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Grounds publishedDecided 9 Feb 2023

Appellate Division of the High Court

Crescendas Bionics Pte Ltd v Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd and other appeals

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[2023] SGHC(A) 9Case no. Civil Appeal No 87 of 2021

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] Before us are three appeals (the “Appeals”) arising from the trial in HC/S 477/2015 (the “Suit”):

  3. (a) AD/CA 87/2021 (“CA 87”), which is Crescendas Bionics Pte Ltd’s (“Crescendas”) appeal against the award of damages by a judge of the General Division of the High Court (the “Judge”) in Crescendas Bionics Pte Ltd v Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd [2021] SGHC 189 (the “Damages Judgment (HC)”);

  4. (b) AD/CA 88/2021 (“CA 88”), which is Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd’s (“JP”) cross-appeal against the Judge’s award of damages in the Damages Judgment (HC); and

  5. (c) AD/CA 128/2021 (“CA 128”), which is Crescendas’ appeal against part of the Judge’s decision on pre-judgment interest and costs for both the liability and assessment of damages tranches of the trial.

  6. Facts

  7. Background to the dispute

  8. [2] Crescendas is a property developer. JP is a general building contractor registered as a Grade A1 contractor with the Building and Construction Authority (“BCA”).

  9. [3] On 30 June 2008, the parties signed a Letter of Intent dated 26 June 2008 (the “LOI”) under which Crescendas engaged JP as the management contractor to build Biopolis 3. This is a seven-storey multi-tenanted business park development in One-North envisaged as a research and development (“R&D”) hub for biomedical sciences (“BMS”) institutes and organisations, offering specialised facilities such as wet laboratories, chemistry laboratories and an animal facility.

  10. [4] Under cl 5.0 of the LOI, JP was obliged to complete Biopolis 3 in 18 months, ie, by 22 January 2010. However, the time taken for completion exceeded the 18 months stipulated in the LOI – BCA directed the Superintending Officer to apply for the Temporary Occupation Permit (“TOP”) only on 22 December 2010. The TOP was obtained only on 12 January 2011.

  11. Procedural history

  12. [5] In the light of the delay, Crescendas commenced the Suit against JP, which in turn brought various counterclaims against Crescendas.

  13. [6] The trial was bifurcated, such that issues of liability and assessment of damages were decided separately in two tranches.

  14. [7] Following the first tranche of the trial, the Judge reached a decision on liability in Crescendas Bionics Pte Ltd v Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd [2019] SGHC 4 (the “Liability Judgment (HC)”), which was affirmed on appeal in Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd v Crescendas Bionics Pte Ltd and another appeal [2019] SGCA 63 (the “Liability Judgment (CA)”), save in relation to the arithmetic computation of the days of delay for which JP was responsible and the time taken for capping beams work (see the Liability Judgment (CA) at [14]–[20]).

  15. [8] In gist, the Liability Judgment (HC) and the Liability Judgment (CA) found that for the purpose of cl 5.0 of the LOI, Biopolis 3 was deemed to be completed on 22 December 2010 when Biopolis 3 was considered by BCA to be ready for TOP application (see the Liability Judgment (HC) at [223]–[244]). On this basis, the completion of Biopolis 3 was deemed to be delayed by a total of 334 days, from 23 January 2010 (ie, the day after the contractual completion date) to 22 December 2010 (the “Combined Delay”). Of these 334 days, Crescendas was responsible for an aggregate of 173 days of delay caused by its own acts of prevention. As a result, time for Biopolis 3’s completion was set at large, and JP was only liable to complete Biopolis 3 within a reasonable time of 18 months (the original period) plus 173 days. 14 July 2010 was the reasonable date of completion. JP exceeded the reasonable time for completion by 161 days (see the Liability Judgment (HC) at [352] and [392], and the Liability Judgment (CA) at [14]–[20]). JP was liable to Crescendas in general damages rather than under the liquidated damages clause in cl 6.0 of the LOI, as the latter, in the absence of an extension of time clause, had been rendered inoperative by Crescendas’ acts of prevention (Liability Judgment (HC) at [353]).

  16. [9] Whilst each party’s delay was treated as a singular block of time for the purpose of computing the reasonable time for completion and the delay beyond this reasonable period, the days of delay which each party was responsible for were spread out over the period of the Combined Delay, both before and after the reasonable date of completion of 14 July 2010. The actual periods of delay attributable to Crescendas were six days from 26 to 31 December 2008; 147 days from 4 January 2009 to 1 June 2009; seven days in November 2010; and 13 days in December 2010. The actual periods of delay attributable to JP were interspersed between the periods of delay caused by Crescendas (see Damages Judgment (HC) at [12]–[23] and [79]; Liability Judgment (HC) at [76]–[77], [268], [327], [345] and [349]).

  17. [10] In the second tranche of the trial, Crescendas sought an assessment of general damages in respect of the 161 days of delay for which JP was responsible. The Judge delivered his decision on damages in Damages Judgment (HC).

  18. Undisputed facts

  19. Parties’ cases before the Judge

  20. [12] Crescendas claimed general damages for the delayed completion in respect of three heads of loss:

  21. JP accepted that it should be liable for Site Staff Costs incurred during the 161-day period from 15 July 2010 (ie, the day after the reasonable date of completion) to 22 December 2010, amounting to $132,157.12. The dispute between parties therefore revolved around the quantum and recoverability of damages for the “loss of chance” to earn net rental revenue and Holding Costs.

  22. [13] Crescendas’ claim in respect of the “loss of chance” to earn net rental revenue was made on an expectation basis. According to Crescendas, three forms of net rental revenue loss flowed from the Combined Delay:

  23. [14] In particular, Crescendas argued that the Combined Delay resulted in the loss of five pre-commitment tenants which would have otherwise taken up a lease in Biopolis 3 at the start of 2010. These five pre-commitment tenants were the Institute of Chemical and Engineering Sciences (“ICES”) under the Agency for Science, Technology and Research, Abbott Laboratories (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“Abbott”), the Nanyang Technological University (“NTU”), PetNet Solutions Pte Ltd (“PetNet”), and Philip Morris Products SA (“Philip Morris”).

  24. [15] In quantifying its net rental revenue loss, Crescendas submitted that the appropriate method of quantification was the “Multi-Year Model”, which computed the difference between the projected net rental revenue it would have earned had there been no Combined Delay and the actual net rental revenue it had earned, over the span of multiple years stretching from the period of the Combined Delay to the years thereafter. A discount rate of 8% was then applied to this difference. Crescendas contended that the Multi-Year Model reflected the full loss it suffered and was preferable to the “Single-Year Model”, which only calculated Crescendas’ loss of net rental revenue in the year of 2010. Using the Multi-Year Model, Crescendas claimed net rental revenue loss of $10.2m from JP.

