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Grounds publishedDecided 5 Mar 2025
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Singapore International Commercial Court

Pertamina International Marketing & Distribution Pte Ltd v P-H-O-E-N-I-X Petroleum Philippines, Inc (also known as Phoenix Petroleum Philippines, Inc) and another and another matter

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[2025] SGHC(I) 6Case no. Originating Application No 23 of 2023 (Summons No 27 of 2024)8 paragraphs

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Introduction

  2. [2] In summary:

  3. (a) SUM 27 was brought by Udenna to set aside the service of the originating papers in OA 23. I dismissed the application on 27 September 2024 pursuant to the Judgment. Udenna subsequently sought leave in CA/OAS 3/2024 ("OAS 3") from the Court of Appeal to appeal against such dismissal of SUM 27. This was, in turn, dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 27 November 2024: see Udenna Corp v Pertamina International Marketing & Distribution Pte Ltd [2025] 1 SLR 19.

  4. (b) OA 4, SUM 11 and SUM 42: OA 4 was brought by PIMD on 8 March 2024, seeking orders to compel Udenna to withdraw a Comment filed in the Philippines Courts and to obtain a permanent anti-suit injunction restraining Udenna from pursuing, or continuing to pursue, the reliefs sought in the Comment. This Comment was filed by Udenna on 5 February 2024 in the Philippines Court to (i) join P-H-O-E-N-I-X Petroleum Philippines, Inc. ("Phoenix") in Phoenix's application under Civil Case No. RDVO-23-6338-SC (the “Philippines Proceedings") (ii) to declare the Final Award dated 28 November 2023 (Singapore International Arbitration Centre Award No. 145 of 2023) ("Final Award") void; and (ii) to obtain an injunction against PIMD to restrain it from enforcing the Final Award against Udenna.

  5. (d) SUM 42 was Udenna's application in OA 4 to set aside service of the originating papers in OA 4 on similar grounds raised by Udenna in SUM 27. Given the overlap between SUM 27 and SUM 42, SUM 42 was stayed pending the decision in OAS 3.

  6. (e) On 9 January 2025, PIMD notified the Court that the Philippines Proceedings had been discontinued and that the related appeal had also been fully resolved; and that therefore, OA 4 was no longer necessary. The parties agreed by consent to the withdrawal of OA 4 and SUM 42, subject to the Court’s determination on the issues of costs.

  7. [5] This Judgment is delivered following receipt of the parties’ written submissions without an oral hearing.

  8. SUM 27

  9. [9] In response, Udenna submits that the amount claimed is unreasonable and should be reduced to S$100,000. In support of that submission, Udenna makes a number of points as set out below.

  10. (a) I agree with PIMD that the issues in dispute in SUM 27 were complex and novel. No Singapore court had previously decided the question of the effect of the Certificate under the Hague Service Convention, given that Singapore had only recently acceded to the Hague Service Convention. I agree that this would have necessitated extensive research by PIMD into other jurisdictions for relevant cases and commentary which could assist the Court on this issue. Udenna itself acknowledged that the issue was a “question of general principle that [had] not been decided before” in its application for leave to appeal my decision in SUM 27.

  11. (b) A number of foreign law issues, relating to whether service was valid under Philippine law, were put into issue by Udenna in SUM 27. I agree with PIMD that this necessitated the engagement of Philippines counsel to advise on foreign law issues. This, in turn, meant that PIMD’s legal team had to incur costs in liaising with Philippines counsel to instruct counsel and to incorporate these points into PIMD's wider case in SUM 27.

  12. (c) I agree with PIMD that the case advanced by Udenna was unsubstantiated. In large part, Udenna’s case was based on a simple assertion that the service of the originating process in OA 23 was invalid as it was served on an individual who did not have authority to accept service at an address that was not its principal address. Udenna would not have had to expend significant costs in mounting such a case. In contrast, PIMD had to incur significant costs to conduct further investigations. A business intelligence and investigations firm ("JS Held") was engaged by PIMD to assist with verifying the above assertions, incurring substantial costs. Ultimately, JS Held's findings in its first report were relied upon by PIMD and relied upon by the Court in dismissing SUM 27.

  13. [13] Second, Udenna submits that PIMD’s claim for JS Held’s fees should be reduced by 50%, ie, from US$16,690.40 / S$21,697.52 to US$8,345.2 / S$10,848.76. This is on the basis that JS Held’s 1st Report identified the wrong road, which led to JS Held reaching the incorrect conclusion that the building in question did not exist; that when this clear error was brought to PIMD’s attention, it sought permission from the Court to correct this mistake and to file a second expert report resulting in wasted expenses. That there was an error in Mr Vickers’ 1st Report is indisputable and regrettable – but it was not egregious and it arose in the context of the difficult investigations which Mr Vickers carried out which were necessitated by the obstructive position taken by Udenna. The error was corrected as soon as practicable. In these circumstances, I am unpersuaded that the amount claimed should be reduced and, in the exercise of my discretion, I decline to do so.

