why the plaintiff’s previous solicitors (Chevalier) would have become involved in this joint update to the court, ie, stating that it needed time to review its former client’s documents while maintaining that the disclosure of those documents fully complied with the plaintiff’s discovery obligations. In my view, the sentence I referred to would only make sense if it referred to the defendant’s previous solicitors, Dentons.

  49. [47] In any event, Mr Karim’s point was that both Solitaire, as well as Dentons, were mistaken that the plaintiff had disclosed only 9,350 emails when, in fact, Solitaire had sent over all 17,643 emails to Dentons on 10 November 2022 by way of a Google Drive link.

  50. [48] Mr Karim sought to demonstrate that the plaintiff’s solicitors had sent over all 17,643 emails by exhibiting various screenshots that, according to him, showed the process of clicking on the Google Drive link. The process was as follows. One, the first screenshot showed that the Google Drive folder “PSLOD Documents” included a zipped file containing documents responsive to Category 1:

  51. [49] Two, upon downloading and later unzipping the zipped file containing documents responsive to Category 1, it can be seen that there is a folder titled “Emails from PayPal”:

  52. [50] Three, upon opening the folder titled “Emails from PayPal”, it is revealed that there are 9,000 files in the folder. These 9,000 files comprise 8,999 emails and a zipped folder:

  53. [51] After that zipped folder is opened, it can be seen that there are 17,643 files, which Mr Karim claimed were email documents:

  54. [52] Drawing on the above, Mr Karim explained that these 17,643 emails included the same 8,999 email documents located in the folder “Emails from PayPal”, and also an additional 8,644 email documents. As such, when Solitaire sent to Dentons all documents relevant to Category 1 on 10 November 2022, Solitaire was mistaken that only 9,000 emails had been disclosed when in fact all 17,643 emails had already been sent over on 10 November 2022 via the Google Drive link. According to Mr Karim, this evidence therefore showed that the plaintiff never intended to play a “cat and mouse” game with its discovery obligations to suppress the Category 1 documents.

  55. The parties’ arguments

  56. [54] The plaintiff’s main argument in SUM 326 was that the requirements laid down in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 (“Ladd v Marshall”) should not be applied in an unattenuated manner here because RA 24 was clearly not an appeal from a trial. Further, Mr Oommen Mathew (“Mr Mathew”), who appeared as instructed counsel for the plaintiff, stressed that, regardless of whether the Ladd v Marshall requirements applied in the plaintiff’s favour, this court should exercise its discretion to admit the further evidence pursuant to the overarching considerations of proportionality and prejudice (see the High Court decision of SW Trustees Pte Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) and another v Teodros Ashenafi Tesemma and others (Teodros Ashenafi Tesemma, third party) [2023] SGHC 273 at [21]). This was because the plaintiff was putting forward credible evidence that set out the truth of what happened in relation to its discovery obligations for the Category 1 documents.

  57. My decision: SUM 326 was allowed

  58. [56] After considering the parties’ submissions, I allowed SUM 326 for the reasons below.

  59. The applicable law

  60. [57] To begin with, the applicable law was not in dispute. Under O 55D r 11(1) of the ROC 2014, it is provided that:

  61. [58] Although the term “special grounds” in O 55D r 11(1) of the ROC 2014 is not defined either in the ROC 2014 or the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed), the courts have consistently interpreted it to refer to the threefold requirements in the seminal English decision of Ladd v Marshall (see, for example, the Court of Appeal decisions of Toh Eng Lan v Foong Fook Yue and another appeal [1998] 3 SLR(R) 833 (at [34]), ARW v Comptroller of Income Tax and another and another appeal [2019] 1 SLR 499 (at [99]), and AnAn Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Co) [2019] 2 SLR 341 (“AnAn Group”) (at [21])). In this regard, the three requirements in Ladd v Marshall are (at 1491):

  62. These three requirements have often been referred to, respectively, as the criteria of non-availability, relevance, and credibility.

  63. [59] Furthermore, following the Court of Appeal’s comments in AnAn Group (at [35]), the cases applying the Ladd v Marshall requirements should be analysed as lying on a spectrum. On one end of the spectrum are appeals against trials or hearings having the full characteristics of a trial, where the requirements would apply with full rigour. On the other end are appeals against decisions not touching upon the merits at all, such as interlocutory applications, where the requirements would serve as guidelines that the court is entitled, but not obliged, to refer to in the exercise of its unfettered discretion.

  64. [60] In any event, the court should conduct a balancing exercise between the interests of finality and the right of an applicant to put forth relevant and credible evidence, having regard to the considerations of proportionality and prejudice (see AnAn Group at [59]).

