Singapore International Commercial Court · Decided 11 March 2025
Marketlend Pty Ltd and another v QBE Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd
Feedback & support[2025] SGHC(I) 8 · Case no. Originating Application No 16 of 2023 · 6 paragraphs
✱ What happened, in plain English
There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.
Ask about this judgment →Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
- [4]
[4] In summary the defendant claims a total of S$2,616,897.26 broken down as follows:
(a) Pre-Transfer: S$232,747.87 being S$206,127.99 in costs including GST (reflecting 75% of its legal fees) and reasonable disbursements amounting to S$26,619.88.
(b) Post-Transfer: S$2,348,149.39 being S$1,642,965.52 in costs including GST (reflecting 100% of its legal fees) and reasonable disbursements amounting to S$705,183.87.
(c) S$36,000 for the preparation of its costs submissions.
(a) Pre-transfer costs: S$35,000.
(b) Post-transfer costs and disbursements: S$1,141,563.66.
(c) Costs of the claimants’ submissions on costs to be in the cause, fixed at S$10,000.
Pre-Transfer Costs
- [7]
[7] As to the applicable principles pre-transfer, the defendant submits in summary as follows:
(b) The successful party is entitled to “a reasonable amount in respect of all costs reasonably incurred”: O 21 r 22(2) of the ROC.
(c) In exercising its power to fix or assess costs, the Court must have regard to all relevant circumstances, including the following (O 21 r 2(2) of the ROC): efforts made by the parties at amicable resolution; complexity of the case and the difficulty or novelty of the questions involved; the skill, specialised knowledge and responsibility required of, and the time and labour expended by, the solicitor; the urgency and importance of the action to the parties; the conduct of the parties; the principle of proportionality; and the stage at which the proceedings were concluded.
(d) Whether costs are a reasonable amount is also assessed objectively by considering whether the overall amount is in line with the level of costs “generally accepted as being likely to be incurred for the particular type of dispute”. The Court is therefore also guided by costs precedents and the Costs Guidelines in Appendix G of the Supreme Court Practice Directions (“Appendix G”): see DBX and DBY v DBZ [2024] SGHC(I) 5 (“DBX”) at [6].
(e) The objective standard is used for pre-transfer costs because costs awarded under O 21 of the ROC are assessed “at such a level as would enable a litigant with reasonable merits to pursue justice”, and are “shaped by the normative question of what ought to be the amount of costs a successful party can recover for the particular work done in the context of the dispute in question…” [emphasis in original]: DBX at [5].
(f) The guidelines in Appendix G “represent the level of fees which members of the public and the legal profession would generally accept as reasonable … But these are guides only, and the court may depart from Appendix G or apply an uplift if, guided by the factors in O 21 r 2(2), the circumstances of the case so warrant” [emphasis added]: DBX at [6].
(g) The regard to costs precedents “tends to awarding the same levels of costs in similar or comparable cases” [emphasis added]: DBX at [6].
(a) The defendant prevailed on most of its defences, and the claimants’ claim was fully dismissed. The defences on which the defendant did not prevail, ie, the challenge to Marketlend’s standing under the Power of Attorney, and avoidance based on Novita’s non-disclosure of Fidelity’s insolvency, were not very factually or legally complicated.
(b) The parties attempted mediation in good faith after the close of pleadings but were unable to bridge their differences.
(c) The Suit led to the first judgment on trade credit insurance in Singapore and engaged questions of broader significance, including not only questions on the scope of trade credit insurance coverage, but also the nature of pre- and post-contract disclosures, and the insured’s obligations of cooperation in relation to claims thereunder. All of these were untested questions under Singapore law. There is no suitable costs precedent given the novelty of the case.
(d) The need for reconstruction of the actual sales chains for the underlying goods which Novita was alleged to have traded required specialised knowledge of industry practice of the ways in which different commodities can be traded. Further, considerable time and labour was expended by the solicitors in making various queries to identify the relevant parties that actually traded the goods and elicit responses from them. This intensive reconstruction exercise was underway from the time that the Suit commenced. The number of solicitors at any point was generally three, save for brief periods reflecting changes in the legal team with departures of employees. The number of solicitors is identical to the claimants’ legal team of three lawyers, which is commensurate with the nature and complexity of the matter.
(e) The Suit was of critical importance to the defendant, a factor which should also guide the proportionality of costs. Quite apart from the claim value of around US$9m, the Suit was the first among four then ongoing trade credit insurance litigations that companies in the defendant’s corporate group were facing to have gone to trial. This made the Suit a critical test case for the defendant. The other ongoing litigations include a Malaysian suit that the claimants commenced against the defendant’s sister company in December 2022. That suit concerns claims made under an identically worded trade credit insurance policy and has a claim value in excess of US$9m. The two other ongoing litigations are against the defendant in the High Court of Singapore. Like the Suit, they also relate to claims under trade credit insurance policies by financiers in relation to alleged trades conducted by their borrowers; and have a cumulative claim value in excess of US$13m.