  25. [17] In response, JP raised various issues of causation and remoteness to deny the recoverability of damages for net rental revenue loss. As to quantum, JP argued that the maximum amount of damages that Crescendas could claim should be limited to the amount of liquidated damages it would have been liable for under cl 6.0 of the LOI. Further, the Single-Year Model should be used in lieu of the Multi-Year Model because the former had fewer speculative elements. Using the Single-Year Model, JP submitted that it should only be liable for a sum between $308,045.33 and $627,987.17 (depending on the parameters adopted by the court). JP further argued that a settlement sum of $4.75m paid to Crescendas by one of the pre-commitment tenants, PetNet (the “Settlement Sum”), should be deducted from any damages awarded for net rental revenue loss.

  26. The decision below

  27. [19] On 10 August 2021, the Judge delivered the Damages Judgment (HC) setting out his detailed reasoning. It is sufficient for the purposes of these Appeals to summarise the Judge’s key findings which were appealed against.

  28. [20] To begin with, the Judge held that both Crescendas’ and JP’s delays were effective causes of Crescendas’ loss (Damages Judgment (HC) at [72]), and that the loss caused by the entire period of delay should be apportioned proportionately between the parties, based on the duration of delay attributable to each (Damages Judgment (HC) at [81]). Given that JP was accountable for 161 out of 334 days of the Combined Delay, it was liable for 48.2% of the total recoverable loss (Damages Judgment (HC) at [82]). In the Judge’s opinion, the maximum amount of general damages that JP was liable for was also not limited to the amount of liquidated damages it would have otherwise been liable for under cl 6.0 of the LOI (Damages Judgment (HC) at [57]–[62]).

  29. [21] As regards Crescendas’ claim for its “loss of chance” to earn net rental revenue, the Judge characterised this claim as a claim for “loss of net rental revenue” (Damages Judgment (HC) at [85]). He proceeded to observe that this claim comprised two distinct categories of loss. First, the “loss of net rental revenue” during the period of the Combined Delay (“pre-completion net rental revenue loss”). Secondly, the “loss of net rental revenue” after the completion of Biopolis 3 (“post-completion net rental revenue loss”) (Damages Judgment (HC) at [93]). This is similar to Crescendas’ claims for pre-completion and post-completion loss mentioned at [13] above.

  30. [22] On remoteness, the Judge held that pre-completion net rental revenue loss was not too remote as it was a natural consequence of the Combined Delay. As for post-completion net rental revenue loss, the Judge was of the view that Crescendas had accepted it as “indirect loss”. On this premise, the Judge found that the latter was too remote to be recoverable as Crescendas had not shown that JP had actual knowledge that the delay would cause further net rental revenue loss even after completion (Damages Judgment (HC) at [96]–[102]).

  31. [23] On the issue of quantifying Crescendas’ net rental revenue loss, the Judge preferred the Single-Year Model to the Multi-Year Model even though the latter was preferred by Crescendas’ experts, as well as the Court’s expert Adjunct Assoc Prof Tay Kah Poh (“Assoc Prof Tay”). The Judge held that the Single-Year Model provided the “fairest and most appropriate method of quantifying [Crescendas’] loss of net rental revenue” (Damages Judgment (HC) at [104]–[128]).

  32. [24] The Judge adopted the following formula in the Single-Year Model to derive net rental revenue loss amounting to $4,056,711.62 for the whole of 2010 (Damages Judgment (HC) at [131] and [227]):

  33. The Judge pro-rated $4,056,711.62 to reflect the 334 days of the Combined Delay, and arrived at $3,712,168.99:

  34. The Judge then apportioned $3,712,168.99 based on 161 out of 334 days to reflect JP’s liability. This amounted to $1,789,398.82 (Damages Judgment (HC) at [228]).

  35. [25] The Judge found that the Settlement Sum paid by PetNet to Crescendas should not be deducted from the award of damages for net rental revenue loss (Damages Judgment (HC) at [164]–[170]), and therefore found JP liable for $1,789,398.82 in this regard.

  36. [26] Although the Judge was of the view that Crescendas’ net rental revenue loss should be calculated based on the Single-Year Model, he also considered the quantum of net rental revenue loss based on the Multi-Year Model as an alternative. After apportionment, he found that JP would have been liable for $4,641,300.23 if the Multi-Year Model were used (Damages Judgment (HC) at [231] and [319]).

  37. The parties’ cases

  38. [29] On the other hand, JP argued that the Judge was justified in rejecting the Multi-Year Model as being too remote and speculative. However, it took issue with some aspects of the Judge’s application of the Single-Year Model. In so far as the Judge had made an alternative finding on the quantum of loss if the Multi-Year Model was applied, JP had limited grounds of challenge which we elaborate on later (see below at [192]–[195]). JP also submitted that the Settlement Sum that Crescendas had obtained from PetNet should be deducted from the net rental revenue loss recoverable by Crescendas. Further, it argued that the Judge erred in finding that there was a causal link between its delay and Crescendas’ alleged loss, and that the loss of two of its pre-commitment tenants, Philip Morris and PetNet, were due to the Combined Delay.

  39. Issues on appeal

  40. [31] There are two preliminary issues that we will consider before addressing the substantive appeals against the Judge’s findings. The first concerns the applicability of the liquidated damages clause in the LOI. The second relates to whether Crescendas is really claiming for a “loss of chance” to earn net rental revenue arising from its use of that expression. As we explain below, Crescendas was in substance claiming for net rental revenue loss.

  41. [32] In addition, there are four main areas of issues to be determined:

  42. Preliminary issue 1: The applicability of the liquidated damages clause

  43. [34] Notwithstanding that the LOI contained a liquidated damages clause, the Judge in the Liability Judgment (HC) at [353] held that it was inapplicable, because Crescendas had committed acts of prevention and there was no extension of time clause in the LOI:

  44. Parties did not appeal against this finding at the liability stage. We agree that the principles set out at [353] of the Liability Judgment (HC) are correct as a matter of law, and therefore proceed on the basis that Crescendas cannot rely on the liquidated damages clause and is only entitled to general damages. Neither can JP rely on it to restrict the quantum which Crescendas may claim in general damages.