  65. The first Ladd v Marshall requirement applied more strictly

  66. [62] Applying these factors, I found that the Ladd v Marshall requirement of non-availability should be applied more strictly in this case for the following reasons. First, while the Second Striking Out Application was interlocutory in nature, there was a significant extent of fact-finding based on the documentary evidence adduced for the purposes of the hearing. Second, there was no indication that the parties lacked ample opportunity to refine and revisit their cases before the hearing. Third, subject to any appeal, the proceedings below disposed of the dispute between the parties (save for the counterclaim), albeit on a procedural as opposed to a substantive point. In these circumstances, especially given that the parties have had ample time to refine and revisit their cases, it would not be in the interests of finality and certainty for a party to be allowed to easily reopen his or her case by adducing new evidence.

  67. [63] I turn then to the application of the Ladd v Marshall requirements to the facts.

  68. The evidence could have been obtained with reasonable diligence

  69. [64] First, I found that the first Ladd v Marshall requirement applied against the plaintiff. Indeed, Mr Karim admitted as much in his 12th Affidavit − that the evidence could have been obtained earlier with reasonable diligence. One, Mr Karim said that it was only after AR Koonar’s decision to strike out that “the [p]lainiff’s solicitors and [him] have conducted further and thorough checks”. It was unclear why the plaintiff could not have done so before the Second Striking Out Application, especially when the plaintiff knew of the serious consequences it would face. Two, Mr Karim stated that he only realised on 31 January 2024 that the plaintiff had already provided full discovery of the Category 1 documents back in November 2022. In other words, he only realised this after the Second Striking Out Application. Yet, again, it was unclear why the plaintiff could not have come to this realisation earlier, especially when full discovery was allegedly provided in November 2022. Three, Mr Karim said that he instructed Solitaire to conduct “further checks” to verify that the Category 1 emails had been sent by Chevalier to Solitaire and confirmed that Chevalier had done so. But, again, it was unclear why the plaintiff could not have done so earlier.

  70. [65] In sum, it appeared that the plaintiff had to be woken into action by AR Koonar’s decision to strike out its case. It was only through those further checks that the plaintiff found out what it now stated to be the truth. This is the textbook definition of a party not having taken reasonable diligence. Indeed, there was nothing in Mr Karim’s latest affidavit to explain why the plaintiff could not have obtained the new evidence with reasonable diligence before the Second Striking Out Application. Further, it turned out that the plaintiff’s explanation of what actually happened was not so complicated. At its core, the plaintiff’s account was that it ought to have looked harder at the actual zipped file it sent over to Dentons. This did not take a forensic investigation of the files. The plaintiff had this information all along. This is yet again another textbook example of a party not having taken reasonable diligence.

  71. [66] For all these reasons, I found that the plaintiff could have obtained the evidence that it now seeks to admit with reasonable diligence.

  72. The evidence would not have an important influence on the outcome of RA 24

  73. [67] Second, I found that the second Ladd v Marshall requirement applied against the plaintiff. This is because even if I were to allow the evidence to be admitted, it would not have an important influence on the outcome of RA 24.

  74. [70] Accordingly, I found that the evidence, even if admitted, would not have an important influence on the outcome of RA 24.

  75. The evidence was, however, apparently credible

  76. [71] Third, and in contrast to the previous two requirements, I found that the third Ladd v Marshall requirement applied in favour of the plaintiff. While I had some concerns as to whether the downloaded zipped file was the actual file downloaded from the Google Drive link (as the screenshots do not show this), Ms Ong Siew Choo (“Ms Ong”) from Solitaire showed me that this was so by (a) downloading the actual file from the Google Drive link in court, and (b) unzipping it to show that its contents matched the relevant screenshot in Karim’s 12th Affidavit. Mr Benedict Teo (“Mr Teo”), who appeared on behalf of the defendant, did not object either to Ms Ong’s demonstration of the above in court, or to the apparent credibility of the evidence.

  77. [72] Accordingly, I found that the evidence was, on its face, apparently credible.

  78. It was ultimately proportionate to admit the further evidence

  79. [73] Ultimately, despite finding that two of the three Ladd v Marshall requirements applied against the plaintiff, I decided that it was proportionate to admit the further evidence. This was because the evidence had the effect of explaining if the plaintiff had discharged its discovery obligations in relation to Category 1. While the plaintiff’s inconsistent prior explanations could still lead to a finding that it was indolent and negligent with respect to its discovery obligations, it served the ends of practical justice for a party to be able to put forward an apparently credible account of what actually happened.

  80. [74] For this primary reason, and despite my concerns about the plaintiff’s lack of reasonable diligence in obtaining this evidence, and the materiality of the evidence in RA 24, I allowed SUM 326.

  81. RA 24: appeal against the AR’s decision to strike out the plaintiff’s case

  82. The parties’ arguments

  83. (a) It was not disputed that the plaintiff had provided discovery of the Category 1 documents. Further, the plaintiff had never suppressed the production of these documents because (i) the plaintiff had disclosed at least 9,000 emails in Category 1, (ii) the plaintiff had no reason to suppress the remaining emails because there was nothing to set the remaining emails apart from the 9,000 emails disclosed, and (iii) the plaintiff’s latest investigations showed that it had in fact provided disclosure of all the emails in November 2022.