(f) There is nothing in the defendant’s pre-transfer conduct that is open to question. The claimants, on the other hand, provided general disclosure with documents which were not organised chronologically, were impossible to tally with their list of documents, omitted a number of attachments (in case of emails), and had attachments which could not be correlated with their cover emails. Instead of rectifying all these issues, the first claimant engaged in various rounds of correspondence with the defendant defending its position and/or providing partial rectifications, before it was directed by the court on 15 September 2023 to file a revised list of documents with all email attachments corresponding with their cover emails. This delayed the defendant’s review of the documents and specific disclosure.
(g) The circumstances of the case set out above justify a departure from Appendix G. Paragraph 3 of Appendix G expressly states that the precise amount of costs awarded remains in the Court’s discretion and the Court may depart from the guidelines in Appendix G depending on the particular circumstances of each case. In Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd and others v Yeo Boong Hua and others and another appeal [2019] 1 SLR 214, the Court of Appeal departed from Appendix G in light of the complexity of the appeals (which engaged a contentious area of law), the fact that the appeals involved three rounds of submissions, and the number of appellants involved (at [28]−[29]). The test nature of this case on a number of issues and the critical need for extensive non-party evidence in particular justify a departure from Appendix G. Appendix G provides a range of S$25,000–70,000 for pre-trial work. Considering that some pre-trial work was conducted after the transfer of the Suit to the SICC, costs of S$50,000 with a multiplier of four should be used to assess the defendant’s pre-transfer costs. The resultant figure of S$200,000 is close to 75% of the defendant’s pre-transfer legal costs of S$206,127.99.
- [13]
[13] Third, the claimants dispute that the case involved any special features which might justify an uplift. In particular, the claimants submit that the case did not involve any novel points involving untested questions of Singapore law; that the Suit was neither of critical importance nor served as a test case; and that, in any event, there is no principled reason why the claimants should be made to subsidise the defendant's defence(s) in other litigation.
- [14]
[14] In considering these rival submissions, I bear in mind that, as stated above, Appendix G remains the starting point and that, although the range specified in Appendix G is only a guideline and the court has a discretion to allow an uplift in appropriate circumstances, the burden lies squarely on the defendant to show that such departure is warranted.
- [16]
[16] In my view, the defendant is on much stronger ground having regard to the fact that although the claim is presented by the claimants as one which was relatively simple, this is obviously not so because the defendant was facing a suit which was, as I have held, based upon a series of fictitious trades. This required careful investigation of matters which were entirely outside the defendant’s knowledge. For that reason, it seems to me that, at least so far as the defendant is concerned, the present case was very much out of the norm.
Post-transfer costs
(a) The defendant’s applications for disclosure from and interrogatories against non-parties (ie, SIC/SUM 5/2023 (“SUM 5”) and SIC/SUM 32/2023 (“SUM 32”)), and its applications to have non-party evidence admitted (ie, SIC/SUM 43/2023 (“SUM 43”), SIC/SUM 45/2023 (“SUM 45”) and SIC/SUM 47/2023 (“SUM 47”)), entailed extensive work.
(c) At an early stage, it made sense to cast the net wide and seek orders against as many parties as possible to reconstruct any potential sales chain. In interests of proportionality however, over time, the defendant narrowed down the trades.
(d) The applications to admit evidence from non-parties (ie, SUM 43 and 47) entailed complex legal issues, and strategic planning with evidence being led of the attempts to seek the attendance of non-party witnesses. This included the defendant’s application seeking permission to adduce evidence from non-parties out of jurisdiction by video link pursuant to the Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, again requiring advice from and coordination with foreign counsel from six jurisdictions. Domestically, the defendant also subpoenaed Viant’s Ms Samantha Lim. The defendant kept the claimant apprised of evidence from non-parties, even though the formal admission of such evidence took place, as is customarily the case, during the trial. The timing of non-party witness statements was however out of the defendant’s hands.
(e) The defendant conducted the case efficiently, whilst attempting its best to preserve the timetable despite the claimants’ delays in filing witness statements and preparation of hearing bundles (with which the defendant lent considerable assistance); its eleventh-hour application to recuse me from hearing the case (which I rejected on the first day of the trial); and a further last-minute application made during the trial to admit evidence.
(f) The proceedings only concluded after a trial, with the defendant leading witness evidence from four lay witnesses, five non-parties, and (further to the parties’ express agreement) three expert witnesses.
- [24]
[24] First, the claimants submit that account should be taken of the fact that the defendant did not prevail in all of its defences. In particular, the defendant failed in their defences in relation to standing and avoidance based on Novita's non-disclosure of Fidelity's insolvency. In principle, I agree that account can and should be taken of these matters. However, in the overall scheme of the litigation, these points were relatively minor.
(a) 50% of the defendant's legal fees to be awarded, being S$821,482.76;
(b) 40% of its fees incurred on experts to be awarded, being S$183,651.37; and
(c) 100% of the fees incurred by J S Held billed as disbursements to be excluded, being S$109,625.91.
In addition, the claimants confirm that they do not dispute the other disbursements post-transfer (eg, the lay witness travel and accommodation costs, e-litigation fees etc.). This brings the total post-transfer costs claim to S$1,141,563.66 (comprising of S$821,482.76 in legal fees and S$320,080.90 in disbursements).