  45. Preliminary issue 2: Is Crescendas’ claim truly premised on a loss of chance?

  46. [35] Before the Judge, Crescendas claimed that it lost the chance to earn net rental revenue due to the Combined Delay. In particular, it submitted that it was claiming for a loss of chance “to earn the net rental revenues that it [said] it could have [otherwise] achieved”. In this connection, it used a discount rate of 8% to account for the “uncertainty in [Biopolis 3’s] cashflows” and to “account for this loss of chance”. Notwithstanding this, the Judge adjudged that Crescendas was claiming for the “loss of net rental revenue” caused by the Combined Delay (Damages Judgment (HC) at [93]). This difference is not one of semantics. The loss in question is substantively different. The loss that Crescendas appeared to be alluding to was the chance to earn net rental revenue, whereas the Judge recharacterised the loss as the net rental revenue which Crescendas did not earn due to the Combined Delay. On appeal before us, Crescendas once again used the expression “loss of chance” in its claim.

  47. [36] Accordingly, a preliminary question arises as to whether Crescendas was in substance seeking damages for a loss of chance or whether it was in substance claiming for the loss of net rental revenue, as held by the Judge. In our view, the Judge had correctly recognised that Crescendas’ claim was in substance a claim for loss of net rental revenue and not a claim for loss of chance, as such. We add that notwithstanding Crescendas’ use of the phrase “loss of chance”, it had in substance proceeded on the basis that it was claiming for loss of net rental revenue. Likewise, JP also proceeded along the line that that was the claim of Crescendas. Indeed, neither side really identified what the chance was that was purportedly lost.

  48. [37] It is pertinent to first set the context in which the loss of chance doctrine arises. This doctrine has to be understood against the compensatory principle which undergirds the award of damages for a breach of contract. This principle is enshrined in the famous English decision of Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Exch 850 (“Robinson”), where Parke B said at 855:

  49. It follows that to give effect to the compensatory principle, the court has to compare the position the claimant would have been in had the contract not been breached (ie, the “hypothetical no-breach position”), and the position the claimant is currently in given that the contract has been breached (ie, the “breach position”). Where the claimant is worse off in the latter, the difference between the two positions represents the claimant’s loss: see Adam Kramer KC, The Law of Contract Damages (Hart Publishing, 3rd Ed, 2022) at paras 1-39 and 1-46 to 1-48; The Law of Contract in Singapore (Andrew Phang Boon Leong gen ed) (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2022) at para 21.002 (“The Law of Contract in Singapore”).

  50. [38] Closely connected to the compensatory principle and the identification of loss is the issue of whether that loss is in fact a result of the defendant’s contractual breach. Factual causation is determined by reference to the “but for” test, which requires the claimant to prove on a balance of probabilities that but for the defendant’s breach, it would not have suffered loss (Sunny Metal & Engineering Pte Ltd v Ng Khim Ming Eric [2007] 3 SLR(R) 782 (“Sunny Metal”) at [63] and [71]). Implicit in this is once again a comparison between the hypothetical no-breach position and the breach position. If the balance of probabilities tips in the claimant’s favour in respect of the “but for” test for causation, the claimant is taken as having shown, as a matter of fact, the causal link between the defendant’s contractual breach and the claimant’s loss, and that entitles the claimant to recover in full from the defendant, with no account being taken of the degree of strength of the proof. If, on the other hand, the claimant fails to persuade the court of the causal link on a balance of probabilities, the claim will fail regardless of how close the strength of proof came to overcoming the balance of probabilities: Sunny Metal at [74]. It is for this reason that the “but for” test is described as taking an all-or-nothing approach to factual causation.

  51. [39] This all-or-nothing approach is particularly problematic in situations where the occurrence of loss is contingent upon the acts of third parties to the contract that has been breached. In these circumstances, the claimant is saddled with the difficult task of having to establish on a balance of probabilities that the third party would have acted in a relevant manner to confer on the claimant a favourable outcome if not for the defendant’s contractual breach: see The Law of Contract in Singapore at para 21.154.

  52. [40] These problems are ameliorated by the loss of chance doctrine, which allows a claimant to claim for the loss of a chance of a favourable outcome (rather than the favourable outcome itself), where that favourable outcome is contingent on the action of a third party: see Sunny Metal at [74]; Justlogin Pte Ltd and another v Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp Ltd and another [2007] 1 SLR(R) 425 at [38]; Auston International Group Ltd and another v Ng Swee Hua [2009] 4 SLR(R) 628 at [38]; BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd and another v PT Bayan Resources TBK and another [2022] SGHC(I) 2 at [200]–[207]. Where the claim is premised on a loss of chance, the claimant needs to show that the defendant’s contractual breach caused it to lose a chance of acquiring a favourable outcome, and that this chance is a real and substantial one. In other words, there is a real and substantial chance (which may well be less than 50%) of the third party acting in such a way as to confer the favourable outcome on the claimant in the hypothetical no-breach position: see Asia Hotel Investments Ltd v Starwood Asia Pacific Management Pte Ltd and another [2005] 1 SLR(R) 661 (“Asia Hotel”) at [139]; MK Distripark Pte Ltd v Pedder Warehousing & Logistics (S) Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 433 (“MK Distripark”) at [58]. However, the claimant need not go further and undertake the more challenging task of showing on a balance of probabilities (ie, a more than 50% likelihood) that the third party would have behaved so as to confer the favourable outcome in the hypothetical no-breach position. This is because the loss is not the favourable outcome per se but the loss of the chance to obtain that foreseeable outcome (see Asia Hotel at [133]). In other words, the loss of chance doctrine allows the claimant to avert the difficulty of proving that the claimant would have acquired the favourable outcome, by allowing the claimant to claim that he could (not would) have obtained the favourable outcome but for the breach.

  53. [41] A claim on a loss of chance basis also avoids an all-or-nothing outcome. This is illustrated in Vinodh Coomaraswamy J’s analysis in AKM v AKN and another and other matters [2014] 4 SLR 245 (“AKM”) at [184]–[186], where he compared a claim for the loss of actual profits with a claim for the loss of a chance to earn profits (this point was not overturned on appeal in AKN and another v ALC and others and other appeals [2015] 3 SLR 488):

  54. [42] In sum, a claimant must ordinarily establish a causal link between the contractual breach and the alleged loss. This, however, is an uphill task where the loss consists of a favourable outcome which is dependent on third party action, and the claimant, who has no control over what the third party chooses to do, has to prove the causal link on an all-or-nothing basis. To relieve the burden on the claimant, the loss of chance doctrine allows the claimant to characterise the loss as being the chance of securing the favourable outcome, thus making it easier for the claimant to prove the causal link between the loss and the contractual breach.