  84. (b) In retrospect, the plaintiff’s inconsistent positions as regards the Category 1 documents occurred because it was genuinely overwhelmed by the numerous interlocutory applications which the defendant had taken out against it since changing solicitors in 2023. It was therefore understandable why the plaintiff and Solitaire would have made unintended errors in relation to the scope and fulfilment of its discovery obligations.

  85. (a) AR Koonar was wrong in finding that the plaintiff exercised a significant degree of control over the contents of its advertisements and had failed to exercise reasonable efforts to reach out to the freelance marketers.

  86. (b) Even if it were true that the plaintiff could exercise a significant degree of control over the contents of its advertisements and had not fulfilled its discovery obligations by failing to extract documents provided by the freelance marketers in their replies, the plaintiff’s extent of PCP merely stretched to the ambits of a “starter pack”, which was merely a “creative content pack”. Thus, the plaintiff had no authority and power to compel the freelance marketers to turn over advertisements that had been produced by them, much less the content they had produced, save for the materials provided in the starter pack.

  87. (c) In any event, the advertisements were not material to the defendant’s case. The presence of the advertisements did not support the defendant’s allegation that the plaintiff had violated the law, ordinances, and statutes of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany.

  88. (d) As for the directives, regulations, and standards, while “it cannot be disputed that the [p]laintiff had breached its discovery obligations, [the plaintiff] submit[s] that the directives, regulations or standards still fail to go toward the heart of the dispute”. To be fair to the plaintiff, Mr Mathew clarified that this sentence in the plaintiff’s submissions should be taken to mean that the plaintiff had taken all efforts to comply with its discovery obligations for this sub-category of documents.

  89. (a) AR Koonar was mistaken as to the nature of what he had termed as the “CRM Database”. This is, in fact, a consolidation of information obtained from the database of the plaintiff’s third-party customer relationship manager service provider. It is essentially a PDF file containing information. In this regard, the plaintiff had not been concealing the CRM Database; instead, there was simply no reason to disclose this summary of information at an earlier juncture given that the document is a consolidation of information in relation to transactions carried out by the plaintiff. This was thus not directly responsive to Category 5, which pertained to documents showing proof of delivery. Also, the CRM Database is not a crucial source of information since it concerned buyer complaints and/or payment invalidation requests, which do not go to the heart of the dispute in the Suit.

  90. My decision: RA 24 was dismissed

  91. [81] After considering the parties’ submissions, I dismissed RA 24 for the reasons below.

  92. The applicable law

  93. (1) Striking out for breach of an unless order

  94. The rationale for Browne-Wilkinson VC’s opinion can be seen from his explanation a few paragraphs prior (at 1202), where he said:

  95. (2) Striking out under O 24 r 16(1) of the Rules of Court 2014 for breach of discovery obligations

  96. [94] Andre Maniam JC (as he then was) in the High Court decision of Saxo Bank A/S v Innopac Holdings Ltd [2022] 3 SLR 964 summarised the applicable principles in relation to when a court is to strike out pleadings under O 24 r 16(1) in the face of a party’s non-compliance with its discovery obligations. The learned judge’s very helpful summary, which, in my respectful view, warrants setting out in full, is as follows (at [94]):

  97. (3) Two broad situations for striking out due to non-compliance with discovery obligations

  98. [102] Accordingly, I would suggest the following analytical framework for a court to decide whether a party’s breach of its discovery obligations should result in a striking out of its case:

  99. (i) If so, then move on to (b).

  100. (ii) If not, then consider the matter under O 24 r 16(1) of the ROC 2014 and the relevant principles, with an especial consideration of whether striking out the defaulting party’s pleadings is a proportionate response.

  101. (c) Third, if so, can the defaulting party show that its breach had not been intentional and contumelious?

  102. (i) If so, then consider the matter with an especial consideration of whether striking out the defaulting party’s pleadings is a proportionate response.

  103. [103] With the applicable law in mind, I turn now to explain why I dismissed RA 24. To be safe, because I was aware that what I have said above may not be entirely aligned with a strict reading of higher authority (although I have tried to advance an understanding of the law that conforms, in my view, with such higher authority), I proceeded with the more conventional approach that is derived from Mitora, the conventional approach being that I considered proportionality on a normal and not limited basis in the present case.

  104. The Second Unless Order was legitimately imposed and clearly stated

  105. (b) Second, the plaintiff had no valid excuse for its failure to comply with the discovery orders. This was especially since the plaintiff had more than a year since 6 July 2022 to comply but had still failed to do so. It was irrelevant that the plaintiff claimed to have become aware of the need to disclose further documents only after receiving the D&N 27 September Letter on 27 September 2023.

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