(a) the fact that, as I have stated at least so far as the defendant is concerned, the present case falls outside of the norm in that the defendant had no knowledge itself of the circumstances giving rise to the claim and thus was required to carry out intensive investigations with third parties to try to piece together a rather difficult jigsaw;
(b) the original insured, Novita, did not participate in the trial and was obstructive almost from the outset. The result was that documents that one might normally have expected to have been provided at least on discovery if not before were never provided to the defendant. Indeed, the failure to provide such documents was one of the grounds which resulted in the dismissal of the Suit;
(c) the amounts claimed by the defendant are very large indeed. Where the amounts involved are relatively small, it is much easier for the Court to make an appropriate estimate or, at the very least, identify an appropriate ballpark or range;
(d) although the claimants have (as referred to above) pointed to a number of individual items of costs which seem, on their face, unreasonably high, there has been no attempt by the claimants to provide a comprehensive (or at least more extensive) analysis; and
(e) the claimants have not provided any figure(s) for their own costs which might have provided some basis of comparison with regard to the reasonableness of the costs claimed by the defendant.
(a) Stage 4: Case Management Conferences (“CMC”)/Interlocutory hearings
(i) Sum claimed: S$462,507 plus GST
(ii) Sum allowed: S$437,146 plus GST
Reasons: Given the explanations provided by the defendant with regard to the non-party disclosure applications (SUM 5 and SUM 32), the application seeking to adduce evidence by video link (SUM 45) and the application to admit evidence from non-party witnesses (SUM 43 and SUM 47), I would allow the sums claimed in respect of these items in full as well as the amounts claimed for preparation, attendance at and follow ups from case conferences and/or interlocutory hearings and considering/dealing with SUM 17. However, I am unpersuaded that the amount claimed in respect of preparation of the Pre-Case Conference Questionnaire (S$50,721.87 plus GST) is reasonable. I would allow 50% of that item.
(b) Stage 5: Disclosure
(i) Sum claimed: S$34,605 plus GST
(ii) Sum allowed: S$34,605 plus GST
Reasons: The sum claimed appears reasonable in the circumstances.
(c) Stage 6: Witness Statements
(i) Sum claimed: S$175,523 plus GST
(ii) Sum allowed: S$150,000 plus GST
Reasons: The sum claimed is a single global figure which is stated to include costs in respect of the statement of Mr Vickers and many other witnesses. For the reasons given by the claimants and summarised above, I agree that the costs incurred by the defendant’s counsel in assisting with the preparation of Mr Vickers’ statement should be reduced. The difficulty is that the defendant’s costs schedule does not specify what those particular costs were but given the size of Mr Vickers’ witness statement (4220 pages), it is reasonable to assume that such costs would not be insignificant. The sum allowed is my best attempt to take account of that factor. I would allow 100% of the other costs included in the total figure and claimed under this head.
(d) Stage 7: Expert Evidence
(i) Sum claimed: S$192,757 plus GST
(ii) Sum allowed: S$25,000 plus GST
Reasons: in my view, much of the expert evidence adduced by the defendant was inadmissible or irrelevant.
(e) Stage 8: Preparation for Trial:
(i) Sum claimed: S$394,624 plus GST
(ii) Sum allowed: S$250,000 plus GST
Reasons: I have no doubt that this was an important case involving a significant sum of money which required careful and intensive preparation in advance of the trial including preparation of the opening written submissions. However, the sum claimed seems to me unreasonably high given that, at the rates charged by the respective lawyers, the amounts claimed represent approximately 160 hours for Mr Bhinder, 350 hours for Ms Kaur and 110 hours for Mr Vedam. From the information provided by the defendant, it is impossible to know how much of that time was spent considering the evidence of Mr Vickers or the expert evidence much of which was, as I have said, inadmissible or irrelevant. However, doing the best I can, it seems to me that a reasonable figure to allow for costs under this head would be as stated above.
(f) Stage 9: Trial attendance
(i) Sum claimed: S$249,734 plus GST
(ii) Sum allowed: S$150,000 plus GST
Reasons: This was a seven-day trial spread over two weeks. I recognise that attendance by counsel at trial requires intense work and often involves long hours. Even so, I find it difficult to understand how the figures for the defendant’s counsel as set out in the costs schedule have been calculated. On the basis of those figures, it would seem that during this period, Mr Bhinder and Ms Kaur each worked in excess of 130 hours. On any view, that seems a very large figure over a relatively short period. At the very least, the figures claimed are, in my view, unreasonable and should be discounted having regard to the points already mentioned − in particular that: (a) the defendant’s definition of “genuine physical trade” gave rise to confusion; (b) the evidence concerning the Sujana trades was ultimately unnecessary and irrelevant; and (c) much of the expert evidence was inadmissible or irrelevant − all of which caused wasted time and effort. In my view, having regard to the nature of the issues arising, a reasonable figure for attendance of the defendant’s three counsel at trial is as set out above.
Conclusion
(a) Pre-Transfer: S$100,000
(b) Post-Transfer: S$1,366,831.90
Annex: Summary of sums awarded