  14. [14] Third, Udenna submits that the Court should apply a 75% discount to the amounts claimed by PIMD regarding the preparation of Mr Vickers’ and Ms Prodigalidad’s statements – US$19,697.75 / S$25,607.08 – and allow only US$4,991.94 / S$6,401.77. This is on the basis that, according to Udenna, (i) there was a “fundamental error” in Mr Vickers’/JS Held’s 1st Report; and (ii) the amounts claimed based on some 18.6 hours work are excessive. I do not accept that submission. As to (i), I do not propose to repeat what I have already stated in the previous paragraph. As to (ii), I bear well in mind the main point made by Udenna in this context that Ms Prodigalidad’s statement and accompanying materials should have been prepared entirely by Ms Prodigalidad as she were meant to provide an independent expert opinion on Philippine law, and Prolegis was not qualified to practise Philippine law. However, it was plainly necessary and is unsurprising that Prolegis would itself need to spend time in giving appropriate instructions to Ms Prodigalidad and reviewing the materials produced to ensure that they addressed the relevant issues appropriately; and I do not consider that the time spent in so doing was unreasonable or excessive. For these brief reasons, I reject this part of Udenna’s case.

  15. [15] For all these reasons, I would allow the full amount of PIMD’s claim in respect of SUM 27 less S$20,000, ie, S$246,992.33.

  16. OA 4, SUM 11, AND SUM 42

  17. [18] PIMD submits that the position in respect of OA 4 is exactly such a situation, viz, PIMD had filed OA 4 to restrain Udenna from progressing the Comment which was an attempt to impermissibly challenge the validity of the Final Award; the impermissibility of the Comment was recognised (at least on a prima facie basis) by this Court when I granted the interim anti-suit injunction to restrain Udenna from pursuing the reliefs it sought in the Comment; after ORC 14 was granted, the Philippines Proceedings and the Comment were withdrawn by Phoenix and Udenna. PIMD submits that this was precisely the prayer for relief sought in OA 4, ie, that the Comment be withdrawn; that given the withdrawal, an effective “surrender” on the part of Udenna, there was no more application for PIMD to injunct; and that, accordingly, there was no more need for OA 4. PIMD did not pursue OA 4 thereafter – PIMD would have pursued OA 4 had the Philippines Proceedings not been withdrawn.

  18. (a) The parties did not file any substantive response to each other in the three applications: (i) SUM 11 was obtained on an ex parte basis; (ii) PIMD did not file a response to SUM 42; and (iii) the parties did not fully ventilate or engage on their respective positions on OA 4. Shortly after Udenna entered an appearance for OA 4 on 21 August 2024, the proceedings were stayed. Therefore, PIMD did not undertake complex or substantial work in relation to the three applications.

  19. (b) There was also no urgency involved which justified increased costs. PIMD clearly did not consider OA 4 to be urgent: (i) PIMD itself proposed the stay of SUM 42 pending the resolution of SUM 27; and (ii) it had suggested as early as 13 September 2024 in a letter to Court that “OA 4 may no longer be necessary” depending on developments in the Philippines Proceedings.

  20. (c) Much of PIMD’s work for OA 4 would have overlapped with the work done for PIMD’s earlier application for an anti-suit injunction in SIC/OA 1/2024 (“OA 1”) against Phoenix, which was commenced about two months before OA 4. PIMD was awarded costs of S$319,000 for OA 1 and for SUM 21 in OA 23: see Pertamina International Marketing & Distribution Pte Ltd v P-H-O-E-N-I-X Petroleum Philippines, Inc (also known as Phoenix Petroleum Philippines, Inc) and another matter [2024] SGHC(I) 26 at [11]. PIMD itself acknowledges these two applications were similar, but yet has not applied any reduction or discount for the costs of such work. Presumably, therefore, PIMD’s claim for costs would include costs for which it has already been compensated for in OA 1.

  21. [26] In addition, Udenna disputes a number of individual amounts as claimed by PIMD. Udenna made the following contentions:

  22. (a) Stage 1 to 3: Preparation of OA 4 and SUM 11 papers (39.09 hours; S$47,296.28). The matters set out in: (i) the only substantive witness statement which PIMD relied on for OA 4 and SUM 11; (ii) the five-page memorandum from PIMD’s Philippine law expert; and (iii) the 10-page submissions PIMD filed for SUM 11, would have contained a high degree of overlap with the factual matters and legal arguments PIMD relied on in OA 1. PIMD would have already recovered costs for such work. The time costs claimed by PIMD is thus excessive and should be discounted by at least 50% to account for the work in OA 1;

  23. (b) Stage 5: Preparation of filing of originating process in OA 4 to be served out of jurisdiction in accordance with the Hague Convention on Service (9.83 hours; S$10,159.31). PIMD has not furnished an explanation as to why almost 10 hours were required to carry out this largely administrative task. PIMD should be familiar with the process as it would have done so in its previous applications. This should be discounted by 75%.

  24. (c) Stage 6: Reviewing SUM 42 papers (14.21 hours; S$15,261.74). PIMD’s claim is patently excessive given that it sought a stay for SUM 42 (which it obtained) just five days after it was filed and thus could not have incurred significant costs in reviewing it. The stay meant that PIMD did not file a response in SUM 42. This item should be discounted by 75%.

  25. (d) Stage 7: Preparing and advising client on costs proposal (12.43 hours; S$12,162.02). PIMD’s claim for this item is grossly disproportionate. PIMD only sent Udenna two short letters with its costs proposal – the latter was simply to inform Udenna that it would seek the Court’s directions on costs. This item should be discounted by 75%.

  26. Conclusion