  55. [43] It follows that for the purpose of the loss of chance doctrine, the favourable outcome should not be identified by reference to the exact quantity of the value lost. Instead, it should be characterised at a lower level (eg, the chance of winning a beauty contest or of securing a contract with a third party) upon a comparison between the state of affairs in the breach position and the hypothetical no-breach position, this being part and parcel of the loss identification and factual causation assessment.

  56. [44] Once that is kept in focus, it becomes clear that Crescendas’ case was not for the loss of chance to earn net rental revenue but rather for the loss of the revenue itself. In the present case, the favourable outcome is the gain of additional net rental revenue in the hypothetical no-breach position which was not earned in the breach position. Had Crescendas’ claim truly been for a loss of chance to earn net rental revenue, it would have said that it might or might not have earned additional net rental revenue in the hypothetical no-breach position, but that this chance was lost due to the breach. But that was not how Crescendas ran its case. Instead, Crescendas ran its entire case on the basis that but for JP’s breach, it would (not could) have earned additional net rental revenue. Crescendas’ experts projected that its net rental revenue in the hypothetical no-breach position would exceed what it actually earned in the breach position, and Crescendas relied on the difference between the two to compute the additional net rental revenue it would have earned. Thus, Crescendas’ “loss of chance” claim was really a misnomer. The pith and marrow of Crescendas’ claim was, in truth, for the loss of net rental revenue. We are reinforced in our view by the fact that JP, in its written closing submissions before the Judge, perceived Crescendas’ claim as one relating to the loss of net rental revenue. Further, the dispute between parties did not revolve around the likelihood of Crescendas earning additional net rental revenue.

  57. [45] It appears that Crescendas had thought that because it was difficult to calculate the precise amount of additional net rental revenue that it would have earned in the hypothetical no-breach position, there was uncertainty which led it to use the expression “loss of chance”. For the reasons we have explained, that was not correct. Difficulty in calculating the quantum of loss is different from saying that there might not have been a loss of a favourable outcome in the first place and that there was only a loss of a chance to secure that outcome.

  58. [46] In sum, the expression “loss of chance” is incompatible with the substance of Crescendas’ claim for the loss of net rental revenue simpliciter and should not have been used. It is on this footing that we will now turn to consider the issues canvassed by parties in CA 87 and CA 88.

  59. Issue 1: Causation

  60. [47] There are two sub-issues in respect of causation, leaving aside remoteness for the time being which we address later.

  61. Sub-issue 1: whether there was uncertainty in causation

  62. Background and the parties’ arguments

  63. [48] In the proceedings below, JP had argued that Crescendas must demonstrate a causal link between the specific periods of delay attributable to JP (amounting to 161 days) and the alleged loss suffered by Crescendas. It submitted that Crescendas had failed to do so, as the periods of delay attributable to Crescendas were spread out and intertwined with the periods of delay caused by JP. As such, both parties had jointly contributed to the Combined Delay and neither was principally responsible for Crescendas’ alleged loss (see Damages Judgment (HC) at [67]). In the alternative, JP argued that since the Court of Appeal had found that the reasonable date for the completion of Biopolis 3 was 14 July 2010 in the Liability Judgment (CA), Crescendas had to prove that JP’s delay during the specific period from 15 July 2010 to 22 December 2010 caused Crescendas’ loss (Damages Judgment (HC) at [68]).

  64. [49] The Judge held that it was not appropriate to adopt JP’s approach of clearly delineating each specific period of delay to one party and the consequent damage caused. In this regard, the periods of delay caused by each party were “almost evenly balanced” and there was nothing to indicate that either JP’s delay or Crescendas’ delay was the more efficacious cause. Accordingly, the Judge found that JP’s delay was an “effective cause” of Crescendas’ loss (Damages Judgment (HC) at [73]–[76]).

  65. [50] As regards the Court of Appeal’s finding on the reasonable date for the completion of Biopolis 3 made in the Liability Judgment (CA), the Judge agreed with Crescendas that it was not the Court of Appeal’s holding that JP had specifically been responsible for the delay between 15 July 2010 to 22 December 2010 (Damages Judgment (HC) at [77]–[80]).

  66. [51] On appeal, JP argued that the Judge had erred in finding that the “but for” test for causation was satisfied for two reasons. First, there was no demonstratable causal link between the specific periods of delay attributable to JP and the loss allegedly suffered by Crescendas. Not only was Crescendas the dominant cause of the delay, the delays caused by Crescendas were also spread out throughout the entire duration of the project (both before and after the reasonable date for completion on 14 July 2010) and were so closely intertwined with the delays caused by JP that a clear causal link could not be drawn between Crescendas’ loss and JP’s delay.

  67. [52] Secondly, JP argued that the Judge had erred in rejecting its alternative case that JP was only responsible for the delay between 15 July 2010 and 22 December 2010. On this premise, JP submitted that Crescendas must establish a causal link between this period of delay and its alleged loss. Since Crescendas had not done so, its claim for loss should be dismissed.

  68. [53] In response, Crescendas submitted that the Judge’s rejection of JP’s case on causation should be upheld.

  69. [55] The following cases illustrate what happens when the loss caused is not solely attributable to the defendant (or defendants as the case may be) against whom the claim is being pursued.

  70. [56] In Heskell v Continental Express Ltd and another [1950] 1 All ER 1033 (“Heskell”), the plaintiff had entered into an agreement to sell goods to a Persian buyer. The plaintiff instructed the first defendant, in whose warehouse the goods were, to despatch the goods. The first defendant failed to despatch the goods, but the second defendant (the shipowner’s loading brokers) issued a bill of lading for the goods which were never shipped. The first defendant argued that it was only responsible for any loss up till the time the false bill of lading was issued, and the second defendant was responsible for any loss incurred after that. Devlin J (as he then was) held that the second defendant’s issuance of a false bill of lading did not extinguish the first defendant’s breach of duty as a causative event and that the first defendant’s breach, being a continuing one, was a continuous source of damage. The two causes of damage were equally operative, in the sense that if either had ceased the damage would have ceased. Accordingly, the first defendant’s breach was held to be sufficiently causative of the plaintiff’s loss (Heskell at 1047).

