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Grounds publishedDecided 2 Jul 2025

General Division of the High Court

A defamation claim belonged in the Magistrate's Court, so court fees were limited

Foo Diana v Woo Mui Chan

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[2025] SGHC 125Case no. High Court Suit No 510 of 202117 paragraphs

The decision, in one line

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A defamation claim belonged in the Magistrate's Court, so court fees were limited

Summary by laws.sgParagraphs [4], [18], [29]

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Background facts

  2. [3] The background facts are set out in Diana Foo v Woo Mui Chan [2023] SGHC 221 (“Diana Foo (Liability)”), and I need only recount them in brief.

  3. [4] The plaintiff is an advocate and solicitor of around 20 years standing. She became acquainted with the defendant sometime in 2015, after which they became friends. Their relationship eventually soured and became litigious due to disagreements over some loans extended by the plaintiff to the defendant. Sometime in 2018, the defendant posted an online review relating to the plaintiff on the Google page of The Law Society of Singapore (“LSS”) (“Statement 1”). On 3 March 2020, the defendant filed a written complaint to the LSS in respect of the plaintiff (“Statement 2”). The plaintiff sued the defendant for defamation in respect of these two statements.

  4. Applicable principles and the parties’ submissions

  5. [9] There are four exceptions to the general rule in s 39(1) SCA:

  6. (a) if the court is satisfied that there was “sufficient reason” to bring the action in the High Court (s 39(4)(a) SCA);

  7. (b) if the court is satisfied that the “the defendant or one of the defendants objected to the transfer of the action to a State Court” (s 39(4)(b) SCA);

  8. (c) in the case of “any proceedings by the Government” (s 39(5) SCA); and

  9. (d) “if it appears to the General Division of the High Court that there was reasonable ground for supposing the amount recoverable in respect of the claimant’s claim to be in excess of the amount recoverable in an action commenced in a State Court” (s 39(6) SCA).

  10. [11] The plaintiff argues that the principles applied in Shanmugam also apply to the present case. According to the plaintiff, her defamation claim “raises important public interest considerations concerning the integrity and reputation of legal professionals, as well as the misuse of digital platforms for defamatory conduct”. She highlights that the defendant was “afforded every opportunity to resolve this matter amicably but chose instead to mount an untenable defence of justification”, and had also persisted in her defamatory conduct even after the letter of demand. Lastly, the plaintiff asks the court to have regard to the “nature of the proceedings and the damages awarded”.

  11. [13] In her reply submissions, the plaintiff instead sought the sum of $175,225, but nothing turns on this minor difference.

  12. [14] The defendant submits that the plaintiff’s alleged “public interest” issues were actually “simple issues which could have been dealt with in the Magistrate’s Court”, and the plaintiff had been “misguided by characterizing them as important questions of law”. She highlights that in Diana Foo (Assessment), I had rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the reputation of lawyers could be worse than defaming a politician (at [80]). I had also rejected the plaintiff’s approach towards the assessment of damages arising from online defamation – this demonstrated that the issue was a simple one. Finally, the defendant stressed that damages had been assessed at $41,250, within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s Court.

  13. Discussion

  14. [16] I agree with the defendant that there was no sufficient reason for the claim to be brought by the plaintiff in the High Court.

  15. [17] There was nothing novel about the plaintiff’s case. The plaintiff contends that hers was the “first case of a lawyer being maligned on the internet” . I am unable to verify if this contention is accurate but even if it is, there is nothing novel about lawyers being defamed or defamation occurring on the internet. In particular, there is a substantial body of jurisprudence relating to online defamation in Singapore, where courts have used the level of interaction to gauge the extent of publication: see Diana Foo (Assessment) at [100]. A case does not become novel simply because well-settled principles are applied together for the first time.

  16. [18] I also find that there was no reasonable ground for supposing that the damages the plaintiff was likely to recover would have exceeded the jurisdiction of the State Courts (s 39(6) SCA). A proper and objective evaluation of the law would have revealed that obtaining damages within or even near to the High Court’s jurisdiction was simply not a reasonably likely outcome for the plaintiff.

  17. [19] First, the plaintiff’s attempt to place lawyers on equal (or even superior) footing to public figures was entirely misconceived. As the defendant has pointed out (see above at [14]), I had observed in Diana Foo (Assessment) that it was settled law that “defamation of public figures should generally sound in greater damages than defamation of individuals” (at [80]). The plaintiff’s argument that she deserved greater damages as a senior lawyer completely missed the mark. Seniority at the Bar does not in and of itself necessarily confer the prominence associated with public figures which makes them more susceptible to harm from defamation (thereby justifying higher damages). In this case, I found that “there [was] no evidence that the plaintiff possesses a greater than ordinary reputation among the body of advocates and solicitors in Singapore”: Diana Foo (Assessment) at [83].

  18. [20] Second, I had found that the plaintiff’s evidence of her loss of earnings fell “woefully short”: Diana Foo (Assessment) at [49]. Her claim that she had suffered at least $500,000 in losses from lost clients was only supported by “general statements and sweeping assertions”, and “to the tune of figures which, with respect, appear to have been pulled out of thin air without any evidential basis or rationalisation as to how they have been derived”: Diana Foo (Assessment) at [53]. It was open to the plaintiff to amend her pleadings to properly plead special damages and to adduce the necessary evidence at the assessment of damages to support her assertion of loss of clientele and earnings. Had any such steps been taken, they might have provided some justification for this action being brought and continued in the High Court. But the point is academic as no such steps were ever taken by the plaintiff.

  19. [21] In these circumstances, the plaintiff’s remarkable claim for $300,000 was quite simply unsupportable either as a matter of general or special damages. She did not come close to being a public figure which might justify anything near this amount, nor was she able to provide any tangible evidence of her lost earnings. Overall, one could not but get the sense that the plaintiff was, as the phrase goes, “taking a punt” – but taking such a course of action does not come without consequence.

  20. [23] Para (2) provides that these scales “apply to the entire proceedings irrespective of whether the issues of liability and quantum are tried together or separately”.

  21. [29] In respect of disbursements, it would also not be reasonable to allow the plaintiff to claim for court fees incurred on the High Court scale. If these proceedings had been prosecuted in the Magistrate’s Court (as they should have), lower court fees would have been incurred. Disbursements relating to court fees are thus only allowed on the Magistrate’s Court scale.

  22. Conduct of counsel

  23. [31] When the court gives directions and imposes timelines for written submissions to be filed and served, it expects the timelines to be complied with. Judges appreciate that the demands of practice (and life) will at times necessitate a certain amount of latitude to be extended by the court to the parties and their counsel. But the court’s generosity should not be abused. It was unfortunate that in this case, plaintiff’s counsel treated the timelines imposed by the court with a disconcerting degree of nonchalance.

  24. Conclusion

  25. [35] Within seven days from the date of this judgment, the plaintiff is to tender to the court, a breakdown for the court’s approval of (a) the court fees payable for every document filed by the plaintiff in the action as if it had been filed in the Magistrate’s Court, and (b) the total revised amount of disbursements. The breakdown and revised amount of disbursements are also to be served on the defendant at the same time they are filed in court.

  26. [36] The defendant is at liberty to file and serve a response to the plaintiff’s breakdown and revised list of disbursements within seven days after the plaintiff has filed and served the same. Thereafter, no further responses are to be filed or served unless otherwise directed by the court. I will then determine and fix the amount of disbursements recoverable by the plaintiff from the defendant.