  71. [57] In the case of Great Eastern Hotel Company Ltd v John Laing Construction Ltd and another [2005] EWHC 181 (TCC) (“Great Eastern”), the claimant sought damages against the construction managers for delays in the completion of works to a hotel. Similar to JP, the defendants in Great Eastern argued that the causal link had not been established as the entire delay might not have been solely attributable to them (at [65]). However, the court held at [314] that:

  72. [58] In the case of Smile Inc Dental Surgeons Pte Ltd v OP3 International Pte Ltd [2020] 3 SLR 1234 (“Smile Inc”), the plaintiff had appointed the defendant to carry out fitting-out works at its clinic in a shopping mall. Due to the defendant’s breach in providing defective works, the clinic was flooded. This prevented the plaintiff from resuming business at the clinic. As a result of the plaintiff not resuming business as well as the plaintiff’s failure to pay rent timeously, the landlord charged the plaintiff rent for what would otherwise have been a rent-free period. Chan Seng Onn J (as he then was) held that the defendant was still liable for the amount of rent paid even though both its breach and the plaintiff’s failure to pay rent on time were causes of this particular loss, citing at [25] the case of Heskell:

  73. [59] The passages from Heskell and Smile Inc above were cited with approval in the recent Court of Appeal decision of iVenture Card Ltd and others v Big Bus Singapore City Sightseeing Pte Ltd and others [2022] 1 SLR 302 (“iVenture”), although, as it was held that there was only one operative causative factor on the facts of iVenture, the discussion that ensued was technically obiter. With the above principles in mind, we turn to consider if causation had been established between the delay attributable to JP and the loss suffered by Crescendas.

  74. Whether causation was established

  75. [60] On the facts, the Judge held that both Crescendas’ and JP’s delays were the effective causes of Crescendas’ loss (Damages Judgment (HC) at [72]). We agree, given that the length of the delay attributable to Crescendas and JP respectively were almost evenly balanced, with 161 days attributable to JP and 173 days attributable to Crescendas. The delay attributable to each party was each an independent and effective cause of the loss suffered by Crescendas.

  76. [61] In our judgment, JP’s assertion that Crescendas must prove a causal link between the delay from 15 July 2010 to 22 December 2010 and the loss Crescendas suffered, misses the point. To recapitulate, the Court of Appeal in the Liability Judgment (CA) had upheld the Judge’s decision in Liability Judgment (HC) apart from an agreed calculation error and an additional period of 25 days’ delay attributable to JP arising from the sole issue of capping beams work (see Liability Judgment (CA) at [14]–[20]). Turning to the Liability Judgment (HC) at [373] and [375], the Judge had held:

  77. [62] While at first glance the methodology adopted by the Judge to calculate the period of delay attributable to JP might appear to attribute to JP an exact period between the “new” contractual completion date and the actual completion date, a closer examination of the Liability Judgment (HC) reveals that this was just a mathematical formula adopted by the Judge. As the Judge had explained, he did not hold that JP was responsible for a specific period of delay between the “new” contractual completion date and the actual completion date, but was merely stating the aggregate period of delay attributable to JP (Damages Judgment (HC) at [79]). JP’s alternative case glossed over the fact that the Judge had found, in the liability phase, that the periods of delay attributable to Crescendas had been interspersed throughout the period of construction (see Liability Judgment (HC) at [268], [327], [345] and [349]).

  78. [63] In our judgment, JP’s case that Crescendas’ delay was the dominant cause as well as its alternative case on causation are unmeritorious. Causation was clearly made out on the facts.

  79. Sub-issue 2: whether the Combined Delay caused Crescendas to lose Philip Morris and/or PetNet as pre-commitment tenants

  80. [64] The Judge held that the Combined Delay caused Crescendas to lose five pre-commitment tenants – ICES, Abbott, NTU, PetNet, and Philip Morris – which would have otherwise leased 35.7% of Biopolis 3’s NLA at the start of 2010 (Damages Judgment (HC) at [171]). He thus used a starting occupancy level of 35.7% at the start of 2010. He also projected that Biopolis 3 was likely to have achieved an occupancy level of 49.3% at the start of 2011 (Damages Judgment (HC) at [185]–[186] and [274]). Using the average of the two values, he found that the average first-year occupancy level over the course of 2010 would be 42.5% if there had been no Combined Delay (Damages Judgment (HC) at [193] and [273]).

  81. [65] JP contested the Judge’s finding that the Combined Delay caused Crescendas to lose PetNet and Philip Morris as pre-commitment tenants. In relation to Philip Morris, JP argued that the Judge’s finding was inconsistent with the evidence. In particular, it was submitted that Philip Morris had decided to take up a lease at another business park (ie, the Kendall) for reasons other than the Combined Delay.

  82. [66] As for PetNet, JP had put forward two antithetical arguments on whether the Combined Delay had caused Crescendas to lose PetNet as a pre-commitment tenant. The “primary” position adopted by JP was that the Combined Delay had caused Crescendas to lose PetNet as a pre-commitment tenant, and that therefore the Settlement Sum should be deducted from any damages for net rental revenue loss. The “secondary” position adopted by JP was that the Combined Delay had not caused Crescendas to lose PetNet as a pre-commitment tenant; PetNet walked away from its lease agreement due to a change of its business plans. Even on its “secondary” position, JP submitted that the Settlement Sum was a windfall Crescendas had received as a result of the Combined Delay and should be deducted from any damages awarded to Crescendas for loss of net rental revenue.

  83. Philip Morris

  84. [67] We turn first to consider whether the Combined Delay had caused Crescendas to lose Philip Morris as a pre-commitment tenant.

  85. [68] Philip Morris had been placed in communication with Crescendas through the Economic Development Board (“EDB”) sometime in 2008. A memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) was signed by Philip Morris and Crescendas on 29 April 2009, granting a period of exclusivity to Philip Morris during which time the space intended for Philip Morris could not be marketed to other prospective tenants in return for an exclusivity fee which was refundable if the parties did not enter into a binding lease agreement. Despite entering into discussions on the specifics of the lease agreement, Crescendas and Philip Morris did not come to an agreement. On 1 August 2009, Philip Morris informed Crescendas that the exclusivity period had expired and that it would not be extended and requested for the return of the exclusivity fee.

  86. [69] While it was not apparent on the face of the email correspondence between Philip Morris and Crescendas as to why the former had decided to end its negotiations for a lease, it would appear that the timing of completion of Biopolis 3 was an important factor in Philip Morris’ decision to lease premises there. On 18 May 2009, despite Philip Morris already asking for and receiving a list of key milestones on the building construction from Crescendas, it requested a “more detailed schedule”. On 5 June 2009, Philip Morris had informed Crescendas that it intended to commence fitting out works in January 2010 and start full operations in January 2011. In amendments made on 16 June 2009 to the draft lease agreement, Philip Morris’ solicitors had inserted a cl 3 which detailed Crescendas’ obligations to keep it apprised of the expected date the TOP would be obtained as well as the progress of the construction. On 26 June 2009, Philip Morris asked Crescendas for an update as to the construction progress. There does not appear to have been a documented reply to the above-mentioned email. However, after Philip Morris had indicated on 1 August 2009 its request for the return of the exclusivity fee, Crescendas stated in an email dated 4 August 2009:

  87. [71] The threshold for appellate intervention is a high one, and we see no basis to disturb the Judge’s finding on this issue, ie, that the Combined Delay caused the loss of Philip Morris as a tenant.

  88. PetNet

  89. [72] We turn next to consider whether the Combined Delay had caused Crescendas to lose PetNet as a pre-commitment tenant.

  90. [73] Crescendas had started negotiations with Siemens Pte Ltd (“Siemens”) sometime in July 2008, to set up a facility in Biopolis 3. The discussions were held primarily between PetNet (which was a subsidiary of Siemens) and Crescendas, but the initial drafts of the lease agreement and letter of offer were between Siemens and Crescendas. In June 2010, it was decided that the lease agreement and letter of offer were to be signed between a new private limited company set up by PetNet in Singapore and Crescendas.

  91. [74] In the meantime, in November 2008, PetNet informed Crescendas that it wanted to rig a cyclotron into the building, which required specific modifications to the structure of the building. On 6 January 2009, PetNet requested for an update on the status of Biopolis 3’s construction and when the structural modifications to the space were scheduled for. Following an exchange of e-mails, on 8 January 2009, PetNet replied:

  92. [76] PetNet did not eventually take up a lease at Biopolis 3, although there were invoices issued by Crescendas to PetNet for rent from August 2011 to September 2012. In this regard, JP did not dispute that Crescendas did not receive any payment on the invoices and instead argued that the invoices had evidenced a binding lease agreement between Crescendas and PetNet. We add that there is no suggestion that PetNet had disputed Crescendas’ right to issue the invoices and this in turn suggests that notwithstanding the Combined Delay, PetNet acknowledged that there was already a binding commitment on its part to rent premises at Biopolis 3.

  93. [77] Furthermore, in the course of the trial it belatedly emerged that when PetNet decided not to take up a lease at Biopolis 3, it agreed to pay Crescendas the Settlement Sum. Prior to this disclosure, the only hint that Crescendas had received this sum was a comment made in its financial statement for the financial year 2015, that a sum of $4.75m was received pursuant to the terms of a settlement agreement from “a prospective tenant”. Notwithstanding this disclosure, the settlement agreement itself was not adduced in evidence nor was any representative from PetNet called as a witness.

  94. [78] We have mentioned JP's alternative arguments, ie, as to whether the Combined Delay had caused the loss of PetNet as a tenant. At the hearing, we asked counsel for JP to clarify JP’s position. Counsel confirmed that JP’s position was to assert that the Combined Delay had not caused the loss of PetNet. Hence, this is the primary focus for the analysis that follows.

  95. [79] Although the Judge had been of the view that the correspondence between PetNet and Crescendas did not clearly indicate the reason for PetNet’s decision not to lease premises at Biopolis 3, he went on to find that the Combined Delay had caused PetNet not to take up the lease due to its expressed concerns about the delay in construction affecting its project plans (Damages Judgment (HC) at [163]). However, in our judgment, apart from the isolated incident in January 2009 detailed above (at [74]), PetNet did not bring up the issue of delay in its negotiations with Crescendas up to and including in its last documented discussion with Crescendas in September 2011. In fact, up till the last meeting between parties in September 2011, nine months after Biopolis 3 was completed, PetNet still appeared to be interested in negotiating the terms of the lease agreement.

  96. [80] Furthermore, the Judge had based part of his finding on the evidence of Mr Lawrence Leow Chin Hin (“Mr Leow”), Crescendas’ director, that PetNet had to change its business plans because its business was no longer competitive due to the delay in Biopolis 3 (Damages Judgment (HC) at [162]–[163]). In our view, as set out below, this was hearsay evidence which should not have been relied upon:

  97. [81] More importantly, if the Combined Delay had been the reason for PetNet declining to lease premises at Biopolis 3, then there would be no logical reason for PetNet to agree to pay Crescendas any sum as a settlement. The fact that PetNet agreed to and did pay the Settlement Sum strongly suggested that it was not walking away because of any delay in the construction.

  98. [82] In our view, the Judge had erred in not giving due weight to the correspondence between the parties, the invoices from Crescendas to PetNet and the fact that it was PetNet who paid Crescendas the Settlement Sum.

  99. [83] Accordingly, Crescendas has not discharged its evidential burden to show that it lost PetNet as a tenant because of the Combined Delay.

  100. [84] For completeness, we would also make some observations about the way in which the issue of the Settlement Sum had been brought up in the proceedings below. As discussed above at [77], the only documentary evidence of the Settlement Sum was an anonymous reference to “a prospective tenant”. It was not until the cross-examination of Mr Leow that it was disclosed that PetNet had made a payment to Crescendas for forgoing a lease at Biopolis 3. In our view, the late disclosure of the Settlement Sum was unsatisfactory. The audited financial statement which did not even provide any details as to the Settlement Sum or the identity of the prospective tenant was inadequate. If there was concern about other confidential information in the settlement agreement which was not relevant to the trial, those parts of the settlement agreement could have been redacted. Since Crescendas was claiming that it had lost PetNet as a tenant because of the Combined Delay, it was obliged to disclose the settlement agreement even if it took the view that the Settlement Sum was paid by PetNet for a reason other than the omission to proceed with a lease. It was for Crescendas to disclose and state its position and for the court to decide whether the settlement agreement was relevant and indeed material.

  101. [85] Since Crescendas has not shown that it lost PetNet as a tenant because of the Combined Delay (see above at [83]), JP is not liable to Crescendas for any loss of rent from PetNet. The Settlement Sum associated with PetNet’s departure is not to be taken into account to reduce any other loss that JP is liable to Crescendas for.

  102. Issue 2: Remoteness of Crescendas’ claim for loss of net rental revenue

  103. Law on the remoteness of damages

  104. [86] The remoteness rule in Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341 (“Hadley v Baxendale”) imposes a horizon on the extent of the contract breaker’s liability. That rule has two limbs (Out of the Box Pte Ltd v Wanin Industries Pte Ltd [2013] 2 SLR 363 (“Out of the Box”) at [13]–[15] and [17]–[18]; Robertson Quay Investment Pte Ltd v Steen Consultants Pte Ltd and another [2008] 2 SLR(R) 623 (“Robertson Quay”) at [55] and [81]–[82]):

  105. (a) Damage falling under the first limb of Hadley v Baxendale (the “First Limb of Hadley v Baxendale”) may be termed “ordinary” damage. Ordinary damage is awarded for consequences which may be seen as arising naturally (ie, according to the usual course of things) from the breach of contract itself or flowing from what may reasonably be supposed to be in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract, having regard to the knowledge of the relevant surrounding circumstances that the contract breaker would generally be taken to have had.

  106. (b) Damage falling under the second limb of Hadley v Baxendale (the “Second Limb of Hadley v Baxendale”) may be termed “extraordinary” damage. Such damage is not by its very nature within the reasonable contemplation of contracting parties. Neither does it flow naturally from the breach of contract. Rather, it arises due to special circumstances which are outside the usual course of things. For there to be liability for extraordinary damage, the contract breaker must have had actual knowledge of these special circumstances.

  107. [87] The overarching criterion of the loss being in “reasonable contemplation” applies to both limbs. For the First Limb of Hadley v Baxendale, the horizon of contemplation is confined to loss which arises naturally (ie, in the usual course of things) and which is therefore presumed to have been in the contemplation of parties. For the Second Limb of Hadley v Baxendale, by reason of the actual knowledge possessed by the contract breaker of the special circumstances giving rise to the extraordinary damage, the horizon of contemplation is extended to loss that does not arise in the usual course of things (Robertson Quay at [59]).

  108. Preliminary issue: whether Crescendas’ case on appeal is inconsistent with its case in the proceedings below

  109. [88] Before going into the remoteness analysis proper, a preliminary issue which arises is whether Crescendas’ case on appeal departed from its case in the proceedings below in so far as the remoteness of post-completion net rental revenue loss is concerned. The Judge understood Crescendas as having argued that pre-completion net rental revenue loss constituted ordinary damage but post-completion net rental revenue loss constituted extraordinary damage (see Damages Judgment (HC) at [90] and [97]). However, Crescendas argued before us that the entirety of its claim, for pre- and post-completion net rental revenue loss, constituted ordinary damage. JP pointed out the discrepancy in Crescendas’ position below and on appeal in relation to post-completion net rental revenue loss, and submitted that Crescendas was precluded by the doctrine of approbation and reprobation from submitting that post-completion net rental revenue loss was ordinary damage.

  110. [89] Having reviewed parties’ pleadings and submissions before the Judge, we note that Crescendas’ case, from its statement of claim up to its written closing submissions, was that its entire claim for net rental revenue loss would not be too remote as the entirety of that claim would satisfy either limb of the Hadley v Baxendale rule. Crescendas’ written closing submissions dated 17 May 2021 are particularly significant. There, Crescendas expressly submitted that its post-completion net rental revenue loss satisfied the First Limb of Hadley v Baxendale. It then proceeded to consider the Second Limb of Hadley v Baxendale, but only as an alternative in the event its net rental revenue loss was not within JP’s reasonable contemplation at the time of contracting.

  111. [90] Curiously, however, Crescendas’ written reply submissions to the Judge dated 31 May 2021 suggested that its case was that its pre-completion net rental revenue loss fell within the First Limb of Hadley v Baxendale whilst its post-completion net rental revenue loss fell within the Second Limb of Hadley v Baxendale. Indeed, it was Crescendas’ written reply submissions which led the Judge to the view that Crescendas had proceeded on the basis that pre-completion net rental revenue loss constituted ordinary damage but post-completion net rental revenue loss constituted extraordinary damage.

  112. [91] Oral submissions before the Judge took place on 28 June 2021. Counsel for Crescendas did not clarify the situation. His oral submissions were reconcilable with both its initial case (as enunciated in its pleadings and written closing submissions) as well as what appears to have been its modified case (as suggested in its written reply submissions). No explanation was given for this strange turn of events. Following Crescendas’ oral submissions, counsel for JP in his oral submissions before the Judge on the same day noted that Crescendas’ written reply submissions “now seems to accept that loss … of revenue claim is [extraordinary damage] after [Biopolis 3] was completed”, but caveated that he was unsure if this was the correct interpretation of Crescendas’ case. Unfortunately, counsel for Crescendas did not attempt to clarify the situation in reply oral submissions then.

  113. [92] Having regard to the way in which both sides ran their cases below, we are of the view that Crescendas had carelessly miscommunicated its primary case in its written reply submissions. This mistake only came about after Crescendas had consistently maintained from its pleadings to its written closing submissions that its entire claim (in respect of pre- and post-completion net rental revenue loss) would satisfy either limb of the Hadley v Baxendale rule, and had expressly submitted in its written closing submissions that its post-completion net rental revenue loss satisfied the First Limb of Hadley v Baxendale. As a result, JP had ample opportunity in the proceedings below to meet Crescendas’ case that its post-completion net rental revenue loss satisfied the First Limb of Hadley v Baxendale. In our view, if Crescendas were permitted to argue on appeal, as it did, that its post-completion net rental revenue loss satisfied the First Limb of Hadley v Baxendale, JP would not be prejudiced.

  114. [93] In truth, the only party which had suffered prejudice was Crescendas itself. It had led the Judge into thinking that its primary case was that its post-completion net rental revenue loss was extraordinary damage falling within the Second Limb of Hadley v Baxendale. The Judge then agreed with Crescendas’ “concession” that the post-completion net rental revenue loss fell within the Second Limb of Hadley v Baxendale, and found that Crescendas had not shown that JP had actual knowledge that the delay in completion would cause Crescendas to suffer post-completion net rental revenue loss. The Judge therefore held that Crescendas’ post-completion net rental revenue loss was too remote to be recoverable (Damages Judgment (HC) at [97]).

  115. [94] As mentioned, JP argued that Crescendas was precluded by the doctrine of approbation and reprobation from arguing on appeal that post-completion net rental revenue loss fell within the First Limb of Hadley v Baxendale. We note that the doctrine of approbation and reprobation bars a claimant from running a case on appeal that is inconsistent with its case in the proceedings below, if that claimant had in fact obtained some benefit from its chosen course in the proceedings below (see Recovery Vehicle 1 Pte Ltd v Industries Chimiques Du Senegal and another appeal and another matter [2021] 1 SLR 342 at [100]). JP submitted that Crescendas had obtained a benefit from the wrongful position it had adopted below. However, Crescendas clearly did not benefit from taking the position that its case was that its post-completion net rental revenue loss was extraordinary damage falling within the Second Limb of Hadley v Baxendale. On the contrary, it was JP who obtained the benefit of the Judge’s ruling based on that concession. In our view, the doctrine of approbation and reprobation will not stand in the way of permitting Crescendas to argue in these Appeals that its post-completion net rental revenue loss constitutes ordinary damage for the purposes of the remoteness analysis.

  116. [95] For the above reasons, we allow Crescendas to argue in these Appeals that its post-completion net rental revenue loss satisfied the First Limb of Hadley v Baxendale. Nevertheless, Crescendas deserves to be criticised for its inconsistent positions and for not being immediately candid that its argument on appeal was inconsistent with its written reply submissions below.

  117. Whether Crescendas’ pre- and post-completion net rental revenue loss satisfy the First Limb of Hadley v Baxendale

  118. [96] Before the Judge, JP argued that the loss of net rental revenue is the “most remote” form of loss. It submitted that Crescendas’ entire claim for net rental revenue loss fell within the Second Limb instead of the First Limb of Hadley v Baxendale because this loss did not flow naturally from a breach of contract but arose from circumstances outside of JP’s control, such as Crescendas’ pricing strategy, negotiations between Crescendas and prospective tenants, each prospective tenant’s decision-making calculus, and the global financial crisis back in late 2008. It stressed that JP, a management contractor, was only responsible for building Biopolis 3 and would not be aware of how Crescendas would deal with Biopolis 3 upon completion, what the negotiated rental rates with prospective tenants would be and what the market conditions would be following completion. JP also submitted that loss of profits have been recognised by the courts as extraordinary damage falling within the Second Limb of Hadley v Baxendale. We highlight that before the Judge, JP did not draw a distinction between Crescendas’ pre- and post-completion net rental revenue loss. Its case was that the entirety of Crescendas’ loss of chance claim fell within the Second Limb of Hadley v Baxendale.

  119. [97] Crescendas’ case before the Judge and the Judge’s decision on the issue of remoteness have been canvassed above and we will not repeat these, save to mention that the Judge did not elaborate as to why he concluded that Crescendas’ post-completion net rental revenue loss failed to satisfy the First Limb of Hadley v Baxendale in the light of Crescendas’ apparent concession then.

  120. [99] We are of the view that the two cases cited by JP do not assist it. In PH Hydraulics, the claimant bought a reel drive unit (“RDU”) from the defendant pursuant to a sale and purchase agreement. The defendant breached the agreement by not delivering an RDU that was of merchantable quality and fit for its purpose, and the claimant sought damages in respect of loss of revenue or profit which the RDU would have made over a period of normal utility (ie, 15 years) if it had been properly designed and manufactured. The Court of Appeal in PH Hydraulics at [155] found that this claim for loss of revenue or profit did not fall within the First Limb of Hadley v Baxendale because there was insufficient evidence that the parties knew that the RDU would be rented out by the claimant for its entire period of normal utility. In our view, the Court of Appeal was not setting out or applying a general proposition of law that loss of profits or revenue can never fall within the First Limb of Hadley v Baxendale. It was simply applying rules on remoteness to the evidence before it. Further, in so far as the facts are concerned, the Court of Appeal in PH Hydraulics was dealing with a situation where the breach consisted of a failure to supply a machine of merchantable quality that was fit for purpose, whereas the breach in the case at hand concerns a delay in completing a building which JP must have known would be rented to multiple tenants. The kind of loss that would naturally flow from these two breaches, which are distinctively different in character, would necessarily be different. A factual finding on the issue of remoteness in one does not necessarily apply to the other.

  121. [101] In the course of his analysis, however, Cole J also observed (at 519–521):

  122. [104] On the facts, the pre-completion net rental revenue loss came within the First Limb of Hadley v Baxendale. This was no longer disputed by JP.

  123. [105] We are also of the view that post-completion net rental revenue loss came within the First Limb of Hadley v Baxendale in principle. As will be explained below at [146]–[148], the Combined Delay had a multi-year impact on Crescendas’ net rental revenue stream and caused Crescendas to suffer post-completion net rental revenue loss in the years following the Combined Delay. Briefly, this is because Biopolis 3 was a multi-tenanted development which would have taken several years to fill up, and the lost prospective leases would have been for multi-year terms.

  124. [106] Here, both parties were aware that Biopolis 3 was a multi-tenanted development at the time of contracting. The fact that such a development would take multiple years to fill up was within the reasonable contemplation of parties at the time of contracting, and this is demonstrated by the fact that it is agreed between the parties and their experts that even in the absence of the Combined Delay, the reasonable time taken for Biopolis 3 to reach stabilised occupancy would have been four years (the concept of stabilised occupancy is elaborated below at [114]). In light of this, it must have been within parties’ reasonable contemplation that a considerable delay in completion of Biopolis 3 would disrupt Crescendas’ net rental revenue stream over multiple years, thus giving rise to post-completion net rental revenue loss.

  125. [108] JP argued that the post-completion net rental revenue loss arose from circumstances outside of its knowledge and control, such as the terms of each specific lease, Crescendas’ marketing and pricing strategy and market conditions. Be that as it may, this does not preclude the recoverability of post-completion net rental revenue loss under the First Limb of Hadley v Baxendale. The conventional principle is that the contract breaker will be held liable for the full extent of the loss as long as the type or kind of loss that has occurred was reasonably contemplated at the time of the contract, even if its precise detail or extent were not: Out of the Box at [41]. The circumstances enumerated by JP affect the precise quantum of post-completion net rental revenue loss sustained by Crescendas. The fact that JP could not reasonably contemplate the precise quantum of loss does not take away from the point that post-completion net rental revenue loss, as a category of loss, was within JP’s reasonable contemplation for the reasons given above.

  126. [109] Thus, Crescendas’ entire claim for loss of net rental revenue comes within the First Limb of Hadley v Baxendale and is not too remote to be recoverable. It is therefore not necessary to address Crescendas’ alternative argument about JP’s actual knowledge of the net rental revenue loss Crescendas would suffer if there was a delay in completion.

  127. Issue 3: Quantification of net rental revenue loss

  128. [110] To justify an award of substantial damages, a claimant must satisfy the court as to the fact of damage and its amount. If the claimant satisfies the court on neither, his action will fail, or at the most he will be awarded nominal damages where a right has been infringed: Robertson Quay at [27].

  129. [111] In this case, Crescendas is claiming damages for lost net rental revenue as a result of JP’s delay. It has sought to compute its damages through the following method:

  130. [112] The first step is the most contentious and turns on the issue of whether Crescendas’ loss in net rental revenue should be assessed only with respect to the period of the Combined Delay (which is approximately one year) (ie, the Single-Year Model) or over a longer timeframe spanning a number of years beyond the Combined Delay (ie, the Multi-Year Model).

  131. Sub-issue 1: whether the Single-Year Model or the Multi-Year Model should be used

  132. A comparison of the Single-Year Model and the Multi-Year Model

  133. [113] We begin by comparing the key features of each model.

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